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8 Itagaki

①??

Extracts from Interrogation of DOIHARA, General Kenji --
12 February 1946

Page 7

- Q. Did General ITAGAKI have anything to do with it?
A. Colonel ITAGAKI was the Chief of the Second Section of the General Staff.
- Q. Well, did he have anything to do with sending you to Tientsin?
A. Yes, order to proceed to Tientsin was issued by General HONJO, the Chief. However, details as to my meeting with Pu-yi at Tientsin was arranged by Colonel ITAGAKI.
- Q. What was Colonel ITAGAKI's order, do you remember?
A. In substance, my instruction was to convey to Pu-yi that should he return to Manchuria the Kwantung Army would welcome his return, and, next, he arranged for my transportation and expenses, etc.

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Entry from Marquis KIDO's Diary, 11 Jan '32

At 10.30 this morning in the antechamber of the lecture hall of the Imperial Palace, I, together with persons close to the Emperor, heard from Colonel Itagaki, staff officer of the Kwantung Army, concerning suppression of bandits in Manchuria and Mongolia. Colonel Itagaki first explained the situation regarding the progress of the campaign against soldier bandit forces in Manchuria and Mongolia as well as the progress in establishing a new state in Manchuria, etc.

Regarding the establishment of a new state, Colonel Itagaki hinted that Manchuria would be placed under a new ruler, Emperor HSUAN TUNG and the Japanese Army would take charge of a national defense of the new Manchurian state.

Colonel Itagaki further explained that Japanese people would participate in the management of the new state as high government officials and such Japanese becoming Manchurian officials would become Manchurian subject. Under such circumstances, Colonel Itagaki further said that they are now studying regulations concerning naturalization and dual certificate of nationality. Hearing this from Itagaki I was astonished to find that there was such a wide difference between our ideas and theirs.

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
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CARTE N° 1.



INDEX DES NOMS DE LIEUX.

République de Chine.

Année	Noms	Année	Noms	Année	Noms
1912	Beiping	1912	Shanghai	1912	Shanghai
1913	Chongking	1913	Chongking	1913	Chongking
1914	Chongking	1914	Chongking	1914	Chongking
1915	Chongking	1915	Chongking	1915	Chongking
1916	Chongking	1916	Chongking	1916	Chongking
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1918	Chongking	1918	Chongking	1918	Chongking
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1930	Chongking	1930	Chongking	1930	Chongking
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1934	Chongking	1934	Chongking	1934	Chongking
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1939	Chongking	1939	Chongking	1939	Chongking
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1945	Chongking	1945	Chongking	1945	Chongking
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1947	Chongking	1947	Chongking	1947	Chongking
1948	Chongking	1948	Chongking	1948	Chongking
1949	Chongking	1949	Chongking	1949	Chongking
1950	Chongking	1950	Chongking	1950	Chongking

Empire Japonais.

Année	Noms	Année	Noms	Année	Noms
1912	Manchurie	1912	Manchurie	1912	Manchurie
1913	Manchurie	1913	Manchurie	1913	Manchurie
1914	Manchurie	1914	Manchurie	1914	Manchurie
1915	Manchurie	1915	Manchurie	1915	Manchurie
1916	Manchurie	1916	Manchurie	1916	Manchurie
1917	Manchurie	1917	Manchurie	1917	Manchurie
1918	Manchurie	1918	Manchurie	1918	Manchurie
1919	Manchurie	1919	Manchurie	1919	Manchurie
1920	Manchurie	1920	Manchurie	1920	Manchurie
1921	Manchurie	1921	Manchurie	1921	Manchurie
1922	Manchurie	1922	Manchurie	1922	Manchurie
1923	Manchurie	1923	Manchurie	1923	Manchurie
1924	Manchurie	1924	Manchurie	1924	Manchurie
1925	Manchurie	1925	Manchurie	1925	Manchurie
1926	Manchurie	1926	Manchurie	1926	Manchurie
1927	Manchurie	1927	Manchurie	1927	Manchurie
1928	Manchurie	1928	Manchurie	1928	Manchurie
1929	Manchurie	1929	Manchurie	1929	Manchurie
1930	Manchurie	1930	Manchurie	1930	Manchurie
1931	Manchurie	1931	Manchurie	1931	Manchurie
1932	Manchurie	1932	Manchurie	1932	Manchurie
1933	Manchurie	1933	Manchurie	1933	Manchurie
1934	Manchurie	1934	Manchurie	1934	Manchurie
1935	Manchurie	1935	Manchurie	1935	Manchurie
1936	Manchurie	1936	Manchurie	1936	Manchurie
1937	Manchurie	1937	Manchurie	1937	Manchurie
1938	Manchurie	1938	Manchurie	1938	Manchurie
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1941	Manchurie	1941	Manchurie	1941	Manchurie
1942	Manchurie	1942	Manchurie	1942	Manchurie
1943	Manchurie	1943	Manchurie	1943	Manchurie
1944	Manchurie	1944	Manchurie	1944	Manchurie
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1946	Manchurie	1946	Manchurie	1946	Manchurie
1947	Manchurie	1947	Manchurie	1947	Manchurie
1948	Manchurie	1948	Manchurie	1948	Manchurie
1949	Manchurie	1949	Manchurie	1949	Manchurie
1950	Manchurie	1950	Manchurie	1950	Manchurie

Régions Ignitropes.

Année	Noms	Année	Noms	Année	Noms
1912	Hankow	1912	Hankow	1912	Hankow
1913	Hankow	1913	Hankow	1913	Hankow
1914	Hankow	1914	Hankow	1914	Hankow
1915	Hankow	1915	Hankow	1915	Hankow
1916	Hankow	1916	Hankow	1916	Hankow
1917	Hankow	1917	Hankow	1917	Hankow
1918	Hankow	1918	Hankow	1918	Hankow
1919	Hankow	1919	Hankow	1919	Hankow
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1921	Hankow	1921	Hankow	1921	Hankow
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1923	Hankow	1923	Hankow	1923	Hankow
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1926	Hankow	1926	Hankow	1926	Hankow
1927	Hankow	1927	Hankow	1927	Hankow
1928	Hankow	1928	Hankow	1928	Hankow
1929	Hankow	1929	Hankow	1929	Hankow
1930	Hankow	1930	Hankow	1930	Hankow
1931	Hankow	1931	Hankow	1931	Hankow
1932	Hankow	1932	Hankow	1932	Hankow
1933	Hankow	1933	Hankow	1933	Hankow
1934	Hankow	1934	Hankow	1934	Hankow
1935	Hankow	1935	Hankow	1935	Hankow
1936	Hankow	1936	Hankow	1936	Hankow
1937	Hankow	1937	Hankow	1937	Hankow
1938	Hankow	1938	Hankow	1938	Hankow
1939	Hankow	1939	Hankow	1939	Hankow
1940	Hankow	1940	Hankow	1940	Hankow
1941	Hankow	1941	Hankow	1941	Hankow
1942	Hankow	1942	Hankow	1942	Hankow
1943	Hankow	1943	Hankow	1943	Hankow
1944	Hankow	1944	Hankow	1944	Hankow
1945	Hankow	1945	Hankow	1945	Hankow
1946	Hankow	1946	Hankow	1946	Hankow
1947	Hankow	1947	Hankow	1947	Hankow
1948	Hankow	1948	Hankow	1948	Hankow
1949	Hankow	1949	Hankow	1949	Hankow
1950	Hankow	1950	Hankow	1950	Hankow

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CHINE POLITIQUE
 MANCHOUURIE

Scale: 1:1,000,000

Legend:

- Railway
- Road
- River
- Canal
- Boundary


Table with columns for names in Chinese, French, and Japanese, along with numerical values. The table is organized into sections, possibly representing different administrative divisions or provinces.

Chinese Name	French Name	Japanese Name	Value
Harbin	Harbin	ハルビン	100
Qiqihar	Qiqihar	チチハル	80
Changhai	Changhai	長春	120
...



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LÉGENDE

ABBREVIATIONS

Approx	Approximation	Qg	Quartier général
Arm	Armée	Inf	Infanterie
Arts	Artillerie	Kw	Kwantung
Cas	Caserne	Mit	Mitrailleuses
Bn	Bataillon	Mix	Mixte
Brig	Brigade	NE	Nord-Est
Cav	Cavalerie	Prov	Provisoire
Co	Compagnie	Reclam	Reclamation
Corps	Corps	Sec	Services
Def	Défense	Tr	A l'entraînement
Det	Détachement		
Div	Division		
Front	Frontière		
Gr	Garde		

COULEURS

Chinois	—
Japonais	—

SYMBLES


Unités, armes, etc.	Lignes (indiquant les emplacements occupés, les zones assignées aux unités, etc.)
Patrouille	Brigade
Petit détachement	Division
Compagnie	Armée
Bataillon	Zone ou unité mixte
Régiment	Troupes japonaises
Brigade	Antérieures troupes chinoises japonaises
Division	Troupes régulières chinoises
Armée	(y compris les troupes provinciales avant le 18 septembre)
Quartier général	Troupes provinciales chinoises après le 18 septembre
Unité mixte	Volontaires, bandits, etc.
Infanterie	Direction de l'attaque
Cavalerie	
Artillerie	
Air	
Unité indépendante de garde des chemins de fer	
Chemins de fer gardés par des gardes indépendants	
Arme mixte	

DIVISION MILITAIRE DE MANDCHOU
 Situation avant le 12 septembre 1937
 Echelle 1:200,000
 Révisé pour le Rapport de la Commission d'Enquête des Nations Unies
 Août 1952

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CARTE N° 6
(Voir Rapport, pages 73 à 77.)



LÉGENDE

ABBREVIATIONS.

Approx	Approximation	Hq	Quartier général
Arm	Armée	Inf	Infanterie
Arty	Artillerie	kw	Issuing-plant
Bka	Batterie	Mb	Mitralseuses
Bn	Bataillon	Mxd	Mitr
Brig	Brigade	NE	Nor-Est
Cav	Cavalerie	Trcs	Trcs
Co	Compagnie	Trcs	Travaux
Cpa	Corps	Trcliam	Trésorier
Def	Défense	Hy-Ltd	Gares de chemins de fer indépendants
Det	Détachement	Regt	Régiment
Div	Division	Sers	Services
Front	Frontière	Tr	A-Traitements
Gal	Grade		

COULEURS


Chinois
Japonais

SYMBOLES.

Unités, zones, etc.	Lignes indiquant les emplacements occupés, les zones assignées aux unités, etc.
Patrouille	Brigade
Post. détachement	Division
Compagnie	Armée
Bataillon	Arme ou unité mixte
Régiment	Troupes japonaises
Brigade	Anciennes troupes chinoises japonaises
Division	Troupes régulières chinoises
Armée	... compris les troupes provinciales avant le 18 septembre
Quartier général	Troupes provinciales chinoises après le 18 septembre
Unité mixte	Volontaires, lanciers, etc.
Infanterie	Direction de l'attaque
Cavalerie	
Artillerie	
Armée	
Unité indépendante de garde des chemins de fer	
Chemins de fer gardés par des unités indépendantes	
Arme mixte	


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CARTE N° 1.
(Voir Rapport, page 82.)



SITUATION MILITAIRE EN MANDCHOURIE
 Situation vers le 30 septembre 1931
 (date de la première résolution du Conseil)
 Echelle 1 : 800 000
 Préparée pour le Rapport de la Commission d'enquête de la Société des Nations
 (Résolution de l'Assemblée Générale du 24 septembre 1931)
 Août 1932

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LÉGENDE

ABBREVIATIONS

Approx	Approximation	Q.G.	Quartier général
Art	Artillerie	Inf	Infanterie
Arts	Artillerie	Inf	Infanterie
Bas	Caserne	Inf	Infanterie
Bn	Bataillon	Mix	Mixte
Brig	Brigade	NE	Nord-Est
Cav	Cavalerie	Prov	Province
Co	Campagne	Reclam	Réclamation
Corps	Corps	Ry. Gt.	Gardes de chemins de fer indépendants
Det	Détachement	Regt	Régiment
Div	Division	Serv	Services
Front	Frontière	Tr	A l'entraînement
Gd	Garde		

COULEURS

Chinois	_____
Japonais	_____
Européen	_____

SYMBOLES

Points, cercles, etc.	Lignes (indiquant les emplacements occupés, les zones occupées, etc.)
Patrouille	Brigade
Détachement	Division
Campagne	Armée
Bataillon	Arme ou unité locale
Régiment	Troupes japonaises
Brigade	Anciennes troupes chinoises japonaises
Division	Troupes régulières chinoises
Armée	(y compris les troupes volontaires avant le 18 septembre)
Quartier général	Troupes provinciales chinoises après le 18 septembre
Unité mixte	Volontaires, policiers, etc.
Infanterie	Direction de l'Empire
Cavalerie	
Artillerie	
Ar	
Unité indépendante de garde des chemins de fer	
Division sur les gardes par des unités indépendantes	
Arme mixte	


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CARTE N° 8.
(Voir Rapport, page 84.)

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外務省



SITUATION MILITAIRE EN MANDCHOURIE

Situation le 15 décembre 1931
(Date de la dernière réaction du C. E. C.)
Echelle 1:2.000.000
Préparé pour le Rapport de la Commission mixte de la Société des Nations
Août 1932

LÉGENDE

ABRÉVIATIONS

Aprox.	Approximation	Hq	Headquarters
Arm.	Armée	Inf	Infantry
Art.	Artillerie	Kw	Quartiers
Av.	Aviation	Ma	Mines
B.	Bataillon	Md	Mines
C.	Compagnie	Nl	Navy
D.	Détachement	Pres	Press
E.	Escadron	Prov	Province
G.	Garde	Redab	Redoubt
L.	Ligne	Ry. Col	Railway Colonel
M.	Mine	Stgt	Station
N.	Navigable	Serv	Service
R.	Rivière	Tr	Tramway

COULEURS

Chinois
Japonais

SYMBOLES


Partout	Brigade
Détachement	Division
Compagnie	Armée
Bataillon	Armée
Escadron	Troupes
Compagnie	Armée
Escadron	Troupes
Armée	Troupes
Quartier-général	Troupes
Trappe	Troupes
Trappe	Troupes
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(Voir Rapport, page 86.)

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LÉGENDE

ABBREVIATIONS

Approx	Approximation	Hq	Quartier général
Arm	Armée	Inf	Infanterie
Art	Artillerie	Kw	Kwantung
Ch	Chemin	M	Mitrailleuses
Col	Colonne	Mad	Monte
Div	Division	NE	Nord-Est
Esc	Escadron	Pl	Plat
Gen	Général	Pr	Prisonnier
Gr	Grande	Reclam	Reclutement
Inf	Infanterie	St. Ind	Stations de chemins de fer indépendants
Int	Intérieur	Regt	Régiment
Log	Logistique	Ser	Services
Ma	Maître	Tr	À l'entraînement

COULEURS


Vert	Occupé	-----
Rouge	Libre	-----

SYMBOLES

-----	Troncs, lignes, etc.	-----	Lignes indiquant les emplacements occupés, les zones assignées aux unités, etc.
-----	Troncs	-----	Troncs
-----	Troncs occupés	-----	Troncs occupés
-----	Troncs libres	-----	Troncs libres
-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises	-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises
-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes chinoises	-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes chinoises
-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises et chinoises	-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises et chinoises
-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises, chinoises, et autres	-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises, chinoises, et autres
-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises, chinoises, et autres, et les troupes japonaises	-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises, chinoises, et autres, et les troupes japonaises
-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises, chinoises, et autres, et les troupes japonaises, et les troupes chinoises	-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises, chinoises, et autres, et les troupes japonaises, et les troupes chinoises
-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises, chinoises, et autres, et les troupes japonaises, et les troupes chinoises, et les troupes japonaises	-----	Troncs occupés par les troupes japonaises, chinoises, et autres, et les troupes japonaises, et les troupes chinoises, et les troupes japonaises

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MANDCHOURIE

Echelle : 1:400,000

Projeté pour le Rapport de la Commission d'étude de la Société des Nations

Mandchourie et Corée au date du 15 octobre 1919

LEGÈND

Table with columns for road types and codes. It lists various road categories like 'Ligne à traverser', 'Ligne de chemin de fer', and 'Ligne de chemin de fer à vapeur', along with their corresponding symbols and codes.


Detailed legend table with columns for 'Nom', 'Code', and 'Description'. It lists specific road types such as 'Chemin de fer à vapeur', 'Chemin de fer électrique', and 'Chemin de fer à traction animale', along with their symbols and codes.

Notes and explanatory text at the bottom of the legend, providing details about the symbols and codes used in the map.



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SITUATION MILITAIRE EN MANDCHOURIE
 Situation vers le 1er mai 1932
 (état de l'équipement primaire de la Commission)
 Echelle 1:1.000.000
 Préparé pour le Rapport de la Commission de l'Armée de la Société des Nations
 Révisé le 1er mai 1932

LÉGENDE

ABBREVIATION

Approx	Approximation	Hq	Quartier général
Arm	Armée	Inf	Infanterie
Art	Artillerie	Kw	Kwantung
Cas	Caserne	Mi	Mitrailleuses
Bn	Bataillon	Mix	Mixte
Brig	Brigade	NE	Nord-Est
Cav	Cavalerie	Pre	Prés
Co	Compagnie	Pro	Provisoire
Corps	Corps	Rec	Reconnaissance
Def	Défense	Ry	Garde de chemins de fer indépendants
Det	Détachement	Regt	Régiment
Div	Division	Serv	Services
Front	Frontière	Tr	À l'entraînement
Gd	Garde		

COULEURS

Chinois —————
 Japonais —————

SYMBÔLES

<i>Unités, armes, etc.</i>	<i>Loges indiquant les emplacements occupés, les zones assignées aux unités, etc.</i>
Patrouille	Brigades
Petit détachement	Divisions
Compagnie	Armées
Bataillon	Armées ou unités mixtes
Régiment	Troupes japonaises
Brigade	Armées, troupes chinoises provisoires
Division	Japonaises
Armée	Troupes régulières chinoises
Quartier général	(à compter des troupes provinciales avant le 18 septembre)
Unité mixte	Troupes provinciales chinoises après le 18 septembre
Infanterie	Voies ferrées, bandes, etc.
Cavalerie	Direction de l'attaque
Artillerie	
Armée indépendante de garde des chemins de fer	
Chemins de fer gardés par des gardes indépendants	
Armée mixte	

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CARTE POLITIQUE DE LA MANDCHOURIE

Echelle 1:400,000

Préparé pour le Rapport de la Commission d'Enquête de la Société des Nations

Mars 1922



1:220 7-30

Les trois Provinces de l'Est

Table with 4 columns: Province, Name, Area, and Population. Lists provinces like Heilungkiang, Chahar, and Jehol with their respective administrative divisions.

Régions limitrophes

Table with 4 columns: Region, Name, Area, and Population. Lists neighboring regions like Mongolia, Chosen, and Korea.

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)
- AGAINST -)
ALAKI, SADA0, et al)

A F F I D A V I T

I, KASAGI, Ryomei, make oath and say as follows:

I was born in 1892 in Techigi-Ken Prefecture, Asio. After attending elementary and middle schools, I entered the Imperial University, from which I graduated in 1919.

Shortly after graduating, I entered the employ of the Manchurian Iron Works, and was assigned to their branch in the Marunouchi Building in Tokyo in the Finance Investigation office. I was employed in this capacity from 1919 to 1929. My superior officers in charge of the department in which I worked were Dr. OKAWA, Shumei, and NAKAO, head of the office.

Dr. OKAWA organized the Gyo Chi Sha in about 1923, and was the leader of this organization of which I became a member. Because I disagreed with some of its principles, I resigned in 1928, but the organization was still in existence when I left Tokyo in 1929.

The Gyo Chi Sha was a nationalistic organization that was organized to study and try to improve the relationship between Japan and the other countries in Asia and to reform the government in Japan, also to promote the idea that Japan was destined to be the leader of East Asia, and that the members should do all that they could to foster and develop the advancement of Japan's prestige and influence.

Dr. OKAWA made some speeches before this organization advocating these principles, and on one occasion at least, stated that Japan should help India obtain its independence.

One of the most influential members of the organization was Professor KINOKOGI, Kazunobu.

Since I desired a promotion and wanted to leave Tokyo, I was sent to Darin, Manchuria, to work for the South Manchuria Railway Company, which was one of the principal owners of the Manchurian Iron Works. My work in Darin, however, was largely with the South Manchuria Railway where I was in charge of personnel which dealt with the employment, welfare and pension provisions for the entire railway system.

In May 1930, I organized and was head of the Yu Wo Kei, which was an organization composed of about thirty to forty Japanese members, largely men who were employed by the South Manchuria Railway Company. One exception was NAKANO, Koitsu, a Japanese lawyer who then held offices in Darin and Akden.

Immediately after September 18, 1931, when the Manchurian Incident began, NAKANO, Koitsu was directed by the political division of the Kwantung Army to join the Self-Government Guiding Board which was organized in the latter part of September to foster, coordinate and direct the activities of various groups urging the independence of Liaoning Province, and later on, all the provinces of Manchuria and Jehol, to declare their



1 : 25

independence from China. The principal object of this organization was to aid in developing and directing this Independence Movement. The head of the organization was Yu Chung-Hen, a Chinese. There were several other Chinese in the organization, but 90 per cent of the members and all those in the most responsible positions were Japanese.

About the middle of October NAKANO, Koitsu called me at Derien and asked me to come to Mukden and work with him in the Self-Government Guiding Board. I spoke to the members of our organization, and about twenty of them went to Mukden to assist in this work. When I arrived in Mukden I found the complete organization already set up, and I was appointed chief liaison man at the headquarters in Mukden. We were working in thirteen or fourteen prefectures of Lisoning or Fengtian Province at first, and I was responsible for eight of them. We had two or three representatives working in each prefecture, most of whom were Japanese, and I maintained contact with them and directed their efforts. I talked to the Prefectural Governors and government workers outlining to them the conditions in other prefectures and showing them how much better it would be for the country if they were to have a stable, organized government that would work to promote the interests of the people, and that in order to do this it was necessary for them to seek independence from China. There was no definite plan at first as to the form this independence should take, but later on, it was decided to form a separate state with a Regent or Emperor at the head.

At the time I left the South Manchurian Railway I borrowed five hundred yen from a loan association operated by the company to finance me in my work, particularly in renting a house in which to have the workers of the Self-Government Guiding Board live. In November of 1931 I received about twenty thousand yen from the South Manchurian Railway, representing money coming to me based upon my years of service, and I then paid back the loan.

There were eight principal departments or divisions in the Self-Government Guiding Board as follows:

1. Advisory, having both Chinese and Japanese members.
2. General Affairs, controlled entirely by the Japanese.
3. Guidance.
4. Censorship.
5. Liaison.
6. Propaganda.
7. Training and Education.
8. Finance.

There were approximately one hundred and twenty members on the committee, about twenty from the Yu Wo Kai and the balance from the Manchurian Seinen Renmei (Manchu Young Men's Association). Out of the members, approximately fifteen were Chinese or Manchurian.

I believe the money to support this organization came from the Kwantung Army, as we operated in close cooperation with it, and all of our policies and activities had to be approved by it. Colonel ITAGAKI, Seis'iro was in charge of this division. Colonel ISHIZAKA, Kanji, was in charge of Tactics and Strategy and Colonel DOIWA, Kenji, was in charge of Special Services or Espionage Division in Mukden. Much of the information we received as to which Chinese would be friendly to our plans came from Colonel DOIWA's Division.

Early in January, 1932, the Self-Government Guiding Board issued a proclamation stating that the North Eastern Provinces were faced with the need for developing at once a great popular movement for the establishment of a new independent state in Manchuria and Mongolia, and it appealed to the people of these provinces to overthrow Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, to join the Self-Government Guiding Association and to cooperate in setting up a new administration to improve the living conditions of the people.

On February 18, 1932, a Declaration of Independence was published, declaring that the relations with the Kuomintang and the government at Nanking had been severed by the North Eastern Provinces, to wit: Fengtian, Pailungkiang, Kirin and Jehol; that a new state should be established. The Self-Government Guiding Board played an important part in organizing Independence Movements in various provinces, which resulted in the setting up of a new state which was called Manchukuo, and Henry Pu-Yi was installed as Regent on March 5, 1932.

Shortly after this action, the Self Government Guiding Board was abolished, and I went to Chengchun with S.H.K.T.H., Shuichi to help establish the Self-Self Kyoku, which was a branch of the new government under the direction of the Home Minister and had to do with the cultural, spiritual and educational development of the new government.

After three or four months this department was abolished, and the government worked through the Kyowa Kai, or Concordia Societies, which carried on the work of developing a nationalist spirit among the Manchurians.

After leaving Chengchun I returned to Dalian where I stayed for nearly a year, and the Kwantung Army became displeased with my activities and I was forced to leave Dalian and come to Tokyo. Here I established a printing house and published a magazine known as Defasia or Greater Asia. I continued in this work until May 1945 and am now unemployed.

/s/ KASAGI, Ryomei
KASAGI, Ryomei

Sworn and subscribed to before the undersigned Officer by the above-named KASAGI, Ryomei, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 10th day of June, 1946.

/s/ Alva C. Carpenter
Col. J.J.G.D.

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, CURTIS, John A., HEREBY CERTIFY that I am fully conversant with the Japanese and English languages, and that I, this day, read the foregoing Affidavit to the above-named KASAGI, Ryomei in Japanese, and in so doing, truly and correctly translated the contents thereof from English into Japanese; and that said KASAGI, Ryomei stated to me that the contents of said Affidavit were the truth; and that he was willing to sign said Affidavit under oath; and that said KASAGI, Ryomei was duly sworn in my presence and signed said Affidavit under oath in my presence; and that all proceedings incidental to the administration of said oath and the signing of said Affidavit were truly and correctly translated from Japanese into English and English into Japanese and fully understood and comprehended by said Affiant.

Dated this 10th day of June, 1945, at Tokyo, Japan

/s/ John A. Curtis
CURTIS, John A.

訂正

訂正理由	撮影ミスの為
訂正箇所	直前の 3 コマ取消
	3 コマ再撮影
訂正年月日	平成 18 年 11 月 16 日
このフィルムは、上記の理由で取消又は再撮影し訂正しました。	
撮影者	塩崎伸一郎 印
受託責任者	神奈川県南足柄市沼210番地 富士写真フイルム株式会社 代表取締役 古森重隆 印

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
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After leaving Chengchun I returned to Darien where I stayed for nearly a year, and the Kwantung Army became displeased with my activities and I was forced to leave Darien and come to Tokyo. Here I established a printing house and published a magazine known as Praxis or Greater Asia. I continued in this work until May 1945 and am now unemployed.

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Dated this 10th day of June, 1946, at Tokyo, Japan

/s/ John L. Curtis
CURTIS, John L.

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Part II Outline
for Management of Foreign Relations with the Foundation
of the New Manchuria-Mongol State.

As regards the appearing of New Manchuria-Mongol State, we should like to lead it so as she would make a steady development after fulfilling her internal affairs first of all, and then gradually make a step towards the development of foreign relations, especially of treaty or recognition of the state in consideration of that the foreign relations of our Empire and the New State should be hampered as little as possible. Therefore,

(1) Towards the new state, our Empire should render all sorts of aids as much as possible in proper ways, instead of giving the recognition based on International Public Law for the time being, and lead her to fulfill the substantial conditions for an independent state step by step, and try to give the chance of her being recognized internationally.

(2) As to the relations between the new state and our Empire, or the third countries, we make her take the ways of respecting already provided treaties, and let her declare the plan of keeping with the Open-door and Equal Opportunity principles so as she can avoid the intervention of powers.

(3) The seizure of the customs houses and salt-tax collecting organs by the new state should be dealt with the consideration not to bring about troubles in foreign relations, deliberating such points as those that the international interests or the organs above said are complicated and especially DAIDEN customs being located in the area of our government, the approval of its seizure will exert an extremely unfavorable influence upon our Empire's foreign relations.

(4) We should make as much efforts to establish factual contact with the new state by unofficial ways as possible, (the procedures of private law contract may be taken as principle, and especially that of local agreement between our despatched officials and the new state or her officials may be carried out), and try for the realization and enlargement of our interests as well as for the formation of actually accomplished status.

(5) Regarding our seizure of real military power, we should try to establish accomplished status according to the right of subjugating bandits and the policy of protecting Empire subjects which were recognized by the League Council.

(6) Regarding our grasp of real power on foreign and home affairs, we should let her appoint small number of Japanese as the officials or councillors at first which may be enlarged gradually later.

(7) As soon as the policies of our government are decided as described above, we should inform our despatched officials of the matter and make them take their best efforts to lead the new state.

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Part III Problems that demand urgent Solution among the Miscellaneous Problems Raised simultaneously with the Foundation of the New Manchuria-Mongol State.

The Basic Plan for Management of Foreign Relations accompanying the Foundation of New Manchuria-Mongol State has been decided by Cabinet Meeting. In the various problems accompanying the establishment of the above-mentioned state, the following problems should be disposed of as according to report in enclosure.

- (1) The plan of dealing with the Manchurian Custom Office.
- (2) The plan of dealing with the salt-tax collecting organs in Manchuria.
- (3) The succession of old treaties and foreign debts by the new state.
- (4) The communication problems of mail (including exchange) and telegram between the new state and Japan or other third countries.
- (5) The appointment of Japanese officials in the new state government.

The Plan of Dealing with the Manchurian Maritime customs.

In dealing with the Manchurian Maritime customs of the new state:

(a) The existing maritime customs in China were organized based on agreements on several occasions since 1854 between China and foreign countries, and China has the obligation not to change this system until 1943;

(b) The fact that powers attach great importance on the preservation of this Chinese custom system, and that Britain especially has maintained it as one of the three basic policies toward China together with the preservation of the Shanghai Concession and trade in the main part of China;

(c) The customs' income has been used as security for Chinese debts to foreign countries which had been often made and which had amounted to a huge sum;

(d) Our government is unable to instruct the Kwantung Government to approve the seizure of Dairen customs by the new state before Japan's recognition of the state, on account of the Established Pact of Dairen Customs in 1907.

The above-mentioned problems should be carefully considered. Therefore, in planning for the disposition of the Manchurian Maritime Customs, the first plan of the following two plans may be better in view of strategy towards foreign countries. The second plan may be considered only when the first plan fails to be carried out after extreme efforts.

First Plan

The Customs organization in Manchuria may reserve its present system but aside from the security for foreign loans, the income from maritime customs

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throughout Manchuria including DAIREN, should be seized by the new state. A conference should be held with the Customs General to approve this plan.

Although the plan may be extremely difficult because of the relations between Manqing Government and the new state, if this negotiation can be concluded, the latter would be able to get all the excesses of custom duty of Dairen which amount to almost half of all the excesses in the Manchuria customs. Moreover, it would bring about advantageous results in foreign relations concerning the problem of preserving the status quo system.

Second Plan

Seize all Manchuria customs except that of Dairen but the income allotted as security of foreign debts should be sent to the Customs General or deposited in a bank in view of respecting foreign security rights.

The plan of establishing new custom stations on the border of the Kwantung Leased Territory must not be carried out, as it will bring about the problem of duplex taxation for the goods passing through Dairen and consequently it may impose considerable damage to Port Dairen and to South Manchurian Railway and may cause unfavorable results concerning other problems. In place of this plan, the income allotted as security for foreign loans of all customs in Manchuria except that of Dairen, would not be sent to the Customs General or deposited in the bank but would be taken by the new government to balance the income of the Dairen custom, since the excess income of Dairen should be the income of the new state.

Furthermore, in case the custom-stations are seized, foreigners employed by the custom offices who want to remain on the post shall be employed after selection and should be re-employed after breaking off with the Manqing government completely. (Pension, etc. must be considered.) However, if the Manqing Government opposes the seizure of customs by the new state and dismiss Japanese officials (approximately 200) employed in the custom stations in China proper, the new state can consider dismissing the foreigners in the Manchurian customs and replace them with Japanese.

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The Plan of Dealing with the Salt-tax
Collecting Organs in Manchuria

The salt-tax system in China was established according to Article 5 of Stabilization Loan Contract concluded between China and the five loan parties, Japan, Britain, France, Russia and Germany in 1913. However, the present salt-collecting organs have been almost entirely taken over by the China government, so there would be little fear of raising the trouble concerning the preservation of the systems as in the customs, even if the new state may begin to take over the organs. But since the income of the salt-tax is used as security for the huge accumulated foreign debts, it should be dealt with the same spirit as that of the maritime customs in view of the fact that security rights of foreign creditors should be respected.

(The new state of Manchuria, since the end of last year, has left the salt-collecting organs as before but after sending the income allotted to the repayment of foreign debts, have kept for themselves the remainder of the income.)

The Succession of Old Treaties and Foreign
Debts by the New State.

1. Even if the new state is founded, she can not enter treaty relations with Japan and other powers logically, pending recognition by Japan and other countries. But for the purpose of facilitating foreign relations in the future of the new state;

(a) The relations between the new state and Japan or third parties should be regulated according to old treaties or pacts concluded between China and Japan, China and third countries, and between powers of which China is a member.

(b) The liabilities of the old North Eastern Regime of China which ought to be succeeded according to international laws or customs should be succeeded by the new state.

(c) The liabilities of the Central Government of China whose security property is located in Manchuria should be succeeded by the new government, but the security property scattered outside of Manchuria should be succeeded according to a certain ratio.

In order to give reassurance to powers as well as to expedite dealings of international problems, the new state should be guided to announce these parts when it is established.

2. In the future, with the development of the new state, treaty relations should be adjusted to suit the circumstances.

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The Communication of Mail (including exchange)
and Telegram Between the New State and Japan
or Third Countries.

1. When the new state is established, mail within the state and mail to be sent outside the state may require the need of issuing new stamps and making other revisions. Mail within the state would not cause any trouble but communication with foreign countries would be stopped if the foreign countries would not recognize the new state so as the new state can be admitted to the international treaty. Therefore, pending such a period where communications with foreign countries would cease due to non-recognition of the new state by Japan and other powers, she should abide by the traditional customs in communicating to and from foreign countries under the principle that, in reality, she has succeeded the international treaties concerning mail communications and also mail treaties between Japan and China.

2. As regards telegram communications, she should abide by the prevailing customs to communicate to Japan. Besides as to the communication to third countries, she should continue to communicate, as much as possible, according to the prevailing means in regards to fees and sending messages through Japan or the Mukden Telegram Station.

The Appointment of Japanese Officials by
the New State

On this subject, we should adhere to the conception that the foundation of the New Manchuria-Mongol State was the will of 30,000,000 people in North-Eastern China, and it is necessary, for the future development of the new country, to impress foreign powers that Japan is not manoeuvring behind the new state.

The appointment of too many Japanese to prominent positions as officials or councillors from the beginning of the foundation of the new state may stimulate the claim that the new state is nothing but a protectorate of Japan. Theoretical explanations can deny this but at any rate, realistically, it may impress otherwise.

And as to the control of the new state by Japan, it can be carried out with military power for the time being. It would be to the benefit of the new state in her future foreign relations to increase the number, formal capacity, and authority of the Japanese in the new government organizations gradually.

Therefore: The appointment of Japanese

1. To prominent positions of the new state organization should be limited to as few as possible at first, without hampering the administration of the

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state. And thus we should not make it appear that important government posts of the new state are exclusively filled by Japanese. (It will be a worthy plan to employ suitable foreigners other than Japanese as officials or councillors of the new state.)

2. Japanese government officials who want to become officials of the new state should be appointed after resigning from their previous government offices and jobs.

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PART 5 RE: The Empire's Practical Assistance and Guidance
Towards the New State of Manchuria and Mongolia. (Decided by the
Cabinet Conference, April 11, 1932)

The history of the establishment of the new states of Manchuria and Mongolia and their present conditions are in substance as mentioned in the other explanatory papers. But, in order to make the new state manifest the very characteristics that are important factors for the existence of the Empire in relation to politics, economy, national defense, transportation and communication, and so many other fields, according to Item 1 of the Outline of the Policy for the Disposition of the Manchurian and Mongolian Problems, which was decided at the Cabinet Conference of March 12 this year, it is necessary for the Empire to clarify the demands of the new state in connection with these general executions and, at the same time, to give the new state the practical assistance and guidance according to (2) of the Outline for the Disposition of Foreign Relations Accompanying the Establishment of the New State of Manchuria and Mongolia, which was decided by the Cabinet Conference on March 12.

And, as regards the immediate urgent problems of employment of the leaders pertinent to the financial administration of the new state and the problem of the means of transportation and communication, the following steps are expected to be taken:

1. In order to solidify the foundation of the state by establishing the financial and economic policies for the new state and to enhance its international confidence, and furthermore, to realize a single self-sufficient economic unit comprising Japan and Manchukuo by effecting a rational control over the industries of the two countries, authoritative leaders are required. Concerning the above, it will be properly executed through the following two measures after taking into consideration the demands of the new state and its missions towards the Empire and all other situations:

- (a) The new state shall employ authoritative advisers from our country and make them the highest advisers in connection with financial, economic and general political problems.
- (b) The new state shall appoint competent Japanese nationals to the leading posts in the Privy Council, the Central Bank, and other organs of the new state.

2. As regards the railroads and other means of transportation of the new state, we shall hold real power of management thereof in view of the national defense and economic requirements of the Empire and the new state. And as one of the concrete measures for carrying

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the above into effect, one shall abide by the Principles for Dealing with the Railroads, Harbors and Rivers of Manchukuo mentioned in the other papers.

(For Reference)

1. The 1st paragraph, Outline of Principles for Dealing with the Manchurian and Mongolian Problem:

"As for Manchuria and Mongolia, we look forward to making these regions manifest under the assistance of the Empire the very characteristics that are important factors for the existence of the Empire in relation to politics, economy, national defense, transportation, communication and many other fields."

2. Outline of Principles for Dealing with Foreign Relations (A):

"Towards the new state, the Empire shall, instead of effecting immediate recognition based upon international public laws, give all kinds of assistance by taking suitable methods whenever possible, thereby gradually leading the new state to have the actual requisites of an independent state, and thus hasten the chances for international recognition in the future."

RE: The Progress of the Establishment and the Present Conditions of the New State of Manchukuo, etc.

1. The progress of the establishment of the new state.
2. The present conditions of the new state.
3. The urgent matters demanded by the new state.

The Progress of Establishment and the Present Conditions of the New State of Manchukuo

1. The progress of the establishment of the new state of Manchukuo, Manchuria, hitherto has been different from China Proper in human nature and in manners and customs and has been a region distinctive by itself from China Proper in history, economy, and also in politics. All such instances as that Chang Tso-lin established the other year an independent government both in name and reality, and Chang Peh-hsiang still kept virtually the independent form of government even after his merger into the Nanking Government, were due to the peculiarity of Manchuria. But, upon the fall of the old Northeastern Government as the result of the Manchurian Incident which took place in September of last year, the hatred of the Manchurian

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general public, who had been suffering for so long a time from the tyrannical government of the military lords of Hsueh-Liang and his party, has gradually turned into a Manchurian independence movement centering around influential Chinese in Manchuria who had severed their connections with the old Northeastern Government and the Nanking Government. Finally, on February 18 this year, Chang Ching-hui, Tsang Shi-i, Hsi-Hsia, and Ma Chan-Shan, and other leaders organized the Northeastern Administrative Commission and declared in the name of 30,000,000 people the severance of relations with the Nanking Government and following that, they issued on March 1 the Declaration of the Establishment of the State in the name of the Manchukuo Government, and announced the policy of equal treatment of the Manchurians, Chinese, Mongolians, Japanese, Koreans and other races, both national and alien, succession of the obligations based upon international treaties, and the open-door policy.

Thus, the newly founded state of Manchukuo held in Changchun on March 9 the ceremony of Pu Yi's assumption of office as Administrator and appointed the high officials of the government, and promulgated such fundamental law systems as the Regulations Concerning the Organization of the Government and of the Privy Council and the Guarantee of Human Rights Law. Thus it took the shape of a newly founded state and on March 12 it effected in the name of the Chief of the Foreign Department the formal notification of the foundation of the new state to the Empire and 17 other countries.

2. The present conditions of the new state. The new state has at present under the Administrator, besides the highest consultative body, i.e., the Privy Council, the Legislation Board, the Executive Board, the Inspection Board, and the Supreme Court. And to the Executive Board belong seven departments namely the Home Affairs Department, the Foreign Affairs Department, the Military Administration Department, the Finance Department, the Industry Department, the Transportation and Communication Department and the Justice Department and each Chief of Department is assumed by a Manchurian, but to the posts of responsibility of each Department are appointed a reasonable number of Japanese as officials.

(a) Organization of the State.

The major laws and ordinances promulgated as the fundamental laws for the organization of Manchukuo are as follows:

The Guarantee of Human Rights
 The Organization of the Government Law
 The Regulations for the Privy Council
 The Regulations for the Executive Board
 The Organization of the Inspection Board Law
 (Refer to the Printed Appendix)

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(b) The Governmental Organs

The organization of the Central Government of Manchukuo are mainly as aforesaid and the details are such as mentioned in the chart in the appendix.

The principal officials of the Central Government of Manchukuo are as follows. As for the necessary personnel, the number of the higher officials is scheduled to be seven or eight hundred, of which about ten per cent, i.e., seventy or eighty are scheduled to be allotted among the Japanese. And at present, it seems about two or three hundred Manchurians and about seventy Japanese have already been appointed.

LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF THE
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF MANCHUKUO
(Appointed March 7)

President of the Privy Council	Chang Ching-hui
Privy Counsellor	Tang Yu-tan
" "	Chang Hui-peng
" "	Yuan Chin-kai
" "	Kuo-fu
" "	Lo Chen-yu
Minister of the Executive Board	Chang Hsiao-hsu
President of the Inspection Board	Yu Chung-han
President of the Legislation Board	Chao Hsin-po
Chief of the Home Affairs Dept., Executive Board	Tsang Chih-i
Chief of the Finance Dept., Executive Board	Hsi Hsia
Chief of the Foreign Affairs Dept., Executive Board	Hoich Chieh-shih
Chief of the Industry Dept., Executive Board	Chang Yen-ching
Chief of the Justice Dept., Executive Board	Feng Han-ching
Chief of the Transportation and Communication Dept., Executive Board	Ting Chien-hsiu
Chief Aide-de-Camp	Chang Hui-peng
Governor of Heilung Province	Tsang Shih-i
Governor of Manchuria Province	Hsi-Hsueh
Governor of Heilungkiang Province	Ma Chan-shan

The offices to which the new state are to appoint Japanese officials are as follows: (including the pending appointments)

	Number
The Privy Council, Counsellor	3
The Privy Council, Chief Secretary	1

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	<u>Number</u>
The General Affairs Bureau, the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Secretariat, the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Personnel Affairs Section, the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Account Section, the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Supplies Section, the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Police Section, the Home Affairs Dept., the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Metropolitan Police Section, the Executive Board	
Adviser	1
The General Affairs Section, the Foreign Affairs Dept., the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Military Administration Dept., the Executive Board	
Adviser (increased)	1
The Financial Section, the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Revenue Office, the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Economy Office, the Executive Board	
Chief	1

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	<u>Number</u>
The Revenue Superintendent Office, the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Home Revenue Offices, the Executive Board	
Chief	15
The Customs Houses, the Executive Board	
Chief	6
The Salt-Work Offices, the Executive Board	
Chief	4
The General Affairs Section, the Industry Dept., the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The General Affairs Section, the Transportation Dept., the Executive Board	
Chief	1
The Auditors, the Inspection Board	2
The Inspectors, the Inspection Board	2
The General Affairs Section, the Justice Dept.	
Chief	1
The Legal Section, the Justice Dept.	
Chief	1
Chiefs of the Sections of each Provincial Office	8
Besides these:	
Vice-President of the Central Bank	1
Director of the Central Bank	1
The Section Chiefs of the Head Office of the Central Bank	8
The Managers of the Branch Offices of the Central Bank	8

(c) Finance and banking

In order to establish a solid financial foundation, the Manchukuo Government is now making effort in observing the budget, in arranging the tax-collection offices, and in controlling smuggling. And also, in order to establish a solid foundation for a money market by unifying the disorderly currency system, the Government wishes to establish the central bank, for which it asked our country the other day for financial assistance.

(d) Treaties and foreign obligations

On March 12, the Government declared in the name of Hsieh Chieh-shi, Chief of the Foreign Affairs Dept., that it should succeed all the existing treaties and foreign obligations.

(e) Tariff and salt-duty

As for the maritime-tax, the Manchukuo Government created customs houses against China on the principle of tariff autonomy and also now is carrying on negotiations with the Director General of Customs of the Nanking Government on the policy of following the existing system.

As for salt, it is, under the army's direction, being dealt gradually on the policy of controlling smuggling and making for smooth distribution and avoiding infringement on foreign credits concerning the salt duty.

(f) Transportation and communication

As for foreign mail and telegram, the Government is continuing the established practices based on the treaties, and as for the inland communication, it was disorganized for some time after the Incident, but with the efforts of the authorities of Japan and Manchukuo, its normal conditions, as a whole, is being restored.

As for air transportation, the Japan Air Transportation Company is entrusted under the administration of the army to link important points of the country.

Explanation concerning the railroads is omitted.

3. The urgent matters demanded by the new state

It is only recently that the new state was founded, and the various phases of administration are not yet under way and quite some assistance or guidance of the Empire are needed. Especially for such matters as mentioned here, urgent steps are necessary to be taken. Besides these there will be many matters for the Empire to do, such as effecting real assistance and guidance one after another by clarifying

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the demands of the new state in the future.

(a) It is obvious that the new state requires the Empire's assistance and guidance in various matters. But, before the Empire gives its full assistance, it is necessary to make as its prerequisite the entry and the guidance of the new state by competent and wise persons in the confidence of Japan. And concerning this, the new state has offered to employ Japanese in the Privy Council and in the Administrative Offices of the Central and local governments.

(b) The new state has not yet created the central organization of finance, which is most urgently needed. And the other general policies in finance and economy are not yet underway. The financial conditions are so difficult that the new state has proposed unofficially to our country for the loan of 20,000,000 to meet the urgent liabilities. With the progress in all sorts of constructions in the future, our assistance and guidance in finance and economy are necessary.

(c) Though the new state entrusts the Empire with its national defense, the police organization on the part of the new state for maintaining public order has not yet been carried out. This also needs our prompt assistance and guidance.

(d) The equipping of transportation and communication facilities in Manchuria is the urgent and most important matter from the standpoint of national defense, maintenance of public order of the new state and economic development of Manchuria. But, as the new state has not the real ability to manage and equip, it is necessary for us to assist and guide her. And concerning this, the new state has proposed to entrust our country with administration and management of transportation and communication facilities in Manchuria.

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No. 7. The General Principle of the Policy Concerning
Construction of the KIRIN-TUNGSHA Railway Extension
Line. (Cabinet Decision, May 3, 1932)

And Concurrently, the Policy in Management of the
TIEN-TU Railway.

1. Route Lines.

Route lines to be adopted shall run from TUNGSHA via
CHU-TSU-KIA to NANYANG in KOREA; and another shall branch
off at CHIAO-YANG-CHUN passing through LUNG-CHI-TSUN and
ending at SHAN-SAN-PHON in KOREA.

2. Management and the Construction Plan of the TIEN-TU Railway

In order to construct the aforementioned lines, the
present TIEN-TU Railway shall be purchased by the State of
MANCHUKUO at a fair price, and the funds needed for this
purpose shall be credited by the South Manchurian Railway Co.
Moreover, the liabilities of this railway against the Savings
Department of the Finance Ministry, TOYAMA (The Oriental
Development Co.) and others, shall be borne by the South
Manchurian Co. Purchase expenses shall be dealt as a loan
made to the State of MANCHUKUO by the South Manchurian Railway
Co.

The reconstruction of the TIEN-TU Railway and the new
line construction project are to be undertaken by the South
Manchurian Railway Co. Reconstruction and construction
expenses shall be treated as a loan made to the State of
MANCHUKUO by the South Manchurian Railway Co.

3. Period of Construction.

Setting of both lines shall commence during the fiscal
year of 1932 and is expected to complete within the fiscal
year of 1933.

4. Form of Management.

The management of both lines shall be entrusted to
South Manchurian Railway Co. by the State of MANCHUKUO.

5. Construction of Termini Facilities.

Concerning termini facilities, the CHEN-CHING and the
SHUEN-KEE ports are to be availed for the time being, but in
view of the loading and unloading capacities of both ports,
it is necessary to build another terminus facility in RASHIN

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(LO-CHING), there enabling it to be a chief port. For this purpose, the South Manchurian Railway Co. shall complete all investigations and planning within this year and have the work completed within the five years after the fiscal year of 1933. It is expected that the project will make speedy progress. (The railway line between CHEN-CHING and RASHUN, which is in relation to the termini facilities should be completed within two and one half years beginning with the fiscal year of 1933).

6. Management of Termini Facilities and Connecting Lines.

The South Manchurian Railway Co. shall manage the connecting lines in MORBA (TOL-HEI Line, CHEN-WEI Line and the SHENKAI-RASHUN Line), and its termini facilities.

Furthermore, in regard to the details of management on the above mentioned (2) TIEN-TU Railway, a meeting was held between the representatives of the War Ministry, Overseas Affairs Ministry, Finance Ministry, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Korean Railway Bureau, South Manchurian Railway Co. and the TOYAKU (Oriental Development Co.) on April 12, 1932 at the Overseas Affairs Ministry. Thereafter, further negotiations were carried between the parties concerned and it has been decided, in general, on the following:

Re. Disposition of the TIEN-TU Railway and the LAU-TOL-KUL Colliery in accompany with the Construction of the TUNG-TU Railway.

1. The TIEN-TU Railway and the LAU-TOL-KUL Colliery shall be treated en bloc at this moment.
2. The TIEN-TU Railway shall be ceded to the State of MANCHUKUO.
3. The LAU-TOL-KUL Colliery shall be a JAPAN-MANCHUKUO joint enterprise and the Japanese representative shall be the South Manchurian Railway Co. and, however, we have no objection for the South Manchurian Railway Co. to manage it individually as the result of their negotiation with MANCHUKUO.
4. The amount from sale of the TIEN-TU Railway and the LAU-TOL-KUL Colliery together with the credit amount in relation to this shall be decided, as a rule, on the basis outstanding as of December 1931.

(1) TIEN-TU Railway.

1. The purchasing price of the TIEN-TU Railway deemed recognizable by MANCHUKUO is to be set at ¥ 7,795,774.00.

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2. The liability amount ¥ 11,230,381.00 of the TIENTSIN-TU Railway shall be assessed at ¥ 8,311,013.00, and that it shall be succeeded by the South Manchurian Railway Co.

3. As regards ¥ 4,723,970.00, invested funds of the Savings Department of the Finance Ministry, the full amount is to be paid back immediately after the elapse of ten years time, and the interest during this period shall be set at 4.2 per cent per annum. (Hereafter, the South Manchurian Railway Co. shall succeed to this fund and the liabilities which the TOTANI (Oriental Development Co.) is due to the Savings Department of the Finance Ministry and that without passing through the TOTANI.)

4. The credit amount ¥ 3,319,148.00 shall be assessed at ¥ 1,780,138.00 and that the full amount shall be paid immediately after the elapse of ten years time. The interest during this period shall be set at 4.2 per cent per annum.

5. The investment amount ¥ 3,187,263.00 of the South Manchuria TAIKO GOMEI KAISHA shall be assessed at ¥ 1,807,705.00 and that the full amount shall be paid immediately after the elapse of ten years time. The interest during this period shall be set at 5.5 per cent per annum. (Besides the said credit, the aforementioned company is authorized to receive a total amount of ¥ 365,500.00 in bank deposits, credits in temporary payments and accounts receivable, storage articles, estates and buildings, etc.)

The South Manchurian Railway Co. shall pay to the South Manchuria TAIKO GOMEI KAISHA the sum of ¥ 750,000.00 as dissolution fund, etc., and the time of payment and the rate of interest shall be in accordance to the above article.

6. The CHINESE GOVERNMENT-GENERAL office shall give opportune consideration in the solution of this current issue at the time of concluding the contract in regard to the deputation in management of rail ways and harbour facilities north of SHENSHIN (CHEN-CHING) in view of the burden incurred by the South Manchurian Railway Co.

(II) LAU-TOL-ANU Colliery.

1. The purchasing price deemed recognizable by JAPAN-MANCHURIAN joint undertakings is to be set at ¥ 328,059.00.

2. The liability amount ¥ 717,367.00 of the Colliery shall be assessed at ¥ 647,024.00 and that it shall be succeeded by the South Manchurian Railway Co.

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3. As regards ¥ 500,030.00, invested funds of the Savings Department of the Finance Ministry, the full amount is to be paid back immediately after the elapse of ten years time, and the interest during this period shall be set at 4.2 per cent per annum. (Hereafter, the South Manchurian Railway Co. shall succeed to this fund and the liabilities which the TOTAKU (Oriental Development Co.) is due to the Savings Department of the Finance Ministry and that without passing through the TOTAKU.)

4. The credit amount ¥ 211,337.00 shall be assessed at ¥ 140,994.00 and that the full amount shall be paid immediately after the elapse of ten years time. The interest during this period shall be set at 4.2 per cent per annum.

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Confidential.

Decided at Cabinet Conference of 12th August 1932.

Concerning Aviation in Manchuria.

The Imperial government, recognizing the urgent necessity of acquiring aviation rights in Manchuria and Mongolia, decided in the Cabinet conference of 18th November 1930, to open negotiations with the Chinese authorities concerning this matter. With this decision, we repeatedly negotiated with the Chang Hseuh-liang regime concerning the organization of an aviation company under joint management of Japan and Manchuria, but it could not be realized and the matter was left untouched till the Manchurian Incident broke out last September. After the outbreak of the incident, the Imperial Government decided in the Cabinet conference of 12th November last year to make the Japan Air Transportation Company temporarily open the regular Changchung-Dairen-Mukden air route and the Seoul-Pinghsiang-Mukden route, on the pretext of military communication and for the purpose of establishing the foundation for acquiring aviation rights in Manchuria and Mongolia and at the same time insuring communications between Kwantung Army units. Since then, according to the above decision, we have been meeting the immediate demands under the pretext of military air service, but today when the surrounding situations have developed favorably for us with the establishment of Manchukuo, we believe it is important that we turn the above military air service into a standing business organ and give it permanency. Furthermore, it is needless to mention that the management of aviation in Manchuria and Mongolia should be carried out in the best possible way with a view of contributing to the execution of the Imperial aviation policy, namely, the accomplishment of European-Asiatic air line, the development of industries and the preparation of acquiring aviation rights in China proper, etc. However, at the same time, considering the special positions of and situations in Manchuria and Mongolia, it shall be our greatest object to let the plan meet the demand of national defense. Therefore, while it is absolutely necessary for the above business organ to be administrated under the perfect leadership and supervision of the Imperial Government, on the other hand, in view of our relations toward both Manchukuo and other nations, it will be proper for us to make this organ a joint company of Japanese and Manchurians, a corporation in Manchukuo and the substantial leadership and supervision in our hands. Moreover, from its original mission, the aviation business will be expected to expand in the future, but as it is necessary to realize it as easily and speedily as possible, we shall at this time, open business with subsidies supplied for the time being by the Manchurian Government and the South Manchurian Railway Company, and expect to take the following steps.

Organization Program.

The fundamental policy for the institution and management of the aviation enterprise in Manchuria is to meet the demand of national defense of our Empire and, at the same time, to contribute to the advance of our nation's aviation enterprise and the economical development of Manchukuo.

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1. As for the aviation enterprise in Manchukuo, an independent Japan-Manchuria joint-stock company (hereafter termed provisionally, the Manchurian Aviation Company) will be organized, which will manage provisions and operations.
2. The capital of the Manchurian Aviation Company will be, for the time being, 3,500,000 yen and the amount of expected investment will be divided as follows. The company will not pay dividends for some time.

The Manchukuo Government	¥ 1,000,000
(Flying fields and intervening landing grounds, etc. in lieu of cash investments.)	
The South Manchurian Railway Co.	¥ 1,500,000
General Public	¥ 1,000,000.
3. A subsidy will be required by the Manchurian Aviation Company in order to fill up the deficiency of its income. The disbursement of subsidy will be expected to divide as follows.

The Manchukuo Government	
1932	¥ 400,000 in silver
1933	1,000,000 in silver
1934	1,400,000 in silver
From 1935 on	1,700,000 in silver.
The South Manchurian Railway Co.	
1932	¥ 500,000
¥ 500,000 every year for 9 years from 1936 to 1941, if we cannot find any other way.	
4. The leadership and supervision of the Manchurian Aviation Company, and furthermore the right of its management in time of emergency shall be entrusted to the supreme organ of our Empire, residing in Manchukuo (transitionally, to the Commander of the Kwantung Army).
5. The Manchurian Aviation Company's projected air routes and its construction program is as you will see in the annexed map.
6. The Manchurian Aviation Company will use the former Mukden Aeronautical Arsenal for repair of airplanes, manufacture and construction of their bodies.

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Document #607

A message addressed to the War Minister from the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army.

Document number: 'Kan-San' No. 323. (Secret document).

Date: April 3, 1932. Hour of dispatch 9.00 p. m.

Note: Identical message was dispatched to the Chief of the Army General Staff, dated April 4, 1932.

Regarding the recent dispatch of a part of the Chosen Army to Chientao, I understand the main objective lies in the protection of Japanese residents there. Accordingly, I believe it favorable for the unification of our Manchurian policy that the general administrative functions in Chientao be conducted by the Manchurian Government under the guidance of the Kwantung Army, since Chientao at present has already become a territory of Manchukuo. But, in view of the historical relations between the Government-General of Chosen and the said district as well as of the peculiarities of the said district, the Kwantung Army is ready to pay full respect to their opinions and afford conveniences to them.

I believe you have no objections that the execution of our policies regarding the whole of Manchukuo, under these circumstances, should, insofar as it involves negotiations with Manchukuo, be left chiefly to the Kwantung Army for unified and joint execution according to the measures decided upon in the recent Cabinet Council. In view of the recent conduct of Japanese Government offices and various other representing organs in Manchukuo, however, I fear that unless we make it thoroughgoing, confusion might arise. I seek your opinion about this matter.

A cipher telegram addressed to the Commander-in-chief of the Kwantung Army from the War Minister in reply to the previous message.

Subject: On the unification of policies towards Manchukuo.

Document number: 'Riku-Man' No. 629. (Secret document).

Date: April 5, 1932.

In reply to your telegrams 'Kan-San' No. 323 and No. 334, I agree in principle to your opinion regarding unification in the execution of our Manchurian policies as well as to the policy of the Army under your command regarding the Chientao question. Considering the actual state of affairs in that area as well as its historical relations, however, I hope you will keep in contact and cooperate with the various organs concerned. Regarding matters relating to the Supreme Command, instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Army General Staff.

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Doc No. 613

VERY SECRET (ARMY)

EXH. 227

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Confirmation of telegram
Despatched----June 4, 1932
2:30 p.m.
Received-----June 4, 1932
7:30 p.m.

From the Chief of Staff of the Adventura Army
To the Vice-minister of War
(Even Sen 520)

In view of the present situation of Manchukuo, it is very natural and (seal) a matter of urgent necessity that Manchukuo should take over at this time (seal) the custom houses, including that at DAIKOP. We consider it a matter of urgent necessity to thoroughly abide by the great policy of supporting Manchukuo, to adopt the undermentioned Manchukuan opinions to give tacit consent to its enforcement and to consistently give her strong support.

Furthermore, we must keep this matter absolutely secret until its enforcement by Manchukuo. Kindly note that the Governor of Adventura Leased Territory, Acting Consul-General Harishima and Director Fukumoto of the Dairen Customs House, fully understand this.

Particulars:

1. Manchukuo's finance is now confronted with a great difficulty in realizing the revenues of 64 million yuan which had been originally estimated at the time of the founding of the State, on account of difficulties in maintaining peace and order. Since this amount included custom revenues of 19 million yuan and Opium monopoly revenues of about 10 million yuan, Manchukuo would find herself in a sad plight with estimated expenditures of 93 million yuan, unless these two items are speedily dealt with so as to raise revenues.

Accordingly, we have decided to take over all the custom houses in Manchukuo, including that of DAIKOP, under the policy of guaranteeing treatment and positions to their personnel, and of collecting the customs revenues, (certain notation in red ink: The part securing foreign loans to be untouched) except that part which secures foreign loans. Above all, the amount of revenue of the DAIKOP custom-house constitutes about one half of the total customs revenues of (certain notation in red ink: the increase in revenues resulting from the seizure of DAIKOP custom house is 7 million Liang) whole Manchukuo (24 million 2-ikwan lian) and is expected to exceed by as much as 7 million liang that part of the customs revenues about 6 million liang which secures the foreign loans for which Manchukuo holds herself responsible. Accordingly, even if Manchukuo acquires the customs revenues of all the custom houses, except that of DAIKOP, she would be able to obtain annually only 7 million liang (four letters are illegible), which would be unbearable to her. Therefore it is intended to take over the DAIKOP custom house at all costs. However, if during this course the Benking Government should give in order to agree to the First Draft which was agreed upon by the United Conference of the Five Provinces sometime ago, we are ready to give assent to it.

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2. The method of taking over the DAIREN custom-house is to have its personnel betray China by joining Manchukuo. If the Chinese side should despatch new personnel and attempt to collect the customs separately and further attempt to shut down all the custom houses in Manchukuo, we shall be obliged to bring the Chinese endeavor in DAIREN to naught through intimidation by collecting customs at Wafeng-tien, etc. At the same time we intend to oppose it, through arrangements made beforehand by appointing simultaneously new personnel for all the custom houses in Manchukuo, including that at DAIREN.

3. We hope that in that case the Japanese Government would maintain a friendly attitude by giving tacit consent to Manchukuo's management of the customs business in Dairen, and that she would not interfere with Manchukuo's management of the customs as the result of protests from China.

We believe that Japan and Manchukuo will not be placed in a disadvantageous situation internationally even in the case of connivance, the reasons being as follows:

- a) The first draft, which Manchukuo intends to accept with great forbearance, preserves what Kaizo calls "customs integrity." And as it is rumored that Kaizing is purposely opposing, it and obstructing in spite of no objections on the part of Kaizo, Manchukuo's present resolution is an unavoidable last resort. The fault is entirely on the other side.
- b) If Japan does not give support, Manchukuo will be obliged to begin collecting customs at Wafeng-tien without taking into consideration the damage to DAIREN. Accordingly, notwithstanding the provisional agreement pertaining to the DAIREN Customs, Japan will be obliged from the standpoint of self-defense to give tacit consent to Manchukuo's actions in DAIREN. Moreover, at the present time when Japan has de facto recognized and supporting Manchukuo, Japan should be able to regard the DAIREN custom house as belonging to Manchukuo. Furthermore, in case the personnel of the custom houses pledge fidelity to Manchukuo, it is doubtful whether it can be said that Japan is violating the Customs Agreement, even if she should give tacit consent to Manchukuo's actions.
- c) Public opinion will interest as a matter of course that Japan, which has de facto recognized and is supporting Manchukuo, should assist in the seizure of the DAIREN customs which are absolutely necessary from the financial standpoint of Manchukuo.
- d) Manchukuo's financial position does not permit her to wait for the departure of the Far Eastern Enquiry Commission of the League of Nations. Not only that, there is no need for Manchukuo to feel, in the least, constrained toward the League in taking urgently necessary financial measures, which are only natural. It is rather advantageous to take this emergency action during the stay of the League's Enquiry Commission in order to display the

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independence of Manchukuo, and to indicate the firm resolution of Japan and Manchukuo in respect to the Manchurian problem.

4. In short, Manchukuo thinks that China is continuing to illegally collect customs because the DAIREN custom house happens to be located in the Manchuria Leased Territory, in spite of the fact that the DAIREN custom house, like the other custom houses in Manchuria, should properly belong to Manchukuo. If Japan should formally recognize Manchukuo at once, and deliver the above mentioned custom house to her, there should be no problem. However, if the recognition of Manchukuo be delayed under certain circumstances, it would be necessary for her to give a great deal of support to Manchukuo.

(Not to be shown to others.)

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EXh. 228
21.7.31 ~ 5
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Manchurian Confidential Diary (HAMITSUDAI) 1932

War Ministry

Re Official Recognition by Japan of Manchukuo.

Telegram dispatched from War Minister to the Commander of Kwantung Army
(Cipher code-wire)

EAI-SAI (T.N., Presumably Chief of Staff Kwantung Army) 577 and 609. Reply.

1. We understand your views relating to official recognition of Manchukuo, especially your awkward position in connection with the guidance of Manchukuo, but as to the time of official recognition, it has a very delicate bearing on various circles at home and abroad, and therefore we are now determined and ready to effect the recognition whenever opportunity offers.
2. As regards unification of various organs in Manchuria, we, taking into consideration the state of affairs relative to the founding of Manchukuo and various conditions at home and abroad emanating therefrom, especially relations with Soviet Russia, are planning to establish a coordinating organ with the Army as its center, among other things aiming at the industrial development of Manchuria to meet with requirements for the speedy stabilization of Manchukuo and national defence. Consequently, it is not of such nature as to set up another government organ over Manchukuo. For avoiding any misunderstandings which may occur in the future among the important people of Manchukuo as a result of the carrying out of this plan, your every endeavor is requested to convince them.
3. It is still premature to discuss such questions as administrative rights in the South Manchurian Railway zone and the question of the Kwantung Leased Territory. Should such underlying motive by any chance leak out at home or abroad, and especially in foreign countries, it would be extremely disadvantageous from the point of view of the direction of Manchukuo. Therefore, we hope that you will be very circumspect even in the study of the matter in your own office.

Army Manchuria /Riku-Man/ No. 1017. 20 June 1932.

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Doc. No. 1041

217-37 (1)

A telegram from the chief of Staff of Manchuria Stationed Army to the Vice-Minister of War-Office, on 19th, August, 1932 (7th year of Showa).

It is thought that the intention of the Japanese Government is to have Manchuria completely under the control of Japan, the envoy extraordinary, minister and plenipotentiary, and the news about the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Treaty, for the time being. If you have, with my opinion, you will please instruct to the concerned authorities.

The report of extracts as a proof: The above shows the military authorities are the ring-leaders of the foundation of Manchuria, for which they had been preparing and leading others clandestine

(Signed): H. Hata.

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21.9.31

Book by ARAKI "Address to All Japanese People"

21 February 1953

P. 34 For what purpose does the League exist?

Doesn't the League exist for the sake of world peace?

Doesn't the 9-Power Treaty exist for the sake of peace of the Far East? If the League of Nations should be such as to suit the convenience of only Europe and America, we wish to be excused from same. If the 9-Power Treaty seeks only the convenience of the rights and interests of themselves, we must give it a flat refusal.

P. 118 It must be, at present, the first resolution toward the Manchuria question to let Europe and America understand the existence of a spirit whereby we shall push ahead by brushing everything aside, in the event of anyone laying obstacles in our way.

P. Various countries of the Far East have been the objects of oppression by white races. The awakened Imperial country, Japan, cannot tolerate their high-handedness anymore. It is the duty of the Imperial Japan resolutely to oppose the action of any power, so long as it is against the Imperial policy.

P. 27 Unnecessary to say, the Imperial Army's spirit lies in exalting the Imperial Way and spreading the National Virtue. Every single bullet must be charged with the Imperial Way and the end of every bayonet must have the National Virtue burnt into it. If there are any who oppose the Imperial Way or the National Virtue, we give them an injection with this bullet and this bayonet.

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Doc. No. 3150-77A

Exh. No. _____

Excerpt from SAICHOJI-HARADA MEMOIRS

Chapter 77 - (page 566)

About 3 April 1933

Japan is not taking a stand that she disagrees with the League of Nations on other matters /than those which concern Manchuria/

. . . . There should be a systematic distinction between the political organ and the organ of the supreme command and a mutual avoidance of intruding in each other's affairs

The above two points were most stressed by His Majesty, and on several occasions the Emperor cautioned along these lines.

And so, when this draft was submitted to a Cabinet council, some advocated: "What do you say to inserting such words as 'both high and low should listen to reason?', 'both high and low should act upon reason?', or the like, following the words 'both civil and military officials should respectfully assume their respective duties', in order to insert words to the effect that both military personnel and civil officials are working in good order?" But, for some reason or other, War Minister ARAMI opposed this, and the words were not inserted after all.

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(5) 17

Doc. 10007

Page 1

EXCERPTS FROM INTERROGATION OF ARAKI, SADAO

(Interrogation of ARAKI, Sadao (File No. 58), 21 February, pages 1-2)

"The Cabinet meeting of February or March 1932 was called by the Premier to form the Administration Committee to set up the independent state of Manchoukuo. A request was transmitted from the Kwantung Army to myself asking that a government be set up to govern the state. I in turn transmitted it to the Premier. The report from the Kwantung Army stated that it was advisable to set up HENRY PU-YI as head of the Manchoukuo Government. The Commander in Chief (DOKUO) of the Kwantung Army sent this request. I had the power to refuse or to over-rule it if I wished to be irresponsible. I would be irresponsible, because I would have to have a better substitute method if I refused the request. I do not think my suggestion of pacification of Manchuria in December 1931 tied my hands on this request. I thought the request of the Kwantung Army would settle the Manchurian matter to the interest of all parties concerned. The proposal in the Cabinet was to carry out the request of the Kwantung Army - set up HENRY PU-YI as governor of Manchoukuo.

"There was already an Administration Committee formed before March 30 by the Kwantung Army. The civil population was administered by various civil governors and the four provinces were placed under one administrator, most of these men being formerly the administrators of that area. This was from the latter part of 1931 to March 1932. The various provincial governors submitted their plans to the Kwantung Army and these were passed upon by the Kwantung Army. The Commander-in-Chief of this army conceived and authorized this, and it was necessary only to make a report to the Tokyo government in those matters. I only gave sanction to him to the effect that if the Manchurian Incident was settled peacefully, there was no need for him to make any special request on minor matters.

"Various Japanese government officials were sent to help in the organization of the Manchurian government since Manchuria did not know how to set up a well functioning government, not having had experience in the past. This was discussed in the Cabinet meeting. Various problems were brought up by the Department concerned. For instance, financial matters were brought up by TAKAHASHI."

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EXH 221

DOC. NO. 10,008
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(Interrogation of ARAKI, Sadao (File No. 58), 8 March, pages 1,2 and 3)

"Q. Did you agree with the Foreign Minister that Manchuria should be recognized as an independent state?

"A. Yes. The government at that time was in order, and since it would be best to recognize their independence while there was order in the government, I thought it best to grant them independence."

.....

"A. ***Since the Manchurian Government proclaimed themselves independent, I thought it best that they be so. At the conference of the Big Three (Foreign, Navy, and Army Ministers) when discussing recognition of Manchuria as an independent state, I suggested that we exchange ambassadors since Manchuria was an independent state."

.....

"Q. After the Foreign, Navy, and War Ministers had agreed to recognize Manchuria, who proposed it to the Cabinet?

"A. The Foreign Minister.

"Q. Was it discussed in the meeting thoroughly?

"A. The discussion was as to when Manchuria should receive recognition—now or later."

.....

"Q. Who suggested that Manchuria should be recognized immediately as an independent state?

"A. The Kwantung headquarters put in a request that we recognize immediately.

"Q. That came to you?

"A. It must have, and also to the Foreign Minister."

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"Q. But you agreed with the Cabinet in its decision to recognize Manchuria as independent on September 15th?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Were all the Cabinet Members there?

"A. Yes."

At this meeting the Cabinet approved unanimously the contents of the treaty to be made between Japan and Manchuria. The treaty later negotiated did not vary in contents from that decided on in the Cabinet meeting in August 1932, giving to the Japanese certain superior rights.

(File 56, 8 Manch, pages 3-4-5)

"Q. Did all agree?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You set the date of September 15th as the date to formally recognize Manchuria?

"A. Yes. The date of agreement was in August.

"Q. Did the Cabinet at this meeting discuss the superiority of Japan's rights in Manchuria in commercial and economic ventures?

"A. At that time we must have discussed superiority rights of Japan in commercial and economic enterprises.

"Q. Did you at this Cabinet meeting discuss the terms or contents of the treaty to be made between Japan and Manchuria?

"A. We discussed the contents of the treaty. I do not remember the contents.

"Q. You did approve the contents of the treaty later to be made between Japan and Manchuria?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Yes.

"A. That was at this Cabinet meeting?

"A. Yes.

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"Q. Do you recall when the treaty was negotiated--was it very shortly thereafter?

"A. I think it might have been on Sept. 15th. I am not sure.

"Q. The terms or contents of the treaty between Japan and Manchuria were the same as agreed upon in the Cabinet in its meeting in August?

"A. Yes.

"Q. This was the same Cabinet meeting as that in which it was agreed to recognize the independence of Manchuria?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Do you recall who drew up the terms of the treaty?

"A. I think it was drawn up in the Foreign Office.

"Q. Did you have any suggestions?

"A. I do not remember whether I did or not. The treaty was drawn up after the Foreign, Navy, and War Ministers discussed it.

"Q. Was it drawn up in the Cabinet meeting?

"A. I do not remember. I think afterwards.

"Q. It was not drawn up in the Cabinet meeting in August--it was drawn up after the Cabinet had agreed on the contents of the treaty?

"A. Yes.

"Q. The treaty as drawn up, did not vary any from what was agreed upon at the Cabinet meeting in August?

"A. No.

"Q. And that was the same treaty that was negotiated later with Manchuria?

"A. Yes."

Japan recognized the independence of Manchuria. (File 58, 13 Feb. page 3)

"Q. General, were you responsible for the plan of the Independent State of Manchukuo?

"A. The Japanese Govt. recognized the independence of Manchuria. Therefore as a member of the Cabinet I was responsible for it. The date was 15 Sept. 1932.

(Ibid. 8 March, page 2)

"A. On March 1, Manchuria proclaimed themselves independent. On September 15 the Japanese Govt. recognized their independence."

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21. 7. 31 - 10
ExH. # 230

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KWAN-SAN-MAN Message No. 381

3 November 1932

To: Vice Minister of War, YANAGIGAWA, Heisuke
From: Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, KOISO, Kuniaki
Subject: Forwarding of Outline for Guiding MANCHUKUO.

Since we have now obtained a concrete program pertaining to the subject which we have previously been studying and working on, we are forwarding it as seen in the separate volume.

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Excerpts from
 A War Minister's Confidential Record Concerning
Manchurian Affairs, dated December 8, 1923

The Principle of Leading Manchukuo

The Staff Section of the Kwantung Army. This draft is a compilation of the Kwantung Army's opinion towards the draft drawn by the Second Section of the General Staff Headquarters, and NAGATA, Chief of the Second Section who was in Manchukuo at that time, attended this conference.

(1) Policy.

1. Manchukuo shall be supported and developed as an independent state which shall adapt herself to our national policy and realize co-prosperity and harmony between Japan and Manchukuo.

2. The polity of Manchukuo in the future shall nominally be a constitutional empire, but substantially it shall be autocratic. The participation of the people in the legislature shall be carried out by those who are selected by the Government.

3. The establishment of institutions and improvement in the various departments of the state of Manchukuo shall be performed as moderately as possible.

(2) The King.

1. The administration shall be backed for the time being by inner leadership of the commander of the Japanese Kwantung Army and shall be carried out with officials of Japanese lineage as its leaders. However, it must be provided that the officials of Manchukuoan lineage shall outwardly assume charge of the administration as much as possible, while officials of Japanese lineage must satisfy themselves by controlling its substance. In order to have the aforesaid substance completed, the administrator shall be a king as in accordance to the people's will, but the political authority of the king shall not be recognized.

2. Even when an organ of administration by civilians is to be established by Imperial ordinance, with a view of accomplishing the national policy of the Japanese Empire towards Manchukuo, it shall be provided that the commander of the Kwantung Army shall hold concurrently the position of the chief in the organ.

3. In order to put the officials of Japanese lineage completely and substantially under the control of the

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commander of the Army, the rights on the personal affairs held by the commander of the Army at present, shall be permanently maintained, shall be executed strictly and properly. For the sake of making the activities of the officials of Japanese lineage advantageous, the central Government including the respective ministries shall establish the principle of centralizing administration in the General Affairs Office; at the same time it shall appoint promising officials to this office. It is necessary that due attention be given in leading the Manchukuoan officials of Japanese ancestry since, in future, their circle might be inclined to be absorbed and involved in political plots characteristic of the Chinese, and finally in losing the ability in accomplishing the whole national policy of the Empire.

4. The guiding spirit in the establishment of Manchukuo shall be based upon the principle of racial harmony with its objective in practical moral, which is in the attaining of wealth; security in livelihood; moral cultivation and good household.

Education is to be carried out according to the above principle, with emphasis being placed in vocational education, especially in the promotion of vocational education below the secondary schools.

5. Economically, co-prosperity and co-existence, in the true sense of the words, shall be the basic principle and each race shall be given opportunities to find their proper places. In regard to the economic system of Manchukuo the good conventions and customs inheritant from the past shall be respected, and with the addition of the national control to the present condition of economics trending towards and developing into capitalism, it shall be guided in a proper way. In the future, the system accompanying accomplishment of a unit for an economic "bloc" between Japan and Manchukuo shall be kept according to the race coordinative to Japan and Manchukuo.

6. Armament shall be aimed in maintaining public peace and order within the country and, shall be only limited to a degree deemed necessary. Especially, the army's individualistic and private characteristics shall be dispensed with and the essence of a centralized command shall be realized.

7. Diplomatically, although her attitude towards China shall be non-interference in principle, she shall adopt an anti-Chinese principle according to the circumstances, and her attitude towards the Soviet and the U.S.A. shall be the same as towards Japan.

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For the time being, she shall advocate the Open Door Policy and the policy of Equality in Opportunity and shall welcome foreign investment as long as there is no danger in her national defense.

8. In regard to the adjustment of relations between Japan and Manchukuo, the following must be borne in mind:

- A. Joint defense of both countries shall be perfected.
- B. In order to realize the economy of Japan and Manchukuo into a single "bloc", we must realize industrially the idea of "Fit industry for suitable locality" both in Japan and Manchukuo with aim of abolishing the mutual customs barriers. However, the national defence industry shall be met with the demand of the above article "A."
- C. The economy of Japan and Manchukuo shall aim in the realization of the self-sufficing of both countries under the principle of co-prosperity and co-existence; and at the same time must attempt advance towards the scale of world industry.

9. Although in principle, centralization of powers is to be effected internally, it shall be possible to emit or legislate articles according to circumstances, and thus, the tradition of local autonomy shall be respected as much as permissible. Home administration aims chiefly at security in living and comfortable work under the principle of agriculture and it shall be never be permitted in initiating wantonly, higher culture.

10. According to the peculiarities connected with the establishment of Manchukuo, and in view of the situation, internally as well as externally, substantial realization of racial harmony, together with adjustments and repletion of the inspection system throughout the country shall be effected, and under the direction of the army, preventive measures shall be taken against political and ideological movements for national destruction which may arise from the inside or outside of the country.

11. For some time, political parties and political bodies shall not be permitted to exist and we do not welcome the rise of political ideas among the people but rather that we lead the general situation skillfully according to the principle of "Let the people follow blindly."

12. The participation of officials of Japanese lineage in administration shall not necessarily be effected by their numbers; in short, its principle is that the Japanese should occupy the key positions in the administration. Therefore, besides the aforementioned principle to centralize

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the General Affairs Office. We must lead the trend in political affairs through control of the Office of State Councillor by the Japanese officials. Although the number in officials of Japanese lineage in offices under the prefectural government are to be limited to the minimum as in accordance to the present system, we shall utilize the inspection systems of Article 10 to keep watch, occasionally over local tendencies. Participation by the Japanese in the fields of industry shall be most welcomed due to its field being different from that of the administration as mentioned above, and the principle of "a right man in the right place" shall be fairly adopted.

We shall attach special importance to immigration in the industrial fields besides those of agriculture according to the principle of "fit industry for suitable locality," as mentioned in "B" of 8.

13. Racial struggle between Japan and Manchukuo is to be expected. Therefore, we must never hesitate to wield military power in case of necessity, although every effort must be made to prevent this conflict; and for this purpose the aforementioned occupying of politically important posts, advocating economical co-prosperity and co-existence, and the establishing of the inspection system should be made.

14. Present day Manchukuo must be lead by emphasis laid in the maintenance and restoration of public peace by the use of military and political powers, and all departments in administration must be concentrated and united to this single point.

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COLLECTION OF CABINET DECISIONS PERTAINING TO MANCHURIA
(July 1939)

Issued by the Second Section of the East Asia Bureau of the
Foreign Office

Matters Relating to the Telegraph and Telephone Enterprises
in Manchuria.

The fundamental policy of wire, wireless, telegraph, telephone, and broadcasting enterprises in Manchuria lies in its coincidence with the carrying out of national policy, especially with demands of national defense as well as in contributing to cultural and economic development of Manchuria. In order to accomplish these purposes, a treaty relating to the establishment of a Japanese-Manchurian joint enterprise under both Japanese and Manchurian supervision, and which will establish and operate the wire, wireless telegraph, telephone and broadcasting work in Kwantung Province, the Manchurian Railway zone, and Manchuria, shall be concluded between Ambassador Plenipotentiary MUTO, and delegates of the Manchurian Government.

Contents of the treaty are desired to comply with the following purport.

A. Preamble.

It must be mentioned that the present treaty is concluded with the Japanese and Manchurian Government's acknowledgment of the advantages obtained through unifying communication facilities in Kwantung Province, the Manchurian Railway Zone, and Manchuria, and that by placing the wire, wireless telegraph, telephone, and broadcasting work in the above-mentioned areas, those which are accessory to the railway or aviation as well as those exclusive for defense are exempted. It is the same in the following articles, under joint management.

B. Text.

1. The Japanese and Manchurian Governments will cooperate and establish a joint stock company under their joint management, and will allow the company to manage wire, wireless telegraph, telephone and broadcasting functions in Kwantung Province, the Manchurian Railway Zone, and Manchuria.

2. Capital of this company will be about ¥ 50,000,000 with increase or decrease subject to approval of the two governments.

3. Subscription of shares among the people of Japan and Manchuria and spot investments by Manchurians shall be acknowledged in addition to Japanese Government investments of communication facilities under the jurisdiction of the Kwantung Government General and the Manchurian Government's investments in communication facilities belonging to it. The amount of the above stated spot investments must be calculated according to estimation obtained by impartial methods of the present value of the institutes.

Relative to this article, it will be prescribed in another attached agreement that the amount of the Japanese government's spot investments is decided to be from ¥ 15,000,000 to ¥ 18,000,000 in value, and the Manchurian Government's spot investment to be from ¥ 4,000,000 to ¥ 6,000,000 in value.

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4. The Japanese and Manchurian governments shall supervise the company's business.

Note: Supervision of the Japanese government with regard to the company shall be done by the Governor-general of Kwantung province in general application. It is the same in the following.

5. The approval of both governments is necessary to change the company's contract, the flotation of company loans, the altering of the decision of charges, the disposal of profits, the decision relating to the affiliation and dissolution, the business scheme of each business year, the concluding of a contract with other communicating companies, and the transfer or establishment of mortgages on the property. It is also necessary to obtain the approval of the government concerned regarding nomination or release of directors.

6. The Japanese and Manchurian governments may give necessary orders relating to the company's business, and may cancel the decision of the company or dismiss a member of the staff when the decision or the activity of the member violates the present treaty, the ordinance of both the governments, or the contract of the company and also when it runs public interests or disobeys the orders of the supervising authorities.

7. Although the rate of the Japanese and the Manchurian directors is in proportion to the number of shares possessed by the government or the people, the ratio of the number of the directors of one nationality must not be under three to one.

8. The shares of the company may be possessed by both governments, public corporations, nationals or juridical persons established according to either of the two countries' laws and when the majority of the right of voting does not lie in the nationals or juridical persons of the third country.

9. Considering the public benefiting nature of the company, the maximum amount shall be limited to a just and definite rate, relating to the dividing of shares, and the preferential dividend of a certain rate shall be acknowledged to the shares excepting those possessed by the government.

10. The Japanese and Manchurian government, public corporations, and other public organizations will exempt all types of duties in Manchuria, of the institutions, properties, the business of the company and also the articles demanded by the company.

11. The military authorities of both governments may give necessary military orders concerning the business of the company and may also take necessary steps regarding the institution of the company.

The purport relating to the present item, and the preceding fourth, fifth and sixth items are prescribed in (a) the annexed paper of the secret official exchange document, and (b) the necessary matters concerning the secret official exchange documents will be prescribed in the secret command relating to the company of both the governments.

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12. Matters in addition to the stipulations of the present treaty will be independently decided.

Stipulations relating to the present article will be prescribed in a separate official exchange document according to the contents of the Japanese commercial law and accessory ordinances.

13. The present treaty must be ratified by both governments after being signed.

C. Additional Rules.

1. The Japanese and Manchurian governments will create an establishing committee composed of Japanese and Manchurian nationals to manage all affairs concerning the establishment of the company.
2. The establishing committee will draw up the contract of the company and after it has been approved by both Japanese and Manchurian governments will offer shares for subscription.
3. The offer of shares for subscription concluded, the committee will present the application of the shares to both governments, and request for approval of establishing the company.
4. When obtaining the approval mentioned in the preceding article, the committee must without delay, make the shareholders pay the first subscription for each share, and when that is done, the inaugural meeting must be held without delay.
5. When the inaugural meeting closes, the establishing committee will transfer its duties to the company.

Annexed document.

Matters which must be prescribed in the secret official exchange documents:

1. The Japanese and the Manchurian governments' business supervision, commands, and approval relating to the company mentioned in the present treaty shall be executed after being discussed by the supervising authorities appointed by the two governments, when opinions differ, it will be executed according to the opinion of the Japanese supervising authorities.
2. The highest military organs of Japan stationed in Manchuria and the highest military organs of Manchuria, may make suggestions to the company regarding its business, when necessary, from a military standpoint, and may at any time dispatch to the said company a necessary number of men and inspect the communicating organs, the execution of business, etc.
3. The highest military organs of Japan stationed in Manchuria and the highest military organs of Manchuria shall possess the rights to employ preferentially all personnel belonging to the said company, to practice supervision and inspection when necessary from the viewpoint of national defense or the maintenance of public order, and to demand the carrying out of necessary institutions from the military standpoint, or to carry out such necessary measures by themselves.
4. In concordance with the preceding two articles, the highest military organs of Manchuria must obtain previously, approval of the highest military organs of Japan stationed in Manchuria when intending to indicate an inspection or to make demands of the said company.

Matters relating to the telegraph and telephone enterprise in Manchuria.

Annexed decision.

1. If the establishment of the company causes a defect in the annual revenue of the special accounts of the Kwantung government general, the make-up of the deficit in the annual revenue must be considered from the general accounts.
2. The company shall employ those of the Kwantung Government General now doing work concerned with telegraph and telephone.
3. The employees mentioned in the above article who desire to retire upon the establishment of the company, shall be given a retirement allowance, and the funds for this must be considered specially.
4. Adequate measures must be taken to secure the rights of the loan on mortgages of properties invested by Manchuria.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

I, SHIMODA, hereby certify that the document marked
IPS document 1014C and entitled "Telegraph and Telephone in
Manchuria" is the decision of the Cabinet made on 9 December,
1932, and that Agreement on the establishment of the Japan
Manchukuo Joint Communications Company was concluded between
Japan and Manchukuo and signed by Nobuyoshi Muto, Japanese
Ambassador and Hsieh Chieh Shin, Minister for the Foreign
Affairs of Manchukuo at Hsin-ching on 26 March, 1933.

Signed at TOYO on this
11th day of July, 1946.

/s/ T. Shimoda

Chief of the Archives Section,
Foreign Office.

Witness: M. Emura /s/

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COLLECTION OF CABINET DECISIONS PERTAINING TO MANCHURIA
(July 1939)

Issued by the Second Section of the East Asia Bureau of the
Foreign Office.

Decided by the cabinet meeting on the 8th of August in the
8th year of Showa (1933).

Summary of the Directing Policy towards Manchuria.

The fundamental policy of the Japanese Empire of directing Manchuria is based upon the spirit of the Japanese-Manchurian Protocol and it is to develop Manchuria into an independent nation possessing indivisible relations with the Japanese Empire.

Essential Points.

1. Japan's directing policy towards Manchuria will endeavor to harmonize the race and to make them enjoy life and duty in accordance with the characteristics of Manchurian society and in respecting the dignities of independence and old customs, thus giving light and contentment to high and low, officials or civilians, so that all people will strive to complete the great task of founding an empire. During this period, it is of course necessary to maintain consistently the latent activities of the Japanese Empire's directive powers.
2. Although positive guidance is operated in matters relating to Manchuria's fundamental constitution, national defense, public order and foreign policy, basic matters important in carrying out Japanese-Manchurian economics, and in important internal affairs concerning the establishment of the foundation of the empire, other matters are entrusted to the liberal activities of the authorities of Manchuria.
3. Directions towards Manchuria shall be executed substantially by Japanese officials under the jurisdiction of the commander of the Kwantung regiment and the Ambassador of Japan residing in Manchuria according to the system now in effect. As Japanese officials must be the nucleus in the execution of national affairs, the selection and nomination of the officials must be appropriate, and every possible measure must be made in order to convince them of the present directing policy, as well as to provide them with a center of their activities and to maintain the present system centered on the general affairs department so as to facilitate the administration.
4. Although Manchuria has a constitutional monarchy as its ultimate aim, she will maintain the present system for the time being, and the formal constitution shall be enacted after deliberate consideration.
It shall be kept in mind that political parties, or other political organizations in Manchuria, must not exist for the time being.
5. The Administration of Manchuria will abolish extreme centralization, and respecting traditional local autonomy will endeavor to harmonize it with centralism and reform of all systems will be gradually advanced.

6. The army and naval armament of Manchuria shall be limited to that necessary for maintenance of internal public order. Nevertheless, the necessary defense equipments and marines towards the neighboring countries shall be completed gradually when necessitated.
7. Relative to Manchuria's maintenance of public order, the inspective organizations must be specially completed in accordance with the specialty of the foundation of the empire, and the internal and external conditions of the said country, and must strive with communication by the Kwantung regiment to ward off beforehand all internal or external movements tending to destroy the nation. The ability of self-defense, which is the special character of Manchurians, must be utilized thoroughly concerning public order.
8. The foreign policy of Manchuria is founded on the foreign policy of our Empire which is to secure the peace of the East and to uphold the noble cause to the whole world, and she must act in concert with this policy. Although the open door and the principle of equal opportunity are maintained, application is limited to matters which are not restricted by the demands of national defense.
9. The aim of Manchurian economy lies in the rational unification of Japanese and Manchurian economies in order to establish securely the foundation of our Empire's expansion of economic powers to the whole world, and at the same time to strengthen the economic powers of Manchuria, and also it must be planned to guarantee improvement and equity of national life.
10. Co-existence and co-prosperity of Japan and Manchuria is the spirit of Manchuria's economical development, and although those which are restricted by the demands of the national defense of our Empire are put under our power, others lie within the power of Manchuria and are adequately operated by fair and open economic activities of nationals or foreigners.
11. As the transportation and correspondence in Manchuria has an especially close relationship to national defense and maintenance of public peace, it is placed under the power of the Japanese government and the earliest possible consolidating completion and development of all establishments is desired.
12. The finances of Manchuria, though considering the appropriateness of the people's incidence, must be quickly established, and at the same time fulfill the obligation of sharing the military expenses of the army stationed in Manchuria. Adequate measures may be taken on consideration of financial or other conditions in Manchuria relating to the utilization and collection of Japanese loans to China which concern Manchuria.
13. The education of Manchurians must be directed with the object of making them conscious of the indivisible relationship with Japan, to awaken in them the pride of possessing a special mission of creating peace in the East and to cultivate the ideal of harmonizing the five races. Also, stress must be laid on labor education, and business education must be promoted.

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14. The system of laws must be quickly completed and the organization must be perfected respecting especially national characteristics and customs, concerning the jurisdiction of Manchuria, and to cultivate in all parts the good custom of obeying the law, as well as to establish foreign confidence so as to realize the gradual abolishment of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

(Reference)

Upon deciding concrete plans based upon present essentials concerning the directing policy towards Manchuria, it shall receive approval of the Committee of the Investigation of the Executive Policy towards Manchuria and Mongolia, the Financial Investigation Committee towards Manchuria, or the Japanese and Manchurian Industrial Administrative Committee as usual when necessary, and those of especially great importance must be decided upon by cabinet meeting.

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COLLECTION OF CABINET DECISIONS PERTAINING TO MANCHURIA
(July 1939)

Issued by the Second Section of the East Asia Bureau of the
Foreign Office

Decided by the cabinet meeting on the
22nd of December, in the 8th year of Showa (1933).

Matters relating to the Preparations of Enforcing the Monarchy
in Manchukuo.

When we contemplate upon recent internal conditions in Manchukuo, we cannot deny the fact that although there is a tendency toward confidence amongst the people brought about by the prevailing of the unflinching resolutions of our empire and also by the development of the maintenance of public peace, there exists an apprehension amongst the Manchurian authorities, and the people in general, for almost two years has passed since the foundation of the nation, yet the dictatorship of the transitional period exists, and what form of government is to be adopted in the future has not yet been decided. It seems that the Manchurian government is considering the swift reformation to Monarchy from dictatorship as soon as possible, so as to remove such apprehensions as are based upon the forms of government, and this must be recognized as an adequate measure to obtain a strong stand among other nations when Manchuria is making steady progress in the founding of the nation. But, on the other hand, there can be anticipated evils attending the enforcement of Monarchy, so on this occasion it is desirable to our Empire that, separate from the enactment of the constitution and the Imperial House Law, preparations complying with the following should be made, relating to the enforcement of Monarchy in the said country, and when preparations are completed, Manchukuo will be directed to enforce the Monarchy.

- I. It must be made clear that the enforcement of Monarchy is not a restoration of the Shin regime, which was an autocracy of followers of the monarch, but the foundation of national constitution of a new Manchukuo, and all causes of hindrances to the development of the Manchurian state affairs and the execution of the national policy must be nullified, especially to contribute to the strengthening and expansion of the Japanese and Manchurian national defense power necessary to overcome the international crisis which we may encounter before long. Accordingly, the enforcement of the Monarchy must act upon the following three essential points.
 1. When enforcing the Monarchy, the constitutional system and all other important laws must be re-investigated, the Board of State Affairs strengthened, the council office improved and other necessary reformations must be made so that there will be no hindrance or check-up on the development of state affairs of Manchukuo and upon the execution of our national policies.
 2. Basic reformation must be exercised upon the internal structure of the present government, especially upon the personnel, so that there will be no violation of distinction in the Imperial Court and so that the evils attending court politics may be plucked out beforehand.

3. It shall be kept in mind that though the Monarchy will be carried into effect, there will be no change in the policy or spirit of directing Manchukuo and that there shall be no hindrance whatever to the execution of national policies. For this reason, existing conventions and agreements between Japan and Manchukuo must be acknowledged by Manchukuo with the realization of the monarchy as well as to make clear the directing power of foreign policies and to arrange an exchange of letters, the substance being that inscribed in the additional document, between the Ambassador to China Ashikari and the Minister of State Affairs Tei.
- II. The drafting of the declaration of the monarch's accession to the throne must be directed under particular prudence and must make distinct the true meaning of the Manchurian monarchy and the indivisible relationship between Japan and Manchuria as well as to take precautions to ward off possible misunderstandings and evil propaganda of other countries.
- III. Judging from our Empire's or other countries' examples and the present conditions in Manchukuo, the enactment and promulgation of the formal constitution must receive every caution, so the investigation must be continued that it may be enforced at an appropriate time in the future.

(The Letter to be received A)

The plan of an official dispatch to be dispatched by the Minister of State Affairs of Manchukuo to the Ambassador of Japan to Manchukuo.

Dear sir, I, the Minister of State Affairs, have the honor of notifying your excellency of councillor Fugi's accession to the throne of Manchukuo on the day of in the year of Daido and that thus, the monarchy of Manchukuo is established, and also of requesting the communication of this dispatch to your government by your excellency.

I sincerely desire the promotion of our friendly relationship upon this occasion.

Yours respectfully.

Date.

The minister of state affairs of Manchukuo
Tei Kosho.

To his Excellency Ashikari Takashi,
The Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Japan
residing in Manchukuo.

(The Letter in answer A)

The plan of the official dispatch to be dispatched by the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo to the Minister of State Affairs of Manchukuo.

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Dear Sir, I take great pleasure in complying with your letter of the
of in the year of Daido notifying me of councillor
Fugi's accession to the throne and of the establishment of the Monarchy
and also requesting me to communicate this message to the Japanese
Government.

I have the honor of answering your excellency under instructions from
the Japanese government that she takes great pleasure in acknowledging
your excellency's notification.

I sincerely wish for the promotion of the friendly relationships now
existing between both countries on this occasion.

Yours respectfully,

Date

Ashikari Takashi, The Ambassador extraordinary
and plenipotentiary of Japan residing in
Manchukuo.

To his Excellency, the Minister of State Affairs of Manchuria
Tei Kosho.

(The letter to be received B.)

The plan of the official dispatch to be dispatched by the Minister of
State Affairs of Manchukuo to the Japanese Ambassador in Manchukuo.

Dear Sir, I have the honor of informing your excellency that concerning
my letter of (date) relating to the accession to the throne of the
Emperor of Manchukuo, the Manchurian Empire will proclaim to respect
the existing conventions and agreements between Manchukuo and Japan
or the Japanese people, and also to discuss thoroughly and confident-
ially beforehand all matters relating to the Manchurian Empire's
declaration of war, reconciliation, conclusion of conventions and other
foreign political affairs in compliance with the spirit of national
co-defense prescribed in the Japanese Manchurian Protocol signed on
the 15th of September in the first year of Daido. I request your
excellency to dispatch to your government the above-mentioned facts.

Yours very truly,

Date

Tei Kosho, The Minister of State Affairs
of Manchukuo.

To his Excellency Ashikari Takashi, the Ambassador extraordinary
and plenipotentiary of Japan to Manchukuo.

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(The letter in answer B)

The plan of the official dispatch to be dispatched by the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo to the Minister of State Affairs of Manchukuo.

Dear Sir, I take it as a great pleasure to comply with your letter of the (date) requesting me as following:

Concerning my letter of (date) relating to the accession to the throne of the Emperor of Manchukuo, the Manchurian Empire will proclaim to respect the existing conventions and agreements between Manchukuo and Japan, or the Japanese people, and also to discuss thoroughly and confidentially beforehand, all matters relating to the Manchurian Empire's declaration of war, reconciliation, conclusion of conventions and other foreign political affairs in compliance with the spirit of national co-defense prescribed in the Japanese-Manchurian Protocol signed on the 15th of September in the first year of Daido. I request your excellency to dispatch to your government the above-mentioned facts.

I have the honor of answering your letter under the instructions of the Japanese government that the proclamation of respecting conventions, agreements or contracts is acknowledged and that there exists no objections concerning the proposal of the discussion by the two governments.

Yours very truly,

Date

Ashikari Takashi,

The Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary
of Japan to Manchukuo.

To his excellency the Minister of State Affairs of Manchukuo,
Tei Koshu.

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DOCUMENT 2412

CERTIFICATE

I, SHIMODA, hereby certify that I am officially con-
nected with the Japanese Government in the capacity
of Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, and
that the exchange of Notes as outlined in the IPS
document 10142 was taken place at Hsin ching between Takashi
Nishikari, Japanese Ambassador, and Cheng hsiao hsii,
Prime Minister of the Manchukuo Government, on 1 March,
1934.

Signed at Tokyo on this
10th day of July, 1946.

/s/ C. Shimoda

Chief of the Archives Section
Foreign Office.

Witness /s/ Mr. Duma

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EX 4 # 235

DOCUMENT 2412

CERTIFICATE

I, SHIMODA, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the capacity of Chief of the Archives Section, Foreign Office, and that the exchange of Notes as outlined in the IPS document 10142 was taken place at Hsin ching between Takashi Hishikari, Japanese Ambassador, and Cheng hsiao hsii, Prime Minister of the Manchukuo Government, on 1 March, 1934.

Signed at Tokyo on this
10th day of July, 1945.

/s/ C. Shimoda
Chief of the Archives Section
Foreign Office.

Witness /s/ H. Dava

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EXN. 240

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FROM: NISHIO, Toshizo, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army

TO : FURUSO, Mikio, Vice Army Minister, 25 October 1935

SUBJECT: Concerning Plans for Controlling Organs Directing Public Opinion in Manchuria.

I herewith send the enclosed record of resolutions of the KOHO Committee which we had reported in the telegram No. kai-sen-den 220.

PLAN FOR THE CONTROLLING ORGANS DIRECTING PUBLIC OPINION IN MANCHURIA

Object

This plan aims at the unification of press and news agencies under the Japanese Government, the Manchukuo Government and the Manchurian Railway Co. Ltd. as well as the rationalization of the management, in order to secure the independence of public opinion in Manchuria and to facilitate and ascertain the unitary control and execution of propaganda by which is necessary to accomplish the national policies.

Outline

1. The following press and news agencies under the guidance of the Japanese Government, the Manchukuo Government and the Manchurian Railway Co. Ltd. shall be unified and consolidated into one, "The Manchuria Kohe Association."

- The Manchukuo News Agency
- The Manchuria Daily News
- The Mukden Daily News
- The Great Ksinking Daily News
- The Harbin Daily News
- The Soikyo Times
- The Daido-Ko
- The Manchu-Mongolia Daily News
- The English Manchurian Newspaper
- The Russian Harbin Times
- The Shinin
- The Manchurian State of Affairs Information Bureau

2. This association shall be a foundation. Among the above mentioned press and news agencies, the companies which are not foundations shall be immediately included in this association and the companies which are juridical persons shall be included after legal procedures. Some companies included into this association may be combined with others or abolished.

3. All the companies in this association shall be united into the following three organs, namely The Manchukuo News Agency, the Manchurian Daily News (in Japanese, English and Russian) and the Kotoku-Ko (Soikyo

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Times and Daido-Ho shall be combined and the Manchu-Mongolia Daily News in Korean shall be issued). The management will be conducted as follows:

The Manchurian State of Affairs Information Bureau shall be attached to the headquarters.

1. The Manchurian News Agency.

This agency shall publish various news with its head office in Hsinking and branches in Dairen and in the seats of provincial governments.

It shall newly begin the broadcasting of wireless news to foreign countries and contract with foreign news agencies, and especially, enter into a sisterly relation with the agencies in Japan as soon as the agencies there are unified into one body. More importance shall be attached to the branches in Tokyo, Osaka, Tientsin and Shanghai.

2. Presses

a. The Manchurian Daily News

The central edition - Dairen

The Kwantung edition - Dairen

The English edition (the present Manchurian Daily News) - Dairen

The Mukden edition (the present Mukden Daily News) - Mukden

The Hsinking edition (the present Great Hsinking Daily News)

(The central edition shall also be published in Hsinking until the removal of the head office there.) - Hsinking

The Harbin edition (the present Harbin Daily News) - Harbin

The Russian edition (the present Harbinsconi Valoniya /T.M. transliteration/ - Harbin

The Mukden edition and the Harbin edition may not be published for some time, but in that case, the South Manchuria edition and the North Manchuria edition will be issued in Hsinking.

The head office shall be placed, for the time being, in Dairen but shall be moved to Hsinking on an early occasion.

b. The Kotoku-Ho

The central edition (the present Daido-Ho /united with the Seikyō Times/)

The Korean edition (the present Manchu-Mongolia Daily News) Hsinking

The Kotoku-Ho tri-monthly edition (the present Shinin)

4. This association shall have its headquarters in Hsinking to supervise and direct the business of the companies which belong to this organization and it shall be conducted by the following personnels:

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The managing director (honorary office allowance shall be given) - 1 person

The vice managing director (salaried office) - 1 person

The directors (honorary office allowance shall be given - 3 persons; salaried office) - 1 person

The supervisors (honorary office allowance shall be given) - 2 persons

The councillors (honorary office allowance shall be given) - This office shall be held by the Hsinking representatives of the concerned companies and corresponding persons of companies which have their head offices in Hsinking.

The clerks (the salaried office) - 3 persons

The general and miscellaneous office work (the salaried office) - 3 persons

Advisers may be appointed when required.

5. Propaganda in Manchukuo conducted by this association shall be carried out chiefly by the press offices and propaganda to foreign countries shall be carried out by the news agencies with the help of the press. For the above mentioned object, this association shall decide upon the policy and means for propaganda and convey them to the companies and control their propaganda operations.

6. The expenses required by the association shall be managed according to the following stipulations:

1. After the formation of the association, it shall be managed by the expenses of the companies that belong to it.

2. The subsidies being given to the companies at present by concerned bodies shall be continued. In future above mentioned subsidies shall be given to the Association by the Koko Committee.

3. The expenses required in forming the association shall be paid by the Kwantung Army, the Manchukuo Government and by the Manchurian Railway Co. Ltd., though it is a matter to be decided upon at each occasion.

7. Organs in Japan and Manchuria connected with this association shall control and direct this association by the following means in order to have the movements of this association in full cooperation towards the accomplishment of our national policies.

1. This association shall be given necessary directions by the Koko Committee concerning the authority of guiding public opinion.

2. The personnel administration of the managing staff of this association and the news agencies belonging to this association shall be decided upon with the consent of the Koko Committee.

8. The following policies shall be adopted to help the development of this association:

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1. The establishment of a new press shall not be permitted, but new local editions may be published if necessary. The buying up of the remaining existing newspapers by others shall be avoided and they shall be left to take their own course.

2. The printing of Manchurian editions of home papers in Manchukuo shall be prohibited and efforts shall be made to check their illegal debouchment.

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COLLECTION OF DECISIONS DECIDED AT CABINET MEETINGS
REGARDING MANCHURIA (JULY 1939) ISSUED BY THE SECOND
SECTION OF THE EAST ASIAN BUREAU OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY

The Summary of Japanese Manchurian Economical Administration
Policy

(Decided on the cabinet meeting on 20th of March in
the 9th Year of SHOWA (1934)).

I The Administration Policy

Based on the fundamental policy of developing Manchuria as an
independent nation possessing an indivisible relationship with Japan,
and with the spirit of co-existence and co-prosperity, the Japanese-Manchurian
Administering Policy will be established with the stabilization and
promotion of the living of the people, establishing securely the
base of Japan's world wide economic expansion and the strengthening
of Manchuria's economic powers as its aims.

(1) According to the existence of resources, the industrial
situation in existence, and the conditions of the development of
national economics, adequate measures suitable for the locality may
be adapted, although the ultimate aim is to unify rational Japanese
Manchurian economics as one organized body.

(2) The reformation of the now existing economical evils must
be made with the advantages of the nationals of both countries as
its keynote.

A systematical economy of Japan and Manchuria applicable for
peace time as well as in emergencies must be established so as to be
adaptable to the international circumstances.

II Summary of General Administrations

(1) The transportation, communication and other enterprises
in Manchuria, restricted by the demands of the Japanese Empire's
national defense will be anticipated of its speedy development under
the power and appropriate administration of the Empire.

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(2) Although most of the enterprises in Manchukuo outside the limits mentioned above will be operated by fair and open economic activities of nationals or foreigners under the administration of Manchukuo, basic matters having a special important bearing on the operation of Japanese and Manchurian economies, will be put under suitable administration and orderly development will be anticipated.

(3) The finances of Manchukuo, under appropriate administrations must maintain smooth harmony with the financial organizations of the Empire and must indicate effective and adequate communications between the capital of the Empire and the resources of Manchukuo. Furthermore, the investment of an adequate third country will be induced within limits which will not impair the administration policy.

(4) In order to provide the technique and labour necessary for the development of industry in Manchuria, a greatest possible number of Japanese must be colonized under certain administrations.

(5) Stress must be laid up on developing resources for which both countries not rely upon foreign supplies as well as to strive to become firm and excellent markets for each other and to avoid all unnecessary conflicts concerning export of the same kind of products to the third country amongst the contemporaries.

The commercial relations of both countries towards neighboring countries especially towards China must be promoted so as to contribute to the commercial union.

(6) It is needless to say that on actualizing the present policy, each office must co-operate and take the best measures available and embodiment of the economic policy of Manchukuo, depends chiefly on the internal guidance of the economic organizations of Manchukuo.

III Methods of Administration

The principle of Manchurian economics lies in the promotion of indivisible relationship with that of Japan as well as to make adequate executive and capitalistic administrations judging from the point of the open door and of the equal opportunity principle and from the nature, and conditions of all kinds of business when affairs need administration.

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The outline is as follows:

(1) Enterprises of the following kinds will be operated by special companies which hold a dominant position among the said business in Manchukuo as a general rule these will be directly or indirectly under the special protection and supervision of the Empire. Though adequate administration according to this purport will be exercised, the nationality of the said company not yet established will chiefly be that of Manchukuo.

(1) Principle matters concerning transportation and correspondence.

(2) Iron and steel works

(3) Light metal industry

(4) Petroleum industry

(5) Substituting liquid fuel industry

(6) Automobile industry

(7) Ammunition industry

(8) Mining of lead, zinc, nickel and asbestos ores

(9) Coal mining

(10) Ammonium sulphate industry

(11) Soda industry

(12) Gold mining

(13) Electro-industry

(14) Lumbering

(2) On the following enterprises appropriate executive or capitalistic administration is exercised upon the line of encouragement and assistance.

(1) Salt industry

(2) Pulp industry

(3) Cultivation of raw cotton

(4) Raising of sheep

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(6) Hemp industry

(3) On the following enterprises executive administration is exercised on the restriction purport judging from the conditions of the industry in our country.

(1) Textile industry

(2) Rice growing

(3) Sericulture

(4) Steam trawling

(4) The enterprises not mentioned in the above three articles will be left to natural development with the exception of the national postal work and salt and opium monopoly but the injustice of producing conditions such as reversely caused by the following of the customs duties of the important export products of our country, and these will be reformed as soon as possible, but until then, adequate interim measures must be taken.

(5) Income duties of Manchukuo relating to the industry which is especially appropriate for our country to support or to develop, will be, after considering the consequences to the finances of the said country, adjusted suitably as soon as possible. For this reason, the import duties of articles which will not be a draw back to Japanese and Manchurian commerce may be raised if necessary.

The export duties of Manchukuo will be abolished as soon as is permissible from the financial point of view.

(6) The import duties of our country will be adjusted with the same purport as that of Manchukuo. However, on the import of farm products, economical conditions of the farmers in our country must be considered.

(7) Adequate measures must be taken to facilitate transportation of articles necessary for the co-defense of the two countries.

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4. The Principles of Control of Classified Branches of Industries

It is expected that practical measures for control of classified branches of industries should be further discussed and promptly established. The principles of control, however, are as follows:

(1) Traffic and Communication

It is not only of utmost importance for national defence as well as for maintenance of public order to arrange and strengthen traffic and communication of Manchuria, especially internal traffic and communication facilities and those between Japan and Manchuria, and to render their operations reasonable, but it is also quite essential for the development of Manchurian economy and for the control of economy of Japan and Manchuria. Above all, special efforts should be made to render railway and shipping freight rates more reasonable.

(2) General and Mining Industries

a) Iron and Steel Industry

It should be rapidly developed, keeping close connections and in concert with the identical industry in Japan.

b) Light Metal Industry

Its rapid development should be expected keeping connections with the previously arranged plan of Japan.

c) Petroleum Industry

Its rapid development should be expected.

d) Substitute Liquid Fuel Industry

Its rapid development should be expected.

e) Automobile Industry

Its rapid development should be expected, keeping close connections and concert with the identical industry in Japan.

f) Arms Industry

Its rapid development should be expected.

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g) Lead, Zinc, Nickel, Asbestos, etc. Ore Mining Industry.

Its rapid development should be expected.

h) Coal Mining Industry.

It should be developed with the object of contributing to the utility of coal to various industries, by exercising strict control of the coal mining industries of Japan and Manchukuo and by bringing about smoothness of demand and supply in both countries, as well as of increasing export of Manchurian coal to other countries.

i) Sulphuric Ammonia Industry.

Its rapid development should be expected, taking into consideration the agricultural demand of Japan and Manchukuo as well as the present state of progress of Japan's identical industry.

j) Alkali Manufacturing Industry.

Its rapid development should be expected, in consideration of the demand of national defense and the present state of progress of Japan's identical industry.

k) Gold Mining Industry.

Its rapid development should be expected.

l) Electrical Industry.

Its development should be accelerated.

m) Salt Industry.

Its rapid development should be expected.

n) Pulp Industry.

Its development should be accelerated.

o) Fibre Industry.

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p) Milling Industry.

Its development should be accelerated.

q) Oil and Grease Industry.

Its development should be accelerated.

r) Hemp-dressing Industry.

Its development should be accelerated.

s) Paper Industry.

Its development should be accelerated, in consideration of the present state of progress of Japan's identical industry.

t) Cement Industry.

Its development should be accelerated, in consideration of the present state of progress of Japan's identical industry.

(3) Agriculture

a) Cotton Raising.

Systematical improvement and increase of raising should be projected in order to expect its rapid development.

b) Wheat Raising.

Special effort should be made for its systematical improvement and increase of raising in consideration of the present state of demand and supply in our country.

c) Rice Raising.

Considering the present state of demand and supply in our country, its production should be controlled.

d) Silk-raising Industry.

Considering the influence on the identical industry in Japan, its production should be controlled.

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Notes:

(1) The agricultural products, the prevention and increase of raising of which should be projected positively in Kamakura, are generally as follows:

- | | |
|--|----------|
| 1. Tobacco | 2. Hops |
| 3. Seed oil plants such as peanut and sesame, etc. | |
| 4. Hop | 5. Resin |

(2) The agriculture products, the improvement of quality of which should be projected with utmost effort, but the increase of raising of which should be left to natural progress, are generally as follows:

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Soya bean | 2. Hoiliang |
| 3. Indian corn | 4. Upland rice-plant |
| 5. Barley | 6. Buckwheat |
| 7. Millet | 8. Dacca-grass |
| 9. Carrot | 10. Fruit-trees & Citrus |
| 11. Wild silkworm | 12. German millet |

(4) Stock-raising

a) Sheep raising

Its rapid development should be expected by systematic improvement and increase of raising.

b) Horse raising

Considering especially the demands of national defense, efforts should be made toward its systematic improvement and increase of raising.

c) Cattle raising.

Its improvement and increase of raising should be accelerated.

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d) Swine raising.

Its improvement and increase of raising should be accelerated.

(5) Forestry

The object of the development of Manchurian forestry lies in maintaining the advantages of forests perfectly by reasonable management - by controlling reckless deforestation by careful protection and by continuous reforestation, etc., thereby contributing to river improvement and earth conservancy; besides supplying the demand of Japan and Manchukuo as to lumber and wood-pulp.

(6) Marine Products Industry.

In conformity with our country's policy towards the Marine products industry, the protection and increase of production of the Manchurian Marine products industry should be projected in order to realize ever-lasting utility. For this purpose, Manchukuo should not encourage trawling fishery by steam-ships and trawl-boats.

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Treaty between Japan and Manchoukuo concerning the Residence of Japanese Subjects, Taxation, etc., in Manchoukuo.

Whereas the Government of Japan, in accordance with the principle of the protocol between Japan and Manchoukuo signed on the fifteenth of September of the seventh year of Showa, have, for the purpose of furthering the healthy development of Manchoukuo and also of promoting and perpetuating the intimate and inseparable relationship now subsisting between Japan and Manchoukuo, decided to abolish, by progressive stages, the right of extra-territoriality at present enjoyed in Manchoukuo by Japan, and to adjust and transfer the administrative rights over the South Manchuria Railway Zone; and,

Whereas the Government of Manchoukuo, appreciating this decision by the Government of Japan have, in return recognized the necessity of ensuring and enhancing the common prosperity of Japanese and Manchoukuo subjects within the territories of Manchoukuo;

Now, therefore, with reference to the right of extra-territoriality and the administrative rights over the South Manchuria Railway enjoyed in Manchoukuo by Japan, the Government of Japan and Manchoukuo have agreed at the first step as follows concerning the residence of, and the enjoyment of various rights and interests by, Japanese subjects, and the application of the laws and ordinances of Manchoukuo concerning taxation, industries, etc.

Article 1.

Japanese subjects shall be free within the territories of Manchoukuo to reside and travel and engage in agriculture, commerce and industry, and to pursue callings and professions, whether public or private, and shall also enjoy all the rights relating to land.

Japanese subjects shall not, in respect of the enjoyment of all rights and interests within the territories of Manchoukuo, be accorded less favorable treatment than that which is or may be accorded to the subjects of Manchoukuo.

Article 2.

Subject to the stipulation of the Supplementary Agreement to the present Treaty, Japanese subjects shall be governed within the territories of Manchoukuo by the provisions of the administrative laws and ordinance of Manchoukuo concerning taxation, industries, etc.

The Japanese Government agrees that, subject to the stipulations of the aforesaid Agreement, the laws and ordinances of Manchoukuo mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be in force within the South Manchuria Railway Zone on the principles of statutus relia.

In respect of the application of present Article, Japanese subjects shall not, under any circumstances, be accorded less favorable treatment than that which is or may be accorded to the subjects of Manchoukuo.

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Article 3.

The stipulations of the preceding two Articles, insofar as they are applicable to juristic persons, apply to Japanese juristic persons.

Article 4.

The stipulations of the present Treaty shall not prejudice the rights, privileges, immunities and exemptions of particular Japanese subjects or juristic persons based on the special engagements entered into between Japan and Manchoukuo.

Article 5.

The present Treaty shall come into force on the 1st of July, the Eleventh Year of Showa, corresponding to the 1st of July, the Third Year of Kangle.

Article 6.

The official text of this Treaty shall be Japanese and Chinese, and in case of a difference of interpretation between the two texts, the difference will be settled according to the Japanese text. As proof to the above, the following have signed and sealed with rightful authority received from their respective governments.

Two copies of this document have been made on 10 June of the 11th Year of Showa (1936) or 10 June of the 3rd Year of Kangle at Hsinking.

Kenkichi UEDA, Japanese Ambassador
Plenipotentiary in the Manchoukuo Empire.
Chang Yen-ching, Foreign Minister of the
Manchoukuo Empire.

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"SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT

EXH 238

"In signing today the treaty between Japan and Manchukuo concerning the residence of Japanese subjects, taxation, etc., in Manchukuo, the respective plenipotentiaries of the two countries have agreed as follows:

"Article 1

"The Government of Manchukuo shall speedily take necessary steps in order that the rights of lease by negotiation hitherto possessed by Japanese subjects shall, in accordance with the different natures of such rights, be converted into landownership or other rights relating to land, as the case may be.

"Article 2

"The scope of the administrative laws and ordinances of Manchukuo concerning taxation, industries, etc., which govern Japanese subjects under Article 2 of the treaty and the manner of application thereof, shall previously be decided upon by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo.

"In case the Government of Manchukuo intend to make any important alterations in respect of the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo which govern Japanese subjects under the stipulations of the preceding paragraph, they shall, until such time as Japanese subjects come within the jurisdiction of the law courts of Manchukuo, obtain the previous approval of the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo.

"The laws and ordinances of Manchukuo, whereon a decision by consultation shall be made immediately after the coming into force of the treaty in accordance with the stipulations of the first paragraph of this article, shall in the main be confined to laws and ordinances relating to the land tax, immovable-property contract tax, business tax, juristic person's business tax, crop-output tax, timber tax, mining tax, mining registration tax, alcoholic drinks tax, cigarette tax, consolidated taxes, commercial registration tax, patent registration tax, utility-model registration tax and local taxes; and to administrative laws and ordinances relating to industrial property, weights and measures, measurement, mining, markets, stock-farming, money exchange and monopoly.

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"In levying upon Japanese subjects the business tax and juristic person's business tax of the various taxes enumerated in the preceding paragraph and the house tax and household income tax in the category of local taxes, the Government of Manchukuo shall, for the time being after the coming into force of the treaty, apply reduced rates in accordance with a decision to be previously made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo; and, of local taxes, the additional business tax shall be based on the amount of tax assessed at such reduced rates. It is provided that the reduced rates to be applied immediately after the coming into force of the treaty shall be one-fourth the original rates in respect of the business tax, household income tax and the house tax levied on individuals, and one-third of the original rates in respect of the juristic person's business tax and the house tax levied on juristic persons.

"Article 3

"The application and execution, in respect to Japanese subjects, of the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo, which govern Japanese subjects under Article 2 of the treaty, shall, in so far as such application and execution require judicial procedure, be effected by Japanese consular officers until such time as Japanese subjects come within the jurisdiction of the law courts of Manchukuo.

"In cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, Japanese consular officers shall, subject to the general rules and principles of consular jurisdiction, apply the relevant laws and ordinances of Manchukuo. It is provided that, of the punishments provided for in such laws and ordinances, 'yu-chi-tu-hsing' shall be regarded and applied as 'chō-eki' (imprisonment with hard labor) or 'kinko' (imprisonment without hard labor); 'chu-i' as 'chō-eki' (imprisonment with hard labor) 'kinko' (imprisonment without hard labor) or 'kōryū' (detention), 'fa-chin' as 'bak-kin' (fine) or 'karyō' (administrative penalty), and 'kuo-tai-chi', as 'ka-ryō' (negligence penalty).

"In case a fine, administrative penalty or negligence penalty is imposed or an article is confiscated, in accordance with the stipulations of this Article, the proceeds of such fine, administrative penalty or negligence penalty and the confiscated article shall revert to the treasury of the Government of Manchukuo.

"Article 4

"In accordance with an agreement with the Government of Manchukuo to be made separately from the present treaty, the Government of Japan shall abolish or transfer, not later than 31 December

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the 12th Year of Showa, corresponding to 31 December the 4th Year of Kangte (31 December 1937), the administrative police existing within the territories of Manchukuo; and, of the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo mentioned in Article 2 of the treaty, those which concern taxation and those which have a special bearing upon administrative police within the South Manchuria Railway Zone shall not, until the aforesaid abolition or transfer of administrative police within the territories of Manchukuo is effected, be put in force within the said zone. The scope of those laws and ordinances of Manchukuo which, as above referred to, have a special bearing upon administrative police within the South Manchuria Railway Zone shall previously be decided upon by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo.

"The Government of Manchukuo shall, in view of the stipulations of the preceding paragraph, perfect their police system and make the reparations necessary for taking over the Japanese institutions and staffs concerned.

"Until the transfer of administrative police within the South Manchuria Railway Zone is effected and, in order to ensure the equality of the incidence of taxation upon Japanese subjects residing within and without the said zone, the Japanese Government shall levy within the zone, from the date of the coming into force of the treaty taxes which are insofar as possible the same as the national taxes imposed by Manchukuo upon Japanese subjects.

"The Government of Manchukuo shall not levy local taxes within the South Manchuria Railway Zone until after the institutions of the South Manchuria Railway Company concerning public works, education, sanitation etc., existing within the said zone shall have been disposed of in accordance with an agreement to be reached between the Governments of Japan and Manchukuo apart from the present treaty.

"Article 5

"Simultaneously with the coming into force within the South Manchuria Railway Zone of the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo under Article 2 of the treaty, the Government of Manchukuo shall take over, in the condition then existing, the Japanese institutions and staffs concerned, in accordance with a decision to be previously made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo.

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"Article 6

"If any Japanese subject makes a complaint against the administrative measures taken by the competent authorities of Manchukuo with reference to the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo which govern Japanese subjects under Article 2 of the treaty, the Government of Manchukuo shall take appropriate steps to redress the grievance.

"Article 7

"Matters which have been decided upon by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo, and also matters in respect to which the approval of the said Japanese Ambassador has been obtained by the Government of Manchukuo, in accordance with the stipulations of the present agreement, shall be made known in the official Gazettes of both Japan and Manchukuo.

"Article 8

"The present agreement shall come into force simultaneously with the treaty.

"In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of Manchukuo have signed this agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

"Done at Hsinking this 10th day of the sixth month of the 11th Year of Showa, corresponding to the 10th day of the sixth month of the 3rd Year of Kangte (10 June 1936).

"(L.S.) Kenkichi UEDA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Manchukuo.

"(L.S.) CH'EN Yen-ching, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo.

"Agreed Terms of Understanding between the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of Manchukuo, with Reference to the Treaty Between the Two Countries concerning the Residence of Japanese Subjects, Taxation, Etc., in Manchukuo, and to the Supplementary Agreement thereto:

"I. With reference to Article 1 of the treaty:

"In case a Japanese subject desires to acquire any right concerning land in an unopened Mongol region, he shall be required to obtain the permission of the competent authorities of Manchukuo.

"II. With reference to Article 2 of the treaty:

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"1. In view of the fact that, within the territories of Manchukuo, Japanese communities are carrying on educational work for Japanese subjects, the Government of Manchukuo shall, in accordance with a decision to be made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo, pay each year a share of the expenses of educational work for Japanese subjects within the territories of Manchukuo.

"2. The Government of Manchukuo shall further improve the existing system of taxation.

"3. The Government of Manchukuo shall, in applying the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo which govern Japanese subjects under Article 2 of the treaty, take the necessary steps to protect the rights and interests which Japanese subjects now enjoy under the laws, ordinances or customs of Japan.

"III. In reference to Article 4 of the Supplementary Agreement to the treaty:

"The imposition and collection of consumption taxes on articles produced within and consumed without the South Manchuria Railway Zone, and also on articles produced without and consumed within the said zone, shall be decided upon by consultation between the competent authorities of Japan and of Manchukuo.

"Done at Hsinking this 10th day of the sixth month of the 11th Year of Showa, corresponding to the 10th day of the sixth month of the 3rd Year of Kangte (10 June 1936).

"(L.S.) Kenkichi UEDA
"(L.S.) CHANG Yen-ching."

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Again, several speakers have stated that the League is the life-line of their existence. This statement is, as I understand it, primarily made for the promotion of the self-interest of each individual Member. In Japan, we entertain a similar notion when we refer to Manchuria. That idea was first on a self-interest, and secondly on that great policy of Japan by which I have had occasion to refer - the maintenance of peace and order in East Asia. Nevertheless, primarily we refer to Manchuria as our life-line from the standpoint of our own self-interest. I do not claim to know exactly the intentions of these speakers in referring to the "life-line", but I do say that these gentlemen, when they speak of the League of Nations as their own life-line, admit that they are speaking primarily from self-interest, and I submit that it is only fair to allow us Japanese to present our case and make contentions based on the self-interests of Japan.

I will say a few words about Manchukuo. As I have already had occasion to point out, the conditions in Manchukuo are improving and the situation compares favourably with that of China proper today. Its administration is working in a better way; its finances are assured; the most difficult question of currency offers no reason for anxiety. Our idea is that the healthy development of Manchukuo will eventually contribute to the attainment of the high object for which the League stands.

Manchukuo, when fully developed, will form the cornerstone of peace in the Far East - that is our faith. If, Gentlemen, you wish to know more about Manchukuo, I can inform you that there are in Geneva three gentlemen connected with the Manchukuo Government. One is General Ting, personal representative of the Chief Executive of Manchukuo; another is George Bronson Rea, Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is regarded as one of the greatest authorities on East-Western affairs; and the third is Mr. Arthur H. Heward, formerly Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs of China, who has accepted the position of adviser to the Manchukuo Government. This proposal was made to him by Manchukuo to utilize his knowledge and experience gained in the Maritime Customs of China and later as the head of that great institution which was built up by Sir Robert Hart - perhaps the only institution worth mentioning in China.

May I now refer to the impression in some quarters that the actions of Japan in Shanghai and Manchuria were the actions of militarists. That is not true. That is a misrepresentation and, by the repetition of dogmatic statements which have no foundation, people were led to believe that misrepresentation. The moment our troops acted in Manchuria, the whole of the Japanese nation was roused and supported them. I belong to a political party in Japan, and we Japanese politicians fight among ourselves in much the same way as you. But, once this incident in Manchuria was known, we buried our differences. The people of all classes and of all shades of opinion buried their differences and supported the military officers who had acted as they should have acted. The same can be said about the military actions in Shanghai.

In this connection, will you allow me to suggest to you that if there were no good reason it would be inexplicable that the whole nation should stand by the actions of the officers? There was not one dissenting voice throughout the land. There are sixty-five million Japanese of pure blood, and they all stood up as one man. Do you suppose that they all went mad? Do you suppose that they were all insane? It is a pretty hard thing to make sixty-five million people insane, and I trust that our delegation here are not regarded by you yet as insane. Does not common sense suggest to you that there must have been a very serious reason that we all went not at least suspect - unless you presume that we all went mad - that there must have been some good reason for the sixty-five million people to unite as one man in backing up our actions?

The reason is plain and simple. Our nation regards the issue connected with Manchuria as involving the very existence of Japan; she looks upon it as a question of life and death.

I see it to compare to states - though it may shock some of you - that the irresponsible and misguided voices which were raised in the autumn of last year and the spring of this year in Geneva scared some of our people so much that they made up their minds to confront even the severest sanction under the Covenant - that is to say, economic boycott. They were ready to face it if need be, and I have no doubt you remember - and this does not imply any threat on our part, though our Chinese Colleagues conveniently refer to my utterance as threats because of a particular

emphasis of a certain intonation which is really a habit of mind that even today our nation is prepared to undergo it. And why? Because they believe that it is a question of now or never. They bow not before threats, they stoop not down even under sanctions. They will calmly face them because, rightly or wrongly, they believe that - now or never! And they do believe that they are right.

THE MANCHURIAN RAILWAY CO.

BY MATSUOKA, Yosuke
(President of the SOUTH
MANCHURIAN RAILWAY CO.)

Pub. May 5, 1937

PREFACE

Thirty years has elapsed since the foundation of the SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY CO. Not to mention the esteemed August Administration of our Great Literary and Military Leader, Emperor Hirohito, it was upon the sacrificed blueblood of our 100,000 heroes, that this enlightened life-line was initially established -- a life-line which, in truth, has been our SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY CO."

"Reminiscing the past thirty years, I believe that the cause which brought about the prosperity of today, notwithstanding the many undulations and disturbances, are due to the gracious influence of HIS MAJESTY'S Wisdom and to the appropriate measures taken by our seniors who performed their duties -- obediently supporting HIS MAJESTY'S Administration and, additionally, to the support given to this cause by the people of our country, together, with the everlasting sacrificial spirit given by the employees of the South Manchurian Railway Co. to our national policy and the obligations displayed to die for the fulfillment of this mission. Recalling the innocent days of my youth -- I, at the age of twelve, met my rosy cheeks against the humiliation of the 'Extraterritoriality' and the inferiority of our Empire's international position, -- praying with all my heart for national prosperity and development. At the age of fourteen, I went to AMERICA. On the following year, on the streets of a foreign land far away from home, I heard the news that gun-fire were being exchanged between JAPAN and China. Moreover, the false reports given out by that old and prostrated country immediately propagandized the disadvantages of the Japanese Army and for several days, until the real aspects was clearly made, I was obliged to spend some days in dire anxiety."

"Needless to say, at that time, AMERICA, in general, looked condescendence of our country and, what is worse, there were best disconcerted persons who had gone so far as to claim that JAPAN was a vassal state of China; a circumstance at the time that just couldn't be helped. And, moreover, it

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to carry to sea that there were none that could have
adversely affected the German land of the Alsace. In
the end, I, also, with CHINA with a single kick. As to its
particulars, it is such as that is already known.
I gained victory after victory in each of her battles,
on land and in the sea, approaching CHINA like the wind
striking the dried leaves before her."

"Amidst the astonishment of the world powers, we
conquered our formidable enemy, RUSSIA; thus elevating our
national prestige. National fortunes rose by leaps and
bounds and I, also, grew up into manhood. Thus, at the age
of thirty-five, I obtained a position in the FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BUREAU and at twenty-seven, I made my first foot-print on
MANCHURIA. Since then, thirty some odd years have elapsed:
and until this day of my gray hair, my place was in
MANCHURIA and the SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY CO., where I
partook in their development -- of which I unassumingly
wish to state."

"Now, our allied (brotherhood) nation enjoys the
first advantage of its establishment; its national founda-
tion is all the more solidified; and, with a direct vision
of the active construction works being carried on each day,
our South Manchurian Railway CO. is about to welcome her
twenty-anniversary of her foundation. I cannot but feel
deep emotion."

"Indeed, our SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY CO.'s thirty
years of history directly constitute the chief sectional
chapter in the history of MANCHURIA's development, and it
could be surmised that its future prospects will be
multiplicative in mission and colorful in enterprises.
Therefore, my post, I wish to take this opportunity to
express, though slight it may be, my long-cherished aims."

Yoshiyuki

MATSUOKA, Yosuke (P. 1-3)

II. THE AMERICAN TENTACLE (pp 77-80)
(2) AMERICA behind the times. (pp. 77-79)

"AMERICA at that time, was not an PIONEER, the Spanish War, the revolt in the Philippines, and Cuba busily occupied, for really Cuba had been occupied, being deprived the same time to look, see the effect of H.N.A. that is the reason AMERICA has come in to help the Cubans. It was then that the thought of the United States such cumbersome to the states of relations already established by the various powers in the world, but to let favorable to on a certain limited advantage, was to let every country compete freely." -- -- -- -- --

" -- -- -- -- -- "This was the proposal to the various Open Door Policy consequent issue of 1899, AMERICA'S Secretary of State, by the various powers -- in short, a proposal that will enable to take AMERICA'S position favorable by gaining the confidence of China."

(b) From AMERICA to KOKA (p. 79-80)

"The first is in 1905 (October 31st year) when the Railway King would be arrived in Japan -- during the policy of the Russo-Japanese Conference -- and proposals with AMERICA-Japan, let management of the Manchurian Railway, which did not participate in this policy, raised by MARQUIS KOMURA." (an explanation on this policy, it shall be stated later when consulting on AMERICA.)

"The second is in October of 1908 (April 1908 year) when AMERICA made a proposal with the cabinet members of GLEND, FRANKLIN, and GARDNER, and a meeting in preliminary part in Paris to the construction of a railroad, the between, Baku, the waterway of the Caspian Sea, the UNITED STATES President WILSON. The Secretary of State was KNOX, the American Consul-General in AMERICA was STANT, " -- -- --

" -- -- -- "It need not be held, it is held because AMERICA protested and refused, instead of participating participation in the said project."

"The third deal on the Russian proposal made by KNOX, the American Secretary of State, regarding the nationality of the MANCHURIAN RAILWAY." (Draft on AMERICA and control of the MANCHURIAN RAILWAY).

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"The major portion of the profit on the purchase of control is available to the shareholders of the State of IRELAND, GERMANY, FRANCE, JAPAN, and RUSSIA and AMERICA during October and December of 1909 (MELROSE 1910 22-23) as follows:

- (1) --- Lot 1000, purchased all the railways in Manchuria.
- (2) --- For this purpose, it is stated that the 4,000,000 shares will be sold to the public at 100 cents per share, that the proceeds, say 400,000,000, will be used to purchase the railways of the State of IRELAND, GERMANY, FRANCE, JAPAN, and AMERICA by the United States Government and the principles of equal opportunity.
- (3) --- The Parliament of the United States in the early part of the year 1909, passed the act which gave the United States the right to purchase the railways in Manchuria.
- (4) --- In the statement of this market policy, it is stated that the 4,000,000 shares of the State of IRELAND, GERMANY, FRANCE, JAPAN, and AMERICA will be sold to the public at 100 cents per share, that the proceeds, say 400,000,000, will be used to purchase the railways of the State of IRELAND, GERMANY, FRANCE, JAPAN, and AMERICA by the United States Government and the principles of equal opportunity.

"The bold conquest of Japan (the USA), after conferring on the United States the position of the world's greatest power in the Pacific, will be the first step in the realization of the grand plan of the United States to dominate the world. It is the duty of the United States to take the lead in the world, and to make the world a part of the United States. This plan is to be carried out by the United States Government and the principles of equal opportunity."

(c) The four major Latin parts and others of America has become the international position of America. It is the duty of the United States to take the lead in the world, and to make the world a part of the United States. This plan is to be carried out by the United States Government and the principles of equal opportunity."

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(b) WASHINGTON CONFERENCE

"The main theme of the WASHINGTON CONFERENCE held from the latter part of 1991 to the middle of 1992 was the following year. This conference was held in the form of a conference for our country. It was a display of a strong effect-able forever for those who possess it. Yes, in MONGOLIA-MONGOLIA and China. As I have mentioned in item 8, it seemed as if this conference was held to deprive us, to diminish the international position and the special privileges which we enjoyed in MONGOLIA. Can China? -- which means a further on this single effort, the American habit of towards MONGOLIA and China; -- that is, to attain what she was unsuccessful in attaining in the past. Nevertheless, the attitude shown by AMERICA in the Peking Conference was extremely favorable to China, and suppressive towards Japan. As a result, not to mention the signature of the ANKHO-ORJIDAAI Alliance and the Ishii-Lashin Agreement, China was compelled to abandon the preferential rights of having foreign advisors and instructors in the political, financial, military and police work in South Manchuria, to mention the rights obtained through the result of the 1911-1912 revolution. Moreover, she was compelled to hinder the preferential rights of Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to the Four Power Law Party, created as the result of the American proposal. In regard to this point, just before the occurrence of the Manchurian Incident, I, being grieved at the retrogressive tendency of our diplomacy, have cried loudly to the people, both in and out of office, as follows:

"In regard to this point, it has been, since the time of Marquis Kishu, somebody of a convention for our country to grasp every available opportunity in promoting, step by step, our position towards Japan, Manchuria, and Mongolia, advising every means available to attain superior rights, and by the Ishii-Lashin Agreement concluded in 1912, we have already recognize the so-called special interest of our country in the adjoining area of Manchuria and Mongolia. This has been the time when its highest peak, in the past. But, even this was far from sufficient in letting the people fully recognize the position which should have been ours. And what became of this? Even this so-called Special Interest disappeared with the Washington Conference held in the spring of 1922. Why, not only that, Japan was forced to abandon the so-called

PRIORITY RIGHTS IN MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA, which she had won by the result of the Russo-Japanese War. Thereafter, in regard to MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA, Japan has been in principle, at the least, pressed down to such a position which was not in the least different to those of England and AMERICA, nay, to those of the SOUTH AMERICAN countries, Spain and PORTUGAL." (Refer to my work comment in the whole of last issue)

"Today, seeing the conclusion of the allied pact between Japan and MANCHUO, I am filled with deep emotion when remembering of the past events. What-ever it may be, there is no regret or lingering in the future of progressive JAPAN. To look back to the past and to discuss the future is, after all, a preparation for progression. And, therefore, as far as it concerns the MANCHURIA-MONGOLIA problem, our JAPAN has enhanced to the world at large our conviction of our positive autonomy. Even AMERICA would no longer be able to saddle into our affairs, and the next to come will be, as a matter of fact, the concert based on unflinching and the correct organization of MANCHUO, governed under the rule of right."

THE MANCHURIAN INCIDENT and the S.M.R.
(pp. 268-270)

The AMNE - S.M.R. Cooperation.

"I shall omit the 'cesses of its origination' of the MANCHURIAN Incident. How and in what ways has the SOUTH MANCHURIAN RAILWAY CO. cooperate in the present incident? -- That I shall briefly outline."

"As soon as the MANCHURIAN R.M.R. the advance guard of our Kwantung Army, set out for MUKDEN with its picked troops on September 16, 1931, the S.M.R. from that very outset advised themselves to undertake the troop transportation, to help the army execute their plans. With the expansion of the incident, the army like a shadow followed the army to JAI-SHANG, PSICHANG, etc. to win the MANCHURIAN RAILWAY CO. to win the conviction of AMERICA, ENGLAND, etc. with the conviction of AMERICA, ENGLAND, etc. And, to see that no slips be made in the lightening-like movements of our

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National Army, and also, that in order to fulfill this mission, we have organized, from the beginning to the end, a unified action with our trained cadres, if many years and the various organs in co-operation. We have not only given our assistance in transportation services in the home lines and the carrying on of smooth supply to the front lines. Whilst the roering of shells, we have built bridges in the front lines and also repaired broken railway lines. Furthermore, at times, we have helped carrying munitions to our fighting soldiers in the trench-lines and, also, have made riceballs. Many were the cases where our brethren willingly took to their post and sacrificed themselves in the fulfillment of their duties -- healing, of locomotives at the head of the train charging against the enemy and while in the act of feeding coal -- only with the feeling that, if to die, to die in the battlefield."

"This does not only concern the men connected with the transportation service. It involved every one of the despatched personnels (from JAPAN) in the whole of MANCHURIA; the vast as organizations; even to the factories -- every one of them cooperated in this. Some engaged in collecting information in barracks, some led investigation work, while others took up work of pacificating the masses. Moreover, before and after the foundation of the State of MANCHUKUO, the best were selected to assist in its establishment, and these 'heroes' that were engaged in the duties of investigation and researches exerted the essence of their learning and technicalities accumulated in many years and participated in the constructive policy of the Army."

"In short, during the MANCHUKUO Incident, the entire S.M.R. cooperated with the National Army and, at the same time, participated in the 'secret duty' of founding the State of MANCHUKUO. Furthermore, with the founding of the State, the S.M.R. sent its expert staff to the State of MANCHUKUO to assist the work of its foundation. This spirit of harmony between the Army, S.M.R. and MANCHUKUO has not changed the least even until today. In truth, it has been the spirit that has kept since its foundation, together with the MANCHUKUO Incident, it was further cultivated, which is now still being promoted."

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"As the relationship between Japan and MANCHUKUO is that of one and indivisible, so is the relationship between the Army, MANCHUKUO, and the S.M.A., which is unlimited in oneness and indivisibility. Our S.I.A. which has given brilliant cooperation during the Incident is now diverting its utmost power in giving collaboration and showing cooperative spirit in the general construction of our allied country."

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"SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT

EXH 33

"In signing today the treaty between Japan and Manchukuo concerning the residence of Japanese subjects, the plenipotentiaries of Japan and Manchukuo, the respective plenipotentiaries of the two countries have agreed as follows:

"Article 1

"The Government of Manchukuo shall speedily take necessary steps in order that the rights of lease by negotiation hitherto possessed by Japanese subjects shall, in accordance with the different natures of such rights, be converted into landownership or other rights relating to land, as the case may be.

"Article 2

"The scope of the administrative laws and ordinances of Manchukuo concerning taxation, industries, etc., which govern Japanese subjects under Article 2 of the treaty and the manner of application thereof, shall previously be decided upon by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo.

"In case the Government of Manchukuo intend to make any important alterations in respect of the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo which govern Japanese subjects under the stipulations of the preceding paragraph, they shall, until such time as Japanese subjects come within the jurisdiction of the law courts of Manchukuo, obtain the previous approval of the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo.

"The laws and ordinances of Manchukuo, whereon a decision by consultation shall be made immediately after the coming into force of the treaty in accordance with the stipulations of the first paragraph of this article, shall in the main be confined to laws and ordinances relating to the land tax, immovable-property contract tax, business tax, juristic person's business tax, crop-output tax, timber tax, mining tax, mining registration tax, alcoholic drinks tax, cigarette tax, consolidated taxes, commercial registration tax, patent registration tax, utility-model registration tax and local taxes and to administrative laws and ordinances relating to industrial property, weights and measures, measurement, mining, markets, stock-farming, money exchange and monopoly.

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"In levying upon Japanese subjects the business tax and juristic person's business tax of the various taxes enumerated in the preceding paragraph and the house tax and household income tax in the category of local taxes, the Government of Manchukuo shall, for the time being after the coming into force of the treaty, apply reduced rates in accordance with a decision to be previously made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo; and, of local taxes, the additional business tax shall be based on the amount of tax assessed at such reduced rates. It is provided that the reduced rates to be applied immediately after the coming into force of the treaty shall be one-fourth the original rates in respect of the business tax, household income tax and the house tax levied on individuals, and one-third of the original rates in respect of the juristic person's business tax and the house tax levied on juristic persons.

"Article 3

"The application and execution, in respect to Japanese subjects, of the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo, which govern Japanese subjects under Article 2 of the treaty, shall, in so far as such application and execution require judicial procedure, be effected by Japanese consular officers until such time as Japanese subjects come within the jurisdiction of the law courts of Manchukuo.

"In cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, Japanese consular officers shall, subject to the general rules and principles of consular jurisdiction, apply the relevant laws and ordinances of Manchukuo. It is provided that, of the punishments provided for in such laws and ordinances, 'yu-chi-tu-hsing' shall be regarded and applied as 'chō-eki' (imprisonment with hard labor) or 'kinko' (imprisonment without hard labor); 'chu-i' as 'chō-eki' (imprisonment with hard labor) 'kinko' (imprisonment without hard labor) or 'kōryū' (detention), 'fa-chin' as 'bak-kin' (fine) or 'karyō' (administrative penalty), and 'kuo-tai-chi', as 'ka-ryō' (negligence penalty).

"In case a fine, administrative penalty or negligence penalty is imposed or an article is confiscated, in accordance with the stipulations of this Article, the proceeds of such fine, administrative penalty or negligence penalty and the confiscated article shall revert to the treasury of the Government of Manchukuo.

"Article 4

"In accordance with an agreement with the Government of Manchukuo to be made separately from the present treaty, the Government of Japan shall abolish or transfer, not later than 31 December

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The 12th Year of Showa, corresponding to 31 December (the 4th day of the month of December) (31 December 1937), the administrative police existing within the territories of Manchukuo; and, of the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo mentioned in Article 2 of the treaty, those which concern taxation and those which have a special bearing upon administrative police within the South Manchuria Railway Zone shall not, until the aforesaid abolition or transfer of administrative police within the territories of Manchukuo is effected, be put in force within the said zone. The scope of these laws and ordinances of Manchukuo which, as above referred to, have a special bearing upon administrative police within the South Manchuria Railway Zone shall previously be decided upon by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo.

"The Government of Manchukuo shall, in view of the stipulations of the preceding paragraph, perfect their police system and make the preparations necessary for taking over the Japanese institutions and staffs concerned.

"Until the transfer of administrative police within the South Manchuria Railway Zone is effected and, in order to ensure the equality of the incidence of taxation upon Japanese subjects residing within and without the said zone, the Japanese Government shall levy within the zone, from the date of the coming into force of the treaty taxes which are insofar as possible the same as the national taxes imposed by Manchukuo upon Japanese subjects.

"The Government of Manchukuo shall not levy local taxes within the South Manchuria Railway Zone until after the institutions of the South Manchuria Railway Company concerning public works, education, sanitation etc., existing within the said zone shall have been disposed of in accordance with an agreement to be reached between the Governments of Japan and Manchukuo apart from the present treaty.

"Article 5

"Simultaneously with the coming into force within the South Manchuria Railway Zone of the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo under Article 2 of the treaty, the Government of Manchukuo shall take over, in the condition then existing, the Japanese institutions and staffs concerned, in accordance with a decision to be previously made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo.

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"Article 6

If any Japanese subject makes a complaint against the administrative measures taken by the competent authorities of Manchukuo with reference to the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo which are in force in Manchukuo under Article 2 of the treaty, the Government of Manchukuo shall take appropriate steps to redress the grievance.

"Article 7

Matters which have been decided upon by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Manchukuo and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo, and also matters in respect to which the approval of the said Japanese Ambassador has been obtained by the Government of Manchukuo, in accordance with the stipulations of the present agreement, shall be made known in the official Gazettes of both Japan and Manchukuo.

"Article 8

The present agreement shall come into force simultaneously with the treaty.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of Manchukuo have signed this agreement and affixed their seals thereto.

Done at Hsinking this 10th day of the sixth month of the 11th Year of Showa, corresponding to the 10th day of the sixth month of the 3rd Year of Kangto (10 June 1936).

(L.S.) Kenkichi UEDA, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Manchukuo.

(L.S.) CHEN Yen-ching, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Manchukuo.

Agreed Terms of Understanding between the Plenipotentiaries of Japan and of Manchukuo, with Reference to the Treaty Between the Two Countries concerning the Residence of Japanese Subjects, Taxation, Etc., in Manchukuo, and to the Supplementary Agreement thereto:

"I. With reference to Article 1 of the treaty:

In case a Japanese subject desires to acquire any right concerning land in an unopened Mongol region, he shall be required to obtain the permission of the competent authorities of Manchukuo.

"II. With reference to Article 2 of the treaty:

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"1. In view of the fact that, within the territories of Manchukuo, Japanese communities are providing an educational system for Japanese subjects, the Government of Manchukuo shall, in accordance with a decision to be made by consultation between the Japanese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, provide for the maintenance of the expenses of educational institutions for Japanese subjects within the territories of Manchukuo.

"2. The Government of Manchukuo shall further improve the existing system of taxation.

"3. The Government of Manchukuo shall, in applying the laws and ordinances of Manchukuo which govern Japanese subjects under Article 2 of the treaty, take the necessary steps to protect the rights and interests which Japanese subjects now enjoy under the laws, ordinances or customs of Japan.

"III. In reference to Article 4 of the Supplementary Agreement to the treaty:

The imposition and collection of consumption taxes on articles produced within and consumed without the South Manchuria Railway Zone, and also on articles produced without and consumed within the said zone, shall be decided upon by consultation between the competent authorities of Japan and of Manchukuo.

"Done at Hsinking this 10th day of the sixth month of the 11th Year of Showa, corresponding to the 10th day of the sixth month of the 3rd year of Mengte (10 June 1936).

"(L.S.) Kenkichi UEDA
"(L.S.) CHANG Yen-ching."

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COLLECTION OF CABINET DECISIONS PERTAINING TO MANCHURIA
(July 1939)

Issued by the Second Section of the East Asia Bureau of the
Foreign Office.

The outline of the establishment of heavy industry in Manchukuo.

(The decision of the cabinet meeting on
Oct. 22, 12 Showa, 1937).

The Policy.

Considering from the present internal and external circumstances, it is urgently necessary to expand the industrial abilities centered on the heavy industry. Therefore, in order to secure and advance the developing policy of Manchurian industry and to establish synthetically and speedily the heavy industry of Manchukuo, the form of enterprises must be renovated, the advancement of powerful internal and external capitals induced, and under the national administration the executive abilities must be fully displayed in the following line and thereby contribute to the future development of Japanese and Manchurian economies.

Outline.

1. With the assistance of the Japanese and Manchurian government, a powerful company of a national political nature will be established with the synthetical operation of heavy industry as its aim, so as to establish and develop the heavy industry.
2. The Manchurian government will invest half the amount, and the other half will be investigated by the privates.
The privates mentioned in the above article is scheduled for the Nissan at present. (The present capital of the Nissan being about ¥ 225,000,000 and the approximate number of shareholders is 50,000.)
3. The present company will generally invest dominantly on the following enterprises and will take the leadership in their operations.
 - (a) Iron and steel industry.
 - (b) Light metal industry.
 - (c) Heavy industry (constructing industry of motor cars and aeroplanes)
 - (d) Coal mining.

Allonge: Bujun coal mine of the Manchurian Railway is exempted at present from coal mining.

The present company may invest in and manage annexedly the enterprises relating to gold mining, zinc, lead, copper, and other mining industry.

4. The Manchurian government will transfer gradually the now existing companies executing such enterprises as prescribed in (a) and (b) articles to the supervision of the present company, and companies having

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relations to the enterprises prescribed in the (a) to (d) articles, when newly established, will also be put under the supervision of the present company. The investments of the Manchurian Railway on the enterprises of the above-mentioned nature will be adjusted according to the preceding article on the agreement of the present company.

5. The participation of foreign funds in the above-mentioned enterprises will be permitted, and the inducement of foreign funds are to be devised as well as the foreign technique and equipment. Special stress shall be laid on this as an important matter in the present policy.
6. The foreign funds may participate in each respective company within the limit of possessing half the right of voting, and concerning the present company, it may participate as a stock fund only in shares without the right of voting.
Investments as debentures and in forms of other loans are not restricted.
7. The general capitals of Japan and Manchukuo may participate appropriately in each enterprising company.
8. The Japanese and Manchurian government will give accommodation and assistance to the utmost as to the utilization of the capital transferred from Nissan to the present company, and in the obtaining of necessary capitals in the future.
9. The Manchurian government will think of some suitable good treatment towards the investments in the present company and in the respective companies made by the Japanese and Manchurian privates or by the foreign countries, and the Japanese government will assist in the trusting advancement of these capitals towards Manchukuo in ways such as facilitating the circulation of the shares of the concerning companies in the home market.
10. The Nittetsu and the present company will participate reciprocally in the capitals concerning the iron and steel industry.
11. The management of the present company will be entrusted to a powerful suitable person among the Japanese civilians.
Allonge: The powerful suitable person among the Japanese civilians is pre-arranged as Aynkawa Gisuke, the present president of Nissan, at present.
12. The Manchurian government will adopt adequate supervising methods over the present company and other enterprising companies, and will hold a close communication with the Japanese government concerning the above supervision.
13. On importing the products of the above-mentioned companies into the domains of Japan, the Japanese government will not in reality handle them as foreign goods in relation to customs duties and other things.

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LETTERS HQ. KAN-SUI-HASSU 163

FROM: NISHIO, Toshiro, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army

TO : FURUSO, Mikio, Vice Army Minister, 25 October 1935

SUBJECT: Concerning Plans for Controlling Organs Directing Public Opinion in Manchuria.

I herewith send the enclosed record of resolutions of the KOHO Committee which we had reported in the telegram No. Kan-sui-han 220.

PLAN FOR THE CONTROLLING ORGANS DIRECTING PUBLIC OPINION IN MANCHURIA

Object

This plan aims at the unification of press and news agencies under the Japanese Government, the Manchukuo Government and the Manchurian Railway Co. Ltd. as well as the rationalization of the management, in order to secure the independence of public opinion in Manchuria and to facilitate and ascertain the unitary control and execution of propaganda by which is necessary to accomplish the national policies.

Outline

1. The following press and news agencies under the guidance of the Japanese Government, the Manchukuo Government and the Manchurian Railway Co. Ltd. shall be unified and consolidated into one, "The Manchuria Echo Association."

The Manchukuo News Agency
 The Manchuria Daily News
 The Mukden Daily News
 The Great Hsinking Daily News
 The Harbin Daily News
 The Soikyo Times
 The Daido-Ho
 The Manchu-Mongolia Daily News
 The English Manchurian Newspaper
 The Russian Harbin Times
 The Shimin
 The Manchurian State of Affairs Information Bureau

2. This association shall be a foundation. Among the above mentioned press and news agencies, the companies which are not foundations shall be immediately included in this association and the companies which are juridical persons shall be included after legal procedures. Some companies included into this association may be combined with others or abolished.

3. All the companies in this association shall be united into the following three organs, namely The Manchukuo News Agency, the Manchurian Daily News (in Japanese, English and Russian) and the Kotoku-Ho (Soikyo

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Times and Daido-Ho shall be combined and the Manchu-Mongolia Daily News in Korean shall be issued). The management will be conducted as follows:

The Manchurian State of Affairs Information Bureau shall be attached to the headquarters.

1. The Manchurian News Agency.

This agency shall publish various news with its head office in Hsinking and branches in Dairen and in the seats of provincial governments.

It shall begin the broadcasting of wireless news to foreign countries and contract with foreign news agencies, and especially, enter into a sisterly relation with the agencies in Japan as soon as the agencies there are unified into one body. More important shall be attached to the branches in Tokyo, Osaka, Tientsin and Shanghai.

2. Presses

- a. The Manchurian Daily News
 The central edition - Dairen
 The Erentung edition - Dairen
 The English edition (the present Manchurian Daily News) - Dairen
 The Mukden edition (the present Mukden Daily News) - Mukden
 The Hsinking edition (the present Great Hsinking Daily News)
 (The central edition shall also be published in Hsinking until the removal of the head office there.) - Hsinking
 The Harbin edition (the present Harbin Daily News) - Harbin
 The Russian edition (the present Harbinsseni Veloniya /T.H. transliteration/ - Harbin
 The Mukden edition and the Harbin edition may not be published for some time, but in that case, the South Manchuria edition and the North Manchuria edition will be issued in Hsinking.
 The head office shall be placed, for the time being, in Dairen but shall be moved to Hsinking on an early occasion.
- b. The Kotoku-Ho
 The central edition (the present Daido-Ho /united with the Seikyo Times/)
 The Korean edition (the present Manchu-Mongolia Daily News)) Hsinking
 The Kotoku-Ho tri-monthly edition (the present Shinin))

4. This association shall have its headquarters in Hsinking to supervise and direct the business of the companies which belong to this organization and it shall be conducted by the following personnels:

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The managing director (honorary office allowance shall be given) - 1 person

The vice managing director (salaried office) - 1 person

The directors (honorary office allowance shall be given - 3 persons; salaried office) - 1 person

The supervisors (honorary office allowance shall be given) - 2 persons

The councillors (honorary office allowance shall be given) - This office shall be held by the Hsinking representatives of the concerned companies and corresponding persons of companies which have their head offices in Hsinking.

The clerks (the salaried office) - 3 persons

The general and miscellaneous office work (the salaried office) - 3 persons

Advisors may be appointed when required.

5. Propaganda in Manchukuo conducted by this association shall be carried out chiefly by the press offices and propaganda to foreign countries shall be carried out by the news agencies with the help of the press. For the above mentioned object, this association shall decide upon the policy and means for propaganda and convey them to the companies and control their propaganda operations.

6. The expenses required by the association shall be managed according to the following stipulations:

1. After the formation of the association, it shall be managed by the expenses of the companies that belong to it.

2. The subsidies being given to the companies at present by concerned bodies shall be continued. In future above mentioned subsidies shall be given to the Association by the Keiho Committee.

3. The expenses required in forming the association shall be paid by the Kwantung Army, the Manchukuo Government and by the Manchurian Railway Co. Ltd., though it is a matter to be decided upon at each occasion.

7. Organs in Japan and Manchuria connected with this association shall control and direct this association by the following means in order to have the movements of this association in full cooperation towards the accomplishment of our national policies.

1. This association shall be given necessary directions by the Keiho Committee concerning the authority of guiding public opinion.

2. The personnel administration of the managing staff of this association and the news agencies belonging to this association shall be decided upon with the consent of the Keiho Committee.

8. The following policies shall be adopted to help the development of this association:

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1. The establishment of a new press shall not be permitted, but new local editions may be published if necessary. The buying up of the remaining existing newspapers by others shall be avoided and they shall be left to take their own course.

2. The printing of Manchurian editions of home papers in Manchukuo shall be prohibited and efforts shall be made to check their illegal debouchment.

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EXH 241

Proceedings of the Privy Council
Re: Signing of the Protocol between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO

Meeting opened at 10:10 a.m. September 13 (Tuesday), 1932.
In the presence of His Majesty the EMPEROR.

Persons present:

Chairman KURATOMI
Vice-Chairman HIRANUMA

Ministers:

Premier	SAITO	No. 4
Finance Minister	TAKAHASHI	No. 5
Home Minister	YAMAGOTO	No. 6
Foreign Minister	UCHIDA	No. 7
Railway Minister	MITSUCHI	No. 8
War Minister	ARAKI	No. 9
Education Minister	HATOHAMA	No. 10
Navy Minister	OKADA	No. 11
Justice Minister	KOYAMA	No. 12
Communications Minister	NISHIMI	No. 13
Commerce & Industry Minister	YAMAGATA	No. 14
Agriculture & Forestry Minister	OGOTO	No. 15
Overseas Affairs Minister	YAMAI	No. 16

Councillors:

Councillor	KUROTA	No. 20
"	TOMII	No. 21
"	ISHIYAMA	No. 22
"	KURODA	No. 23
"	FURUKAWA	No. 24
"	SAKURAI	No. 25
"	ARAKI	No. 26
"	YAMAI	No. 27
"	KAWADA	No. 28
"	SUZUKI (Kantaro)	No. 29
"	ISHII	No. 30
"	MIZUMACHI	No. 31
"	OKADA	No. 32
"	ARIMA	No. 33
"	YAMA	No. 34
"	KUROTA	No. 35
"	KURIBAYASHI	No. 36
"	MOTODA	No. 37
"	SUZUKI (Siroku)	No. 38

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Persons absent:

Princes of the Blood:

Prince YASUHITO	No. 1
Prince KOBUHITO	No. 2
Prince KOTOHITO	No. 3

Councillors:

Councillor ITO	No. 18
Councillor KANEKO	No. 19
Councillor ISHINARA	No. 28

Committee Members:

Director of the Bureau of Legislation	HOBINKIHI
Councillor - " -	KANANOGAI
Vice-Foreign Minister	ANITA
Director of the Bureau of Treaty, Foreign Minister	MATSUDA
Director of the Bureau of Asia, - " -	TANI
Secretary of Foreign Office	YANAI
- " -	MORISHIMA
- " -	HARIMA
- " -	TERAJIMA
Vice Minister of War	YANAGANA
Director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, War Minis.	YAMAOKA

Reporter:

Chairman of the Judging Committee	HIRANUMA
Chief-Secretary:	
Chief Secretary	FUTAKAMI
Secretaries:	
Secretary	HOKI
"	MUTOH

Chairman (KUNATOMI): Meeting is called to order. The subject for discussion today is "The Signing of the Protocol between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO." Please note that, because today's meeting has suddenly been called at the request of the Cabinet, the usual procedural steps such as convocation, etc., were dispensed with. First of all, we open the 1st reading. Omitting the oral reading, I request the report of the chairman of the Judging Committee.

Reporter (HIRANUMA): Regarding the signing of the Protocol between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO, which had been referred to this council by His Majesty the Emperor for deliberation, we, who were appointed members of the Judging Committee, called a Committee meeting on the 11th of this month and instituted a close investigation into the matter, after having listened to the explanations given by Ministers and the officials concerned.

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When the old North-Eastern Regime was destroyed with the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September of last year, influential persons in various districts of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA assembled and consulted with each other. As the result, they declared on March 1, this year, the establishment of MANCHUKUO, whereby they broke off relations with the Republic of CHINA and established MANCHUKUO. They further made public the principles of the foundation of the new country, making clear to the world a very fair and proper political programme. Further, the Manchukuo Government gave notifications to our Imperial Government as well as other governments, with the request that formal diplomatic relations be established between MANCHUKUO and these countries. Our Imperial Government firmly believed that, in view of the aforesaid process of the establishment of MANCHUKUO and her sincere attitude at home and abroad, it would be advisable to recognize that country without delay and foster her development not only to maintain the stability of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA, but also to promote permanent peace in the Far East. Nevertheless, our Government, in order to use prudence and caution, watched for half a year since then the developments in MANCHUKUO as well as the attitudes of the League of Nations and other countries. However, MANCHUKUO has since then shown a steady progress and already realized actual independence, which promises for her a very bright future. Besides, indications are that our country's recognition of that country, although it will, as may be easily imagined, cause for a time no small shock to the world, will not bring about any international crisis. Under the circumstances, our country considered it advisable at this juncture to give MANCHUKUO our formal recognition and open friendly relations with her. As the result of negotiations carried for some time between the representatives of the two countries, an agreement of opinion has been arrived at. Accordingly, with a view to regulating the basis of diplomatic relations between the two countries and also maintaining and extending the rights and interests of our country with the object of co-existence and co-prosperity, our country intends to take measures for recognizing MANCHUKUO by concluding an arrangement through this Protocol and the Notes exchanged between the two countries.

The outlines of this Protocol and Notes exchanged are as follows:

1. Protocol

This protocol consists of a preamble and a text. In the preamble, our country approves the fact that MANCHUKUO was freely formed by the will of her people and became an independent state. MANCHUKUO, on the other hand, declared that she will respect the international agreements concluded by the Republic of CHINA so far as the same are applicable to MANCHUKUO. Thereupon the two countries announce that they enter into this Protocol in order to permanently strengthen their good neighborly relations, mutually respect each other's territorial integrity, and secure peace in the Far East. The text contains two clauses:

The first clause provides that, unless special arrangements are made between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO in the future, all rights which JAPAN and her subjects possessed heretofore in MANCHUKUO territory under various Sino-Japanese arrangements and public and private contracts shall be confirmed and respected by MANCHUKUO.

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The second clause provides that both JAPAN and MANCHUKUO shall consider every menace against the territory and peace and order of one party as a menace against the tranquility and existence of the other party, that they pledge to jointly defend themselves, and that, Japanese troops necessary for this purpose shall be stationed in MANCHUKUO.

This protocol shall come into force on the date of its signature (Refer to the closing sentence.) by the representatives of the two countries. That is, Imperial sanction must be obtained before signing, instead of resorting to ratification procedure.

3. Notes exchanged /between the two countries/.

The notes exchanged comprise four in all, consisting of a note exchanged in the past between the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army of JAPAN and the Regent of MANCHUKUO and three arrangements concluded between the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army of JAPAN and the Prime Minister of MANCHUKUO. The MANCHUKUO Government confirms these notes at this time and positively declares that these notes shall continue to remain effective. That is, these notes shall be deemed as international agreements and shall have legal validity, in addition to the virtual effectiveness they hitherto possessed, to be retroactively effective from the days on which they were exchanged or concluded and that these arrangements shall be made strictly confidential by mutual understanding between both JAPAN and MANCHUKUO.

The outlines of the said four documents and for arrangements are as follows:

(1) A letter addressed to HOSIJO, Commander of the KWANTUNG Army, from the Regent of MANCHUKUO under date of March 19, 1933 and a letter in reply addressed to the Regent of MANCHUKUO from the Said Commander.

In the letter addressed to the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army from the Regent of MANCHUKUO, it is stated that the Regent of MANCHUKUO deeply appreciated the efforts made by our country since the outbreak of the MUKDEN Incident in maintaining peace and order in the whole territories of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA and also the serious damages sustained thereby by our Imperial Army as well as our people, and asked for the consent of our country to the undermentioned items inasmuch as MANCHUKUO is convinced that her development cannot be expected without the support and guidance of our country. In the letter in reply thereto, viz., the letter addressed to the Regent of MANCHUKUO from the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army, it is mentioned that there is no objection on our side to the proposal in question.

A. MANCHUKUO shall entrust to our country her national defense and maintenance of peace and order and shall bear all the necessary expenses therefor (Clause I)

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- B. MANCHUKUO agrees that the control of the existing railways, harbours, waterways, air routes, etc., as well as the construction of new routes so far as the same are required by our Imperial Army for the purpose of national defense shall be wholly entrusted to our country or such organizations as our country may designate (Clause II)
- C. MANCHUKUO shall give every possible assistance in connection with various establishments deemed necessary by our Imperial Army. (Clause III)
- D. Japanese with long-sighted views and high reputation shall be appointed state councillors of MANCHUKUO and, besides them, Japanese shall be appointed officials of central as well as local government offices. The selection of such officials shall be made on the recommendation of the commander of the KWANTUNG Army and their dismissals shall be subject to the consent of the said Commander. The increase or the decrease of the total number of state councillors shall, in case our side has a proposal to make, be decided through consultations between the two countries (Clause IV)
- E. The purport as well as the provisions of the afore-mentioned clauses shall be the basis of treaties to be concluded in future between the two countries. (Clause V)

(II) The convention and supplementary agreement on the control of MANCHUKUO Government railways, harbours, waterways, air-routes, etc., as well as the construction and control of railway tracks, concluded between Commander HOUJO of the KWANTUNG Army and MANCHUKUO Prime Minister CHENG under date of August 7, 1932.

- A. MANCHUKUO shall entrust the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army with the following matters, particulars thereof to be agreed upon separately: The control of ten railway lines, such as "SIN-TAO" Line, "KI-CHANG" Line, "KI-TUNG" Line, etc., national railways necessary for the national defense which are to be newly constructed in future, three harbours including that of KULUTAG, waterways on eight rivers, including the SUGARI River, and AMUR River, and air-routes, the construction and the control of ten newly constructed specific railway lines, other national railways and waterways. (Article I)
- B. The Commander of the KWANTUNG Army shall control the railways, harbours, waterways, and air-routes in accordance with the provisions of law and of this agreement. (Article II)
- C. MANCHUKUO shall obtain the prior understanding of the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army in regard to the enactment, alternation and abolition of important laws concerning transportation. (Article III)

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- D. The Commander of the KWANTUNG Army shall entrust the South Manchuria Railway Company with the management and construction of railways, harbours, and waterways which have been placed under his control. (Article IV)
The funds needed for their construction and improvement and other fixed funds shall be raised by the said company. (Article V)
A loan contract for the total amount of loans, consisting of the afore-mentioned funds, the railway loans, against the railways possessed by the said company in MANCHUKUO, and the total amount of claims based upon construction work contracts, secured by all properties attached to the railways, harbours, and waterways, shall be concluded between the said company and the MANCHUKUO Government. (Article VI)
- E. The balance remaining after deducting the amount for the payment of principal and interest on the loans from the profit that may be realized from the control of the railways, harbours and waterways shall be appropriated for the defrayment of part of the expenses incurred for national defense and maintenance of peace and order by the Imperial Japanese Army. In case a further surplus remains, this shall be acquired by the MANCHUKUO Government and the South Manchurian Railway Company. (Article VII)
- F. MANCHUKUO shall obtain the prior understanding of the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army in case she intends to grant license for the construction of railways other than those under the control of the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army.
- G. MANCHUKUO shall have a specially established organ to manage all aviation enterprises under the assistance of Commander of the KWANTUNG Army and entrust the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army with their control. The particulars in this connection shall be agreed upon separately. (Article IX)
- H. MANCHUKUO shall carry into effect the construction and improvement of the main roads, after obtaining the understanding thereto of the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army. (Article X)
- I. MANCHUKUO shall employ military advisers designated by the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army and consult them with regard to important transportation facilities necessary for national defense. (Art. XI)

As a supplement to this convention, it has been provided that the contract, relative to new construction and management of railways and loans against them, concluded between the President of the South Manchuria Railway Company and the Governor of KIRIN Province under date of November 1, 1931 and also the contract, relative to loans against and management of "SSU-TAO" railway, concluded between the said President and the Director of the "SSU-TAO" railway Bureau under date of December 1, of the same year, both of which will become useless as the result of the enforcement of this convention, shall become null and void.

By an accessory agreement entered into between both parties of this agreement, it has been proved that the MANCHUKUO Government shall separately conclude a contract with the South Manchuria Railway Company on the trusteeship management of railways, harbours, waterways, etc., and the construction of railway lines.

(III) Agreement relative to the establishment of an air-way company, concluded between the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army and Prime Minister CHENG under date of August 7, 1933.

- A. Both parties, by mutual agreement, shall establish an air-way company for the transportation of passengers, luggage and mails as well as the management of aerodromes and airports. (Clause I) This company shall be a joint JAPAN-MANCHUKUO concern organized under MANCHUKUO laws, and capitalised at 3,000,000 Yen, which amount may be increased by mutual consultation in case it becomes necessary in order to cope with the expansion of the enterprise in future. (Clause II)
- B. MANCHUKUO shall appraise the value of specially designated aerodromes and mid-way landing air-fields, and other facilities at 1,000,000 Yen and invest this amount in the air-way company, for which she shall receive shares corresponding to the amount of investment after the company has been established. These shares shall not be transferable. (Clause III) The rest of the capital shall be met by 1,500,000 Yen to be invested by the South Manchuria Railway Company and 1,000,000 Yen by Sumitomo Goshi Kaisha. (Art. IV)
- C. MANCHUKUO shall lend free of charge the land the buildings of the former NUREMI air-plane repair factory and of the Army Engineering School to the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army, who in turn shall lend them, together with the confiscated mechanics attached to the said factory and school, to the air-way company. (Art. V)
- D. MANCHUKUO shall not permit other persons to manage any aviation enterprise in MANCHUKUO without obtaining the consent of the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army. (Article VI)
- E. MANCHUKUO shall grant annually to the air-way company a specially fixed amount of subsidy. The amount of this subsidy shall be subject to alteration by the mutual consultations of both parties, according to the business conditions of the said company.
- F. MANCHUKUO shall entrust the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army with the inspection of all air-planes and examination of their crews.
- G. With regard to the provisional law for the establishment of the air-way company, detailed rules shall be discussed and decided by JAPAN and MANCHUKUO within a month after this agreement is concluded. (Clause IX)

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- H. MANCHUKUO agrees to permit the air-way company to instal necessary aviation facilities, such as exclusive communications and wireless beacons, etc. at its own expense and to use the facilities exclusively. (Clause X)
- I. As to the transport of mail matter, this shall be agreed upon separately. (Clause XI)
- J. MANCHUKUO shall exempt the payment of all taxes on the various facilities attached to the air-way company and on its business as well as the import duties on the articles needed for the use of the company. (Clause XII)

(IV) Agreement relative to the establishment of mining rights necessary for national defence, concluded between Commander KATO of the KWANTUNG Army and Prime Minister CHIANG under date of September 3, 1932.

- A. MANCHUKUO agrees to respect all mining rights /"KOGYOKEN"/ within her territories which had been already acquired by Japanese and also to revise the existing arrangements or agreements, in order to meet the requirements of national defence. Among the said mining rights /"KOGYOKEN"/, the exploiting rights /"SAIKUTSUSEN"/ shall remain valid for an indefinite period of time. (Article I)
- B. MANCHUKUO shall grant to JAPAN-MANCHUKUO corporation, to be designated by mutual consultation between the two countries, the mining rights with the exception of vested rights, of 38 specially indicated mines of coal, oil, light metal ores, iron ore, oil-shades, lead ore and nickel ore.
- C. In respect to also mines containing special minerals other than those enumerated above, MANCHUKUO shall grant mining rights thereof only to a joint JAPAN-MANCHUKUO corporation of either one or both nationality. (Article III)
- D. MANCHUKUO shall confer beforehand with our country in respect to the establishment and release of blockaded zones of the minerals necessary for national defence. (Article IV)
- E. The mining rights stipulated in this agreement shall be governed by the existing provisional law /"KOGYOKEN"/, with the exception of the clauses on the qualifications for acquiring mining rights and the limitation of capital holdings, until such time as a new mining law is enforced in MANCHUKUO. In enacting or revising the mining law relative to minerals necessary for national defence, MANCHUKUO shall obtain beforehand the consent of our country. (Article V)

Of the above-mentioned various documents, the Protocol and the Second, Third, and the Fourth out of the Notes exchanged, that is, the Agreements concluded between the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army and the Prime Minister /of MANCHUKUO/ shall be written in both Japanese and in Chinese. In the event that any doubts occur as to the interpretation thereof, the decision shall be made according to the Japanese text. (Refer to the closing sentence of the Protocol, and others.)

Now that MANCHUKUO has become independent by the will of her people and has already completed the substance of a new state, we consider it a matter of course for our country to recognize that country in order to establish permanent peace in the Far East. And in view of the fact that the objectives of the arrangements under consideration are to recognize the independence of MANCHUKUO, to regulate the foundation of the relations between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO, and at the same time to secure and extend our proper rights and interests, these arrangements may be considered as very opportune measures. However, since in connection with the enforcement of these arrangements there will arise many problems important to our country, our authorities concerned must endeavor to cope with the situation properly, taking every possible precaution in regard to various matters. Especially, as it will greatly affect the finance of our country in the future, we cannot but wish ardently that an appropriate financial programme would be immediately adopted so as to have it enforced properly. Under the circumstances, it has been unanimously agreed upon by the Judging Committee that this Bill be passed without modification, together with the above-mentioned wishes.

The foregoing is the report on our findings.

Mr. 33 Councillor (OKADA) I am in favor of this bill and have no objection at all, but I consider that the Manchurian question cannot be settled merely by our recognition of MANCHUKUO, I should think that difficult problems rather lie in future. I therefore take this opportunity to ask for the views of the authorities concerned on one or two points.

I consider that at this juncture the utmost consideration should be given to international relations. The explanations given to the Diet by the Ministers concerned in regard to the so-called Anti-War Pact was quite to the point, but I think that the existence of the Nine-Power Pact is a source of evil. Although the Foreign Minister explained in the Diet that our recognition of MANCHUKUO would not contravene the Nine-Power Pact, the UNITED STATES and others will not be satisfied with such explanations. Further, the Foreign Minister stated that MANCHUKUO had become independent by the free will of her people and that JAPAN had not agreed by the Nine-Power Pact to prevent the independence of the Chinese People. For example, he said, supposing that CANTON became independent, the countries signatory to the said Pact are not under obligation to prevent this independence. However, the Americans might say that it would be all right if MANCHUKUO had become independent by the free will of her own people, but that it is a violation of the said Pact and a disregard of CHINA's sovereignty for JAPAN to assist and maintain this independence.

The Foreign Minister's explanation on this point is inadequate. What explanation is the Foreign Minister prepared to give in reply to this? Besides, a comparison of the secret agreements in this Bill with the Nine-Power Pact shows that there are not a small number of points of doubt in respect to the conflict between the two. I wish to ask how will the Foreign Minister explain this. Moreover, is it possible after all to keep the agreements strictly confidential? It may be possible for JAPAN, but it is hardly possible for MANCHUKUO to do it. I consider it unrealistic to assume that secrecy cannot be kept. In the event that the secrets are divulged, CHINA will not remain silent and she will demand the convocation of a conference of the countries signatory to the Nine-Power Pact. If, as a result of such a conference, JAPAN's movements be decided to be

a violation of the said Pact, I consider JAPAN would be placed in a very difficult position. Therefore, the authorities concerned should be fully prepared for such a contingency. Nay, such preparedness alone is unsatisfactory. Preparations should be made beforehand to prevent such clash. In this connection I would like to ask the Foreign Minister what preparation he has made to cope with this matter.

No. 7 (UCHIDA) Before answering Councillor OKADA's questions, I wish to say that we will do our utmost to meet the wishes of the Judging Committee, giving careful consideration to the advice and wishes given in the report of the Judging Committee. As to the Nine-Power Pact, the first question of Councillor OKADA, I think I have fully explained our attitude. The action of the Japanese Army to cope with the incident which occurred on Sept. 18 of last year was nothing but the exercise of our right of self-defense. It is true, however, that this action was availed of by the thirty million people of MANCHUKUO for creating a new state, but it is not in the least improper to recognize that the creation of the new state was entirely based on the free will of the people of MANCHUKUO. The Nine-Power Pact provides that the Chinese territorial integrity shall be respected, but it makes no provision at all for a case where a part of CHINA becomes independent as the result of CHINA's own disintegration. Of course, in this respect, various views are held in the UNITED STATES and other countries, but these are their own views. For our part, we should go ahead with the view given above. Of late, the motive and process of the creation of this new state have come to be generally understood and the feelings of the Powers also have been eased to no small degree. In fact, when Ambassador DREUCHI recently approached the American Government authorities and informally asked if they would protest in case JAPAN should recognize MANCHUKUO, they replied that they had not the slightest intention of making a protest or convoking a Nine-Power conference, inasmuch as there was no hope of such a conference reaching any conclusion. Besides, the convocation of Nine-Power conference will be opposed by some of the European countries.

As to the second question, namely, whether or not there is doubt that the contents of the strictly secret treaty are incompatible with the Nine-Power Pact, I am confident that there is no conflict between the two, as I have just stated. The powers are concerned with the open-door principle, principle of equal opportunity, etc., but we do not see any conflict between the documents of this bill and these principles. I see no objection to the fact that JAPAN has been entrusted by MANCHUKUO with such matters as that country can do herself. As to the question what will be done in the event that the secret arrangements between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO are divulged, I do not believe it would leak out from our side and therefore, MANCHUKUO is being cautioned to take special care to prevent leakage on her side. Even if by any chance it should leak out, I firmly believe that there is nothing to be ashamed of.

No. 33. (OKADA) I now understand the situation from the explanation given just now by the Foreign Minister, but my sole anxiety is whether or not the Powers will be satisfied with such explanations. Inasmuch as I am inclined to think that there will be some nations that will surely oppose the conclusion of this treaty. I wish that sufficient study and preparations would be made beforehand.

No. 22. (ISHIGURO) I feel not a little relieved by the explanations given by the Foreign Minister, but the 2nd Note exchanged, that is, the letter addressed to the Commander of our army from Premier CHING contains the following sentence: "This country shall entrust the national defense and maintenance of public peace in future to your country, all necessary expenditure for which shall be borne by our country." Is there any time limit to this? And is the military expenditure being borne by MANCHUKUO at present also?

No. 9. (ARAKI) At present, no budget for this has been provided by MANCHUKUO, but according to the program of our War Ministry authorities, MANCHUKUO will be able to defray some part of the expenditure after 1933 if her internal conditions become stabilized, since she has reliable income from railways. After a lapse of about five years, I think MANCHUKUO will be able to defray the necessary expenditure.

No. 22. (ISHIGURO) Is it impossible to obtain payment for the expenses before the lapse of five years?

No. 9. (ARAKI) The national defense of MANCHUKUO is at the same time the national defense of our country. Consequently I consider it not fair and reasonable to make MANCHUKUO alone bear the whole amount of expenses necessary for national defense. It will be possible, I think, for MANCHUKUO to pay annually 9,000,000 Yen from the year 1933, and 40,000,000 or 50,000,000 Yen after five years.

No. 22 (ISHIGURO) Do you mean to say that 9,000,000 Yen can be paid in the coming year?

No. 9. (ARAKI) Although it is only a plan, I believe that an annual amount of 9,000,000 Yen can be paid by that country, provided that the country is stabilized.

No. 23 (KURODA) It is a matter for congratulation that our empire has now concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with MANCHUKUO. Judging from the explanations and answers given just now by the Foreign Minister, our future relations with other countries will become more and more eventful. I therefore hope the authorities would give careful consideration to the maintenance of amicable and harmonious diplomatic relations with the Powers. The defrayment of expenses, of course, should be cautiously handled, but inasmuch as /the national defense of MANCHUKUO/ is also the national defense of our country, it is hoped that the Army and Navy would give due consideration to the matter. Inasmuch as the present action of JAPAN is to exalt the fundamental spirit of our empire, I anxiously desire that the whole people, united as one, would do their utmost to settle the MANCHURIAN question.

No. 31. (ISHII) I wish to express my heartiest endorsement of the signing of the Protocol between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO. On looking back, the past one year has been really a year of so-called extraordinary emergency in which our country took a very critical path. However, thanks to the proper measures taken by the present cabinet since its formation, we have now arrived at the stage of concluding a JAPAN-MANCHUKUO Alliance treaty, whereby MANCHUKUO has been recognized. This is a matter for congratulations to our country.

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JAPAN vs. the MANCHURIAN question and JAPAN vs. the international problem were the two problems over which I had deeply worried, because my doubts had not been dispelled throughout the previous Cabinet and the one before it. JAPAN possessed from the outset special rights and interests in MANCHURIA. Therefore, our position was a special one. Since last year, while we were repelling CHINA's infringement of those rights and interests, we inadvertently perceived an intention on the part of the Manchus and Mongols of gaining independence and gave them facilities for realizing their aspiration. This was only proper for us to do. However, what I feared was that MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA, after they became independent, would later on come to lack mutual understandings. Such men as NU-CHEN and YUAN, who threatened against JAPAN in the past, were Mongols. Even if the Mongols respect JAPAN as a leader today, who knows that they will not in the future change their attitude and ignore our rights and interests, becoming a second CHANG HSUEH-LIANG? In Europe there is a nation which met with an unexpected calamity owing to its failure to make necessary preparations in international negotiations. I called the attention of our authorities by citing the case of BULGARIA. However, I now observe that our vested rights have been fully secured, according to the Notes exchanged. This has dispelled my doubts, and I feel exceedingly glad. Secondly, I felt very uneasy about JAPAN's contention in regard to the connection between the Manchurian problem and the League of Nations. The main point of our contention was that JAPAN cannot agree to the disposition of the Sino-Japanese dispute over MANCHURIA by the council of the League of Nations under Article XV of the League's Covenant. It was my fear that, inasmuch as some countries among the members of the League had laid before the League, prior to resorting to war, disputes arising inside their own territories and had received deliveration under Article XV, JAPAN's contention could not be carried through after all. I considered that, should the dispute over MANCHURIA, which is not Japanese territory, be disposed of according to article XV, Japan's contention would be rejected by the world's public opinion as well as the International Court of Justice. However, when MANCHUKUO is recognized by JAPAN and becomes an independent state and also JAPAN-MANCHUKUO Alliance is concluded, according to the proposal now under consultation, the point most disadvantageous to JAPAN will be thereby almost removed. This, I think, will be the most desirable result of our formal recognition of MANCHUKUO and the conclusion of a JAPAN-MANCHUKUO Alliance.

It was almost an established view of a large number of the people of the UNITED STATES and other countries that our action in MANCHUKUO violated the anti-war Pact and the Nine-Power Pact. However, now that JAPAN has formally recognized MANCHUKUO and entered into an alliance with her, JAPAN will be able in future to assert that the independence of MANCHUKUO was due to the disintegration of CHINA and that the territorial integrity of the Republic of CHINA was broken by none other than MANCHUKUO. This will nullify the argument that JAPAN violated the Nine-Power Pact. Now that JAPAN has concluded an alliance with new MANCHUKUO for joint national defense, I believe there will be no room for opposing the stationing of Japanese troops in MANCHURIA, thus making the League's past resolution a dead letter.

No, supposing that the LYTTON'S Inquiry Commission recognized CHINA's sovereignty over MANCHURIA and recommended that CHINA allow autonomy to MANCHUKUO, and supposing that the League adopted this recommendation, JAPAN need not comment on it. It is for MANCHUKUO herself to assert that an

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independent state should not be placed under the sovereignty of any other country. In regard to the connection between JAPAN and AMERICA and also other countries, MANCHUKUO herself will bear the brunt of the attack, or back up JAPAN to ease JAPAN's position. At any rate, in consequence of the independence of MANCHUKUO, it has become unnecessary for the League of Nations to deliberate on the Manchurian question under Article XV of the League's covenant. It was rather strange that the Manchurian and Mongolian races had started no independence movement up to now. It was a matter of course that MANCHUKUO has become independent as soon as the old regime under CHANG HSUEH-LIANG collapsed. After all, MANCHURIA became a part of CHINA, when it was brought as a dowry by ANCHIN CHAENGLO, who subjugated CHINA proper. Lord LYTTON's party also must have studied the history of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA and it will not be difficult to make them understand the creation of MANCHUKUO as well as the problem of racial self-determination. Consequently, I believe that through the independence of MANCHUKUO, Japan's position has been improved considerably in respect to her foreign relations.

In short, the present JAPAN-MANCHUKUO Treaty will prove effective in fully maintaining and expanding our special rights in MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA on the one hand and in elevating, on the other hand, JAPAN from a position of predicament full of troubles at home and abroad to a triumphant one. Here I feel that there is a bright future for the Manchurian and Mongolian problem. With this in view, I heartily endorse the exchange of Notes relative to the JAPAN-MANCHUKUO Alliance. However, as has just been stated by the chairman of the Judging Committee and Councillor OKADA, many difficulties still lie ahead and I, therefore, hope the matter would be carried to perfection by the authorities with further cautious reparations.

Chairman (KURATOMI): Before putting the bill to a vote, I should like to call your attention, for cautious sake, to the fact that, although the bill discussed today is termed "Matter on the Signing of JAPAN-MANCHUKUO Protocol," its contents are composed of the Protocol and the Notes exchanged. As there are no further speakers, I shall immediately take a vote on the matter, omitting the Second Reading, etc. The ayes are requested to stand up.

(All rise up.)

Chairman (KURATOMI): The bill has been passed unanimously. Today's meeting is adjourned.

His Majesty the Emperor withdrew to the inner palace.

(The meeting adjourned at 11:45 a.m.)

Chairman, Baron KURATOMI, Yusebuo.
 Chief Secretary FUTAKAMI, Kyoji.
 Secretary HORIE, Sueso.
 " MUTOH, Morio.

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EXH 242

DOC. NO. 1046--1

Code telegram "RIMU-SAN-MITSU" No. 80 from the Vice-Minister of War to the Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army in reference to telegram "LAF-SAN-SAN" No. 715. Dated 24 May, 1938.

Referring to Manchukuo's entry in the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy, we inform you that as far as our country is concerned there would be no objection as clearly stated in the said pact. We are of the opinion that it is best to take on the formality of "Manchukuo requesting entry into the pact on her own will and having Japan assist her in that respect" by seizing a favorable opportunity soon.

DOC NO. 1046--2

Date--15 May, 1938

Telegram (confidential)

Sent--8:08 pm--14th of May
Arrived--8:55 pm--14th of May

TO : Vice-chief of the General Staff
FROM: Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army

With reference to Manchukuo's entry in the Anti-Comintern Pact concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy, the Army Commander had expressed his opinion to the Chief of the General Staff and the Minister of War through Telegram "LAF-SAN-SAN" No. 251 in November of last year. And now, the treaty of amity between Manchukuo and Germany has been signed, and the diplomatic relation between these two countries has been established in due form. Therefore, at this time, we wish to make Manchukuo enter as soon as possible in the aforesaid Three Power Pact.

Please send me your opinion at your earliest opportunity.

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DOC NO. 1046--

Telegram from Commander of the Awentung Army to the Vice-Minister
of War and Vice-Chief of the General Staff.

(Telegram No. 251--"KAW-SAN-SAN")

Despatched-----5:20 p.m. 13th of November
Arrived-----6:45 p.m. 13th of November

By the conclusion of the Anti-Comintern Pact between Japan, Germany,
and Italy, the obligation of our Empire in the defense against
Bolshovism in East Asia today has finally become more important.
With regard to our dealing with firm attitude of positive opposition
against the Nanking Government that adopted pro-Comintern policy, I
have perviously expressed our view (refer to Telegram No. 12, "KAW-
SAN-SAN"). I consider that, availing of this favorable opportunity
under present circumstance, it would be our very timely policy to
make Manchukuo enter in the said Pact between the said three countries
thereby further enlightening her thirty million people's understanding
of the defense against Communism, and simultaneously imparting this
upon the great masses of China; and obtaining actual recognition of
Manchukuo.

We humbly present to you the above opinions.

In case you have no special objection we wish to let Manchukuo
commence her diplomatic activity.

The End.

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EXH 243

MANCHURIAN ARMY CONFIDENTIAL DIARY (RIKU-KAN-MITSU) Received by War
Ministry No. 1935. Urgent Personal Confidential

RO-HO 34 Telegram No. 130

To-Vice Minister of War
Vice-chief of Army General Staff

Despatched: 12:00 16 Dec., 1940
Received : 14:00 16 Dec., 1940
(In. Kwantung crossed out in pencil -
North China substituted)

According to a report from the ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD (China Affairs Board), negotiations for the conclusion of a trade pact between Japan, Manchoukuo and China as one body and Germany shortly will proceed at an early date. We should like to know the truth about the matter.

In view of the spirit of the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, it is needless to state that we agree with the object of such a pact, and the strengthening of the national defense potentialities with it, and we will not spare our efforts to export raw materials to the value of about 20 or 30 million yen to Germany from North China, but we should like to request you:

1. To make sure to provide North China with return goods from Japan, in return for these 20 or 30 million yen of exports to Germany in order not to delay the construction of North China.

2. As regards the direct introduction of German technical assistance into North China, we are of the opinion that such proposal is not at all necessary under the present circumstances. But in any case the rolling stock will have a very important bearing on the construction of North China. We ask you to keep in close touch with us in case of negotiations affecting military matters.

Sent to:

General Army Headquarters War Ministry

General Army Staff Office

Also sent to other offices for reference only.

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Exp. 344
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Document No. 641

Manchurian Army Confidential Master Diary.

(RIKU-MAN-MITSU DAI NIKKI)

Vol. No. 16 - 1940.

War Ministry

Receipt Number: MAN-MITSU, No. 1,725.

From Kwantung Army.

Subject: Change of the Manchukuo Ambassador in Japan.

Telegram from Vice-War Minister to the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army
(Coded and Personal)

Telegram No. 150.

Date: 8 Nov. 1940.

"We have no objection in the matter of the change of the Manchukuo
Ambassador in Japan, according to KAN-SAM-MAN telegram No. 1,111.

Secret telegram Dispatched at 20.50 and received at 21.30 on 5 November.

To Vice-War Minister.

From the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.

KAN-SAM-MAN Telegram No. 1,111.

In view of the fact that the Manchoukuo Ambassador to Japan, Yuan Chen-tee
(Gen. Shin-taku) has been in office for three and a half years already and has
rendered a great deal of meritorious service, it is desired to call him back to
Manchoukuo in the near future and install him as Minister of Communications
and appoint the present Minister of Communications, Li Shao-kong (Li Sho-ko)
as his successor.

Your opinion is solicited concerning this change of the Ambassador. If
there is no objection among various circles interested, we should like to ask
for an AGREEMENT (T.M., Presumably agreement) separately through the Foreign
Office.

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.)	
)	
- AGAINST -)	A F F I D A V I T
)	
ARAKI, SADA0, et al.)	

I, MORISHIMA, Morito, make oath and say as follows:

I am 50 years old, having been born in the City of Kanazawa on February 16, 1896.

I speak, read and understand the English language.

In September 1928, I was sent to Mukden to serve in the capacity of consul as First Assistant to Consul General FAYASHI, Kyujiro. I served in this office until December 1932, during which period I served as Acting Consul General on the occasions when the Consul General was out of the jurisdiction; especially did I serve as Acting Consul General from December 1931 to December 1932, the Consul General having been recalled to Japan at that time on other business.

As the First Assistant to the Consul General, my duties were largely of an executive nature. The office of the Consul General was concerned with matters relating to Chinese affairs, particularly Japan's interests in Manchuria, and all political matters relating to foreign countries, and arranging for the protection of Japanese nationals in peace time. It was the particular duty and obligation of our office to keep posted on current trends and developments which might adversely affect the political policies of the Japanese Government; to anticipate such trends and developments and to currently report conclusions in these respects to the Japanese Foreign Office. In order effectively to perform these duties and functions, the Consul General's office availed itself of all accessible channels of information. Such channels of information consisted among others of the Consular Police, several hundred in number, who were stationed throughout the jurisdiction of our Mukden office; the officials of the South Manchurian Railway; and the Kwantung Government; the officers in the Headquarters of the Special Mission of the Army located in Mukden; the Chinese representative in the three Eastern Provinces comprising Manchuria; Japanese nationals located in Manchuria; and many other such sources of information. It was the duty of the Consular Police to make daily reports to our office of any unusual happenings, events or information as to trends and developments. This they did regularly. I, personally, conducted conferences daily with such

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of the aforementioned officials and officers as circumstances and conditions suggested the advisability of.

In the performance and discharge of the duties and functions of our office, we were required to and did avail ourselves of the aforementioned channels of information. The office of the Consul General took appropriate official action predicated upon the information so acquired and received and made many reports to the Japanese Government in connection therewith. It was the duty and responsibility of our office to draw conclusions from information so obtained and to advise the Japanese Government as to such trends and developments which might involve Japan's political policies, as such information indicated. This, we endeavored to do as effectively as possible.

In 1928 and 1929, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army was located normally at Port Arthur and the Commander of that Army was Lt. General HURAOKA. Major-General HATA, Shinji, was Chief of the Special Mission of the Army, with headquarters at Mukden and Major HOKIOKA was assistant to the Chief of that Mission. These two officers were succeeded by Major-General SUZUKI, Yoshimitsu and Major HAMAYA, Tadashi. Later, Major-General SUZUKI was succeeded by Major-General DOIYAMA, Kenji. These were the officers whom I normally contacted in the headquarters of the Army Special Mission in Mukden when the desirability of conferences with the military was suggested. Occasionally, it became desirable for me to visit the General Headquarters of the Kwantung Army in Port Arthur to confer about special matters. Also, I often conferred with the Governor-General of the Kwantung Province and other officials in that office.

When Premier TANAKA came into office, he announced a more positive policy toward Manchuria than had been followed in the predecessor Cabinet. This policy placed the greatest importance on the maintenance of peace and order throughout the whole of Manchuria. It was the first time that Japan had definitely asserted that she would take upon herself the responsibility and task of preserving peace and order in Manchuria. The positive policy also resulted in troops being sent into China proper; that is, Peinan, on two occasions; namely, May 1927 and April 1928, to insure the safety and protect the rights of Japanese nationals there. The sending of troops into China proper in April 1928 had the effect of deterring the advance of the Chiang-kai-Shek armies toward Peiping and Tientsin.

At this time, Marshal Chang Tso-lin was marshal of Manchuria. In the administration of this positive policy, Premier TANAKA was lending support to and collaborating with Chang Tso-lin. It was the policy of the TANAKA Government to endeavor to promote and expand Japan's interests in Manchuria.

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through collaboration and negotiation with Chang Tso-lin. This policy of collaboration and negotiation with Chang Tso-lin met with strong disapproval on the part of a group and clique of officers in the Kwantung Army which at that time was led by Colonel KAWAMOTO Teisaku. There were other younger officers of the Kwantung Army associated in this group and clique whose names I do not now recall. This element in the Kwantung Army felt that the Government should discontinue collaboration and negotiation with constituted authorities in Manchuria and should employ force to preserve and promote Japan's interest there.

At this time, Chang Tso-lin had ambitions to establish his leadership in China proper and as Grand Marshal of his armies had moved his headquarters to Peiping. This met with the staunch disapproval of Premier TANAKA who consistently advised Chang Tso-lin that he should abandon his ambitions in China proper, return to Manchuria and concern himself solely with maintaining his leadership there.

Chang Tso-lin ignored such advice and requests on the part of Premier TANAKA until he suffered defeat in the summer of 1928 when the Southern Army of Chiang Kai-Shek was making a strong advance into North China. At this time, Chang Tso-lin was compelled by military circumstances to return to Manchuria. Chang Tso-lin departed from North China for Mukden in the first week of June 1928. As the train on which he was traveling approached Mukden, he was killed by an explosion which wrecked his train. This explosion was planned and brought about by the element of the Kwantung Army which was dissatisfied with TANAKA's policy of collaboration with Chang-Tso-lin. This murder of Chang Tso-lin created quite a crisis in the TANAKA Cabinet and ultimately resulted in its fall in 1929.

From the date of the fall of the TANAKA Cabinet until the late summer of 1931, the influence of this element of the Kwantung Army in governmental policies grew progressively stronger. During this period, Colonel ITAGAKI, Seishiro, Lt. Colonel ISHIMARU, Kenji, and Major FANAYA are among those in the Kwantung Army who became definitely identified with the leadership in this group. This group and clique of officers in the Kwantung Army in this period were of the strong opinion that the use of armed forces was necessary to preserve and protect Japan's interests in Manchuria. They seemed to want to occupy it and to establish a government there separate from China proper and which would be subservient to Japan. During this period, many incidents occurred which might be attributed to anti-Japanese feeling prevailing in Manchuria and the policy of restoration of national rights under the leadership of Chang Kuo-liang. The Consulate made the greatest efforts to settle these incidents by negotiation and peaceful means so that they might not be used as pretexts for the use of force. However, the determination

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on the part of the group and clique in the Army to employ force in Manchuria grew progressively stronger throughout the summer of 1931 and it became more and more difficult for the office of the Consul General and the Government to keep the situation in hand. By late summer it became apparent to all concerned that it was only a question of days until the military would be on the move in Manchuria. In the latter part of August and until the middle of September, the Consular office was seriously concerned with the adjustment and settlement of the NAKAMURA affair. This involved the killing of NAKAMURA, a Japanese officer who allegedly was on an investigation tour in inner-Mongolia for the Kwantung Army. He had obtained a passport from the Chinese under the false representation that he was an agricultural scientist who wanted to conduct research in this field. While engaged in his real mission, his true identity became known and he was killed by a number of soldiers belonging to the regular Army of Cheng Yu-chi-liang. On the afternoon of September 18, 1931, negotiations with respect to adjustment and settlement of this affair were in progress between the Consulate and the Chinese representatives. A further conference in the Consulate was adjourned at about eight o'clock in the evening because it had been concluded that since a member of the military was involved, it would be necessary to confer with appropriate representatives of the Army before any further representations should be made to the Chinese officials.

Upon the conclusion of this conference at 8:00 P.M., I was delegated the responsibility to arrange for the attendance of appropriate military representatives at a further conference which was to be held later in the evening. At this time, I endeavored to contact the responsible officers of the Special Mission of the Army in Mukden in order to arrange for them to attend this conference. The officers I endeavored particularly to contact were Colonel BOYARA, Chief of the Special Mission, and Major FANAYA, the Assistant Chief, who were in charge of the Headquarters office. I was unable to locate either of these officers or any other responsible military officer. After I had sought to locate these officers at their respective offices, billets, and the usual hotels, restaurants and other places which they frequented, I so reported to the Consulate and retired to my personal quarters adjacent to the Consulate.

Earlier in the afternoon of September 18, I had received a report from the Consular Police to the effect that a citizen who was traveling on the train from Anqing to Mukden had recognized General TATEKAWA, the strong who was dressed in civilian clothing and who was traveling from Waiye to Mukden. This citizen had sought to have General TATEKAWA acknowledge his identity but was evaded. It seemed strange to me at the time that the Consulate should not have been advised of General TATEKAWA's special mission to Mukden.

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My inability to locate any of the responsible military officers at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of September 18, coupled with the report with respect to General TATEKAWA traveling in civilian clothes to Mukden created quite a bit of apprehension in my mind and I so reported to the Consul.

Earlier in the summer, I had learned that the Army had moved a large gun from Hsi-chang, the headquarters of the Artillery Regiment to the Infantry Barracks in Mukden. I inquired of the Army about the significance of this movement but only received evasive answers. Also, I had received many reports that the Army was planning unusual military maneuvers; particularly had I previously learned that the Kwangtung Army in Fu-shun the important coal mining district, had planned a maneuver which contemplated the occupation of Mukden, leaving Fu-shun at 11:30 P.M. the night of September 18.

All of such reports had served to create an atmosphere of tenseness in the Consulate. It was apparent to me that some unusual military activity was in the making.

By this time, Lt. Colonel ISHIMURA had become an assistant on Colonel ITAGAKI's staff and I from time to time had occasion to speak with him. I learned that he was supporting Colonel ITAGAKI's philosophy that force should be employed to occupy Manchuria.

I was in my personal quarters about 10:30 P.M., September 18 1931, when I received a telephone call from the Army Special Mission advising me that an explosion had occurred on the South Manchurian Railway and that I should come over immediately to the Military Special Mission Headquarters. I arrived there about 10:45 P.M. and met Colonel ITAGAKI, Saito, Major FUKAYA, and some other officers whose names I do not recall. Colonel ITAGAKI said to me that members of the regular Chinese Army had exploded the South Manchurian Railway; that this constituted a serious violation of important Japanese rights; that Japan must take appropriate defensive measures through the use of military force; and that general orders had already been issued to this effect to the Army. I tried to explain that we should resort to peaceful negotiations as an effort to adjust the matter and that I believed that it would be satisfactorily settled in this manner. Colonel ITAGAKI then expressed his opinion and wanted to know if the office of the Consul General intended to interfere with the right of military command. I pointed out that there was no question involved of interference with the right of military command but rather that I was certain the matter could be adjusted amicably through normal negotiations and that the latter course would be advisable from the viewpoint of the interests of the Japanese Government. At this point in the conversation, Major FUKAYA unsheathed his sword in an angry gesture and stated that if I insisted upon interference with the right of military

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command, I should be prepared to suffer the consequences. He stated further that he would kill anyone who endeavored to so interfere. This outburst on the part of Major HAMA broke up the conversation and I returned to my headquarters to make a full report, which I did. By the time I reached my headquarters, Consul General HAYASHI had returned from a visit with an acquaintance and I reported to him the developments of the evening in detail.

Upon receipt of my report, the Consul General talked by phone a number of times during the night of September 18 and the early morning of the 19th with Colonel ITOGAKI in an effort to persuade him to cease the fighting and to permit the Consulate to endeavor to settle the matter through peaceful negotiations. Colonel ITOGAKI remained defiant and consistently informed the Consul General that he should cease interference with the right of the military command; that general orders had been issued to the Army and that the Army would proceed as planned. Throughout the night of September 18 we received numerous representations on the part of the Supreme Advisor for Cheng Ksueh-Liang, then Marshal of Manchuria, that the Chinese were proceeding on a policy of non-resistance and implored the office of the Consul General to persuade the Japanese Army to cease attacks and to resort to peaceful negotiations. All such representations were communicated to the military to no avail and the occupation of Mukden continued. On the day of September 19, in my continued efforts to persuade the Army to cease military activities, I visited the headquarters of the Kwantung Army several times and conferred with officers in the Kwantung Army, the headquarters of the Kwantung Army having been moved by this time from Port Arthur to Mukden. On one of these visits, I observed in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army, General TATEKAWA who was dressed in civilian clothes. At this time, General TATEKAWA held the office of Chief of one of the departments of the General Staff in Tokyo and I could not understand why he should be in Mukden dressed in civilian attire.

Under the general orders which were issued on the night of September 18, all of the Japanese armies in Manchuria came into operation. The Korean Army which was stationed on the border crossed the Yalu River and came over to participate in the activities. Despite all efforts to control the situation, the Army continued with its occupation of Manchuria which was consolidated by the spring of 1932. In March of 1932, a puppet government was established with Pu-yi as its head. There was no popular movement in Manchuria for the establishment of any independent government. This movement was sponsored and inspired by the Kwantung Army and the Self-Government Guiding Board, which was created by the Kwantung Army. All of the important and controlling positions in the puppet government were filled by Japanese selected by the Kwantung Army.

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Upon the establishment of the puppet government, the Province of Jehol in Inner-Mongolia was declared to be within its sphere of influence. This move proved ineffectual because it did not have the support of the Government nor the people of Jehol. When the Kwantung Army realized this situation, and the continued existence of the exiled Government of Chang Hseeh-Liang in Jehol, the Army proceeded to occupy Jehol and make it a part of the puppet regime by force. This puppet government continued to be dominated and controlled by the Kwantung Army until 1945. Japan officially recognized the independence of this Government in September 1932. This gesture in nowise altered the control and domination of the Government by the Kwantung Army.




/s/ MORISYIMA, Morito
MORISYIMA, Morito

SWORN and SUBSCRIBED to before the undersigned Officer by the above-named MORISYIMA, Morito, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 26th day of June 1946.

/s/ CAPT. IN ARMY A. S. SANDUSKY, J.G.D.
IPS, CMC, SCIP

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訂正

訂正理由	撮影ミスの為
訂正箇所	直前の / コマ取消
	/ コマ再撮影
訂正年月日	平成 18 年 11 月 16 日
このフィルムは、上記の理由で取消又は再撮影し訂正しました。	
撮影者	塩崎伸一郎  印
受託責任者	神奈川県南足柄市中沼210番地 富士写真フイルム株式会社 代表取締役  森 重隆  印

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/s/ MORISUMI, Morito
MORISUMI, Morito

SWORN and SUBSCRIBED to before the undersigned Officer by the above-named MORISUMI, Morito, at the War Ministry Building, Tokyo, Japan, this 26th day of June 1946.

/s/ CAPTAIN ARTHUR A. SANDUSKY, JAGD
IPS, GQG, SCRP

1923
 21
 22
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 25 } passing Tariff conference as first secretary Tariff autonomy
 26 } Shidehara policy note Cabinet
 27 } Mar. Terunan Tanaka policy
 28 } April Terunan June 1923
 29 } Fall of Tanaka Cabinet
 30 } Hanaguchi
 31 } Shanghai war
 32 } Shanghai war
 33 } Shanghai war
 34 } Shanghai war
 35 } Shanghai war
 36 } Shanghai war
 37 } Shanghai war
 38 } Shanghai war
 39 } Shanghai war
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 43 } Shanghai war
 44 } Shanghai war
 45 } Shanghai war

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No. 34.

Def. Doc. # 3
EXH. # 246

From Minister Shigemitsu at Shanghai
to Foreign Minister Shidehara
Dispatched from Shanghai afternoon, 19.9.1931,
received in the afternoon, 19.9.1931.

Telegram No. 974-1 (Cipher, strictly confidential, very urgent)

On the morning of the 19th, by special request of Mr. T.V. Soong, I had a pretty long talk with him on the clash of the troops of both countries in Manchuria. Soong eagerly expressed his opinion that, in order to save the general situation, we should do our best to restrain the incident from expanding, and in short proposed to appoint a powerful commission of about three members from both sides to investigate and settle the incident, in order thereby to mitigate disastrous effects upon the relations between Japan and China, as well as both peoples. His proposal was of course personal. (To be concluded)

From Minister Shigemitsu at Shanghai
to Foreign Minister Shidehara
Dispatched from Shanghai, afternoon, 19.9.1931,
received in the afternoon, 19.9.1931.

Telegram No. 974-2 (Cipher, strictly confidential, very urgent)

But after due considerations, I thought it to be an appropriate step and replied to him that I would hurry to find out the opinion of the Government and give him a reply, asking him at the same time if his plan was workable on the part of the Chinese Government. Soong answered that if my reply should be favorable, he would fly to Nanking immediately to obtain approval, and that he himself would join the commission.

I will report separately by telegram about the details of this interview, but its gist being as above, the opinion of the Government, if provisional, concerning this proposal and your directive for my further conducting negotiations in this regard are urgently awaited.

Reported to Mukden, Nanking and Peiping.

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No. 35.

Def. Doc. # 4
EXH. # 246

Showa 6 12784 Cipher Shanghai Dispatched from Shanghai,
afternoon, 19.9.
Received in the forenoon,
20. 9.

To Foreign Minister Shidehara from Minister Shigemitsu
No. 986? (Urgent, strictly confidential)
With reference to my telegram No. 974?

The proposal of Soong may not at once serve our purpose in the present urgency of the situation in Manchuria, but it may strengthen our general stand in regard to the incident. Besides, it may not only be usefully taken advantage of in future, but also may serve as a balk against any radical change of atmosphere on the Chinese side. I am, therefore, of opinion that the proposal should be quickly accepted in principle. Your instruction is awaited by return of telegram. The constitution of the commission, for instance, may be left to a further consideration.

Reported to Mukden, Nanking and Peiping.

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From Foreign Minister Shidehara
to Minister Shigemitsu in China
Dispatched in the afternoon, 21.9.1931,

Telegram No. 372 (Cipher, strictly confidential, urgent)

The line of policy to settle the incident in Manchuria.
With reference to your telegram No. 984;

We herewith request you to state to Mr. T. V. Soong urgently that the Japanese Government entirely share his opinion that paramount importance should be attached to the necessity of alleviating the intensity of the atmosphere by informing the world quickly of our immediate action to settle the matter, in order to prevent the Sino-Japanese relations from being thrown into a chaotic condition through the present incident, and to transmit the following to him as the opinion of the Japanese Government in reply to his proposal. Your reply is awaited.

Taking the fundamental factors of the present political situation into full consideration, we have no doubt that the recent incident has been occasioned by a casual happening breaking loose the disagreeable atmosphere existing in the relations of both nations, and made tense and stuffy during the past score of years. If steps are not to be taken to alleviate this disagreeable atmosphere to a marked degree, the root of evil will inevitably be left to a future day. Upon this general point of view, therefore, the proposed Sino-Japanese commission should aim as its chief objective not only at a settlement of the present incident, but also at finding agreement on basic principles, necessary to prevent similar incidents from recurring, thus turning the present misfortune into a blessing. This objective is by no means easy to attain, but we believe firmly that it is not impossible, if the authorities of both countries take up the matter with sincerity and resolution. If Mr. T. V. Soong agrees, the Japanese Government is happy, in this sense, to accept his proposal to set up a commission.

Reported to Peiping and Mukden.
Please report to Nanking.

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Showa 6 13420 Cipher Dispatched from Shanghai,
afternoon 25. 9.

Received at Foreign Office
forenoon 24. 9.

To Foreign Minister Shidehara From Minister Shigemitsu
No. 1022-1 (strictly confidential)

1. The recent action of the military was based on their conception of the Emperor's prerogative of supreme command, and was taken entirely ignoring the Government. Deep is my feeling to see that whatever achievements in external affairs resultant of our untiring efforts have been all of a sudden reduced to nothing. I am profoundly distressed to think of the future of the nation.

In this situation, it is most earnestly desired that arbitrary actions of the military should be interdicted so as to make the will of the State emanate solely through the channel of the Government, that irresponsible and disadvantageous propaganda of the military circles should be stopped, and that, making its stand clear, the Government should reestablish political leadership.

2. No sooner has the Chinese side found the seriousness of the situation than it has as usual decided upon tactics of non-resistance, so far as military actions are concerned, and has adopted all possible counter-measures short of military actions. Not only the unified leadership of the Party and the Government, but also all the anti-Japanese organizations which have already been well trained have begun their activities. Economic boycott may be less abominable, but in my opinion, the students of the whole country, who did not move at the time of the unrest in Korea, may be active and will wield most serious influences, and anti-Japanese feeling will be brought to a higher pitch than at the time when it was instigated by the so-called Twenty-One Demands, and will be more and more aggravated with time.

Showa 6 13418 Cipher Dispatched from Shanghai,
afternoon 23.9.

Received at Foreign Office
forenoon 24. 9.

To Foreign Minister Shidehara From Minister Shigemitsu
No. 1022-2 (strictly confidential)

As the matter stands to-day, there is no foretelling that unpropitious incidents will not happen outside Manchuria. (In this regard, I request the Government to call full attention of our Navy in no case whatever to move recklessly). Should our troops by any chance advance into North Manchuria a clash with Russia would immediately be surmised, and that will make the situation ever more serious. (I conjecture that this may be part of the plan of the military).

3. The Chinese Government will follow its traditional policy of controlling one foreign country through another, with unified force by quickly settling internal strife. (the compromise pending with Canton being now accelerated in earnest with possibilities to be realized at last). The policy of the Chinese Government will be first of all to appeal to the League of Nation (with which China now stands in closer relations owing to T. V. Soong's approach to it), and to rely upon the United States by reason of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, as well as upon the effect of propaganda at home and abroad, trying thus to force evacuation of the Japanese troops in exactly the same manner as she tried for the restitution of Shantung. In any case, no Chinese authorities will appear hereafter which will be able to conclude any reasonable agreement with Japan on the Manchurian question, or to begin negotiations for that purpose. Consequently we shall have to be prepared to see Japan and China in fact deprived of diplomatic relations for a long time as a result of the present incident, which also will have to remain exposed to censure of world public opinion, due to activities on the part of the Chinese Government.

No. 38.

Showa 6 13576 Simple Cipher Dispatched from Shanghai,
afternoon, 21. 9.

Received in the forenoon,
25. 9.

To Foreign Minister Shidehara From Minister Shigemitsu
No. 1030.

On the 24th, the China Press has published a dispatch from Nanking reporting that the Japanese Government has made public the rejection by the National Government of the unofficial proposal of T. V. Soong regarding the establishment of a joint commission made to Minister Shigemitsu on the 19th, because the latest developments of the incident have made it impossible to put the proposal in practice, (in publishing this kind of unofficial talk, the name of T. V. Soong should better not be given, in consideration of future negotiations), reporting at the same time a communique of the National Government on this matter which follows.

Mr. Soong, Vice President of Yuan, stated, at a private talk with Minister Shigemitsu on the 19th, that prompt organization of a commission would be possible to make factual investigations in order to prevent the friendly relations between the two countries from deteriorating. As organs of communications were at that time occupied by the Japanese military, he had only in-

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formation giving him impressions that the incident was a purely local clash. But the warlike nature of the military operations of the Japanese Army having been made clear, and aggression continuing, the National Government has appealed to the League of Nations, which has made a decision to discuss the matter at 5 o'clock (Nanking time) on the 22nd. At noon of the same day, the Japanese Consul at Nanking called on Mr. T. V. Soong and communicated to him that the Japanese Government agreed to set up the aforesaid commission. Thereupon Mr. T. V. Soong, representing the Government, communicated to him that all prospects for direct negotiations were absolutely frustrated owing to the invasion of Chinese territory by the Japanese Army.

Reported by telegram to Peiping, Mukden and Nanking, and reported to Shanghai.

Document No. 676

REPORTS BY POLICE ATTACHED TO JAPANESE EMBASSY
AT SINKIANG 30 NOVEMBER 1927

Instruction in reference to the enforcement of guarding following the North China incident.

Resulting from the fact that about 10:00 p.m. on July 7th, while Abe Company of our Mainguchi Regiment was engaged in a night maneuver near Lung-Wang-Niao about 1 kilometer north of the Marco Polo Bridge in the suburb of Peking, it was fired upon by a Chinese Army stationed there, but army was forced to return fire and there were many casualties on both sides. Our repeated negotiations brought no solution, and the insincere actions on the part of the Chinese Army became more and more provocative. Finally this incident became the starting point of hostilities between Japan and China. The government issued a mobilization order to the army in order to help the North China expeditionary force and at the same time it was decided to call this affair the "North China Incident".

Following this incident Jehol and Southern Manchurian districts bordering North China prepared themselves and took a waiting position as the situation became pressing, necessitating a strict watch. The Kwantung Army, by orders sent necessary force to help the North China stationary troops. From the 12th orders were also sent to the province of Mukden and Antung, generally south of the Mukden-Antung line, to the Jehol and Kin Chou provinces and to the Kwantung Peninsula to enforce air defence and necessary guarding for air defence. In order to enforce the above defence, the commander of Kwantung Gendarmerie would assume a unified command of both Japanese and Manchurian gendarmerie and police force in regards to the enforcement of military police duties. Orders were also issued that the heads of the gendarmerie and police of those places where the police is attached to the Kwantung board and the consulates were to receive orders from the head of Gendarmerie of the respective districts. In compliance with the above, Chief FUJII of the Police Affairs Department, gave instruction by telegrams on 12th to each head of diplomatic establishments of Southern Manchurian districts to make contact with and cooperate with the military police and to study defence measures and instructed the police attached to the consulate that they were to receive orders from the commander of the gendarmerie concerning the enforcement of military police duties. On the 13th he issued orders in detail by Wan-Dai-Go-Ki Mitau (Joint Secret of Embassy in Manchukuo and Police No. 68) No. 68 public communications to the heads of the diplomatic establishments in Manchukuo and chiefs of prefectural police of the police stations, of the branch and of the detached stations to have nothing undone in carrying out defence work.

(Manchurian Embassy Police Joint Secret)
M.E.P.J.S. No. 68

13 July (Showa 12) 1937
Hsinking

From Chief of the Police Affairs Department
In the Embassy in Manchuria

To All the Chiefs of Diplomatic Establishments in Manchukuo,
Chief of Police of Chientao Province, All the Chiefs of
the Police Stations Attached to the Diplomatic Establish-
ments, and Chiefs of the Branch and the Detached Police
Stations

Regarding Augmentation of Watch and
Defense Concerning the Present North
China Incident

As regards the efforts which will be made by the present North China Incident upon the security of Manchukuo, it goes without saying that, judging from the international surroundings of both Japan and Manchukuo, it is most essential to augment watch and defense. It is necessary to strengthen control to check espionage, especially to preserve secrets and to prevent the least leakage of them. At the same time it is necessary to make full and complete the guard, that is, the positive counter-espionage measures against the various machinations of the dangerous elements with anti-Manchukuo and anti-Japanese thoughts and their secret informations and intrigues to and against Japan and Manchukuo. It is also necessary at this time to intensify and make more complete the investigation of the dangerous elements among armed groups. Therefore, we expect you to keep close connection with the army, Kempeitai and other defense organs of both countries in your locality and do your utmost to complete the defense and guard. I must add that at this time it is also most urgently necessary to strengthen the control over those who purposefully spread alarming rumors or aburdities to mislead and instigate the simple lower-class Manchurian and Korean people and thus prevent groundless unrest among the people. On the other hand, we expect you to pay careful attention to the trend of thought of the Manchurian people regarding this incident and do your best to guide and develop their trend of thought toward the better and leave nothing undone.

P.S. Regarding the present Incident, the purport thereof has already been informed by telegram to the diplomatic establishments concerned. Moreover, the general anti-air raid equipments and the preparedness of mind thereof of the people are as yet incomplete and crude. We expect you will positively guide and

help them for the completion of anti-air raid equipments in mind and in substance as well, as was indicated in the order issued by the commander of the Kwantung Military Police shown in separate sheet (Kwantung Military Police, Police Department No. 248, Kwantung Military Police Defence Ordinance No. 1). (Pay attention to the general principle for preservation of secrets.)

Copy of this letter sent to the Commander of the Kwantung Kempai-Tai

K.S.I. No. 213
Kwantung Army Staff Counter-Espionage Department Doc. No. 213
Annex 1

August 23 (Showa 12) 1937
Heinking

Hidoki Tojo
Chief of Staff
of the Kwantung Army

To Seieichi Tanaka
Commander of the
Kwantung Kempai-Tai

Regarding the Restriction of Contact
with the Russian Officials and others
in view of the Present Situation

In view of the present situation, as it is advantageous to avoid the contact with foreign officials and others upon whom strict watch is especially needed from the viewpoint of counter-espionage, we wish you to guide your subordinates so as to avoid, during the present incident any contact with them, such as meeting, conference, exchange of letters, etc., except on official business. However, those who have obtained previous understanding of the police and Kempai-Tai shall be exempted from the above restriction. Further, as regards the above said foreigners who need surveillance, their names only will be informed to those concerned by the police or Kempai-Tai.

Lastly, the above-mentioned items must be strictly confidential to only those concerned.

I hereby notify you by order.

Document No. 676

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Kwantung Army Staff Counter-Espionage Department Doc. No. 212
Annex II

August 23 (Showa 12) 1937

From Hidoki Toji,
Chief of Staff of the
Kwantung Army

To Seiichi Tanaka
Commander of the
Kwantung Reserve Troop

Regarding the Limitation of Those
Who Can Have Contact With Foreign
Officials on Official Business

Hitherto both Japanese and Manchurian officials have been conferring or exchanging letters on official matters without contacting the diplomatic establishments concerned, and for this reason there are not few examples whereby our secrets have been leaked causing disadvantages to our military and diplomatic foreign negotiations. In view of the fact that this has caused a considerable effect on Japan-Manchuria joint defence, it has been decided that the officials of both countries who can contact with foreign officials on official matters shall hereafter be limited to those diplomats on duty at the diplomatic establishments of both countries and also the chiefs of the Military Secret Service, and if those other than the above find it necessary to contact with foreign officials on official matters they shall have previous negotiation with and get the understanding of the diplomatic establishments concerned. (In case of those connected with the Japanese Army, understanding shall be obtained from the chiefs of the Military Secret Service.)

I hereby notify you by order.

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7. No. 1014 A

Resolution Establishing the Japanese-Manchukuo

Industry Administrative Committee. (October 11, 1932.)

COMMITTEE OF CABINET DECISIONS PERTAINING TO MANCHUKUA
(July 1932)

Issued by the Second Section of the East Asia Bureau of the
Foreign Office.

Passed by the Committee for the Resolution of Policy towards
Manchukua and Mongolia on the 20th of September in the 17th
Year of Showa (1932) with a reservation on the side of the
Overseas Bureau.

Matters relating to the Establishment of a Japan vs. Manchurian
Industry Administrative Committee.

Purpose.

The Japanese-Manchurian Industry Administrative Committee shall be
established with the Director of the National Resources Bureau as its chairman,
besides the Committee of the Investigation of the Executive Policy towards
Manchuria and Mongolia in the administration of industry between both the
Japanese and Manchurian Governments, and their relations and discuss the plan
of the administration of industry between the two countries.

Outline.

The Japanese-Manchurian Industry Administrative Committee is under the
supervision of the Prime Minister and shall investigate and discuss the affairs
concerning the administration of Japanese and Manchurian industry. When the
subject is of importance, it shall be reported to the cabinet conference
after being discussed by the Committee for the Resolution of Policy towards
Manchuria and Mongolia and when it is a suitable matter, it shall be put
directly into effect by the competent authorities without inquiring the
subject's consent.

1. Discussable matters.
Matters concerning the administration of Japanese-Manchurian industry.

2. The organization of the committee.
Chairman. The Director of the National Resources Bureau,
Seishu-cho, Tokyo.

Members. One from each of the following

Ministry of Education

The Ministry of Agriculture

The Ministry of Industry

The Ministry of Finance

The Ministry of Commerce

The Ministry of Industry

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Ministry of Agriculture

The Ministry of Industry

3. The conference of the secretaries shall be organized in order to prepare a report to be submitted to the Council, and to conduct the necessary work.

The chief of the National Resources Bureau,
 and two of the chief of the following
 Government offices:

The Foreign Ministry,

The Finance Ministry,

The War Ministry,

The Navy Ministry,

The Commerce and Customs Ministry,

The Ministry of Overseas Affairs,

The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,

The National Resources Bureau.

4. Others besides the commission or secretaries may be present at a committee or a secretary conference at any time and their opinions may be asked on professional matters.

5. General Affairs of the committee or secretary meetings shall be managed in the Bureau of General Affairs.

6. A committee or a secretary meeting shall be held at any time at a suitable place and called out by its chairman.

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Doc. No. 2197 (97)

Br. Ex. 33

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TELEGRAM
THE AMBASSADOR IN JAPAN (GREW) TO THE SECRETARY
OF STATE

TOKYO, May 3, 1933--noon.
(Received May 3--2:10 a.m.)

89. Last week the correspondent of the New York Times cabled to his paper a statement made to him by Komai, Privy Councillor of Manchukuo, that Manchukuo would apply the principle of the open door only to those countries which recognized Manchukuo's independence. On the following day Byas cabled to his paper a statement by the spokesman of the Foreign Office to the effect that Komai possessed no influence or authority and that the Japanese Government would never countenance any violations of the open-door principles which she regards as basic in the Far East.

In view of the adverse publicity which has occurred abroad, the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs today authorized me to inform my Government officially that Komai spoke without authority and that the principle of the open door in Manchukuo would be strictly maintained.

GREW

Foreign Relations I, pp. 119-120

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CONFERENCE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF MANCHUKUO (1935) CONCERNING THE STABILIZATION OF THE FOREIGN VALUE OF THE MANCHURIAN COIN

Measures relating to the stabilization of Manchurian coin value and the unification of exchange system.

Decided on the cabinet meeting of Nov. 4, 1935 (10 shows). Although the foreign value of Manchurian coin has lowered in reality all relations with silver in accordance with the rise in the silver value caused by the American silver policy, the drift of silver value in the future cannot be forecasted, and as the currency value of the principle countries of the world have fallen apart from the common basis and are in a consistent drifting state, the decision of the monetary standard would better be actualized when the currencies of the principle countries including our country are established and stabilized and the actual stabilization of the foreign value of Manchurian coin has maintained for a considerably long period and also when the establishing of the monetary standard in compliance with the circumstances would be appropriate to the Manchurian financial conditions and to the close financial relationships of Japan and Manchukuo.

When we consider this problem from our view-point, the bank notes of the bank of Chosen and the Yokohama Specie Bank now in current in the domain of Manchukuo, had possessed an important mission on our Manchurian and Korean policy, our national policy will be renovated with the independence of Manchukuo and the cabinet has decided to aid our neighbor and in the meanwhile, the Manchurian government has established the Central Bank and had adopted the system of entrusting the administration of currency and finance to the said bank. And as Manchukuo has been striving earnestly to demonstrate the faculty of the above bank, it must be said that a change was naturally brought about in the historical missions of the bank notes of our country and if the currency of the said bank notes are left as they are in the present state, it will but complicate the currency of Manchukuo and hinder the stabilization of the foreign value of the Manchurian coin.

Consequently, we have decided on the following policies relating to the stabilization of the national coin value of Manchukuo and the unification of coinage system and will, in the first place, actualize this policy according to the following summary:

ACCOUNT

General Policy

Relating to the stabilization of the national coin value of Manchukuo and the unification of coinage system:

- (1) It is important on the part of Manchukuo to strive for the actual stabilization of the foreign value of national coin at present,

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and to prepare what is necessary for the legal stabilization on a
higher level in the future, when the coinage system of the province
is transferred to the established system.

(5) As the paper of our country, it would be appropriate to
control, to be stabilized, of the national coin value by uni-
fying and restricting the bank notes issued by Japanese banks with the
national coin at a suitable time in the future. However, on executing
the said restriction, not only is it necessary to take the best measures
so as not to hinder the cooperation of Japanese and Manchurian economy,
particularly the transportation of goods, but it is also necessary
to prepare measures for the enforcement of this policy as there are
many attending legal and technical matters which require investigations such as
the abolition of all administrative jurisdictions, the readjustment
and transfer of all administrative rights of provinces and the con-
sistency of the Japanese banks caused by the unification of the
coinage system and the measures towards it.

(6) Although it is actually inconvenient to enforce different
coinage systems in Kwantung Province and Manchuria, as the two terri-
tories hold a close and indivisible economic relation to each other,
the Kwantung Province will not be included in a district where the
coinage system will be enforced, for there is a doubt from the view-
point of our laws as to the circulation of the Manchurian national
coin as the local coin in Kwantung Province.

III. The Summary of Execution

No. 1 The Policy to be Adopted by Manchuria

(1) In order to prevent the swift and unnatural competition of
the foreign value, necessary measures must be speedily adopted, such
as the unification of money order and control must be exercised
over transactions of a speculative nature and every extraordinary
transfer of funds such as the flying of loans.

(2) In order to cultivate the economic power and thereby es-
tablish the basis of stabilization of national coin value, it is
necessary.

- (a) To consolidate the basis of finance and to
endeavor to establish and maintain the
equilibrium of the income and expenditures.
- (b) To reform the international interest and
expenditure considering the industrial
policy.
- (c) To adopt sound and adequate currency policy
and thereby secure and complete the capital
preparatory for the issuing of the Central
bank notes.

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(d) To strive singleminded for the stabilization of the foreign value, especially the exchange value towards Japan.

(4) To take active measures so as to establish communication and business amongst the Manchurian government or the Central Bank, the Japanese Empire, the Nippon Bank, and other Japanese Banks in Manchuria.

Doc. 2. The Policy to be Adopted by our Country

(1) In order to facilitate the exchange of the national coin value of Manchuria, appropriate arrangements will be exercised on the operations of the Bank of Chosen, in Manchuria and especially, the agency management of the bank post if the said bank should outside the division will be established.

(2) In order to have good results from the administration of exchange, it is necessary,

(a) To give suitable consideration to the system and application of the exchange administration on our part.

(b) The Japanese banks in Manchuria, especially the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Bank of Chosen, will be active when necessary.

(3) Japanese citizens and civilians will try to use the national coin as much as possible and the military and the Manchurian Railway will try to the national coin as much as possible.

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Doc. No. 1014-N

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COLLECTION OF CABINET DECISIONS PERTAINING TO BURMA

Issued by the Bureau of the East Asia Division of the
Foreign Office.

Re. Matters concerning the repulsion and development of our
country's economic mobilization.

When we consider the present internal and external circumstances, the
necessity of carrying diverse policies based on the national defense and
national life is not, first and foremost, to establishing of a concrete plan
of the mobilization program with the repulsion and development of both the
Japanese and American economies, the development of industrial
facilities, and the carrying of international relations and expenditures on
the three other hand, as an overall duty.

It is necessary to devise the said concrete plan from the standpoint
of incorporation of the said plan. Therefore, close connections must
be held among the mobilization department, education and other organizations,
and the planning department with working and adjust plans and thereby
draw up a concrete plan. On drawing up the concrete plan, measures must be
adopted so as to coordinate the said plan with the cooperation of each department.

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AGREEMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
JAPAN-KOREAN JOINT ECONOMIC COMMISSION

July 15, 1935

Whereas the governments of Japan and Manchukuo entertain a desire to realize the national coordination of the economies of the two countries with the purpose of more rapidly and effectively promoting their economic interdependence and existing bilateral trade relations;

Whereas the two governments have expressed the wish of achieving all and close cooperation among their citizens in industrial and economic matters affecting the interests of both countries with the purpose of the promotion of Japan and Manchukuo signed on the twentieth day of the Ninth month of the first year of Heian, corresponding to the Fifteenth day of the Fourth month of the first year of Taisho;

Now the two governments, having resolved to establish a Japan-Korean Joint Economic Commission, have agreed as follows:

- Article I. A Japan-Korean Joint Economic Commission shall be established as follows in Manchukuo.
- Article II. The Commission may be consulted by the governments of Japan and Manchukuo as to industrial matters regarding the inter-relationship of the economies of the two countries as well as important matters regarding the supervision of the management of special companies and all Japanese-Manchukuo joint enterprises and shall then submit its views thereon to the two governments.
- Article III. The governments of Japan and Manchukuo shall take no measures regarding such matters as are specified in the preceding article unless they have previously consulted the Commission regarding them and have obtained its views thereon.
- Article IV. The Commission may, when necessary, make recommendations to the governments of Japan and Manchukuo in respect to all matters pertaining to the national coordination of the economies of the two countries.
- Article V. The organization and composition of the Commission shall be regulated by the Annex to the present Agreement.

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In witness whereof We, the undersigned, being duly authorized
by our respective Home Governments, have signed and sealed this agreement.

Drawn up in duplicate at Hsinking this fifteenth day of July of the
Tenth Year of SHOWA (1935) or the fifteenth day of July of the second year
of KANKO (1935).

/s/ JIRO MIYAMA
Special Envoy and Ambassador
Plenipotentiary of Japan

/s/ CHANG YI-CHENG
Foreign Minister of Manchoukuo

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Article VI. The present Agreement shall be put into effect on the day of its signature.

The present agreement has been drawn up in the Japanese and the Chinese languages, and should any difference arise in regard to interpretation between the Japanese and the Chinese texts, the Japanese text shall prevail.

ANNEX

1. The Commission shall be composed of eight Members, of whom the governments of Japan and Manchukuo shall each appoint four and all respectively inform the other government of their appointments, in the event of any Member being prevented from attending any meeting of the Commission on account of unavoidable circumstances, the Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo shall consult with each other in the nomination of a deputy and the said deputy shall attend the meeting. The said deputy shall act in the absence of the absent member.

Besides the Members mentioned in the preceding paragraph the governments of Japan and Manchukuo, when necessary, may, upon consultation, each appoint an equal number of Temporary Members.

2. The president shall be elected by the Members of the Commission from among their number.

3. There shall be a certain number of Secretaries of the Commission. They shall deal with the secretarial affairs of the Commission.

The governments of Japan and Manchukuo shall each appoint an equal number of Secretaries from among those attached to the Members of the Commission.

4. The proceedings of the Commission shall be decided by a majority vote. In the event of an equality of votes, the president shall decide.

The president shall not be prevented from voting as a Member of the Commission.

5. The Commission shall adopt its own Rules of procedure subject to the approval of the governments of Japan and Manchukuo.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

H.D.C. No. _____
I.P.S. No. 2167

Statement of Authenticity

I, Toru Nakagawa, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the capacity of the Chief of the Continental Affairs Section, Overseas Residents Division, Control Bureau, Foreign Office, and that as such official I have seen and know the document attached hereto and described as follows: Official Gazettes of the Manchoukuo Government for June-July 1935. I further certify that the attached document is the official publication of the Manchoukuo Government.

Signed at Foreign Office

/s/ Toru Nakagawa
Chief of the Continental Affairs
Section, Overseas Residents
Bureau, Control Division,
Foreign Office. (S.L.)

● this 17th day of July, 1946.

Witness /s/ A. H. Muggor

I, Lt. Robert Teaze, hereby certify that ATIS Document No. SA 10090, Item 29, described as follows:

"Official Manchurian Government Gazette-Translated into Japanese (MANCHURIAN SENJU HONBU HAKU YAKU)", June-July 1935,

was obtained by me in the course of my official duties from East Asia Research Institute and on 11 Jun 1945 was delivered to Mr. E. P. Moganhan of the International Prosecution Section.

Date: 18 July 1946

/s/ Robert S. Teaze
ROBERT S. TEAZE
3d Lt., AUS
ATIS Document Section

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(Doc. 2167)

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the attached document, IPS No. 2167, Manchoukuo Government Bulletin for June-July 1935, was obtained by me from Lt. Robert S. Teaze, ATIS Document Section, in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

27th day of August, 1946.

Witness: Richard H. Larsh

/s/ Edward P. Monaghan
Name

Investigator, IPS
Official Capacity

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(Excerpt from The Japan Yearbook, 1941-42, Page 941)

JAPAN'S INVESTMENT IN MANCHOUKUO

Japan's investment in Manchoukuo was estimated to have amounted to about ¥1,700,000,000, before the Manchurian Incident of 1931. According to the South Manchuria Railway Company, the pre-incident investments were distributed as follows: 30 per cent in transportation; 11.6 per cent in finance; 6.7 per cent in commerce; 16.2 per cent in agriculture, forestry and mining; 9.2 per cent in industry; and 25.3 per cent in other enterprises. It is further classified that out of the ¥ 1,700,000,000 investments, ¥837,000,000 took the form of investments in securities and the remaining ¥863,000,000 in limited and unlimited partnership companies and private companies.

Investments in securities before the incident consisted of those in debentures and stocks and loans which may be partially regarded as investments in securities. At the end of 1931, the total investments of Japan in securities relative to Manchuria amounted to ¥837,536,000, of which ¥710,906,000 was connected with the S.M.R.Co. The fact shows Japan's investments in Manchuria before the incident were almost exclusively limited to the railway company.

To the above base total were added new investments amounting to ¥2,600,000,000. During the period under review, according to the reports of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, ¥262,995,000 were added in 1935, ¥341,273,000 in 1937, ¥430,961,000 in 1938, and ¥1,103,715,000 in 1939. The grand total of Japanese investments in Manchuria at the end of 1939 is thus estimated to be around ¥4,739,483,000. The total amount of Japanese investments in the form of shares and bonds in 1940 reached ¥ 2,815,205,000.

JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN MANCHOUKUO DURING 1940
(In ¥1,000)

	Amount Newly Issued	Conversion	Total	Redemption	Outstanding At the End of the Year
National Bonds.....	200,000	-	200,000	2,000	630,900
Bank Bonds.....	45,000	-	45,000	-	75,000
Company Shares.....	334,000	-	231,000	3,650	734,700
Shares of Japanese companies in Manchoukuo.....	245,000	38,000	283,000	45,545	1,334,605
TOTAL	724,000	38,000	762,000	51,195	2,815,205

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ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION OF MANCHURIA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION 13

Chapter I General Provisions

Article I. The corporation shall be called MANCHURIA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and shall be supervised by the Government under the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation Administration Act passed by virtue of Imperial Ordinance No. 460 of the 4th year of Kangō / 1936/.

Article II. The objects and purposes of the Corporation are to invest in any or all of the following industries in Manchukuo, and to direct the management thereof:

1. Iron and Steel Industry
2. Light Metal Industry
3. Automobile Manufacturing Industry
4. Aeroplane Manufacturing Industry
5. Coal Industry

Besides the business mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Corporation may invest in the business of mining gold, zinc, lead, copper and other metals, as well as in various domestic and foreign business for which the sanction of the Minister of the Competent Department is obtained.

The Corporation may become a promoter for the purpose of organizing companies the objects of which are businesses in the two preceding paragraphs or may advance funds to affiliated companies and guarantee the obligations thereof.

Article III. The amount of capital of the Corporation shall be Six Hundred Seventy-Five Million Yen (¥675,000,000) Japanese currency.

Article VI. The capital of the Corporation shall be divided into Thirteen Million Five Hundred Thousand (13,500,000) shares with a par value of Fifty Yen (¥50) each, Japanese currency.

Article VII. The shares of the Corporation shall be classified into three classes, viz., four Million Five Hundred Thousand (4,500,000) shares owned by the Government which shall be designated as Class A shares, four Million Five Hundred Thousand (4,500,000) shares owned by persons other than the Government, designated as Class B shares, and four Million Five Hundred Thousand (4,500,000) shares designated as Class C shares. Class C shares shall have no voting right.

Article VIII. The total paid-in amount of Class A shares shall be equal to the total paid-in amount of Class B shares.

Article IX. The profits of the company available for dividend in the account settlement of each fiscal year shall be distributed preferentially to C Class shares over A and B Class shares until the dividend on the C class shares reaches a rate of six (6) per cent per annum against their paid up amount.

The profit remaining after distribution in the dividend on the C class shares in accordance with the preceding paragraph shall be distributed to A class shares and B class shares respectively, at the rate of one to two until the rate reaches three (3) percent per annum and six (6) percent per annum against the said amount of A class and B class shares, respectively. The balance remaining thereafter shall be distributed to A class, B class and C class shares at the ratio of one to two, respectively, until the rate reaches five (5) percent per annum for A class shares, and ten percent per annum for both B class and C class shares. The profit remaining after making the distribution prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be distributed at a uniform rate to A class, B class and C class shares in proportion to their respective paid up amounts.

Article XXII. Shares of this Corporation shall not be transferable to persons other than nationals of Manchukuo and Japan, or juridical persons organized under the laws of either of these countries, the majority of the voting power of which belongs to persons or juridical persons of both countries.

Article XXVII. The President shall represent the Corporation and superintend the business affairs thereof.

In case of unavoidable circumstances to the President, one of the Vice-Presidents shall act on his behalf.

The Vice-presidents and the Directors shall assist the President and manage the business affairs of the Corporation.

The Auditors shall inspect the business affairs of the Corporation.

Article XXVIII. The President and Vice-Presidents shall be appointed by the Government, while the Directors and Auditors shall be elected at the General Meeting of Shareholders.

Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation
Administration Act
Imperial Ordinance No. 460
Proclamation December 20, 1937

Article I. The Government shall supervise the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation in accordance with this Law in order to supervise and coordinate establishment of heavy industries in this territory, and to control these industries.

Article II. The objects of the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation are to invest funds or all of the following industries and to direct the management thereof in this country:

1. Iron and Steel Industry
2. Light Metal Industry
3. Automobile Manufacturing Industry
4. Aeroplane Manufacturing Industry
5. Coal Industry

Besides the business mentioned in the preceding paragraph the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation may incidentally invest in the business of mining gold, zinc, lead, copper and other metals or other enterprises. Provided, that the sanction of the Minister of the Competent Department shall be obtained for business other than investments in the mining business in this country.

Article IV. The amount of capital of the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation shall be Four Hundred Fifty Million Yen (¥450,000,000). Provided, however, that the amount of capital may be increased with the sanction of the Minister of the Competent Department.

Article VI. Shares with voting power of the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation may be transferred to persons of Manchukuo and Japanese nationality only, or to juridical persons organized under the laws of either of these countries, the majority of the voting power of which juridical persons belongs to a person or persons or a juridical person or persons of Manchukuo or Japanese nationality.

Article VIII. The president shall represent the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation and superintend the business affairs thereof.

In case the president is prevented from performing his duties, one of the vice-presidents shall perform the duties of the president.

The Vice-presidents and the Directors shall assist the President and shall manage the business affairs of the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation. The Auditors shall audit the business affairs of the Manchuria Development Corporation.

Article IV. The President and Vice-presidents shall be appointed by the Government and Directors and Auditors shall be elected in accordance with the provisions of share-holders.

Article V. The amount of dividend payable to the holders of the shares of each class, term of the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation, shall be in excess of three per cent (3%) per cent per annum on the paid-in capital, shall be distributed in the order of one part to the holder owned by the Government and two parts to the shares owned by others than the Government.

3. In case the amount of dividend payable to shareholders exceeds seven and one half (7½) per cent per annum on the paid-in capital, the rate of dividend for such excess shall be equal as to each share.

In case the capital is increased in accordance with the provision of Article IV, a special provision shall be made, with the sanction of the Minister of the Competent Department, as to the dividend payable to shareholders, irrespective of the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs.

Article VIII. If at the close of each fiscal term of the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation, the consolidated net profits accrued from the business carried on in Manchoukuo do not equal six (6) per cent per annum on the total amount of funds appropriated for such undertakings (including the total amount of profits earned from such undertakings excepted), the Government shall contribute an amount equal to the amount of such shortage for any fiscal term ending within ten years from the enforcement date of this law. If and when consolidated net profits for subsequent fiscal terms exceed six (6) per cent per annum, the rate of contribution shall be reduced from such excess, with interest at the rate of 4% (4) per cent per annum.

Consolidated net profits shall be calculated by deducting certain losses (interest on loans granted) from gross profits (profit brought forward included) accrued from the business carried on in Manchoukuo.

Article IX. The Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation may issue debentures to the extent of three per cent of the paid-in capital with the sanction of the Minister of the Competent Department.

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Article XVII. The Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation shall determine its business plans for each fiscal year, and submit the plans to the Minister of the Competent Department. This rule shall apply to any corporations in the plans.

Article XX. The Minister of the Competent Department may issue the necessary orders for supervision of the business affairs of the Manchuria Industrial Development Corporation.

Article XXI. The Minister of the Competent Department may issue the necessary order for control of the transactions as to the business of the Manchuria Development Corporation.

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Doc. No. 438 A

I.P.S., G.V.O., S.C.A.P.

2 July 1946

C L A I M I N G S

I, Edward P. Monaghan, hereby certify that I am a member of I.P.S., G.V.O., S.C.A.P., and that the attached document, i.e. the document entitled "Articles of the Hanchuan Ferry Industry Development Company," comprising 18 pages, was delivered to me on official business by the Japanese Foreign Ministry on the above date.

Edward P. Monaghan
I.P.S. Investigator

Doc. No. 438 B

Page 1

I.P.S., G.H.Q., S.O.n.7.

2 July 1946

CERTIFIC..TF

I, Edward J. COYNE, hereby certify that I am a member of I.P.S., G.H.Q., S.O.n.7, and that the attached document, i.e., the document entitled "Industry Development Plan, No. 460, issued on 20 December 1937, and containing ten pages, was delivered to me on official business by the Japanese Foreign Ministry on the above date.

EDWARD J. COYNE
IPS, Investigator

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21-8-6.2 6 August 46
(Doc. 6904)

OPENING STATEMENT

SUBJECT: ALL CHINA MILITARY AGGRESSION
(1937 - 1945)

ASSOCIATE COUNSEL FOR CHINA:
JUDGE CHE-CHUN HSLING

PRESENTED BY: COL. THOMAS H. MORRO.

ASSOCIATES: MR. KENNETH W. PARKINSON
MR. HENRY CHIU

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
JUNE 1946
TOKYO, JAPAN

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OPENING STATEMENT

The subject which my associates and I will present covers military aggression in all China, except Manchuria, consisting in planned warlike attack and invasion for conquest and plunder by means of modern armies, naval and air forces.

The evidence which we shall present will show the following:

That four major invasions by the Japanese armed forces were made upon the territory of China and a naval blockade was imposed upon the coast of China.

The military aggression continued and persisted, until by the latter phase of the Sino-Japanese war, Japan had gained domination over coastal China and the greater part of Eastern China.

The conflict in Manchuria, concerning which Dr. Dorsey and his associates have presented evidence, spread to Shanghai, and the invasion of China at Shanghai on the 29th and 30th of January, 1932, by the Japanese armed forces, was an outgrowth of the Manchurian aggression.

The Japanese invading forces met an unexpectedly desperate and prolonged resistance by the Chinese 19th Route Army, which stood up to the landing party of the Japanese navy, later reinforced by the army, until a wide flank movement by newly landed Japanese troops drove the Chinese from the immediate vicinity of the international settlement, where the fighting started.

A truce was arranged 5 May 1932, and on the 31st of the same month, the Japanese troops withdrew from Shanghai.

The Chinese troops encountered had fought as never before, and it was their strong defense which forced a change in Japanese plans, and the temporary cessation of major military activity in Central China.

The second military aggression in China started five years after the first Shanghai invasion had been concluded by the truce.

As in the first aggression, it will be shown that the hostilities started in the dead of night, when Japanese troops moved under cover of darkness upon a position rightfully occupied by Chinese troops. Also, as in the first aggression, the Japanese springboard was a territorial concession wrung from the impotent Manchu Empire many years ago.

At the so-called Marco Polo Bridge, some ten miles southwest of Peiping, the clash occurred 7 July 1937. Events moved swiftly. Thousands of Japanese troops poured into the vicinity of Peiping from Korea and Manchuria. Peiping was assaulted and captured by the Japanese forces, and the Chinese army driven toward the west.

The Chief of the Information Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office, later stated that the Marco Polo Bridge Incident was the opening gun in a battle between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek's forces for control of the five provinces of North China.

The Marco Polo Bridge clash happened in July. The 13th of August of the same year, the second invasion at Shanghai commenced. Japanese military aggression did not stop this time with a truce at the outskirts of Shanghai, but the fertile region of Central China between Shanghai and Nanking, one of the world's most thickly populated plains, was over-run, plundered, pillaged,

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bombed, burned and devastated in an undeclared war of aggression, flaunting international law and all time-honored rules of warfare.

The campaign ended with the taking of Nanking, capital of China. We shall show that the inhabitants of this ancient city were subjected to robbery, torture, rape, murder; that firebrand, bayonet and machine gun in the hands of sadistic mobs of soldiers spelled a tale of horror without parallel since the days of (Attila the Hun²) that Chinese soldier prisoners of war were tied in bunches and massacred in wholesale lots.

Successive campaigns under Generals MATSUJI, HATA, and others, proceeded along railroad lines, and the banks of rivers, and the coast of China was blockaded by the Japanese navy. Japanese warships ascended the Yangtze and other rivers to assist progress of the army, and Japanese airplanes bombed cities throughout that part of China not occupied by Japanese forces.

When this undeclared war of aggression reached its high-water mark, two-hundred-and-fifty-million Chinese in the Eastern part of the Republic, were under the domination of the Japanese army and navy, and the capital of China had been moved to Chungking, a city in a western province, remote from the sea.

Until the establishment of the puppet government of China by the Japanese 30 March 1940, no provisions officially were made for the custody and treatment of Chinese soldier prisoners of war, and you will have presented before you evidence that Chinese soldiers who were captured, and those suspected to have borne arms in the Chinese forces, were summarily executed in a barbarous manner by the Japanese armed forces, under direction of their officers.

A comparison of the evidence which we shall produce showing the Chinese and Japanese statistics of Chinese casualties for the four years of war

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succeeding 7 July 1937, indicates that the Chinese "missing" column should list as almost a million, the number of those who were taken in battle by the Japanese and then slain, leaving an additional 411,000 unaccounted for. Chinese and Japanese casualty statistics can be reconciled only on this assumption.

This was done contrary to the laws of war, to which Japan had subscribed, and the aggression itself was accomplished in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and other treaties and assurances to which Japan was a party.

Notwithstanding that this military aggression is studiously denominated an "affair" by the Japanese statesman, it will be proved that 1,449,133 Chinese soldiers and sailors were killed in battle, or missing, and that total casualties were 3,207,948 (Chinese figures) and vastly greater according to the Japanese official estimates, in the resisting of this Japanese aggression on the soil of China. Also, in reckless disregard of the rights of neutrals, the Japanese bombed and shelled United States and British warships rightfully in Chinese waters, and bombed and wounded the British ambassador while proceeding in an automobile.

There was a third invasion of Shanghai 8 December 1941, but this time the International Settlement was the target, and American and British there located were captured and interned.

The British gunboat PETREL in the river opposite the Shanghai International Settlement, was sunk by shell fire from Japanese batteries and warships. This matter will be presented later by our British colleagues.

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The Class "C" offenses which were committed in the course of the China military aggression, and which concern principally crimes against the civilian population of China, and the unlawful use of opium and other narcotics, will be presented by Judge Che-Chun Hsiang and Mr. David N. Sutton in connection with this subject.

Because of their conduct in official positions, in the successive Japanese governments which carried out military aggression in the territory of China, as well as their personal activity, participation or acquiescence therein, all the defendants are responsible for the war crimes above related, and as charged in the following counts: Group 1-6, 19, 28; Group 2 - 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50; Group 3 - count 54. Also the evidence relates to the following appendices of the Indictment: appendix A, section 2; appendix B, sub-paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34 and 35; appendix C, sub-paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8; appendix D - sub-paragraphs 1 and 2; Section 4, sub-paragraph a, sections 10, 11, and 12; appendix E - especially the second (unnumbered) paragraph.

Evidence in support of these charges will be offered through oral testimony, and by means of documentary evidence, a great portion of which being official utterances of the Japanese themselves.

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EXHIBIT "C" - Affidavit of Isaac H. Ballantyne, 24 June 1941

"Draft Proposal Hence" by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Nomura) on June 21, 1941.

"Unofficial, Exploratory and Without Commitment (Washington,) June 21, 1941

"The Governments of the United States and of Japan accept joint responsibility for the initiation and conclusion of a general agreement of understanding expressed in a joint declaration for the resumption of traditional friendly relations.

"Without reference to specific causes of recent estrangement, it is the sincere desire of both Governments that the incidents which led to the deterioration of amicable sentiment between their countries should be prevented from recurrence and corrected in their unforeseen and unfortunate consequences.

"It is our earnest hope that, by a cooperative effort, the United States and Japan may contribute effectively toward the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area and, by the rapid consummation of an amicable understanding, encourage world peace and arrest, if not dispel, the tragic confusion that now threatens to engulf civilization.

"For such decisive action, protracted negotiations would seem ill-suited and wasteful. Both Governments, therefore, desire that adequate instrumentalities should be developed for the realization of a general understanding which would bind, meanwhile, both Governments in honor and in act.

"It is the belief of the two Governments that such an understanding should comprise only the pivotal issues of urgency and not the necessary concerns which could be deliberated later at a conference.

"Both Governments presume to anticipate that they could achieve harmonious relations if certain situations and attitudes were clarified or improved, to wit:

- 1. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respecting international relations and the character of nations.
- 2. The attitudes of both Governments toward the European War.
- 3. Action toward a successful settlement between China and Japan.
- 4. Commerce between both nations.

Exhibit "C"

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Exhibit "C" - cont'd - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine

"5. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.
6. The policies of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

7. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

"Accordingly, the Government of the United States and the Government of Japan have come to the following mutual understanding and declaration of policy:

"I. The concepts of the United States and of Japan respectively in international relations are the character of nations.

"Both governments affirm that their national policies are directed toward the foundation of a lasting peace and the inauguration of a new era of racial confidence and cooperation between our peoples. 10,000

"Both Governments declare that it is their traditional, and present, concept and conviction that nations and races compose, as members of a family, one household living under the ideal of universal concord through justice and equity; each equally enjoying rights and admitting responsibilities with mutual interests regulated by peaceful processes and directed to the pursuit of their moral and physical welfare, which they are bound to defend for themselves as they are bound not to destroy for others; they further admit their responsibilities to oppose the oppression or exploitation of other peoples.

"Both Governments are firmly determined that their respective traditional concepts on the character of nations and the underlying moral principles of social order and national life will continue to be preserved and never transmuted by foreign ideas or ideologies contrary to their moral principles and concepts.

"II. The attitude of both Governments toward the European war is:

"The Government of Japan insists that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, and is, defensive and is confined to contribute to the prevention of a unprovoked extension of the European war.

"The Government of the United States maintains that its attitude toward the European hostilities is and will continue to be determined solely and exclusively by considerations of protection and self-defense; its national security and the defense thereof.

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Exhibit "C" - cont'd - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine

"Note: There is appended a suggested draft of an exchange of letters as a substitute for the Annex and Supplement of the Government of the United States on this subject which constituted a part of the draft of May 31, 1941. For discussion of the fundamental question underlying this whole section, vice the Oral statement rendered the Japanese Ambassador on June 21.)

"III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

"The Japanese Government having communicated to the Government of the United States the general terms within framework of which the Japanese Government will welcome the negotiation of a peaceful settlement with the Chinese Government, which terms are declared by the Japanese Government to be in harmony with the Keene principles regarding neighborly friendship and mutual respect of sovereignty and territories and with the reciprocal application of those principles, the President of the United States will suggest to the Government of China that the Government of China and the Government of Japan enter into a negotiation on a basis mutually advantageous and acceptable for a termination of hostilities and resumption of peaceful relations.

"Note (The foregoing draft of Section III is subject to further discussion of the question of cooperative defense against communistic activities, including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory, and the question of economic cooperation between China and Japan. With respect to suggestions that the language of Section III be changed, it is believed that consideration of any suggested change can most advantageously be given after all the points in the survey relating to this section have been satisfactorily worked out, when the section and its effect can be viewed as a whole.)

"IV. Commerce between both nations.

"When official approbation to the present understanding has been given by both Governments, the United States and Japan shall assure each other mutually to supply such commodities as are, respectively, available and required by either of them. Both Governments further consent to take necessary steps to remove normal trade relations as formerly established under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan. A new commercial treaty is desired by both Governments, it could be negotiated as soon as possible and be concluded in accordance with usual procedure.

"V. Economic activity of both nations in the Pacific area.

"On the basis of mutual pledges hereby given that Japanese activity and American activity in the Pacific area shall be carried on by peaceful means and in conformity with the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations, the Japanese Government and the Government of the United States agree to cooperate each with the other toward obtaining non-discriminatory access by Japan and by

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Exhibit "C" - cont'd - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine

"The United States to essential supplies of natural resources (such as oil, rubber, tin, nickel) which each country needs for the safeguarding and development of its own economy."

"VI. The position of both nations affecting political stabilization in the Pacific area.

"Both Governments declare that the controlling policy underlying this understanding is peace in the Pacific area; that it is their fundamental purpose through cooperative effort, to contribute to the maintenance and the preservation of peace in the Pacific area; and that neither has territorial designs in this area mentioned."

"VII. Neutralization of the Philippine Islands.

"The Government of Japan declares its willingness to enter at such time as the Government of the United States may desire into negotiation with the Government of the United States with a view to the conclusion of a treaty for the neutralization of the Philippine Islands, when Philippine independence shall have been achieved."

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"Annex and Supplement on the Part of the Japanese Government.

"III. Action toward a peaceful settlement between China and Japan.

"The basic terms as referred to in the above section are as follows:

1. Neighborly friendship.
2. (Cooperative defense against injurious economic activities--including the stationing of Japanese troops in Chinese territory.) Subject to further discussion.
3. (Economic cooperation.) Subject to agreement on an exchange of letters in regard to the application to this point of the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
4. Mutual respect of sovereignty and territories.
5. Mutual respect for the inherent characteristics of each nation cooperating as good neighbors and forming an East Asian nucleus contributing to world peace.
6. Withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from Chinese territory as promptly as possible and in accordance with an agreement to be concluded between Japan and China.
7. No annexation.
8. No indemnities.
9. Amicable negotiations in regard to Manchukuo.

Exhibit "C"

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Exhibit "C" - cont'd - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine

Annex 2.7

ANNEX AND SUPPLEMENT ON THE PART OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

IV. Commerce between both nations.

"It is understood that during the present international emergency Japan and the United States each shall permit export to the other of commodities to amounts up to the figures of usual peacetime trade, except, in the case of each, commodities which it needs for its own purposes of security and self-defense. These limitations are mentioned to clarify the obligations of each Government. They are not intended as restrictions against either Government; and, it is understood, both Governments will apply such regulations in the spirit dominating relations with friendly nations.

Annex 2.7

SUGGESTED EXCELLENCE OF LETTERS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR

The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador: /

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"Excellency: In Section II of the Joint Declaration which was entered into today on behalf of our two Governments, statements are made with regard to the attitudes of the two Governments toward the European war. During the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of this Joint Declaration I explained to you on a number of occasions the attitude and policy of the Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe and I pointed out that this attitude and policy were based on the inalienable right of self-defense. I called special attention to an address which I delivered on April 24 setting forth fully the position of this Government upon this subject.

"I am sure that you are fully cognizant of this Government's attitude toward the European war but in order that there may be no misunderstanding I am again referring to the subject. I shall be glad to receive from you confirmation by the Government of Japan that, with regard to the measures which this nation may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, which have been set forth as indicated, the Government of Japan is not under any commitment which would require Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement to establish and to preserve peace in the Pacific area.

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"Except, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest consideration.

Exhibit "C"

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Exhibit "C" - cont'd - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine

"The Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State:

"Excellency: I have received your letter of June--:

"I wish to state that my Government is fully aware of the attitude of the Government of the United States toward the hostilities in Europe as explained to me by you during our recent conversations and as set forth in your address of April 24. I did not fail to report to my Government the policy of the Government of the United States as it had been explained to me, and I may assure you that my Government understands and appreciates the attitude and position of the Government of the United States with regard to the European war.

"I wish also to assure you that the Government of Japan, with regard to the measures which the Government of the United States may be forced to adopt in defense of its own security, is not under any commitment requiring Japan to take any action contrary to or destructive of the fundamental objective of the present agreement.

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"The Government of Japan, fully cognizant of its responsibilities freely assumed by the conclusion of this agreement, is determined to take no action inimical to the establishment and preservation of peace in the Pacific area.

"Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

[Annex 47

"SUGGESTED LETTER TO BE ADDRESSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN CONNECTION WITH THE JOINT DECLARATION.

"Excellency: In the informal conversations which resulted in the conclusion of a general agreement of understanding between our two Governments, you and your associates expressed fully and frankly views on the intentions of the Japanese Government in regard to applying to Japan's proposed economic cooperation with China the principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations. It is believed that it would be helpful if you could be so good as to confirm the statements already expressed orally in the form of replies on the following points:

"1. Does the term 'economic cooperation' between Japan and China contemplate the granting by the Government of China to the Japanese Government or its nationals of any preferential or monopolistic rights which would discriminate in favor of the Japanese Government and Japanese nationals as compared with the Government and nationals of the United States and of other third countries? Is it contemplated that upon the inauguration of negotiations for a peaceful settlement between Japan and China the special Japanese companies, such as the North China Development Company and the Central China Production Company and their subsidiaries, will be divested, in so far as Japanese official support may be involved, of any monopolistic or other preferential rights that they may exercise in fact or that may inure to them by virtue of present circumstances in areas of China under Japanese military occupation?

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Exhibit "C"

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Exhibit "C" - cont'd - Affidavit of Joseph W. Ballantine

"2. With regard to existing restrictions upon freedom of trade and travel by nationals of third countries in Chinese territory under Japanese military occupation, could the Japanese Government indicate approximately what restrictions will be removed immediately upon the entering into by the Government of Chungking of negotiations with the Government of Japan and what restrictions will be removed at later dates, with an indication in each case in so far as possible of the approximate time within which removal of such restrictions would be effected?

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"3. In the interests of the Japanese Government that the Chinese Government shall exercise full and complete control of matters relating to trade, currency and exchange? Is it the intention of the Japanese Government to withdraw and to reduce the Japanese military forces which are being circulated in China and the notes of Japanese-sponsored regions in China? Can the Japanese Government indicate any steps after the inauguration of the contemplated negotiations arrangements to the above ends and in its opinion be carried out?

"It would be appreciated if an specific replies on possible could be made to the questions above listed.

"Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration." (Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 436-492.)

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Extract from Interrogation of (Largu's)
KIDO, Heichi - 7 February 1946, pg. 251

- Q When did the military group start thinking in terms of expansion in China, territorially? Approximately - I realize you don't know the exact date?
- A I don't believe such a feeling existed until the outbreak of the China Incident and there was opposition among the military to the effect that as long as Manchuria is not as yet settled and developed, we should not get involved in China.
- Q It was a long-range plan in the military fraction that after Manchuria had been properly controlled and brought into Japanese sphere of influence, the militarists then would move into China. Was that it?
- A There were certain persons discussing to that effect but I don't believe there actually was a plan.
- Q And those that were discussing that were Chief of Staff officers, were they?
- A I do not know but I believe that those young officers of which I previously mentioned had such an idea.
- Q The most outspoken all through those days were the younger officers? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Was HASHIMOTO one of them?
- A Yes.
- Q And the other ones who stand out in your mind are who?
- A ITO, SHIGEMOTO and such persons as that.
- Q Those three men, then, SHIGEMOTO, ITO and HASHIMOTO? Those three?
- A Yes.

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Extracts from Interrogation of KIDO, (Marquis) Koichi -
7 February 1946.

Page 244

Q And who was advocating the expansion of Japan across the
Great Wall into China.

A I believe the Kwantung Army.

Q Were the Chiefs of Staff in Tokyo also advocating further
expansion?

A I believe that the Chief of Staff in Tokyo did not have
such a view in mind.

Q Do you think they were fearful that the Chief of Staff of the
Kwantung Army would just keep going on and move across the
Great Wall into China? Was that the problem?

A Yes.

Q Would that action be initiated by ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA?

A Yes.

Q They would have led such a movement?

A Yes.

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Excerpts from Interrogation of KIDO, (Marquis) Keichi, 15 February 1946

Page 357

Q On June 15 and 18, I notice you had some talks with Mr. TANI of the
 Athletic Bureau about the so-called China incident and Manchurian
 situation. Do you remember what he had to say on those occasions?
 A I believe he gave a talk on the progress of the North China incident
 which I have related a while ago and he informed us that it was settled
 without any serious development.

Q (19th) Isn't it true that in those days, what the Government was
 concerned about was the fear that the Army in the field in North China
 and Manchuria would, without sanction from the Government move forward
 into China?
 A There was such a worry and if such a situation would arise, the matter of
 self-defense would come out.

Q Well, isn't it true that those men in the field, such as ITAGAKI and
 SANO were very belligerent and quite active in fomenting trouble in
 North China and that the Government was very much concerned that they
 would start some incident so that the armies could sweep in under the
 guise of self-defense?
 A Yes, the Government was worried such a thing would arise.

Q And people that were causing all this trouble for Japan at this
 particular period were ITAGAKI, SANO, ISHII and not DOHARA?
 A I am not clear about DOHARA.

Q But the other three you agree with me on?
 A I think so.

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CHAPTER 22. VARIOUS MATTERS RELATING TO CHINA

Section 1. The Policy towards China

1. Deciding upon a policy.

Regarding our policy towards China, "The Three Principles China Policy," dated October 4, Showa 10 (1935), and "An Outline for the Management of North China," dated January 19, Showa 11, (1936), had already been decided upon. However, as the result of several conferences, held since July between the authorities concerned in the Foreign, War and Navy Ministries, in connection and aide by discussions with the "Diplomatic Policy of the Japanese Empire," decided on August 7, Showa 11 (1936), "Practical Measures towards China," Annex A and "Outline for the Management of North China," No. 2 (Annex B) and the appendix to the same were agreed upon on August 11 by the four Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and Navy, after being referred to the deliberations of the Emergency Commission.

2. Putting forward the Decisions.

Accordingly, it was decided that officials in charge of the affair should be dispatched to China from the Foreign Ministry (Secretary UTA), the War Ministry (Lieut.-Colonel KAGIYA) and the Navy Ministry (Commander NAKAMURA), in order to convey and make fully understood the gist of the above policy. By the order of the Foreign Ministry, Secretary UTA left Tokyo on August 14, at- tended the Chief Diplomats' conferences and delivered the said policy at the conferences, which were held successively at the Japanese Embassy at Hanking (on August 17, 18, 19, 20); at the Japanese Consulate-General at Tientsin (on August 22, 23, 24, attended by Ambassador IYAGOE, Consul-General at Tainan, ARINO, Consul-General at Tsingtao, NISHI, Secretary ABE and HANATA, Deputy Consul at Changchikou, NAKAMURA, etc.) and at the Japanese Embassy at Shanghai (on August 27, 28, 29, attended by Consul-General NAKAMURA, Shanghai, CHIBA, Hanking; KURITA, Hankow, and ANA, Wu, Foo-chow).

Annex A

Practical Measures for China (Decided by the Ministries concerned on August 11, Showa 11, (1936).)

The measures to be taken for the present regarding the Japanese policy towards China, in accordance with the "Diplomatic Policy of the Japanese Empire," decided on August 7, Showa 11 (1936),

(5) 21-8-6 (3)
Page 1

1. Measures for North China.

The main object of our policy towards North China lies in making the full use of special anti-communist, pro-Japan-Manchukuo zone, as well as in rendering the area useful for acquisition of national defense resources and strengthening communication facilities; one, for preparation against the invasion of the Soviet Union and the other for laying the foundation for the realization of triple coalition and mutual assistance between Japan, Manchukuo and China. The above-mentioned pro-Japan-Manchukuo zone should ultimately include the five provinces of North China. Futuristic attempts to enlarge the zone or to accomplish at a single stroke ideal decentralization of local governments will not only bring troubles and hinder the ultimate aim, but are also apt to contradict our intentions to secure advantages over the Soviet Union. We should first endeavor to accomplish gradually the decentralization of the Hebei and Chahar provinces, and as for the other three provinces, especially towards the Shantung Province, we should direct our main efforts towards bringing about anti-communist, pro-Japanese sentiment and the triple economical coalition of Japan, Manchukuo and China. As regards the form of the decentralization, we should take care to obtain practical effect, without being scrupulous about formalities. Taking into consideration saving face of the Nanking Government, it is decided advisable to have the Nanking regime recognize the decentralization of the North China provinces actually under the formality of authorization. (Ref. "Outline for the Management of North China, No. 2").

Our admission of the above-mentioned authorization of the Nanking Government is intended as a political art for obtaining the largest possible result in the diplomatic negotiations with that Government. Therefore, in handling the matter, it is essential for our central Government and dispatched organs to be united as one body, to take opportune measures, and, with resolute attitude, not allow the Chinese Government to take advantage of the opportunity, and play a so-called "double policy."

2. Measures to deal with the Nanking Government.

Practical measures should be taken to expedite rapprochement between the Nanking Government and Japan and to make it become gradually anti-Soviet. Particularly, we should make it so that it will become necessary for the Nanking Government to endeavor voluntarily to improve conditions in North China. In dealing with the matter, we should avoid, taking into consideration saving face of the Nanking Government, such measures as would necessitate that Government to resort to an anti-Japanese policy out of consideration for the people. We should take pains to execute such economic measures, making the people of China the object of our

policy, as would realize co-existence and co-prosperity-realism ally. Moreover, it is necessary, always keeping in mind a speedy realization of the anti-imperialist policy, that we make it so that the government can avoid being dependent upon us by leaving them present in a hurry. Such measures should not be taken, however, that would consolidate the foundations of the Hanking regime without first correcting its policy.

(1) Conclusion of an anti-imperialist military pact.

a) A secret Specialists Commission composed of military experts of both countries should be organized to conclude this pact.

b) The object of the Specialists Commission is to confer on the range of enforcement of the anti-imperialist pact, the content of the pact and the measures to be taken to attain these ends, etc.

(2) Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese military alliance.

With the object of concluding offensive and defensive alliance against the invasion of a third country, a secret specialists commission should be organized which should be composed of the same number of experts from Japan and China.

(3) For the acceleration of solution of the pending problems between Japan and China.

a) The employment of a supreme political advisor.

To make the National Government employ a Japanese supreme political advisor to participate in the important affairs of internal administration and diplomacy of the National Government.

b) The employment of military advisors.

To make the National Government employ Japanese military advisors and military instructors.

c) The opening of air-lines between Japan and China.

We expect prompt opening of air-lines between Japan and China. In order to accomplish this aim, measures should be taken to make the Hanking government comply with our proposal, by resorting to methods such as flights between Taiwan and Fukien and experimental flights between Shanghai and Fukuoka, etc. together with the establishment of a North China Aviation Company.

d) Conclusion of a Sino-Japanese reciprocal tariff agreement.

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We expect prompt realization of a Sino-Japanese reciprocal tariff agreement, in accordance with the principle decided upon between the Ministers concerned regarding the abolition of special trade in East China and the reduction of anti-Japanese high customs duties. In case of necessity, we should propose to China the organization of a Sino-Japanese joint specialists commission.

(4) Acceleration of Sino-Japanese economic coalition.

We expect the setting up of an inseparable relation between Japan and China which will not be influenced by the political situation in China by proceeding with economic plans such as would, with the people of China as the object of our purpose, bring about realistic Sino-Japanese co-prosperity.

It is not expected that the policies towards the Nanking Government in this item should necessarily be brought to solution side by side and at the same time as our policies towards North China as given in the previous item. They should be solved by elastic measures suitable to the occasion. And in handling the matter, organization of the Nanking Government and its political parties as well as its personnel elements should be adjusted, if necessary.

3. Measures towards other Local Governments.

The prime object of our policies towards local governments is to extend our prestige by making them pro-Japanese and thus causing the Nanking Government to change its attitude towards Japan. Accordingly, we should not adopt such policy as would be of assistance to any local governments in bringing about unification or bringing about segregation.

Under the above-mentioned principles, the measures to be taken towards local governments are as follows:

(1) Possible invasion into South China. (For instance, development of resources in the provinces of Fukien, Canton and Kwangshai, Kanton-Swallow railway connection, Japan-Siam air service, Ku-Chow-Taihoku air service, etc.)

(2) Investigations into the outlying districts (dispatch of resources, investigation expeditions to Szechuan, Kansu, Kweichow, Chinghai, etc.)

4. Regarding Inner Mongolia.

We should help establish a Mongolia for the Mongolians, with the object of adjusting relations with the Soviet Union, which stands on a basis of friendly relations with Japan and Manchukuo. It is desirable that we handle the matter as secretly and implicitly as possible and take care to maintain harmony with our policies towards the Soviet Union, Manchukuo and China.

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ANNEX B

An Outline of the Management of North China, No. 2, (discussed between the Ministries, requested on August 11, 1936)

Prima Object.

1. The prime object in handling North China is to help accomplish the decentralization of local governments for the benefit of the local people; to construct a steady anti-communistic, pro-Japanese zone; to facilitate Japan's acquisition of national defense resources as well as enlarged means of communications; so as to be well prepared for Soviet's anticipated invasion, and also to pave the way for the realization of the Japan-Manchukuo-China coalition.
2. For achievement of the above-mentioned, it will be necessary for Japan, besides giving confidential guidance to the local governments, to have the Nanking (Central) Government recognize the speciality of North China, and voluntarily give the North China Government a special and voluntarily decentralized power, instead of restraining the decentralization of North China.

General policy.

1. Substance of Decentralization.

The substance of decentralization lies in having the North China Government exercise substantial power in finance, industry, communication and other general matters, not to be influenced by any anti-Japanese movements by the Nanking Government or any other sources in political and economic activities directed towards bringing about the peace and welfare of the people and towards the realization of the Japan-Manchukuo-China coalition. Especially, actions which might be construed as if Japan's object consists in denying the sovereignty of China in that area, or in helping establish an independent state separate from the Nanking Government, or else in realising the extension of Manchukuo, should be strictly avoided.

2. Area of Decentralization.

Although we have North China's five provinces in view as our ultimate objective, we will first do our best in bringing about brighter conditions in the Hopei and Chahar Provinces (economic development and stabilization of public sentiment) as well as the complete decentralization of these provinces, because it is not advisable for us to be too eager for hasty expansion of the area.

THE 3RD ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY TOWARD NORTH CHINA

Feb. 20, 1937.

The object in view

1. The principal object of administering North China is to complete our aim of making Manchukuo quite pro-Japanese and pro-anti-communism, procuring defense materials, enforcing transportation, preparing the defense against U.S.S.R. and establishing the concert between Japan, Manchukuo and C.I.A.

2. To complete the above object, we do our best for the economic policy in North China, aid in secret government of North China and make Nanking Government recognize the speciality of North China and aid the concert between Japan, Manchukuo and C.I.A.

Principles

1. Attitude toward Administering North China

The measures which we took for North China made the foreign powers think that we were aggressive in China. So we must abstain from all the actions as give other powers misunderstanding of our intention. We should do our best for the culture of the people in North China.

For the economic development of North China we welcome the investment of private capitals. To the demand by the Government of East Hopei and by that of Nanking we should always respond with sympathetic attitude. For the special trade and for free flight in East Hopei we continue our already decided plan to settle the matter quickly.

2. In guiding the government of Hopei and Chahar, we must take a fair attitude, evade all the militaristic policies in finance, economy and military affairs and win the popular mind.

3. In guiding the government of East Hopei, we aid the progress in its inner government and its industries. We must establish there the paradise free from the exploitation by Chinese militarists.

Considering that East Hopei cannot govern itself, we must not take any measures as to hinder the guidance of East Hopei.

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4. Guiding the Governments of Szechung, Szechuan and Suiyuan.
We aim the concert of these governments with Japan by our cultural and economic policy for these governments. As it may stimulate the anti-Japanese feeling among the Chinese if we carry out our anti-colonialism and pro-Japanese and pro-Manchurian propaganda, we must pay strict attention.
5. Object of developing economy.
We welcome the investment of private capitals, and by the extension of our rights and interests in North China we establish the close friendship between Japan and China. By thus establishing the friendship not only in time of peace but in time of war we may procure the materials for munition industries.
As for the interests and rights of the third parties, we must estimate them, and in case of need we concert with them or we make the most of their capitals.

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C E R T I F I C A T E

M.O.C. No. _____

I.F.S. No. 1634

Statement of Source and Authenticity

● Yuzo ISONO, hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Chief of Archives Section, Foreign Office and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 14 items, dated 1934-1937, and described as follows: File: Important Decisions re: International and National Politics, 1934-1937.

I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives of files): Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo, on this
15th day of June, 1946.

/Sign/ Y. Inono
Signature of Official

CPAL

Official Capacity

Witness Claires Stearns /Sign/

Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C. Trout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
15th day of June, 1946

/Sign/ William C. Trout
NAME

Investigator, IFS
Official Capacity

Witness Claires Stearns /Sign/

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C E R T I F I C A T E

A.D.C. No. _____

I.P.S. No. 1634

Statement of Source and Authenticity

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Signed at Tokyo on this
18th day of June, 1946.

/Sign/ Y. Isono
Signature of Official

Witness: Nogaharu Odo /Sign/

SEAL

Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, William C. Prout, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this
18th day of June, 1946

/Sign/ William C. Prout
NAME

Witness: Claire Stefanelli /Sign/

Investigator IPS
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(Excerpt from Foreign Ministry File)

"IMPORTANT DECISION RE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL POLICIES".Question Concerning Policy Towards China.
(7 December 1934)

I. General principle

1. The fundamental principle of our policy towards China lies (a) in making China follow the policy of the Empire to insure peace in East Asia by cooperation and mutual aid among Japan, Manchukuo and China, with the Empire as centre, as well as (b) in developing our commercial right in China.
2. In view of the present situation in China, however, it is not only most difficult for us to quickly attain the object given in (a) of Article 7, by enforcing our policy against the political situation in China, but there is also danger of bringing about a contrary effect, if we are to carry out such a policy in haste. We must try to attain our object step by step.
3. On the other hand, development of our commercial right in China, namely our building a firm economic stand in China, is not only in itself the basis of our policy towards China, but also is it an effective measure to control China with our influence and compel her to seek to approach us. In order to develop the commercial right given above, it is necessary for us to strictly correct the anti-Japanese attitude of the central and local governments, while paying attention to the maintenance of public order in various places in China which have close economic relations with Japan, and also growing an atmosphere among the general government officials and people to depend on Japan.
4. Our side, therefore, should avoid, under the present circumstances, to take forcible measures going against the natural transition of the Chinese political situation. We should rather act in such a way as to lead their natural transition favorably for us and enforce earnestly and persistently the plans which are considered necessary for us in view of the actual condition in China, with the result that side by side with an absolute deadlock

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in the domestic administration of China, which is considered a natural outcome of the transition of the Chinese political situation, we force China, after all, into such a situation that she is finally compelled to approach us.

II. Gist of Policy

1. General policy

(a) Although we should act with the idea to impress the Chinese government officials and people all the more with the firm resolution on our side that if the Chinese side continues her policy to destroy the peace in East Asia without awakening to its general situation, we will not give up requesting China to correct herself. We should take a strict and fair attitude towards her that if the Chinese side actually shows sincerity for a new turn in the Japanese-Chinese relations, but we must not seek friendship of our own accord. In case the Chinese trespass on our right, we should adopt necessary steps according to our own particular stand.

It is further necessary to pay attention to reforming the anti-Japanese policy, availing ourselves of their interior struggles.

(b) It would be inevitable that if we should cause agitation in the political situation in China as the result of our taking measures necessary for the protection of our interest as is stated above. Otherwise, we must not so act as to especially complicate the situation in China. We should develop our commercial right by paying attention to the maintenance of public order in various places of China, especially in those places which are closely connected with Japan economically, in order to develop the atmosphere among the general government officials and people to depend upon Japan, while, as to the anti-Japanese movement, we should firmly request that it should be given up.

(c) The Chinese psychology of befriending distant states and of antagonizing neighbors, which is the greatest obstacle for Japan and China to approach to each other, namely the psychology which makes China trust to chance to check Japan by borrowing foreign power, should be excluded with all our might, as well as various movements based on this psychology and the corresponding support given to China by foreign countries. For this purpose, diplomatic and economic policy should be enforced in a positive manner.

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2. Policy towards the Nanking regime.

As the guiding principle of the National government fundamentally differs from the Empire's policy towards China, our basic principle towards the Nanking regime lies in bringing it, in the end, into the situation in which the existence of the Nanking regime depends on its showing sincerity in bringing a new turn for the relations between Japan and China. For this purpose, we must carry out persistently (a) and (b) in the General Policy given above. Especially, we must request the Nanking regime to give up the anti-Japanese movement, particularly, to control the movements of the party; while, as to the solution of the pending problems and the development of our interest, we must make more positive efforts than before, and lead the Nanking regime in our favor by taking such steps as will appoint persons convenient for us to carry out our policy for the government posts under the command of the Nanking regime.

3. Policy towards the government in North China.

Although we wish for a condition that the political influence of the Nanking regime will not extend to the North China area it will be difficult to bring about such a situation quickly, unless we are determined to use an enormous actual power. Therefore, we should aim, under the present circumstances, to gradually intensify the situation so that the political influence of the Nanking regime may be deprived of its power in the North China area according to the actual condition of that area. This plan should be realized step by step. Accordingly, we are to adopt, with necessary changes, our policy towards the Nanking regime stated above towards the government in North China as well. If the government in question is powerful and shows sincerity, we should deal with it with good-will and exert ourselves for the solution of the pending problems and maintenance and development of our interest, while trying, at least, to blockade the activities of the party actually. We should replace the official posts under the command of the government in North China with such persons as are convenient for the accomplishment of our policy, in order to develop the atmosphere in which the government officials and people in North China may come to have a preoccupied idea that they do not have anti-Japanese movement in that area, until at last, by developing our interest and promoting the general atmosphere untainted with anti-Japanese color, we shall bring about the condition in which the special relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China in North China cannot be ignored, whoever the leader of the regime in North China may be.

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4. Policy towards the Southwest Party and other local governments.

It is needless to say that towards the Southwest Party and the other local governments we should apply the general policy stated above and the policies which are based on it and which we apply towards the Nanking regime and the government in North China. But as it is desirable in checking the attitude of the Nanking regime against Japan that the Southwest Party, HANFU-KUFI, YUANJIEHAI and others should keep the condition of confronting with the Nanking regime or assume inseparable attitude with it, we should show friendship towards these governments and maintain proper connection with them, if they show good-will towards us.

The new growth of such local political governments, however, should be left to the natural transition of the political situation in China. We must be careful not to be partial in supporting the Nanking regime. We should avoid to take such steps as will help the new growth of local governments in a positive manner.

5. Policy concerning the development of commercial right.

While enforcing each policy stated above, we should try to develop our commercial right in China. We must try to attain this purpose by leading each government to our advantage. At the same time, by seeking our object widely among financial groups, as well as among people in general, in order to promote economic relations with the nation. We must further contrive to develop a general atmosphere untainted with the anti-Japanese color and bring about the condition in which the special economic relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China cannot be altered for political and other reasons.

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OUR POLICY TOWARD CHINA

(Decided by the Ministries
Concerned on 11 August 1936)

For the present, our policy toward China should be according to our foreign policy defined on 7 August 1936. It is as follows:

(Part of Item 8: beginning of Item 8, Chapters 1 and 4)

(1) Our Policy Toward North China.

The main purpose of our policy toward North China is to make the area anti-communistic and to make it friendly to Japan and Manchukuo and to secure national defense materials for Japan as well as to better its transportation facilities so that our national defense against Soviet Russia's invasion may be perfect and the cooperation and mutual assistance of Japan, Manchukuo and China may be secured. It is to be learned that the area to be turned friendly toward Japan, China and Manchukuo consists of 5 provinces in the northern part of China.

However, it is not a wise policy for Japan to try to extend our power or to try to gain administration in a hurry, since such a policy will surely cause more trouble without achieving the very object. We may say that it would be detrimental to our diplomacy toward Soviet Russia. We should rather devote ourselves to gain administration over Hopei and Chahar first and then to get the rest of the provinces ready for economic cooperation of Japan, Manchukuo and China as well as for making them anti-communistic and pro-Japanese.

Regarding the manner of our administration, we should try to realize substantial gain regardless of the denomination of our administration. Again, we should be careful not to disgrace the Nanking Government. The wisest way for us is to lead the Nanking Government to acknowledge our administration as if it were willingly entrusted to our charge. And, in our accepting it from the Nanking Government, we may place the Nanking Government under obligation. We may in turn ask a favour of the Chinese Government.

In order to gain as much as possible from this bargaining, the Japanese Central Government as well as the local Japanese officials should become one in acting rigidly as well as according to circumstances lest it should allow the Nanking Government to take the so-called double policy.

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Doc. No. 626 A-3

Extract from
Interrogation of Hideki TOJO
4 February 1946
p. 2-3

2. Would China not have been all right without any closer relations with Japan?

A. No. As I have previously explained, the problem viewed from the Oriental standpoint was that China was threatened with partition by European Powers and America. On such a basis, the Orient could never have been stabilized. That is one reason. A second reason is expressed by the phrase, "dōbun dōshu", that is to say, "a common culture, a common race". Japan and China both had the same writing and were both oriental peoples, hence it was a natural idea that they should be on intimate terms with each other. Moreover, it is specifically stated in the text of the Washington Treaty that "It is the constant and earnest desire of the American Government to succeed in building mutual understanding as a basis for the development of perpetual friendly relations among all peoples". You will note that the first reason relates to the actual situation in China, the second to ties of blood, and third to treaty obligations. Thus, from the standpoint of actual situation in China, from the standpoint of common blood, and from the standpoint of treaty obligations, Japan was impelled toward closer ties with China.

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Excerpt from
TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ACTS,
PROTOCOLS AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN U. S. AND
OTHER POWERS 1776 - 1909.

EX A 247

(AE) (4th COPY)

FINAL PROTOCOL ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PLENIPOLENTIARIES
OF VARIOUS POWERS AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE SO-CALLED
"BOXER" TROUBLES IN 1900.

Article IX.

The Chinese Government has conceded the right to the Powers in the protocol annexed to the letter of the 16th of January, 1901, to occupy certain points, to be determined by an agreement between them, for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the powers are:

Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chun-liang Ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lu-tai, Tang-shan, Lan-chou, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang tao, Shan-hai kuan.

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Table 11 6

一九〇一年、明治三十三年「朝鮮の事情」は、その
 目録に「全島」の項に「朝鮮」セラレタルは、その
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| 通 村 (YAMAGUCHI) | 天 津 (TIANJIN) |
| 軍 艦 隊 (CHUN-LEI) | 漢 口 (HANKOU) |
| 巨 港 (KAI) | 蔚 山 (WU-SHAN) |
| 漢 州 (HANJU) | 仁 川 (IN-CHUN) |
| 忠 清 道 (CHUNG-CHUNG DO) | 仁 海 道 (IN-HE DO) |
| | 仁 川 道 (IN-CHUN DO) |

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FACTUAL ACCOUNTS OF "LUKOUCHIAO" CASE

Recorded by Wang Len-ch'ai.

Relative to the inception of Japanese invasion of North China and to the history of "Lukouchiao" case, ex-Mayor of Peiping, Mr. Ching Teh-tsun, has already made out a factual report. Mr. Ching was then one of the high-ranking officials in North China. At the inception of the war, Chairman Sung Cheh-yuen of the Political Council for the Provinces of Hopei and Chahar was on leave at his native place. Mr. Ching was made to act on his behalf on all matters, diplomatic as well as military. He personally directed and conducted all negotiations and military defense. Therefore, what he has recorded is factual and truthful. I was then the Executive Supervisor for the 3rd District of Hopei Province and concurrently the Magistrate of Wan-ping Hsien. Lukouchiao, where the Japanese started the initial attack, is within the district of my jurisdiction, and I had personally participated in all of the negotiations and conducted military defense. I shall now proceed to relate the situation then existing:

I assumed the duties of the above-mentioned offices in the fall of 1936, when the Japanese were intensifying their measures of invasion. Consequently, there were numerous negotiations taking place, and the situation was considerably critical. The city of Wan-ping is the stronghold in the outskirts of Peiping and is the center of communications in North China. The jurisdiction of Wan-ping Hsien extends to Lukouchiao on the Peiping-Hankow Line, Fengtai on the Pei-ning Line and Tsingho on the Peiping-Suiyan Line. With the occupation of Fengtai by the Japanese troops, they were in the position to control the communications of Peiping-Hankow Line and cut off North China from Central China, thereby making North China into what they called the "Special Sphere of Influence", which they had been yearning for ever since a long time ago. The Japanese by repeating what they had successfully tried out in the Northeastern Three Provinces, hoped to achieve the occupation of North China without sacrificing one single soldier and one single bullet. With this end in view, they started with "peaceful invasion". After they had occupied Fengtai and stationed troops there, they tried to take Lukouchiao as well. Had this been successful,

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Peiping would be under their control with a single pincer-movement, and the 29th Army would also be kept under watch. Earlier, they had, with the cooperation of Chen Chueh-sun, then the Director of the Peiping-Liaoning Line, and in the name of the Railway Administration, effected a survey of some six thousand mow of land lying between Fengtai and Lukouchiao. With the surveying done, they approached our authorities with the request that this land be either rented or sold to the Japanese army for the purpose of building barracks and airfield. Several approaches were made in Peiping, but were categorically refused by us. Unsuccessful in these attempts, they turned to the inhabitants of the place, over whom they tried to buy with money. They made the inhabitants there to submit a petition to the Magistrate Government, alleging that they would voluntarily sell the land to the Japanese, so as to get some money to maintain their living on one hand and to avoid the forceful oppression of the Japanese on the other hand. Knowing that this being a trick played by the Japanese after they could not achieve what they wanted in their dealings with the Chinese authorities through their Special Service Corps in Peiping and their headquarters in Tientsin, and realizing that it was my duty not to give up one single inch of land to the invader, I summoned all the inhabitants there and exhorted them. Overwhelmed with patriotism, they swore not to sell the land, neither to move from the place without having shed blood. The sworn statement was fingerprinted, in order to show their determination. Subsequently, when the Japanese approached with the saying that the inhabitants were willing to sell the land, we showed them the sworn statement. Aware of the impossibility of "peaceful invasion", they could not but resort to military aggression. Then there followed the war at Lukouchiao on 7 July 1937.

The war of Lukouchiao was started as a consequence of the Japanese military maneuvers which they performed upon Chinese soil freely without any treaty rights and without notifying the local Chinese authorities beforehand. From the time of my assumption of office up to the outbreak of the Lukouchiao Incident, the Japanese staged maneuvers no less than six times. With a view to maintaining the peaceful relations with Japan we did not seek to stop them by force. But the Japanese paid no attention to our protests against their repeated maneuvering. There was once when after the maneuver,

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I protested and called their attention to the fact that such might cause misunderstanding among the inhabitants, the Japanese replied that since the scale of maneuver was small and the guns were not loaded, they would not cause any disturbance, but promised that they would notify us if they decided to maneuver with loaded guns and rifles. They did, afterwards, maneuver with actual firing, but, instead of notifying the Chinese authorities, sent their interpreters to inform the inhabitants. These showed that the plan of their invasion must have been meticulously studied and that the tempo was being gradually intensified till a certain time when it was ripe for them to wage the war.

At around 11 o'clock on the night of July 7, 1937, a few shots were heard to have been fired from the outskirts of Wan-ping city. Investigation reports showed that the Japanese troops were then staging maneuvers. I directed close attention to this matter. Soon Major Ching telephoned me that a protest had been lodged by MATSUI, commander of the Japanese Special Service Corps, alleging that one of the Japanese soldiers was found missing after the Chinese garrison forces at Wan-ping had opened fire at the Japanese maneuvering troops, and demanding that the Japanese troops should be allowed entry into the city to conduct searches. I was instructed to investigate into the matter at once and submit a report. A number of my men were detailed and sent out to investigate inside as well as outside of the city. But no missing soldier was ever found. I immediately proceeded to Peiping where I reported to Major Ching. Pressed for a settlement by Commander MATSUI, I was ordered to take up negotiations, in the company of Mr. Wei Tsung-han, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Lin Ken-yu, member of the Committee and Mr. Chow Yun-yieh, Director of the Department of Communications, under the Pacification Headquarters, with the Japanese representatives. Commander MATSUI insisted that it was true that they had one soldier missing and kept on demanding the entry of the Japanese troops into the city to conduct searches by themselves. I refused it outrightly and recalled that the Japanese Consul-General at Nanking, Mr. KURAMOTO, who was claimed to have been missing, was found to have hidden himself for the purpose of putting blames on the shoulders of the Chinese government. I hinted that this particular Japanese soldier might have tried to imitate what the Japanese Consul-General had done. Commander MATSUI denied the fact. As a result of the negotiation, it was decided that both Japanese and Chinese authorities should jointly send members out to Wan-ping to conduct an investigation on the spot, and that a satisfactory settlement should be reached. Representatives from

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our side included Messrs. Lin and Chow and myself, while the Japanese representatives were Messrs. TERAHIRA and SAITO. I was also visited by Commander KUDA of the Japanese army who intimated to me that since the situation had been very serious, I should have full authority to settle the matter on the spot and that if I had to refer to the authorities at Peiping for instructions, there might not be time enough. My answer was that before instituting a preliminary investigation no settlement could be made. In leaving the "Legation Quarters" for Wan-ping, Mr. Chow and SAITO started off in one car followed by another car carrying Mr. Lin, TERAHIRA and myself. When we approached Sha-k'an, near Han-tung on the Lukouchiao Railway, about a mile from Wan-ping, I observed a unit of Japanese troops under the direction of MORITA, deputy regiment commander, already taking up field positions at Sha-k'an. Mr. TERAHIRA then asked me to alight from the car and said to me that having seen this, I must now be able to realize the seriousness of the situation. He further threatened that there was no time left for conducting any investigation and that I should give orders to open the city gates. Without letting the Japanese troops enter into the city, he said, no settlement could be effected. MORITA went so far as even trying to threaten me by force. I took the situation very easily and told them that since it was decided at the office of the Japanese Special Service Corps that the first step would be to conduct investigation and that the second step would be to try to effect a settlement, any departure from the decision would be contradictory to it. I asked that if they would be responsible for any aggravation of the situation, should we not follow what had already been decided. They later came to realize that it would be futile for them to threaten me in such a way, and finally agreed to abide by the decision previously reached, that is, to conduct an investigation first. Then, I went into the city with Mr. TERAHIRA.

After entering the city, we held a discussion in my office. I had just ordered the Director of Police Bureau to make his report on the search when a number of gunshots were heard, and bullets were zooming past our heads. Undoubtedly, the Japanese troops had already opened fire. A few minutes later, our guards on the city walls began to return firing. The duel lasted for about another hour. The Japanese officer in command, KUDA, sent me a note, asking that I should go out of the city

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with Lt. Col. Chi Hsin Wen who was then guarding the district and try to effect a truce. I refused on the ground that both Lt. Col. Chi and I had been charged with the duty of guarding the city, and therefore, were not in a position to leave without being so ordered. Thereupon, Mr. Lin Ken-yu together with TERAHIRA went out, by climbing over the city wall. Two hours had elapsed since then, and we heard nothing from them. The Japanese started shooting again, and we also returned fire. The skirmishes lasted until 4 p.m. with considerable losses on both sides. By five o'clock in the afternoon, they again attacked us with trench mortars and hit and blasted my office which was entirely destroyed. Fortunately enough, I had removed all my staff to a safer place a few minutes before this happened. After 6 p.m., the firing quieted down. The Japanese commander, one named KAWANE, Shozo, also sent a note to me and asked me to go out of the city for negotiation, failing which, I should see that all the inhabitants be evacuated because they would bombard the city with heavy artillery. I declined the demand. At that moment, our reinforcements from Changhsintien arrived, and that very night, our Big Sword Company fought hand to hand against the Japanese troops at Lungwanmiao. As this Company of ours was well trained and extremely brave, many Japanese soldiers were killed. The iron bridge which was hitherto occupied by the Japanese was recaptured. Being routed, the Japanese became quiet.

The next morning, a telephone message was received from Mayor Ching, stating that the Japanese had asked for a discussion of truce, ostensibly owing to the fact that a part of their troops were routed the previous night. Accordingly, I was told that there were three conditions included in the truce, namely, 1) both sides shall stop forthwith all activities of war; 2) troops of both sides shall return to their respective positions; and 3) the garrison duties of the city shall be taken over by the Peace Preservation Corps of the Northern Hopei Province. The Peace Preservation Corps had then a force of three hundred strong, which was then expected to arrive in two hours' time. Meanwhile, a Japanese adviser, Mr. KASAI and his interpreter, Mr. AIZAWA, came into the city with some wine, allegedly for celebrating peace. But shortly after they left, firing again started. That was about 4 p.m. The Peace Preservation Corps had not yet then arrived. Inquiry was made, and I was

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told that when the Corps passed through Tachints'un (mid-way between Peiping and Lukouchiao) they were halted by the Japanese troops and that fighting had already been in progress between them. The Peiping authorities then took up the matter with the Japanese army headquarters represented by HASHIMOTO. The latter, however, refuted what was previously agreed upon and stated that the Peace Preservation Corps did not need a force of three hundred men and that they did not have to carry machine guns. We tried to resist this demand, but to no avail. Consequently, only one hundred fifty men of the corps entered into the city and the machine guns were also not brought in. The Japanese Army sent their advisers, NAKASHIMA and SAKURAI over, together with our Mr. Lin Ken-yu and Mr. Chow Sze-chin, members of the General Staff, to supervise the withdrawal of troops. Abiding with the agreement, our units under the command of Lt. Col. Chi Hsin-wen retreated to their original line. The Japanese units were then withdrawn toward Fengtai. But it was later found out that some one hundred Japanese soldiers along the railway line were not withdrawn. On being asked, NAKASHIMA promised that they would all be withdrawn and guaranteed that no fighting would be ever resumed. During midnight that night, the Japanese troops there again fired at the city for almost half an hour. With refusal of the Japanese to withdraw their troops along the railway, I knew for sure that they were inclined to be tricky. The Japanese, having built some military constructions there, would surely try to stick to that place. With this ambition unabated, I was afraid that the truce was but a scheme devised by the Japanese to gain time. I persistently asked NAKASHIMA who was then supposed to supervise the withdrawal, to hasten his side to fulfill the conditions as set out and agreed upon. He agreed to go to Peiping with me to effect a settlement there. The next morning, I proceeded to Peiping with NAKASHIMA, and when the train passed through Hantung (a tunnel) I did observe a few Japanese soldiers standing on guard outside Hantung. This served to prove constructively the Japanese intrigues.

On arrival at Peiping, I went to Mayor Ching's residence where I met General Feng Chih-an, Chairman of Hopei Province, Colonel Cheng Hsi Hsien, Commander of the Peace Preservation Corps of the Northern Hopei. The Japanese adviser, SAKURAI, and secretary, SAITO, came in a few minutes later. I made a report to Mayor Ching and

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Chairman Feng on the refusal of the Japanese troops to withdraw from the railway line. Mayor Ching then called NAKASHIMA, SAKURAI, SAITO, Cheng Hsi-hsien and myself to a meeting and discussed the matter thoroughly. SAITO offered the explanation that because some of the corpses of Japanese soldiers killed in action were not found, a certain number of Japanese troops were, therefore, stationed there and promised that as soon as the corpses were found, they would immediately withdraw. I asked why did they need to station troops there when they were trying to locate the corpses. SAITO replied that if the size of troop was too small, they were afraid that they might be murdered by the Chinese army, and that for the sake of self-defense, they had to station a large size of troops there. Mayor Ching considered this as an evasion and some heated argument ensued. Finally, it was agreed that an unarmed search party should be organized, with 10 men from our side and 10 from the Japanese army. All these men should carry no arms, and they were given one day to conduct and finish the search. Whether or not they found the corpses, the Japanese were to withdraw upon expiration of that one day's time. Having no pretext nor means to drag the matter further, they agreed to this. While we were discussing the organization of the search party, NAKASHIMA and his people left the meeting without announcing their departure. Then, we received telephone messages from various sources, informing us that the Japanese army had sent some reinforcements from Kubeikou, Shanhaikwan and other places, totalling not less than two Japanese Divisions. Some airplanes were reported to have arrived at Tientsin. A part of the Japanese troops were observed marching toward Lukouchiao. Meanwhile, communications between Peiping and Wan-ping were also broken up. That the Japanese had frequently changed their attitudes showed nothing but their intrigue. They oscillated between fighting and peace-making in order to gain time. Not a few days after the war started, they came to realize that they had under-estimated our strength. Not only we put up a very satisfactory defense at Lukouchiao, but also we made some gains at Papaoshan (mid-way between Peiping and Mengtougou). The attempt of the Japanese to overpower us with one division of troops then stationed at Tientsin, was, of course, frustrated. With the Japanese intrigues bared, I knew for sure that the outbreak of major warfare would follow soon. With nothing to hope for in the way of peaceful or diplomatic negotiations, I left Peiping for Wan-ping through Mentougou and Changhsintien.

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Ever since then, fighting was intermittently going on, till the 22nd of July, when rumor of another truce was in the air again. The Japanese asked the Chinese authorities to replace the bellicose 37th Division and transfer it to southern Hopei, and suggested that the points along Peiping and Lukouchiao be garrisoned by the 132nd Division of the 29th army. They would then withdraw toward Fengtai. Some headway was made out of the negotiation, and a cease-fire order was given. However, the Japanese ceased fighting in daytime but kept on shelling at the city in the night. On being asked for an explanation, they pretended that this would serve as a cover for the troops to withdraw. On the 26th, they suddenly sent over an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of our 37th army from Peiping within 24 hours. Being so cornered and pressed, our authorities ordered to attack. A very fierce counter-attack was launched by our forces at Lukouchiao and Papaoshan, and onslaught was made toward Fengtai. On the 27th, the railway station at Fengtai was recovered. But on the 28th, the Japanese concentrated all their forces and attacked us near Nan-yuan, with the help of army airplanes and artillery. The fight lasted until 2 p.m. General Chao Teng-yu, Commander of the Division and General Toong Lin-ke, Deputy-Commander of the 29th army were killed in action. Chairman Sung Choh-yuan, following instructions from the Supreme Commander, left for Paoting to assume his command, while General Chang Tze-chung, Division Commander, was instructed to stay on in Peiping, to help the various troops coordinating their defense. I was, however, instructed to proceed to Paoting also.

Judging from the above accounts, one would readily realize that the Japanese invasion was a studied and systematic scheme which was not meted out overnight. They should be made to shoulder the full responsibilities of the war.

Recorded by Wang Len-ch'ai, (sealed)
Formerly, Magistrate of Wan-ping
Hsien and concurrently,
Executive Supervisor for the
Third District of Hopei Pro.

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Ex 11-249

Doc. No. 1946

Page 1

A F F I D A V I T

COLONEL DAVID D. BARRITT, General Staff Corps, U. S. Army, Acting Military Attaché, Embassy of the United States of America, Nanking, China, deposes and states as follows:

I was Assistant Military Attaché of the Embassy of the United States of America, Peiping, China, in July 1937. My commanding officer, the Military Attaché, was General (then Colonel) Joseph W. Stilwell. On the morning of 9 July 1937, Colonel Stilwell directed me to proceed to Wanping-shan, generally referred to by the Chinese as Lukouchino, a small walled city about ten miles southwest of Peiping near which is located the bridge commonly known as the "Marco Polo Bridge." Colonel Stilwell directed me to investigate the report on the situation at Wanping, as he had been informed that a clash had taken place there the day before between forces of the Chinese 29th Army and Japanese troops who had been conducting maneuvers in the vicinity for several days.

I arrived at Wanping about 0800, and found the east gate shut and barricaded. Some small houses near the gate had been demolished, apparently by mortar fire from positions outside the town. One or two sentries were visible on the city wall, but there were no Chinese soldiers or civilians to be seen outside the city. A sentry posted on the wall above the gate shouted to me that I could not enter the city.

I then walked around the north-east corner of the city wall to the Peking-Hankow railway at a point approximately due north of the city. There I found a battalion of Japanese infantry assembled along the north side of the railway. A few sentries were posted along the top of the railway embankment observing the city of Wanping to the south. I observed one or two dead Japanese soldiers lying near the railway embankment.

From the Japanese position behind the railway embankment I then proceeded past the north-west corner of the city wall and into Wanping through the west gate which was shut, but not barricaded. Some Chinese sentries were posted on the Marco Polo Bridge just west of the city and at points near the ends of the bridge.

Inside the city, I visited the office of the usien Magistrate where police officials showed no damage apparently caused by mortar fire from outside the walls. The police official informed me that the usien Magistrate was in Peiping consulting with the mayor. The officials gave me an account of what had happened since the night of July 7-8. This account was substantially the same as that contained in the affidavits presented by General Chin To-chun and Mr. Wang Len-chai, which I have read. I then returned to Peiping.

During the time I was visiting the city and adjacent areas, there were only a few scattered shots exchanged between Chinese sentries on the wall and Japanese troops behind the railway embankment.

On my return to Peiping, I reported to Colonel Stilwell what I had observed substantially as noted above, and stated that as far as I could determine the clash had been on a very small scale and was not nearly so serious as many other clashes which had occurred since September 18, 1931. I further stated

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that I believed the incident could easily be settled if the Japanese really so desired, as I had observed absolutely no signs of any aggressive attitude on the part of the Chinese.

On at least five different occasions between 9 July and 25 July, I visited Wenping, and on at least two of these occasions I accompanied the Military Attaché, Colonel Stilwell. During these visits, I observed evidences of fighting on a small scale near Wenping between Chinese and Japanese forces, but at no time did I actually see any such fighting although occasionally I heard a few shots fired. It was my firm conviction during this period that the incident could have been settled at any time the Japanese so desired. In many discussions of the situation between Colonel Stilwell and myself, we agreed that we could see no indications whatsoever that the Chinese would refuse a settlement of the incident, even if it involved further extension of Japanese military authority in North China.

On or about 12 July, Colonel Stilwell and I were informed that a settlement of the incident had been or was just about to be effected and Japanese forces were to be withdrawn from near Wenping. We visited Wenping on the morning of 14 July, and observed Japanese forces assembling on the road at a point about a mile east of the city. Some of these troops were actually moving east on the road toward Peiping. We visited Wenping and found all quiet there. On our way back to Peiping, however, we observed that the withdrawal of Japanese forces toward the city had apparently been halted and we saw some troops moving west again. We were at a loss to explain this apparently sudden development as we had seen or heard nothing in or near Lukouchiao which would indicate any observation of the situation which had prevailed since the night of 7-8 July.

On the morning of 23 July, I observed Japanese planes attacking an area to the south of the city of Peiping. I estimated this area to be the Nanyuan Airfield, about ten miles south of the city. Later in the day, I observed Chinese infantry straggling in to the city along the street which runs to one of the gates leading to the Nanyuan Airfield. These troops did not appear to have been engaged in combat, but something had evidently occurred which had disrupted their normal military organization.

On or about 31 July, Colonel Stilwell and I went outside the gate of the city through which the road runs to Nanyuan Airfield. About a mile south of the gate, we found hundreds of dead bodies of men and horses and quantities of material lying on the road, indicating that a Chinese unit had been attacked while in close column. Numerous wounded, still alive, were in the ditches on both sides of the road and in the nearby fields. Hundreds of corpses, rotting in the summer heat, were still jammed in the trucks in which Chinese troops had been riding when the Japanese attacked. It was evident that the Chinese unit had been taken by surprise and had had no time to deploy. Identification badges on dead bodies indicated that the unit was the Special Brigade of the 37th Division, 29th Army.

As the Japanese attack on Peiping on 28 July came from the south and this Chinese unit was moving north when attacked, I believe the Chinese troops had no aggressive intentions whatsoever and were seeking merely to withdraw within the gates of Peiping.

I was stationed in Tientsin, China, with the 15th U.S. Infantry, from October 1931 to October 1934, during which period I was assigned as Assistant Intelligence Officer and Intelligence Officer of the regiment. I returned to China again in July 1936

as Assistant Military Attache of the Embassy of the United States of America in Peiping, and have served in China ever since. The nature of my duties during the three years I was stationed in Tientsin, and during the year I served in Peiping prior to the Japanese attack on Wanping, afforded me an unusually fine opportunity to observe the conduct of Japanese troops in China during this period.

I consider that the conduct of the Japanese troops towards the Chinese during the period referred to was arrogant and offensive, and that their actions in many instances constituted an insult to and direct violation of the sovereign rights of the Chinese nation.

During a period of at least seven days, either late in October or early in November of 1931, clashes occurred in Tientsin between Chinese police and Japanese forces stationed in the city. The Japanese alleged that the clashes were provoked by the actions of Chinese police stationed in an area adjacent to the Japanese concession in Tientsin. I personally observed the measures taken by the Japanese as a result of the incident and, in my opinion, they were far more severe and on a much larger scale than the importance of the incident justified. At one time during the period of tension resulting from the incident, Japanese military forces were deployed in a position from which they could have attacked the large and important area of Tientsin known as the Chinese City. The Japanese officer in command of the force deployed informed me at 1600 one afternoon that Japanese forces would begin an attack on the area in question at 1830. The attack never took place. Why, I do not know.

During the first few days of January 1932, Japanese forces attacked and occupied the city of Shenai-kuan. The Japanese alleged they had attacked because of aggressive actions on the part of Chinese forces stationed in Shenai-kuan at the time. I visited Shenai-kuan two or three days after the Japanese occupied the city and made a careful investigation of the situation. I was unable to find any definite proof that Chinese forces had provoked the incident. Were again the measures taken by the Japanese appeared to me out of all proportion to the importance of the incident itself, regardless of the causes thereof.

In my opinion, the action of the Japanese in conducting night maneuvers near Wanping during the first week of July 1937 was deliberately provocative. The Japanese could not but have been aware of the strained relations then existing between Japan and China, and of the chances for misunderstanding and friction which might arise during such maneuvers. The fact that movements of large Japanese forces from Manchuria to areas south of the Great Wall began within a period of twenty-four hours after the Japanese attack at Wanping inevitably suggests that the Wanping incident was the carefully prepared excuse for the second stage of Japan's undeclared war on China, the first stage having been begun at Lu-shan on the night 17-18 September 1931.

Subscribed and sworn to before
me this _____ day of June, 1946.

/s/ David D. Barrett
COLONEL DAVID D. BARRIETT

COLONEL DAVID D. BARRIETT

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN LIANG TING-PANG

7 April, 1946

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I was in the Medical Corps and after the Chinese Army was retreating from Shanghai to Nanking and when we were stationed in NANKING, it appeared that the city would be taken and we were given orders to stay in NANKING and take care of the Chinese wounded, and stay there after the Japanese took the city. We found that the Red Cross was no protection, and therefore dressed in civilian clothes, and we were in a refugee camp when the Japanese took the city. On the sixteenth, we were ordered by the Japanese to proceed to Shsia Kwan, on the Bank of the River YANGTSE, in Nanking. I estimate there were above 5,000 who were marched 4 abreast, and the line was 3/4th of a mile long. When we arrived there we were placed in a line near the River, and on either side of the line there formed and in front of line were machine guns and Japanese soldiers, with the machine gun pointing at the line. There were two trucks carrying rope, and men were tied five in a group with their wrists tied below their backs, and I saw the first men who were shot by rifles in such groups and who were then thrown in the river by the Japanese. There were about 800 Japanese present, including officers, some of whom were in sedan automobiles. We were lined up on the edge of the river, and before our wrists were bound, my friend saw that rather than die in this way, he would sooner jump in the river and be drowned. We started from the refugee camp about five o'clock in the evening, arrived at the bank of the river about seven o'clock and the binding of the prisoners, and shooting kept up until two o'clock. The moon was shining at the time, and I saw what was happening, and my watch was on my wrist. My friend and I decided to escape after the shooting had been going on for 4 hours, and about eleven o'clock my friend and I made a dash for the river, and jumped in. The machine guns fired at us, but we were not hit. There was a steep bank of the river, and as we found the water was only waist deep we hid under the steep bank, and the shadow prevented the Japs from seeing us. However, they fired at us with machine guns, and shot me in the shoulder. The shooting of prisoners kept up until 2 o'clock in the morning. I fainted from loss of blood, and when I awakened in the morning, my friend was gone. He afterwards told me he thought I was dead. I then crawled up the river bank, and hid in a hut nearby. This was after two o'clock, but before sunrise. I stayed in the hut for three days without food or water, and then a Japanese soldier came up and burnt the hut. When the hut was burnt I crawled out, and the Japanese soldier found me. One of the officers questioned me, and I told him I was a civilian, and was a coolie hired by the Japanese Army to carry burdens.

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STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN LIANG TING-FANG:

The officer did not ask me about my wound. The officer gave me a pass to go home, and I did so.

When they were lining up the men at the refugee camp several Americans whose names I do not know, tried to prevent the Japanese from marching us to the river, but they were ordered away, and were unsuccessful in preventing the massacre.

There were a few other cases of persons who jumped into the river, but the Japanese at once shot at them, and I do not know if any of them got away. As far as I know, my friend and I were the only two to escape. During the shooting I heard one young man call out "Long live China", but no other sound except the shooting.

I finally got back to Free China after being captured once again, but I got away to Free China in June, 1939.

I had this statement translated to me by Colonel TU, and the statement is correct.

Witness:
THOMAS H. MORROW
COLONEL TU YING-KUANG
April 7, 1946.

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Excerpt from Interrogation of (Marquis)
KIDO, Keichi - 14 February 1946

Page 337

- Q Would you say that HINAYA and KAGESKA were leaders in the aggressive action that took place as a result of the China Incident in 1937?
- A Yes, I believe they were central figures.
- Q And ITAGAKI likewise was in the China Incident?
- A Yes.
- Q Were there others that come into your mind at the moment that were outstanding leaders in the China Incident and the activities that followed in North China.
- A I don't remember any others at the present time.

21.8.7
Extract from Interrogation of (Marquis) KIDO,
Koichi - 15 February 1946.

Page 344

Q But if we were going ahead with the list of names of the particular individuals who were most aggressive as expansionists, we would have to include him alongside of ITAGAKI and ISHIMARA.

A Yes.

Q Was he active in the war that broke out in 1941?

A I believe he was an Army commander.

Q Was he still in the China theatre, or did he operate out of Japan proper?

A I believe he went to Japan later on.

Q Was he, to your knowledge, an advocate of driving the British and the Americans out of Asia and did he subscribe to the Asia for the Asiatics theory?

A I do not know because I did not hear a clear-cut statement concerning him.

Q But that principle was generally followed by ITAGAKI and ISHIMARA and people of that type, was it not?

A Yes.

* * *

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Q According to your diary, the North China garrison Army was taking things into its own hands, isn't that right, and were making demands on China without consulting with the Chief of Staff in Tokyo or with the Japanese Government?

A I got this information from the Vice Minister of War, HASHIMOTO, that UMEZU, the Commander of the Japanese garrison troops in Tientsin, and HAYASHI went to Chungking and that HAYASHI, the War Minister is present there for a conference and I felt that that is a good indication that the Army was taking things in their own hands.

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Q This Chief of Staff of the Japanese garrison, SAKAI, was he closely associated with ISHIWARA and ITAGAKI?

A I believe so. I believe this person had grievances about not receiving any medals and perhaps this dissatisfaction caused him to create an incident.

Q He was active in the movement to expand Japanese influence in North China, wasn't he?

A I believe so.

Q And he and ITAGAKI were insisting upon taking matters in their own hands and not leaving negotiations up to the Foreign Office, isn't that right?

A There were accusations that they were trying to take away the authorities within the Foreign Ministry to the Army?

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21.8.7
 "Extract from Interrogation of Major General Eugene Att, 28 Feb. 1945
 1400-1600 Hrs, pp. 12 to 16."

Q. I see. Next, I want to ask you about ITAGAKI, Saishiro. Did

A. I know him.

Q. When did you get acquainted with him?

A. I met him for the first time as Chief of the General Staff of the
 Kwantung Army.

Q. What time was that?

A. In the winter of 1935 to 1936.

Q. Did you talk to him at that time?

A. I had a chance in this winter to make an interesting reconnoitering
 flight on the Russian border south of Harbin and alongside the
 Sungari River in the strongest winter time. I had asked for this
 flight in order to win personally an experience about the fighting
 conditions in Manchuria in winter time which lasts for about six
 months, and coming back from this flight I suggested to ITAGAKI
 to make a kind of speech to his staff about my experiences in
 order to stop a little the growing activity among that army which
 I felt during my trip for some conflict with Russia.

Q. Let me ask you now--to interrupt you there--what did you feel about
 the army? What did you notice about the army there?

A. I noticed in the army a certain activity and a certain tension to
 have, or to like a conflict with Russia on the border line. It was
 a kind of strong tension. So, I had the idea it would be useful
 to stop, as I could to do it, this tension to a certain extent be-
 cause I considered it would be a very bad thing to have a conflict
 with Russia because the Japanese army seemed to be not to be able
 to go to war. So ITAGAKI asked me to make this speech and seemed
 to be very satisfied with the tendency of my speech, "Stop your
 activity and improve your conditions first."

Q. What did ITAGAKI say in regard to the activities of the Japanese
 army up to that time in Manchuria in China and those places?

A. He mainly asked my experiences about my trip and discussed my
 opinion about the necessity of consolidating the defense system.

Q. What did you mean by "defense system?"

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1. Defense system? I found on several places I considered the system as a whole not very effective owing to many military details, for instance--
2. I don't believe you understood my question. Why was it necessary for defense and defense against what?
1. Border defense against Russia. I mean the defense system--every country has their permanent defense system--it wasn't especially necessary--
- Q. Were they expecting Russia to attack?
1. They didn't say, as every country had to build up a permanent defense system.
- Q. What was said about the defense they were using in China and Manchuria at that time?
1. Beg your pardon?
- Q. Did you discuss the defense of Manchuria?
1. Manchuria only. Because my trip was limited to a part of Manchuria.
1. I see.
1. In a purely military way this discussion. Later on, I met ITAGAKI a second time as a War Minister when I came back from Berlin in 1938 to begin my Ambassadorship in Tokyo. Then I asked him about his opinion of the development of the China conflict at that time, because, as I mentioned on another occasion, I tried to stop the danger of a German-English conflict in that time. So when I heard from him that the Japanese army has developed in the meantime during my absence a fighting of life and death in China, I reported to my government that at the present time the Japanese are unable to do anything else than to occupy themselves with their fighting in China.
- Q. Now, what did ITAGAKI say about their advances there? Did he talk to you about what was happening there?
1. He gave me only a common general aspect that in the meantime they had advanced further on. At present time I don't know the names of the places.
- Q. Why did he say they had advanced? For what reason?

1. In order to accomplish the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek.
- Q. Did he tell you that was the aim to defeat Chiang Kai-shek?
- A. To win the war.
- Q. To win the war?
- A. This war had in the meantime developed to a fighting of death and life.
- Q. Did he say that he was in favor of the Japanese going ahead and winning the war against China? What was his attitude?
- A. He was War Minister--
- Q. I know that. What did he say?
- A. He was War Minister, so of course he told me, "Now we are fighting for death and life. We have to win this war in a complete engagement of our forces."
- Q. Then he told you that the Japanese intended to use all their resources and power to win the war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And that he was in favor of them going ahead?
- A. Probably.
- Q. Did he say that?
- A. He didn't tell this exactly.
- Q. From what he said to you?
- A. I had to conclude it.
- Q. Yes. Well, did you say anything to him about stopping the war in China?
- A. This I couldn't say, no.
- Q. You didn't?
- A. No. May I add? My main interest at that time was to hear and report to Germany that Japan wasn't able to go on any other adventure against another country; she is limited to her aims or purposes.

Q. Did he tell you at that time what the aims of Japan were?

A. Only winning this Chinese war.

Q. Chinese war? He didn't mention going to Singapore?

A. No, no, nothing. A third role of ITAGAKI, which I didn't talk over with him, personally, was his influence upon the negotiations of a military alliance between Germany, Japan and Italy in 1939. I think he was War Minister at that time. These negotiations eventually failed. After my impression, the army was to a certain extent and probably ITAGAKI personally, in favor of such an alliance, but eventually followed the idea of the navy. It would be not possible for them to engage in an alliance without obligation to act automatically in case of a conflict, because they were not advanced enough in the building up of their fighting forces. But I had no personal talk with ITAGAKI about those questions. It is my impression. He retired when the Hiranuma cabinet retired owing to the conclusion of the German-Russian treaty. Generally spoken, ITAGAKI belongs to the most intelligent and able leading army men of Japan.

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Doc. No. 2895

I. Itagaki

22 (11)

Extract from Interrogation of ARAKI, Sadao, 14 February 1946

P. 5

- Q. You have answered one part of the question very satisfactorily, but the other part is not yet answered, namely, who was responsible during 1936-1939 for continuing the China Incident?
- A. The army I think.
- Q. What leader of the army?
- A. The War Minister, ITAGAKI, I should say.
- Q. What about the General Staff?
- A. I think some of the younger officers there were perhaps most responsible but I don't know their names.

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AFFIDAVIT

General TADA, Hayao, Japanese army, deposes and states as follows:

I was a general in the Japanese Army August 1937 through December 1938 and my assignment was Vice Chief of the General Staff at Tokyo.

As such, I made the plans for the campaign of Japanese armed forces culminating in the capture of Shanghai 12 November, 1937, the campaign ending in the capture of Nanking 13 December, 1937, and the campaign which finally resulted in the taking of Hankow 27 October 1938.

The plans for the capture of Shanghai were made when the incident broke out in Shanghai; during the battle of Shanghai, plans were drawn up for the capture of Nanking, and plans for the capture of Hankow were drawn up in June or July 1938.

General TADA, Hayao

Witnessed:

s/Thos. H. Morrow

this ____ day of June 1946

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21.10.5

THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET (YARNELL) TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(SHANGHAI,) December 26, 1937
(Received 7 a.m.)



"Shanghai, China, 24 December, 1937.

My Dear General: As a result of the hostilities that have been carried on in Shanghai and the Yangtze Valley for the past four months there has arisen a situation that has become critical for the population and the neutral business interests which sustained the life of the city.

The Japanese Government has officially and repeatedly stated that it will respect foreign rights and properties in China. The restrictions that were placed into effect at the beginning of hostilities and still govern, regardless of statements to the contrary, lead one to doubt the sincerity of the above statement.

Commercial firms are restricted or entirely prevented from carrying on their normal operations in industrial and warehouse areas, such as Yangtzepoo, Point Island, and Footung. A great apartment house stands empty within a stone's throw of Garden Bridge.

Residents are not allowed free access to their homes in residential areas such as Hongkew and the Settlement roads north and west of the International Settlement, except under such onerous restrictions as to make living in these areas impossible.

Actual fighting ceased in the Hongkew and Chapei areas nearly two months ago but the restrictions still continue.

原本不明瞭

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Br. Ex. 111

It is known that looting of properties in Hongkew, Yangtzepoo, and the residential areas west of the city has taken place, yet owners are denied the right to occupy their properties or place proper guards over them.

I am inclosing copies of memoranda from the American, British, French, and Italian representatives in Shanghai and the Shanghai Municipal Council, which show the extent to which the intolerable conditions I have before pointed out prevail. These lists give many instances of neutral vessels seized without any warning or right, other than of armed force, of denial of owners to their lawful property, of looting, denial of owners to enter their own homes and so on. These lists merit very serious consideration.

Foreign Relations I, pp. 758-759

原本不明瞭

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21.8.7 - 6

Letter from General Wang Pi-Chan, Chief of
the Second Bureau of the Ministry of Military
Operations to Mr. Henry Chiu, Secretary to
Judge Che-Chun Hsiang, Associate Prosecutor
for China.

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2 April 1946

Dear Mr. Chiu:

Enclosed please find a copy of "Table of Casualties
in the Chinese Army during the Period of War of Resistance
(from July 7, 1937 to August, 1945)". Kindly forward it to
Colonel Morrow of the United States of America.

With best regards,

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Wang Pi-Chan

ENCLOSURE: "Table of Casualties in the Chinese Army during
the Period of War of Resistance from July 7,
1937 to August 1945"

TABLE OF CASUALTIES IN CHINESE ARMY DURING THE
PERIOD OF WAR OF RESISTANCE, FROM JULY 7, 1937
TO AUGUST 1945

----- Compiled on Feb. 16th, 1946 -----

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>WOUNDED</u>	<u>KILLED IN ACTION</u>	<u>MISSING</u>	<u>SUB-TOTAL</u>
1937	243,232	124,130	-	367,362
1938	483,804	249,263	-	733,067
1939	176,891	169,651	-	346,542
1940	332,318	339,530	-	671,848
1941	137,254	144,915	17,314	299,483
1942	114,180	87,917	45,070	247,167
1943	81,957	43,223	37,715	162,895
1944	103,596	102,719	4,419	210,734
1945	85,583	57,659	25,608	168,850
GRAND TOTAL	1,758,815	1,319,007	130,126	3,207,948

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10/03
STATISTICS SHOWING AIR RAID CASUALTIES AND DAMAGES IN CHUNGKING DURING 1938 - 1941.

EVA 253

I. Civilian Casualties:

Dead	6,596
Wounded	<u>9,141</u>
Total	15,737

II. Property Damages (in Chinese National Currency, Dollars)

<u>Classification</u>	<u>Value at time of damage</u>	<u>Value estimated in 1945</u>
Civilian Properties		
Private Properties	37,513,736	11,743,606,737
Buildings destroyed by bombing and burning	<u>68,075,888</u>	<u>6,750,660,000</u>
Total.....	105,589,624	18,494,266,737
Properties of Municipal Government Institutions	7,255,329	1,690,997,133
Properties of Municipal Schools of all grades	3,427,350	1,284,004,767
Properties of Municipal Public Utilities - water and power	143,293,194	47,606,459,154
Loss in Municipal Taxation	21,463,551	-----
Other Losses - Air Defense	132,741,975	158,181,832*
GRAND TOTAL.....	413,771,023	69,233,909,623
* (Expenditure of Administration Office of Air Raid Shelters)	70,446,455	75,951,747
* (Construction fees of public and private air raid shelters)	52,295,520	82,230,085

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SOURCE: This table is compiled from the data supplied by the Garrison Headquarters, Chungking and the various departments of Chungking Municipal Government.

DATE: 2 April 1946 (s.s.) LI WEI-YUAN,
Chief, Statistics Bureau,
Chungking Municipal Government.

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EXH # 254
21.8.8-1

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Doc.No. 1948

Page 1.

DEEDS OF JAPANESE MILITARY AGGRESSIONS
IN CHINA.

1937	July	7	Outbreak of Marco Polo Bridge Incident
	August	13	Outbreak of War in Tsoong-Shanghai area
	August	26	Japanese captured Falgen
	Sept	24	Japanese captured Foting
	Oct	14	Japanese captured Kwei sui
	Nov	9	Japanese captured Taiyuan
	Nov	10	Japanese captured Shanghai
	Dec.	13	Japanese captured Nanking
	Dec	25	Japanese captured Hangehow
	Dec	31	Japanese captured Tsinan
1938	May	19	Japanese captured Hsuehow
	June	6	Japanese captured Kaifong
	June	27	Japanese captured Matsang
	July	25	Japanese captured Kiuksiang
	Oct	12	Japanese captured Sinyang
	Oct	20	Japanese captured Canton
	Oct	25	Japanese captured Hankow
	Nov	11	Japanese captured Tsyang
1939	Mar	26	Japanese captured Manchang
	April	12	Chinese re-captured Kaifong
	Dec 5-31		Japanese attacked Kun Lun Kwan but was repulsed
	Dec	23	Japanese landed at Lungchow
	Dec	24	Japanese captured Nanning
1940	April	24	Japanese again captured Kaifong
	June	12	Japanese captured Niehang
	June	30	Chinese again re-captured Kaifong, but evacuated again
	Oct	31	Chinese recaptured Nanning
1941	April	21	Japanese landed at Foochow
	Sept	3	Chinese recaptured Foochow
	Oct	10	Chinese recaptured Niehang
	Oct	12	Japanese again captured Niehang
1942	May	5-10	Japanese captured Lungling and Tungchung
1943	Dec	3	Japanese captured Changteh
	Dec	9	Chinese recaptured Changteh

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1944	April 20	Japanese captured Chenchow
	May 25	Japanese captured Loyang
	June 16	Japanese captured Changsha
	August 8	Japanese captured Hengyang
	Nov 3	Chinese recaptured Lungling
	Nov 10	Japanese captured Kweilin
	Nov 11	Japanese captured Liuchow
	Nov 22	Japanese captured Nanning
1945	May 27	Chinese recaptured Nanning
	June 29	Chinese recaptured Liuchow

The above Annals are compiled from the files of our Ministry and authenticated.

D.TE: 17 June 1946, Tokyo

/s/ Maj. Gen. Loo Li-bai

Chief, 1st Section, 2nd Department (Intelligence)
Ministry of Military Operations, Republic of
China

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1948-1

日本軍ニ依ル中華民国軍事侵略年表

千九百三十七年

七月	遼瀋省事件ノ發生
八月一三	吳淞、上海地區戦斗發生
八月二六	日本軍張家口占領
九月二四	日本軍保定占領
一〇。一四	歸綏占領
一一。九	太原占領
一二。一〇	上海占領
一二。一三	南京
二五	衡洲
三一	濟南

千九百三十八年

五月一九	日本軍許洲占領
六月六	蘭封
六月二七	馬尾
六月二五	九江
一〇。一二	信陽
一〇。二〇	廣東
一〇。二五	漢口
一一。一一	岳陽

裏面白紙

1948-2

千九百三十九年

月日

三。五。二六

日本軍南昌占領

四。一二

中國軍開封ヲ奪還

一一。五。三一

日本軍昆崙關ヲ攻撃シタルモ奪還

〃 二三

〃 瀋州ニ上陸

〃 二四

〃 南京占領

千九百四十年

月日

四。二四

日本軍長沙開封占領

六。一二

日本軍宜昌占領

〃 三〇

中國軍長沙開封奪還、長沙撤退

一〇。三一

〃 南京奪還

千九百四十一年

月日

四。二一

日本軍福州ニ上陸

九。三

中國軍福州奪還

一〇。一〇

中國軍宜昌ヲ奪還

〃 一二

日本軍宜昌ヲ奪還

千九百四十二年

月日

五。五。一〇

日本軍龍巖及通城占領

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Excerpt from Interrogation of MUTO, Akira, dated
16 April 1946, pages 1, 2, 3 and 4.

Questions by Mr. Hyder:

Q. From the time you became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in 1939 and up to 1942, the Military Affairs Bureau determined the policies relative to the treatment of prisoners of war?

A. No, the actual prisoners of war camps are built under the direction of my section. The policies pertaining to prisoners of war emanated from the Prisoners of War Information Bureau after it was set up.

Q. In 1942?

A. I am not sure when it was, but I believe it was somewhere around the end of December 1941, or early in 1942.

Q. But up to that time your office had determined the policies governing the treatment of prisoners of war?

A. Yes.

Q. And, of course, you took prisoners from the Chinese Armies?

A. No. The question of whether Chinese captives would be declared prisoners of war or not was quite a problem and it was finally decided in 1938 that because the Chinese conflict was officially known as an "incident" that Chinese captives would not be regarded as prisoners of war. This time, however, if there was to be a declaration of war all captives were to be treated as prisoners of war.

Q. As a matter of fact the China Incident was a war, was it not?

A. Actually yes, but the Japanese Government looked upon it as being an incident.

Q. So that when you became Chief of Military Affairs Bureau in 1939, you carried on a policy of not treating the Chinese captives as prisoners of war?

A. Yes.

Q. What regulations governed the treatment of the Chinese that were not treated as prisoners of war?

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- A. We had no connection whatsoever with this matter in the Military Affairs section. It was all handled by the Nanking Government under Wang Chin Wei. Before the setting up of the Nanking Government, these matters were handled by the Chinese (puppet) Government that existed in Central China and in North China.
- Q. That government, of course, was a puppet government dominated by Japan?
- A. You may call it that, but I personally do not believe it to be so.
- Q. In 1939, 1940, 1941, the Japanese army was fighting in China, is that correct?
- A. Yes.
- Q. They took large numbers of prisoners, did they not?
- A. Because, as I just told you, these matters were handled by the Chinese Government, we received no reports of how many prisoners were taken and only read in the papers that such and such elements of the Chinese Chungking army had surrendered.
- Q. Did your Japanese army turn the captured Chinese over to the Nanking Government after their capture?
- A. Yes, and in turn the Nanking Government put these people into their own armies.
- Q. Didn't the Japanese army frequently work Chinese prisoners?
- A. Whether the Japanese army actually used them or whether they were used by Japanese contractors, I do not know.
- Q. You were in China in 1939, were you not?
- A. Yes, until October 1939.
- Q. Very frequently your army took prisoners, did it not?
- A. There were very few prisoners taken at this time. Those that were taken were turned over to the North China Government and used as soldiers.
- Q. Whose army utilized these soldiers that had been captured?

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A. They were used by this North China Army (Chinese). It was called something or other, but the name I do not recall at this moment.

Q. That is the Chinese army that collaborated with the Japanese Army?

A. Yes.

* * * * *

Q. What were the orders given by your command with respect to the treatment of the Chinese captured by you in the course of the fighting?

A. Those orders had been in effect for some time and while I was there I have no recollection of any new orders having been put out.

Q. What were those orders that you carried out?

A. It was as I just related to you, that is to say, that they will be turned over to the North China Army.

Q. You mean to say that you didn't have an internment camp of your own?

A. There was no prisoner of war camp. As they were not considered prisoners of war, the distinction becomes somewhat complicated and we felt that once they had laid down their arms and surrendered that they would be treated as ordinary citizens and be turned over to the Chinese.

Q. To what Chinese government were you turning over the prisoners that you captured?

A. The North China Provisional Government.

Q. Whose government was that?

A. O-KUKUBIN. I think the first character is read in Chinese as Wang, but otherwise I do not know.

Q. Is that government under the government of Chiang Kai-shek?

A. No.

Q. It was opposed to Chiang Kai-shek?

A. Yes.

Q. And it was friendly to the Japanese Government?

A. Yes.

Excerpt from Interrogation of MUTO, Akira dated 20 April, 1946, pages 5, 6, 7.

Questions by Mr. Hyder:

Q. General, in November 1937 you joined the Staff of the Central China Army?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was the Commander of that Army?

A. General MATSUI.

Q. Did you join it in the first part of November? Do you recall approximately the date?

A. In the latter part.

Q. Nanking fell in December?

A. Yes.

Q. And you were there from December until when, in Nanking?

A. I returned to Shanghai around December 24th or 25th.

Q. Nanking fell approximately December 13th?

A. Yes, around the 13th or 14th.

Q. And you left about two weeks later?

A. Yes, I was there around ten days.

Q. And what was your position at the time?

A. Adjutant to the Chief of Staff.

Q. General, were you aware of the misbehavior of the Japanese troops at the time of the surrender in Nanking?

A. At that time General MATSUI was suffering from tuberculosis and had been in the rear area. We came to Nanking for the taking over ceremonies. I remained ten days. At that time the town was already cleaned up and it was safe for us to walk about alone. I had not heard of the Japanese soldiers acting up.

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Q. Either before or after the time you entered Nanking City proper?

A. I had heard of incidents from my superior TSUKADA, who was Chief of Staff.

Q. What did he tell you?

A. The original order for the taking of Nanking stated that only picked, fine troops were to enter the town. The remainder of the troops were to remain out. However, all of the units entered the town, for which action General MATSUI was reprimanded by the staff. I heard from TSUKADA that there were incidents of stealing, killing, assault and rape. Following that, orders were issued for all units except security troops to leave the town.

Q. General, what was the reason for the order requiring that only picked troops could enter the city? Had there been misbehavior of the troops in other cities?

A. It was felt that if too many troops were allowed in Nanking, there was due to be trouble, inasmuch as the troops had suffered many hardships since Shanghai. The men were under pressure for such a long time that it was felt inadvisable to allow them in town.

Q. MATSUI, of course, knew of these reports?

A. General MATSUI heard of the incidents afterwards and became quite enraged at the conduct.

Q. Did he tell you this?

A. I was there when General MATSUI heard of this and was being reprimanded.

Q. By whom?

A. By the Chief of Staff.

(Interpreter: I made a mistake, MATSUI became mad and balved out his subordinates.)

Q. Now the report listed a great number of such incidents, did it not?

A. The reports did not show very many incidents. As soon as it was published, orders were issued to the MPs to suppress such activities and arrest any participants.

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Q. You issued that order?

A. The order was issued by General MATSUI.

Q. When did he do so?

A. The order was issued as soon as he heard of the incidents. The MPs normally had the duty. However, the order was to more severely enforce the regulations.

Q. Was the order issued just before you left or afterwards?

A. As soon as we arrived in Nanking for the ceremonies, he received the information and the order was immediately issued.

Q. Did the incidents reported take place in November of 1937?

A. No, not in November. They first occurred after entry into Nanking.

Q. That was approximately what date?

A. Nanking was entered around the 12th to the 14th, and I believe that's when these incidents started.

Q. You joined MATSUI's Army as it was attempting to take the city of Nanking.

A. Yes, just before that.

Q. How far out of the city was the Army when you joined it?

A. They were still in the vicinity of Shanghai.

Excerpt from Interrogation of MUTO, Akira dated 22 April, 1946, pages 2, 3.

Q. In this report, did it mention incidents singly or just report that so many soldiers had looted the town and robbed the inhabitants?

A. I remember in a report that it was reported that the Chinese people were looted, burglarized, and others, such as rape, etc?

Q. By the Japanese Army?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Were the incidents reported up in the thousands, hundreds or what was the number given in this report?
- A. Between ten and twenty incidents were reported.
- Q. Were any other reports made, General?
- A. There were two commanders under General MATSUI, and only the number mentioned previously were reported.
- Q. What were the names of the two commanders under MATSUI?
- A. Prince ASAKA was the Commander of one army, and Lt.Gen. YANAGAWA was the Commander of the other.
- Q. Are those men living today, General?
- A. Prince ASAKA is still living, but I believe Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA died. I heard that Lt. Gen. YANAGAWA died when he was in Sumatra.
- Q. Does the Prince live in Tokyo?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. General, as a matter of fact, you knew that there were thousands of these incidents rather than a dozen or so, did you not?
- A. I can't imagine that there were so many incidents.
- Q. General, you read the newspapers at the time, did you not, that mentioned more than thousands -- that ran the number up into the hundreds of thousands in Nanking?
- A. I did not read the papers.
- Q. You know, of course, that there was such a thing as "The Rape of Nanking"?
- A. When I went to North China, I did hear that such a book was published in America concerning the rape of Nanking, but due to the fact that I could not read English, I was unable to read the book.
- Q. Now, General, didn't you know that there thousands of these incidents, such as murder, robbery, pillage, rape, by Japanese soldiers?
- A. My answer is still same as my previous answer.

Q. You want to go on the record, General, as being entirely ignorant of thousands of such incidents in the rape of Nanking?

A. I followed General MATSU during the formal entrance into the City of Nanking, and at that time there were between ten to twenty incidents reported to me. At that time it was reported that there were ten to twenty incidents. Also, the City of Nanking was pretty well cleared away, and ten days later I returned to Shanghai. I cannot ever believe or imagine that there were incidents numbering into thousands.

Q. Then your answer is "yes"?

(The witness answered without the question being translated to him in Japanese.)

A. To your statement about putting it into the record, I give the same statement that I could not imagine that it could have run into thousands.

Q. General, your position at that time was Adjutant to the Chief of Staff?

A. Yes.

Q. What were your duties?

A. To assist the Chief of Staff.

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Doc. No. 10102

INTERROGATION OF

General Shunroku HATA

Date and Time: 14 January 1946, 1545-1700 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : General Shunroku HATA
Carlisle W. Higgins, Interrogator
Col. Thos. W. Morrow, Interrogator
Danis Kildoyle, Interpreter
Claire Farrell, Stenographer

Questions by: Mr. Higgins

Q. Tell the General that Colonel Morrow and Mr. Higgins of the International Prosecution Section are here and would like to talk to him if he is willing to answer questions and if it is all right with him.

A. He said yes.

Q. How old is the General?

A. He will be 67 in July.

Q. What military school, if he was a student at such, did the General attend?

A. He is a graduate of the Officers School, which is equivalent to West Point, and then of the Army Artillery and Engineering School; also the Army College (Staff College).

Q. What was his branch of the service?

A. He did not specialize in anything. His branch is artillery but he didn't specialize.

Q. When was he first commissioned as an officer in the Imperial Japanese Army?

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- A. In 1901 he became a Sub-Lieutenant.
- Q. What military commands has the General held?
- A. He became Commander of the 16th Field Artillery Regiment -- he doesn't remember the exact date. The year before the earthquake -- it would be 1922. In 1926 he became 4th Artillery Brigade Commander.
- Q. What service did the General perform outside the Islands?
- A. He was Commander of the Taiwan (Formosa) Army from 1936 to 1937. And Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Armies in central China in 1938.
- Q. Did he assume command on the 17th of February 1938?
- A. Yes. He became Commander-in-Chief of all the Expeditionary Armies in China.
- Q. Did the General succeed General Iwane MATSUI?
- A. He succeeded General MATSUI in central China. And when he became Commander-in-Chief for all the Forces in China he succeeded General NISHIO.
- Q. Where were General NISHIO's headquarters?
- A. In Nanking.
- Q. Where were MATSUI's headquarters?
- A. First in Shanghai; then moved to Nanking.
- Q. When did the General first go to China as a Commander?
- A. In 1938.
- Q. What command did he have at that time when he first went to continental China?

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- A. In August of 1937 he came back and became Inspector General of Military Education; in 1938 he went to China again. When the China Incident began he was in Formosa.
- Q. Did he move his command with him from Formosa to China?
- A. No, he came back here to Tokyo. They were two entirely different operations and he had come back to Tokyo to be Inspector General. It was a very small affair in China at this time.
- Q. How many troops were under his command when he first went to China?
- A. Five divisions under his command when he first went to China.
- Q. Was that about 20,000 men?
- A. He doesn't remember but he thinks it was a little more because there are other services attached to this - like supply services.
- Q. Were those troops from the home islands of Japan or were they continentals made up of Formosan or Korean troops, or both?
- A. They were all from Japan proper. The numbers of the Divisions he commanded are 3d, 6th, 9th, 15th Reserve Division, 18th Reserve Division; all from the main islands.
- Q. Were those troops already in China when the General assumed command or were they transferred from the islands when he assumed command?
- A. They had been under MATSUI and he took over.
- Q. Does the General know why he was assigned to relieve MATSUI?

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- A. Yes, he said the object of General MATSUI's expeditionary forces had been achieved with the capture of Nanking and he was sent there with the principal object of pacifying the district that had been captured. His instructions were that Nanking -- that it was not advisable to leave the triangle comprised by Shanghai, Nanking and Foochow, and that he was to pacify this district -- and, if he found it necessary to leave this triangle, it would be advisable to obtain instructions from the Imperial General Headquarters.
- Q. Did he ever receive instructions from the Imperial General Headquarters to leave the triangle?
- A. No. He left this for Fangchow.
- Q. Was that after instructions were given by the General Headquarters not to leave?
- A. No, this instruction was received from the Imperial Headquarters to leave the triangle.
- Q. What military mission was he assigned to perform in his orders to leave the triangle?
- A. The capture of Fangchow was his objective and instructions.
- Q. At the time he received these instructions what was the total number of troops under his command?
- A. He said for this Fangchow operation an army was sent down from the North and this army comprised 4 or 5 divisions.
- Q. Who was in command of the army?
- A. It was under his command.

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- Q. What was the numerical strength of each of those forces that came down from the North?
- A. He thinks about 300,000 or 400,000, although this is from memory. He is not certain.
- Q. What Chinese Commander-in-Chief opposed him in this move to capture Fangchow?
- A. He thinks it must have been Chiang-Kai Shek himself.
- Q. From the time he first initiated his move how long was it until Fangchow was captured?
- A. Five months.
- Q. What was the approximate number of his troops that were engaged in that operation, including his forces in the triangle and the armies that came down from the North?
- A. In addition to these, later on, after this triangle had been emptied of the forces, two or three divisions arrived to take over this triangle so there would have been 11 or 12 divisions altogether in this sector.
- Q. What was the available strength of each Division?
- A. He thinks about 15,000 to 16,000 troops.
- Q. Were these experienced troops or recruits?
- A. Yes, they were experienced troops. Four Divisions had been recently mobilized but all the rest were seasoned troops.
- Q. Of course the recently mobilized troops had had military training under the Japanese conscription laws?
- A. Yes.

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- Q. Well, I'd like to have an estimate of the number of killed and wounded -- the battle casualties?
- A. It is a matter of many years ago and he doesn't remember. This was a long time ago and he has no idea but he does remember figures after he became Commander-in-Chief of all the armies in China.
- Q. For long did he serve as Commander-in-Chief?
- A. Ten months, 1938 from February to November.
- Q. What were the battle casualties of the Japanese armies under him during that period?
- A. There is a little mistake. From February to November 1938 he was in central China and he became Commander-in-Chief in 1941 until 1944.
- Q. What were the figures up until about November?
- A. He does not remember those. He remembers figures in connection with 1941-4 but he has forgotten for the earlier period. For 1941-4 the dead numbered 50,000 in China.
- Q. According to the usual ratio then, isn't it likely to assume that the wounded amounted to about 200,000?
- A. He figures about 200,000. He mentioned a ratio of 1-5 -- the others died of illness -- but he doesn't remember figures.
- Q. What was the date on which Nanjocher was captured?
- A. He thinks it was October 25, 1938.
- Q. Does the General not have some definite idea as to his losses in that operation?
- A. He could guess a figure but it would be just a figure taken at random.

Q. Can the General give me his estimate of what the Chinese losses were then from the time he left the triangle until Kankchow was captured?

A. No, he has no idea.

Q. How many Chinese troops did his army capture in this operation? How many prisoners were taken?

A. He doesn't think there were so many. He didn't worry about figures of prisoners taken there. He thinks many of them just turned tail and left the field of battle.

Q. Did he look upon this as a war in China or was it just a frontier incident?

A. Although it actually was a war all they ever considered it was as a China Incident. Actually it was a war.

Q. Did the General study international law in his Staff College?

A. Yes. In the War College.

Q. Did the General know that Japan had treaties in which they promised not to invade China and not to wage war against China -- like in 1922 and 1928?

A. What is this treaty called?

Q. The Nine-Power Treaty.

A. Yes, he knows it.

Q. Well, did he think that they were breaking that treaty or not?

A. He knows of the existence of this treaty but he does not know the terms and there seems to be no other way out but to resort to armed force when other means fail.

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Q. But supposing the treaty says they are not to resort to armed force until they have made a try for peace?

A. He is not well acquainted with the Nine-Power Treaty. He merely knows of its existence.

Questions by: Mr. Higgins

Q. What position, if any, did the General have with the Japanese Army at the time of surrender?

A. Commander-in-Chief of the 2d General Army.

Q. Where was its headquarters?

A. Hiroshima. He was there at the time of the atomic bomb raid. His head is not right yet.

Q. Where did the General leave the army records when he left the China theatre?

A. These were all left in China.

Q. At the time the General's troops were in possession of the triangle were not the civil laws suspended and he, as commander, governed by Japanese military law, and did this not apply not only to his troops but to the civil population?

A. Generally, he said, the law was left in the hands of the Chinese.

Q. What does he mean generally?

A. Anything that would not concern military matters.

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Excerpts from Interrogation of MATSUI,
Iwane, dated 8 March 1946

Q. "When did you first hear, if you did hear, that Europe and America got the idea that your troops committed many outrages in Nanking?"

A. Almost as soon as I entered Nanking.

Q. You heard about it?

A. Yes.

Q. From what source did you hear about it?

A. From Japanese diplomats.

Q. Who was the Japanese diplomat.

A. It was a very small diplomatic official and I do not remember his name, the Consul at Nanking.

Q. Do I understand then that the Japanese Consul was in Nanking when the Japanese troops were approaching the City?

A. They went in with the Japanese troops. They were attached to the army to go in and preserve peace.

Q. There is a history of the Far East in Modern Times written by a man named Vinacke and he says that Chinese civilians were tied in bunches with ropes and machine gunned and women were turned into houses of prostitution for use of the Japanese soldiers and that many civilians were bayoneted in Nanking. Do you know where this historian could have gotten this information.

A. I do not know. Perhaps from the Chinese.

Q. Did you hear any stories of that sort when you came into Nanking?

A. No.

Q. My record says that you made certain public utterances defying foreign governments. I haven't any to point out but did you make any statements?

A. I never refused intervention or defied governments, as a matter of fact in Shanghai and Nanking I collaborated with the United States, British and French diplomats

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and consuls to help Chinese refugees. A French missionary who was engaged in this type of work appealed to me for help and I donated the sum of ten thousand yen to his work.

Q. Do you remember his name?

A. I don't remember now but will try to remember.

Q. Was that in 1932 or 1937?

A. 1937.

Q. Also there is a statement here that you were relieved from command because of this Nanking situation and replaced in February by General Hara. Is that correct?

A. No, that is not the reason. I considered my work ended in Nanking and wished to doff my uniform and engage in peaceful pursuits.

Q. Do I understand you to mean that you gave the French missionary ten thousand yen of your own personal funds or was that collected from the Japanese army or Japanese people as well as yourself?

A. This was army funds.

Q. It was for the help of Chinese refugees around Shanghai?

A. That is correct.

Q. Do I understand that you asked to be relieved of command in 1938?

A. Yes, at my request.

Q. That request was addressed to the Chief of Staff?

A. To War Minister General SUGIYAMA.

Q. Was that in writing?

A. By letter.

Q. Was it personal or official?

A. Half private and half official.

- Q. Mr. Abend states that at the same time you were relieved that Kingoro HASHIMOTO and Prince Yasuhiko ASAKA and about eighty staff officers were sent back to Japan. Do you remember about that and if that correct?
- A. Yes, but Mr. Abend was wrong in his deduction. The reason for the return of the two officers and eighty staff officers was the fact that the ten divisions in Nanking were reduced to some five divisions and as a result these officers were superfluous. There were two army headquarters and this was reduced to one.
- Q. I understand there was an army that came down from the North and then there was the army that had been at Shanghai and they joined forces with you. Is that correct?
- A. This was after I returned to Japan.
- Q. I understand there were some troops between the Shanghai operations and the taking of Nanking, like the Sixth Division for instance, under General TANI, composing in part the Tenth Army which I understood came down from the north. Is that correct?
- A. This came up from Shanghai.
- Q. And the Sixth Division joined you before you went to Nanking, as I understand, and the Tenth Army?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. The charges also are made that the discipline of troops that captured Nanking was very bad.
- A. I considered the discipline excellent but the conduct and behavior was not.
- Q. Of the soldiers?
- A. Yes.
- Q. This was at Nanking?
- A. Yes. I think there were some lawless elements in the army.
- Q. I understand then you are drawing a distinction between the obeying of orders by a soldier in the process of operations and what the soldier does off duty and in this instance after the town was captured?
- A. Yes.

- Q. And, of course, the officers commanding the troops in Nanking did have the duty of overseeing the behavior of their soldiers both off duty and on duty?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Why do you say that it is your opinion that the behavior of the soldiers was bad? On what do you base that statement?
- A. On account of their behavior towards the Chinese population and their acts generally.
- Q. Were there any general orders that preceded the capture of Nanking from your headquarters? Especially regulating the conduct of the soldiers after the capture of the city as was anticipated.
- A. I always advocated the maintenance of strict discipline and the punishment of all evil doers. I also advocated the thorough investigation of the "Nanking Incident, and collaboration with foreign officials and diplomats and this was done.
- Q. Can you give me the names of any of the foreign diplomats that investigated this matter?
- A. One was Mr. HIDAOKA from the Japanese Embassy. I do not remember the names of the foreign diplomats as they were in Nanking.
- Q. Did you talk personally to any of these foreign diplomats?
- A. No, not at Nanking.
- Q. At any time later did you talk to anybody.
- A. I entered Nanking on the 17th and after one week I returned to Shanghai. I met and discussed with U.S. and British commanders and admirals, also the Italian and French ambassadors with a view to settling things in a peaceful way.
- *****
- Q. Were the troops that entered Nanking and that were there on the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th of December, new troops or were they veterans and were they officered by experienced officers or otherwise?
- A. They were all experienced troops officered by experienced men.
- Q. Have you ever commanded these troops before?
- A. No.

- Q. Had you ever heard that these troops had behaved badly off duty in China up to this time?
- A. No, the army was a newly formed organization sent from Japan but it was composed of many experienced veterans. I had not heard of these troops behaving badly elsewhere in China.
- Q. Or in Manchuria?
- A. No.
- Q. Part of them had been engaged in operations around Shanghai and those that had come down from the north had been in some skirmish around Peiping and Tientsin. Is that correct?
- A. One division came down from the Peiping and Tientsin area.
- Q. The claim is made that Lieutenant General Prince ASAKA was a field commander who should have had some oversight over the part of the army that first entered Nanking. Is it correct that Prince ASAKA was so placed?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. And Prince ASAKA married one of the daughter of Emperor Meiji?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. Some people claim that Prince ASAKA was responsible very much for what happened in Nanking but because of his relation to the Imperial family little or nothing has been said about it. Is that correct?
- A. I do not think so. Prince ASAKA had joined the army only about ten days before its entry into Nanking and in view of the short time he was connected with this army I do not think he can be held responsible. I would say that the Division Commanders are the responsible parties.
- *****
- Q. You stated that you went in to Nanking on the 17th. Did you see any bodies of dead civilians, women or children? Anything of that sort?
- A. They had all been removed by this time. I saw a few dead Chinese soldiers near the west gate.
- Q. The Chinese War Crimes Commission claims that several hundred thousand civilians were killed and that there was burning and pillaging of Nanking right after the capture on the 13th. Was there any other evidence than what you stated that the town had been badly handled in the capture?

- A. That is absolutely untrue. There was no, absolutely no, grounds for such accusations. This I can state upon my honor.
- Q. When did you first see Hallett Abend after the Nanking capture?
- A. I met him in China. I first met Mr. Abend after, perhaps a month after Nanking.
- Q. Did Mr. Abend ask for an interview and get it?
- A. No, I requested Mr. Abend to see me as I had heard rumors and I wished to quell these by putting the facts before Mr. Abend.
- Q. What did you and Mr. Abend talk about. What was said?
- A. I explained to Mr. Abend my views regarding the respecting of foreign rights and interests in Nanking. Also, my desire not to inflict damage to neutral properties and interests. I also stated that it was my desire to achieve peace and extend the hand of friendship to Chinese troops who had stopped fighting but that it was my duty to punish Chinese troops who continued opposition.
- Q. After you got back to Japan in February were you ever asked to make a report about the behavior of your troops at Nanking either by the Chief of Staff or the War Minister or anyone else?
- A. I was placed in the reserves immediately upon arrival in Tokyo so I do not know for certain but there must have been investigations and reports.
- Q. Were you asked to make a report or questioned about this rumor concerning the behavior of troops at Nanking?
- A. No, I was not asked to make a report. If there had been any such incidents I would naturally have made a report on my own responsibility. If you are looking for any reports they would be in the Demobilization Bureau.
- Q. Do you have any papers or correspondence or a diary which indicates your activities at Nanking and Shanghai in 1936 or 1937.
- A. The only notes in my diary concern a court martial of an officer and perhaps three soldiers in connection with the rape of Chinese in Nanking.
- Q. What is the date and what was the verdict of the court?

- A. I think the officer was executed and the soldiers imprisoned. This was as a result of my advocating severe punishment for offenders. I received this information when I was in Shanghai and put it in my diary there.
- Q. I suppose you can give us a copy of that? Procure it for us?
- A. All my records were burned including this diary but I have a few notes made from memory since which I think will be useful if I come to trial. My house was destroyed in one of the bombing raids.
- Q. When was this?
- A. August 26.

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DOC. NO. 1949

INTERROGATION OF COLONAL HASHIMOTO, Kingoro,
serial 6 - #343, page 4.

"I had no knowledge of the PANAY incident until the British gunboat LADYBIRD passed by Wuhu; I shelled the LADYBIRD and took it into custody and at that time, the commanding officer of the LADYBIRD told me he was going to the assistance of the PANAY because he had gotten word that the PANAY was in trouble. This was my first knowledge of the incident."

"This was under orders from Lieutenant-General YANAGAWA. These orders read as follows: 'Nanking being in a state of seige, and it appearing that enemy troops would attempt to flee upstream, Colonel HASHIMOTO is to sink all vessels proceeding towards Nanking without regard to nationality. I believe these orders were issued two days before the fall of Nanking. * * *'"

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21.8.6 - in 2/1 # 2573

ITEL 30

Ten-San-Hi No. 169

Dec. 2, 1935.

Vice War Minister Hakiro FUJISU

Dear Sir: Re: Submission of Draft of Outline
for the Military Disposal of
Various Railways in North China.

I herewith report on the subject matter as per
attached document.

Yours very truly,

Shun TAMA,
Commander of the Japanese
Garrison Forces in North
China.

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ANNEXED DOCUMENT TO ITR. 30

Confidential

Draft of Outline for the Military Disposal of
Various Railways in North China

End of November, 1935.

Headquarters of the Japanese
Garrison Forces in North China.

I. Policy

The Army expects to dispose of the railways in North China in such a manner as to place them under its control so as to achieve military objective through direct utilization of them.

In order to attain this end, the Army shall so guide the present Chinese operators to continue their management as far as practicable, but it is anticipated that either a minor or a major part of certain railways may be occupied and seized or administered from the beginning.

II. The gist of measures.

1. We must make the employees including the executive officers of the various railways understand the spirit of the North China autonomous movement and the attitude of the Japanese forces and endeavor to appease the employees by hinting to them that they should feel at ease and assist the Japanese forces even when the latter undertakes military operations (this is already being carried out.)

Copies sent to:

Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army,
Headquarters of Railway Corps of Kwantung Army,
South Manchuria Railway Company,
Tientsin Infantry,
Peking Infantry.

2. We shall endeavor to check the southward transfer of rolling stocks in counter-opposition to the Panking Government's policy of carrying away rolling stocks and other materials to the South. For this purpose we shall do our best in applying all possible indirect means, but in the case of Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway we shall check it even by night if necessary. In case such forcible measure is taken, we shall give as the nominal reason self-defence and protection of the Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway against the anti-Japanese military operations of the Panking Government. (This is being enforced by the dispatch of military police under an agreement made with the Peiping-Shanhaikwan Railway Co.)

3. The extent of the railways in North China to be secured for military operations and the necessity or non-necessity of occupying and seizing them are generally arranged previously as follows:

a. Peiping-Shanhaikwan railway (whole line)

It is sufficient to supervise and guide a part of the personnel.

b. Tientsin-Pukow Railway (North of Su-chow)

If pressure of our forces is employed, it will be possible to operate with the assistance of the men from the South Manchuria Railway Co.

c. Peiping-Hankow Railway (North of the Yellow River.)

It will be necessary to occupy and seize it by Military Railway Units, etc. at the outset.

d. Peiping-Suiyuan Railway (whole line)

It will be possible to achieve the object of transportation by means of supervision and guidance over a certain number of personnel.

e. Shantung Railway (whole line)

It can be utilized as it is at present.

f. Lungai Railway (East of Su Chow)

It is necessary to occupy it when opportunity offers.

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4. Reconnaissances necessary for future utilization will be made in regard to the rolling stocks, materials, and other matters concerning each railway, thereby completing plans and preparations for their operation following the commencement of military operations. These reconnaissances will be started in the order of the Peiping-Shanhaikwan, Tientsin-Pekow, Peiping-Hankow, and if time permits, Peiping-Suiyuan, Shantung and Lunghai Railways.

5. The military administration of railways in North China will be done by the members of the Headquarters of the Railway Corps of the Kwantung Army, the detachments of the employees of the South Manchuria Railway Co. and the military railway units.

6. When the movement of troops becomes necessary, the Army will organize the Headquarters of Railway Corps of the Japanese Garrison Forces, in China with the members of the Headquarters of the Railway Corps of the Kwantung Army, as per schedule No. 1. To this Headquarters will be attached the necessary station headquarters, detachments of the South Manchuria Railway employees, and the Military Railway Units. The Headquarters will take charge of not only military transportation, but also, if necessary, the administration, construction, repair, and operation of the railways.

The commissarial business in the districts along the railway will be looked after by the Headquarters of the Railway Corps.

7. When the army finds it inevitable to settle the issue by armed force, it will lose no time to complete the organization mentioned in the preceding clause and speedily effect the unification of the railways in North China according to the following procedure, and thereby ensure military transportation:

- a. Firstly take control of the Pei-ning Railway to be used as the trunk line of our subsequent military traffic.
- b. Immediately after the commencement of military operation, the air force will be ordered to bomb the Peiping-Hankow Railway bridge over the Yellow River and the strategic points south of Su Chow (which is to be excluded) on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway in order to cut off these railways at various points. At the same time the ground forces will be speedily advanced to the line of Yellow River and Suchow to ensure the free railway traffic in North China.

Even when the situation does not permit the accomplishment of the above plan, efforts will be made to secure the railways north of Shunte and Tsinan at least.

- c. As to the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway, careful watch will be maintained at first and preparations made so as to make possible its utilization along with the progress of the military operations.
- d. In consideration of the landing of our reinforcements at Tsingtao, measures will be taken at an opportune time to utilize the Shantung Railway. Should the Tientsin-Pukow Railway be intercepted, the rolling stocks of the Shantung Railway will be moved to the north to be used for relay service. Depending upon the circumstances, penetration into the Shantung Province via Tsingtao by sea-route may be expected.
- e. As soon as we occupy Suchow, we shall take the section of the Lunghai Railway east of that town. The western section of that railway will be used in such a manner as to check the possible northward march of the Chinese Central Armies along the Peiping-Hankow Railway

8. For the military traffic we shall endeavor to make the best use of the existing Chinese rolling stocks, but at the same time efforts will be made to continue the operation of the principal trains as far as the situation permits so as to keep up the public transportation, except in the case of taking over the control of the railways.

Any shortage of rolling stocks and the cars needed by the Kwantung Army for their advance within the border line will be provided by the S.A.R.

9. While efforts will be made to have the Chinese organs control the railways as far as possible in connection with the utilization of the railways, the branch commander of the Headquarters of the Railway Corps will be charged with the control of each railway, supervising and guiding its operation with the minimum number of personnel. Especially the military railway units will be employed exclusively for the operation of trains and the repairing of the railways in the vicinities of the battle-front.

10. Whether the whole line or a part of a railway should be placed under our control will be decided after the forced run of military trains and in the light of the attitude of the railway employees and other factors in the rear line.

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However, even in the case of temporary control, efforts will be made by pacification operations, etc. to induce dispersed people to return to their home bases as soon as possible. Moreover, in order to prevent the dispersion of people, printed matters will be prepared beforehand for distribution immediately after the first forced run of military trains. And at the same time necessary number of men will be posted at appropriate points along the railway line to prevent their flight.

11. For the patrol of the railways, no large forces will be required in the case where we protect the military clique in North China and operate against the armies of the Nanking Government, but considerable forces will be needed in the case where we move southward while ridding up the military clique in North China. In the latter case it will be necessary to safeguard the railway bridges and important stations. In either case, anti-aircraft defense preparations will be needed for the principal railway bridges in the region south of Peking and Tientsin.

III. The disposal of railways when normal political condition is restored. (A private opinion only. Strictly confidential).

12. When the situation in North China is restored to its normal condition after the military operations are over, the railways will be turned over to the North China Regime generally according to the following procedure:

- a. Although the railways will be operated individually at the start of the war operation (the Peiping Shanhaikwan Railway and the Tientsin Pukow Railway in the state of cut-off as they are now) all the railways in North China will be organized, in case the Army places them under its control into one bloc at the earliest possible moment and unified under a Military Railway Commission.
- b. The personnels which was temporarily reinforced during the war operations will be reduced gradually and the remaining personnel will be charged with the military transportation in North China and other business directly connected with it under the guidance of the Headquarters of the Railways Corps of the Japanese Garrison Forces in China.
- c. When the affairs had been all settled the Headquarters of the Railway Corps will be abolished and the railways amalgamated into one system. Under the management of the Communication Ministry of the North China Regime, Japanese advisers and/or some railway employees will be employed.

The following demands will be made of the North China Regime on the occasion of the abolition of the Headquarters of the Railway Corps.

1. Employment of advisers and high-rankers of the Regime by each railway.
2. The right of guarding the railways and of posting troops at the principal places along the railway lines.
3. Cession of the Shantung Railway and the section of Lurchai Railway east of Anchor.
4. The right of constructing new railways.

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Office Report for 1937.

Published by the Secretariat of the Foreign Ministry

Dec. 1, 1937.

Part II Report of the Personnel Affairs Section.

Section VIII The China Affair (Page 80)

Item 1. Emergency measures in personnel administration to meet the outbreak of the Affair.

Concerning the clash between the troops of Japan and China which broke out on the midnight of 7 July, 1937, near Lukouchiao, as the result of unlawful firing on the part of Chinese soldiers, the Imperial Government, at a cabinet meeting of 11 July, made an important determination and decided to take necessary steps in connection with the dispatching of troops to North China. Accordingly, as a hasty measure for strengthening the staffs of our diplomatic offices in North China, we instructed by telegrams Vice-Consul NIMURA and clerk KATAOKA at Yingkou, and Vice-Consul ARIHISA and clerk MOCHIZUKI at Chengchiatun, (the consulates at these two places had been scheduled to be closed down soon) to await orders for dispatch to North China. Besides, Councillor MORISHIMA was ordered to proceed alone to his post at Peking by advancing the date of his departure. Consul YONAIYAMA, who had been staying in Tokyo, also received unofficial instructions to prepare for dispatch to North China. Thus, on the following day, that is, 12 July, orders were issued to Vice-Consuls NIMURA and ARIHISA to proceed to North China. However, as it so happened that the telegram from the Japanese Ambassador to Manchoukuo reporting that these two Vice-Consuls as well as clerks KATAOKA and MOCHIZUKI had almost finished winding up the affairs of these two consulates and had made all preparations for starting at once upon receipt of orders, crossed the above-mentioned orders, telegraphic instruction was given to clerk KATAOKA to proceed at once.

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COLLECTION OF ADDRESSES BY FOREIGN MINISTER
MATSUOKA, YOSUKI - 1941

The great spirit, which is originally the tradition of our country since the foundation of the state, is HANKO ICHIU, namely to promulgate the moral principles over the world and to let the whole nation be placed in their right post and it is needless to say that the imperial diplomacy fundamentally has to play an important role in spreading this great spirit all over the world and towards the accomplishment of the holy task of realizing this grand ideal on the earth. However, considering the present situation of our country, as an actual problem of foreign policy, there are such constantly important problems before our eyes as how we should maintain the Japanese population which is remarkably increasing annually and how we should heighten the level of our national wealth which is strikingly lower in comparison with those of the two European and American powers, the British Empire and America. In order to solve these problems, the government has been trying for many years to develop our people in foreign countries by means of foreign trade, emigration and oversea enterprise. But the various countries in Europe and America have been and are actually disturbing JAPAN by means of the prohibition or the limitation of her emigration and the levy of high custom duty upon the Japanese commodities and every other measure.

The MANCHURIAN Incident was an exaltation of the National spirit; but in a way, we can say that it was an explosion caused by the oppression of the peaceful development of JAPAN by the Europe and American powers.

"I have, in fact, observed minutely the trend of the world and chiefly the relation between JAPAN and CHINA and the trends of the both countries in East Asia, etc., and come to a view long since, by which I have been more firmly impressed with the outbreak of the CHINA Incident. The present CHINA Incident differs fundamentally in its nature from such wars as caused by the Kings' ambition or simply the material desire, and a traditional or a sudden feeling and dispute or by the utilitarian conflict between the capitalistic countries. That is to say, the fundamental cause of the Sino-Japanese conflicts was ideological. There may be, of course, many other causes of secondary, thirdly importance, but, after all, its fundamental ought to be understood well by everyone of us as the dispute of ideology. I have been trying these several years to persuade some persons about this matter. It is that we have been strongly holding such an ideology as our empire should settle the situation throughout East Asia by our harmonious cooperation with CHINA to the East."

"In short, JAPAN has no intention to annex the territory and conquer or exploit the nation in this zone as Europe and America did. On the contrary, JAPAN will liberate the native from the pressure of the Imperialism and treat them as a brother in place of a slave and have relations of interdependence with them. Our Empire intended to carry out such policies neither for reasons of our constraint for other countries nor our judgment of these as the prudent measures in

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view of the present circumstances of the world, but only for reasons of our fear for a God. The fact that our country is a divine country means, in a way, that there will be the grace of Heaven when our country will go forward in accordance with the divine will and if we act against it we'll be punished by Heaven. Consequently, in executing our national diplomatic policy, the fact that Japan is a divine country must be considered."

"Our future is really of much difficulties. I think our country must, first of all, make every effort to establish a strong armed country, unifying 100 million people in one and at the same time to have the closer economic relations in the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The fact that the Minister of Commerce and Industry KOBAYASHI, a special envoy to Dutch Indies, is now negotiating, relates to this meaning and the fact that a special envoy is going to be sent also to French Indo-China, tells us the same purpose, and we should like to make the cooperation with Siam and others more firm. By the way, I must add a word about this treaty; it is how shall we deal with our Russian relation."

Looking Back at the Establishment of MANCHUKUO

I have an honor to give my expressions today at the eighth anniversary of the recognition of MANCHUKUO.

MANCHURIA might be called as my second native place and I shall be related to MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA five times, if I count my journey to Geneva in 1932 in connection with the MANCHURIAN Incident in addition to my four times stay in MANCHURIA since my first step to MANCHURIA as a twenty seven years old young official over thirty years ago until I left the post of the President of the Manchurian Railway Co. last year. It seems as if belonged to a quite different age when we compare today's MANCHUKUO with MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA before the Incident. There has never been such a country in the world history, which has made so rapid progress only in eight years. Recalling the condition of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA just before the Incident, it was really out of description. The rights and interests we gained at the sacrifice of 100 thousand lives and two billion national funds during both wars of the Sino Japanese and the Russo-Japanese, have mostly come to be on the brink of ruin at last in the course of both obstructions by certain European and American countries and the conspiracies and devices by China and Chang's family and our weak-kneed diplomacy. The fact that our people had by and by forgotten or become indifferent to the actuality that we had paid dearly and that MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA were essential to the existence of our country, that is to say, they were our life line and furthermore had a great importance to the whole situation of East Asia, should be one of the reasons that such a pitiful circumstances have been brought about. While the Chinese became wild with excitement at the withdrawal of the South Manchurian Railway and the Port Arthur and Dairen, there were such persons even among the famous politicians as

advocated boldly the abandonment of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA as if in cooperation with the Chinese. The Chinese side, growing imprudent day by day, and paying no attention to our frequent protests as well as the regulations of the treaty, constructed a parallel line to the MANCHURIAN Railway and planned even the outflanking line at least and projected to strike out our position, rights and interests in MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA together with the MANCHURIAN Railway Company. What we answered against these reckless attempts at that time was nothing but the repeat of the verbal protests. Hereupon, she became imprudent more and more and tried to drive the Japanese out of the earth of MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA at one effort. Our people, however, were still more indifferent and the government, which might had had a serious illusion, behaved with deference and showed even a flattery. This indifferent and spiritless attitude of our government and the people caused her to grow the anti-Japan up to the insult for the Japanese and there happened at last such deplorable events as the MANPOSAN Event of 1931 and Captain MAKIMURA's Slaughter Event. But the government authorities at that time maintained their calmness yet and seemed not to be surprised at all. They, of course, took it the most rustic to get angry and were cool-headed, but our 200 thousand inhabitants and the Imperial Army there could not stand any more. Then, the MANCHURIAN Incident broke out as it should naturally. Our national blood stirred up. Recalling it now, one blow at RYUJOKO was itself the positive counter-attack and exaltation of the Japanese spirit and awakened the Japanese people from their long sleep and made the revival of the Japanese spirit and started them for the display of the true nature of the Imperial Japan, I believe. Otherwise, who would now have controlled MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA? May, where should JAPAN have fallen down now? I'm struck with terror when I imagine such a matter. China brought an action to the League of Nations. There were a considerable number of persons in the government and the people at that time who embraced the League Supremacy Principle or rather feared it in their hearts than respected. The League tried to control Japan to their best and dispatched the famous Lytton Investigation Committee to the Far East and treated Japan as if a defendant. Both the Japanese government and the people did not even refuse the committee and its party to proceed majestically, as if the former were, I wonder, insensible or afraid of the letter in their hearts. You cannot have forgotten the spiritless face of Japan at that time. How would it have been if it were today? I think they would not have come with such an overbearing faces as betrays: "I'll pass judgment on your quarrel and even if not so we would refuse it away." Thinking thus, we stood with wonder at the change of times. Our people must not forget the timid and poor-looking figure of our country in those days, looking up to the gracious and splendid Imperial Japan of today. If you will be fallen in amnesia, you will have an awful experience again as before. They attempted to record MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA, on which they had never shed a drop of blood or never touched a finger, on the Lytton Reports and to place them under the international administration in accordance with their advice. I believe that there has never been in the history of the human race such previous instance as the nonsensical, ridiculous and

audacious conspiracy was projected to be forced on a large country. But, viewing from the situation at that time, it is a question whether they were wrong or Japan was wrong who caused herself such unreasonable attitude or an insult. I think the attitude or the intension of the government and the people at that time should be partly responsible for it.

The revived Japanese spirit has become clearer day by day and refused at last such devices and advices. That is to say, the 24th day in February of 1931, together with the 18th in September of 1929, is the memorial day which ought not to be forgotten by the YAMATO race. The revival of the Japanese spirit which started with the one stroke at RYUJOKO was achieved with the action of the secession from the League of Nations. The 24th day in February of 1931, when the Imperial Japan challenged bravely the hypocrisy, which is a characteristic of the present civilization, will remain long recorded in the history of the world. This is the day on which Japan set the world on the road to the establishment of a true and real peace of the world and Japan, on that day, gave a final blow to the false organization of status quo. In those days I stated, in my farewell address, that one who would be injured by imprudent action (the decision of the nineteen committee meeting) is not Japan, but the League of Nations, but I wonder where the League is now and what it is doing. Then, the Imperial Japan and the Japanese Spirit that started on the course of the revival has been advancing forward speedily since then. Japan has been thrown in a serious situation through her dash after dash in these nine years as well as the world. It is just like a dream. There have been so many changes. I can't help being surprised at the very splendid feature of Japan when we think of the poor-looking and spiritless Japan of just nine years ago. It is far more than to say that it belongs to the different age. For us who have had some knowledge about MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA these over thirty years and see today's MANCHUKUO which was born just eight years ago, it is rather surprising and dreamy matter. I have always insisted that MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA is the key to stabilize the whole situation of East Asia, and even now I still believe it firmly. As to the continental policy, the base of our holy task, which is to be realized in Asia, lies still in MANCHURIA and MONGOLIA and this base will not probably be changed for about a half century. The work of the establishment of MANCHUKUO is the first step of the Reconstruction of the New Order in East Asia and at the same time was the herald of the construction of the World New Order and its position in the world history should be said to be very important. The true significance of the MANCHURIAN Incident will be realized for the first time when the reconstruction of the New Order in East Asia will be accomplished, for which we are now making every endeavor. All changes in East Asia since the MANCHURIAN Incident until now are, that is to say, to be incorporated in one and the true meaning of the MANCHURIAN Incident and the establishment of MANCHUKUO will become clear at the time when the CHINA Incident will be fundamentally settled, and also the reconstruction of the New Order in East Asia is indivisible from the arrangement of the domestic affairs. Even if we dream of the reconstruction of

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new order in East Asia, or moreover throughout the world, while maintaining the status quo in the internal affairs, this attempt is impracticable. I believe firmly that the new order of East Asia, nay, of the world, will be established only when our country will establish the political organization assisted by the whole nation and based upon this really gracious national policy, and will assume exhaustively the actually Japanized totalitarianism meaning that "all the people should be united to the Emperor with hearty gladness and faithfulness" and will carry out the diplomatic policies originated in the Imperial way. When we in this emergency of today, think of the significance of MANCHUKUO again and recall the circumstances before and after the foundation, and moreover bring to mind the future of the mankind in trouble in looking straight at the unprecedented stir and the confusion of the world, we who are the people of East Asia, can't help being stirred up. We must be determined to devote ourselves in overcoming the difficulties under the strong conviction of "The Light from the East" and "The New Order by Us."

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Press Release by Gen. MATSUI, 18 Dec. 1937"Fire will be allowed,
Grave reflection must be called for."

General Matsui's Declaration

General MATSUI, Commander-in-Chief of all the Expeditionary Armies in China, after having performed religious service for the war dead in Nanking, issued a special statement at 4 p.m. on the 18th of December. In his statement he once more called for the grave reflection of the whole Chinese nation and plainly expressed a firm and unshakable resolution regarding the future movements of the military authorities. The statement made at this junction when Japan has made an epochal triumphal entry into the fortress of Nanking is as follows. The army took firm possession of Nanking and performed the triumphal entry yesterday (17th December). And after having performed religious service for the war dead today, the army made every possible preparation for the future military operations without delay. The army lost no time in moving a certain part of the troops towards the Kiangpei districts, and another part toward the Chekiang and Anhui districts. Thus, the army has been engaged in a series of military operations. But taken all together, the army having become considerably exhausted, it is necessary for troops in general to take a little rest, because the army had been engaged in unremitting landing operations for four months since its troops were landed, and immediately after that, the army turned its maneuvers to the pursuit of the enemy. During this time the army is expected to adjust their military preparedness, and to map out the next plan of operations, strengthening the defences of the field of operations, and endeavoring to pacify the inhabitants of the districts.

The future military operations depend entirely upon what attitude Chiang Kai-shek and the National Government of China will assume, and, therefore, I am not in a position to make any immediate comment on this point. On the part of the enemy, I think, the troops and inhabitants of the southern parts of the Yangtze-Kiang must have been menaced not a little by the recent battles. As a matter of course, I think, the National Government of China has been given the opportunity of examining itself. I, preferably, must express my deep sympathy for the enormous loss the troops and inhabitants suffered from the war. Consequently, we must make them rely on the Japanese army and also make them entertain friendly sentiments to the Japanese military authorities by the self-examination on the part of the National Government of China. I hope, in view of the situation, the time will soon come when the National Government will be convinced of the error they have made.

On the contrary, if the National Government does not repent, the army, to my regret, must carry out the war as a result of its mission until they, the National Government, acknowledge themselves beaten.

The cold season is actually here and the closing days of the year are drawing near. At this time, the Japanese army intends to give time for the troops and inhabitants of China in order to call for their grave reflection on the one hand, and to show Japan is fighting in the cause of justice on the other. As I have performed a memorial service for the war dead today, my mind is filled with deep emotions. But I have been touched with compassion not only for the Japanese war dead, but also for the dead who were misled by the National Government

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which entangled the present state of affairs in the East through having not been awakened to the contemporary circumstances. I extend much sympathy to millions of innocent people in the Kiangpei and Chekiang districts, who suffered the evils of war. Now the flag of the rising sun is floating high over Nanking, and the Imperial Way is shining in the southern parts of the Yangtze-Kiang; the dawn of the renaissance of the East is on the verge of offering itself. On this occasion, I hope for reconsideration of the situation by the 400 million people of China.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

WASHINGTON, D.C., February 21, 1946

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE ANNEXED is a photostat of the Finding of Facts from the Record of Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry convened on board the U.S.S. AUGUSTA by orders of the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet to inquire into all the circumstances connected with the bombing and loss of the U.S.S. PAYAN in the Yangtze River near mileage 221 above Woosung, China on December 12, 1937.

ON FILE IN THE Navy Department.

/s/ G. L. Russell
G. L. RUSSELL
Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT G. L. RUSSELL who signed the foregoing certificate, was at the time of signing Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy and that full faith and credit should be given his certification as such.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the Navy Department to be affixed this Twenty-first day of February, one thousand nine hundred and forty-six.

/s/ O. S. Colclough
O. S. COLCLOUGH
Judge Advocate General of the Navy
For the Secretary of the Navy

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The court, having thoroughly inquired into all the facts and circumstances connected with the subject matter of the inquiry, finds as follows:

FINDING OF FACTS

1. That on December 12, 1937, the U.S.S. PANAY, a unit of the Yangtze Patrol of the United States Asiatic Fleet, was operating under lawful orders on the Yangtze river.
2. That the immediate mission of the U.S.S. PANAY was to protect nationals, maintain communication between the United States Embassy office, Nanking, China, and the American Ambassador at Hankow, China; provide a temporary office for the U.S. Embassy staff during the time when Nanking was greatly endangered by military operations, and to afford a refuge for American and other foreign nationals.
3. That due to intensive shell fire around Nanking the U.S.S. PANAY had changed berth several times to avoid being hit, and on the morning of December 12, 1937, formed a convoy of Socony-Vacuum Oil Company vessels, principally the S.S. MEIPING, MEHSIA, and MEIAN and proceeded upriver.
4. That adequate steps were taken at all times to insure that the Japanese authorities were informed of the movements of the U.S.S. PANAY.
5. That, in addition to her regular complement, the U.S.S. PANAY had on board at this time four members of the American Embassy staff, four American nationals and five foreign nationals.
6. That at 0940, while standing upriver, the U.S.S. PANAY stopped in response to a signal from a Japanese landing boat. A Japanese Army boarding officer and guard went on board and was informed that the U.S.S. PANAY and convoy were proceeding to anchorage twenty-eight miles above Nanking. No warning was given of any danger likely to be encountered.
7. That at about 1100 December 12, 1937, the U.S.S. PANAY and convoy anchored in the Yangtze river in a compact group at about mileage 221 above Wosung, twenty-eight miles above Nanking.
8. That the U.S.S. PANAY was painted white with buff upper works and stacks and displayed two large horizontal flags on her upper deck awnings plus large colors at her gaff.
9. That the Socony-Vacuum ships MEIPING, MEHSIA, and MEIAN each displayed numerous horizontal and vertical American flags, all of large size.

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10. That at 1330 the crew of the U.S.S. PANAY were engaged in normal Sunday routine and were all on board except a visiting party of eight men on board the S.S. KEIPING.

11. That at about 1338 three large Japanese twin motored planes in a Vee formation were observed at a considerable height passing overhead down-river. At this time no other craft were in the near vicinity of the U.S.S. PANAY and convoy, and there was no reason to believe the ships were in a dangerous area.

12. That without warning these three Japanese planes released several bombs, one or two of which struck on or very close to the bow of the U.S.S. PANAY and another which struck on or very close to the S.S. KEIPING.

13. That the bombs of the first attack did considerable damage to the U.S.S. PANAY, disabling the forward three inch gun, seriously injuring the Captain and others, wrecking the pilot house and sick bay, disabling the radio equipment and the steaming fireroom so that all power was lost, and causing leaks in the hull which resulted in the ship settling down by the head and listing to starboard thereby contributing fundamentally to the sinking of the ship.

14. That immediately thereafter a group of six single engined biplanes attacked from ahead, diving singly and appearing to concentrate on the U.S.S. PANAY. A total of about twenty bombs were dropped, many striking close aboard and creating, by fragments and concussion, great damage to ship and personnel. These attacks lasted about twenty minutes during which time at least two of the planes attacked also with machine guns; one machine gun attack was directed against a ship's boat bearing wounded ashore, causing several further wounds and piercing the boat with bullets.

15. That during the entire attack the weather was clear with high visibility and little if any wind.

16. That the planes participating in the attacks on the U.S.S. PANAY and its convoy were unmistakably identified by their markings as being Japanese.

17. That immediately after the first bomb struck, air defense stations were manned; the thirty caliber machine gun battery opened fire and engaged the attacking planes throughout the remainder of the attack. The three inch battery was not manned, nor were any three inch shells fired at any time. This was in accordance with the ship's air defense bill.

18. That during the bombing many were injured by flying fragments and concussion and all suffered shock on the first bomb. The Captain suffered a broken hip and severe shock; soon thereafter Lieutenant Anders, executive officer, was wounded by fragments in throat and hand, losing power of speech; Lt. (J.G.) Geist, engineer officer, received fragments in the leg.

Ensign Biverson had clothing blown off and was severely shocked. This includes all the line officers of the ship. The Captain being disabled, the executive officer carried on his duties, giving orders in writing. He issued instructions to secure confidential publications, to get underway, and to beach the ship. Extensive damage prevented getting underway.

19. That at about 1400, believing it impossible to save the ship and considering the number of wounded and the length of time necessary to transfer them ashore in two small boats, the Captain ordered the ship to be abandoned. This was completed by about 1500. By this time the main deck was awash and the PANAY appeared to be sinking.

20. That all severely wounded were transferred ashore in the first trips. The Captain protected in his own case. The executive officer, when no longer able to carry on his wounds, left the ship on the next to the last trip and Ensign Biverson remained until the last trip.

21. That after the PANAY had been abandoned, Mahlmann, Chief boatswain's mate, and Weimers, machinist's mate first class, returned to the PANAY in one of the ship's boats to obtain stores and medical supplies. While they were returning to the beach a Japanese power boat filled with armed Japanese soldiers approached close to the PANAY, opened fire with a machine gun, went alongside, boarded, and left within five minutes.

22. That at 1554 the U.S.S. PANAY, shortly after the Japanese boarding party had left, rolled over to starboard and sank in from seven to ten fathoms of water, approximate latitude 30-44-30 North, longitude 117-27 East. Practically no valuable government property was salvaged.

23. That after the PANAY survivors had reached the left bank of the river, the Captain, in view of his own injuries and the injuries and shock sustained by his remaining line officers, and the general feeling that attempts would be made to exterminate the survivors, requested Captain W.M. Roberts, U.S. Army, who was not injured, and who was familiar with land operations and the Chinese language, to act under his direction as his immediate representative. Captain Roberts functioned in this capacity until the return of the party on board the U.S.S. CAHU on December 15, 1937, performing outstanding service.

24. That Messrs. Atcheson and Paxton of the U.S. Embassy staff rendered highly valuable services on shore where their knowledge of the country and language, coupled with their resourcefulness and sound advice, contributed largely to the safety of the party.

25. That after some fifty hours ashore, during which time the entire party suffered much hardship and exposure, somewhat mitigated by the kindly assistance of the Chinese, they returned and boarded the U.S.S. CAHU and H.M.S. LADYBIRD.

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26. That from the beginning of an unprovoked and unlooked for attack of great violence until their final return, the ship's company and passengers of the U.S.S. *RAMAY* were subjected to grave danger and continuous hardship. Their service under these conditions was in keeping with the best traditions of the Naval Service.

27. That among the *RAMAY* passengers, 6. Genaro Sordani died of his injuries at 1330 December 13, 1937, and Messrs. J. Earl Paxton, Emile Cassie, and Roy Squires were wounded.

28. That early in the bombing attacks the Standard Oil vessels got underway. The *KEIPING* and *MEHSIA* accored to a pontoon at the Kaiyuan wharf, the *MEHSIA* was disabled and beached further down river on the left bank. All these ships received injuries during the first phases of the bombing. Several fires on the *KEIPING* were extinguished by the *RAMAY* visiting party of eight men who were unable to return to their ship.

29. That after attacks on the *RAMAY* had ceased, the *KEIPING* and *MEHSIA* were further attacked by Japanese bombing planes, set on fire and destroyed. Just previous to this bombing Japanese army units on shore near the wharf attempted to avert this bombing by waving Japanese flags. They were not successful and received several casualties. It is known that Captain Carlson of the *KEIPING* was killed and that Messrs Marshall, Vines, and Pickering were wounded. Casualties among the Chinese crews of these vessels were numerous but cannot be fully determined.

30. That the following members of the *RAMAY* crew landed on shore from the *KEIPING* after vainly attempting to extinguish oil and gasoline fires on board; V.P. Packett, Chief machinist's mate; J.A. Granes, gunner's mate first class; J.A. Dirnhoffer, seaman first class; T.A. Coleman, Chief pharmacist's mate; J.A. Bokoski, gunner's mate third class; R.L. Browning, electrician's mate third class, J.L. Hodge, fireman first class, and W.T. Hoyle, machinist's mate second class. These men encountered Japanese soldiers on shore who were not hostile on learning they were Americans.



31. That all of the *RAMAY* crew from the *KEIPING*, except J.L. Hodge, fireman first class, remained in one group ashore until the following day when they were rescued by H.M.S. *BEE*. Hodge made his way to Wuhu and returned to Shanghai via Japanese naval plane on December 14, 1937.

32. That in searching for and rescuing the survivors, Rear Admiral Holt, R.N., and the officers and men of H.M.S. *BEE* and H.M.S. *LADYBIRD* rendered most valuable assistance under trying and difficult conditions thereby showing a fine spirit of helpfulness and cooperation.

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訂正理由	撮影ミスの為
訂正箇所	直前の / コマ取消
	/ コマ再撮影
訂正年月日	平成 18 年 11 月 16 日
このフィルムは、上記の理由で取消又は再撮影し訂正しました。	
撮影者	塩崎伸一郎  印
受託責任者	神奈川県南足柄市中沼210番地 富士写真フイルム株式会社  印 代表取締役 森重隆

26. That from the beginning of an unprovoked and unprovoked and unprovoked for attack of great violence until their final return, the ship's company and passengers of the U.S.S. MAIL were subjected to grave danger and continuous hardship. Their conduct under these conditions was in keeping with the best traditions of the Naval Service.

27. That among the MAIL passengers, 6. Castro Sarda died of his injuries at 1800 December 13, 1937, and Messrs. J. Ella Paxton, Emily Cassie, and Roy Soules were wounded.

28. That during the landing attacks the Standard Oil vessels got underway. The KEIPING and MEIHSIA anchored to a pontoon at the Kaiyuan wharf, the MAIL was beached and beached further down river on the left bank. All these ships received injuries during the first phases of the bombing. Several lines on the KEIPING were extinguished by the PANAY visiting party of eight men who were unable to return to their ship.

29. That after attacks on the MAIL had ceased, the KEIPING and MEIHSIA were further attacked by Japanese bombing planes, set on fire and destroyed. Just previous to this bombing Japanese army units on shore near the wharf attempted to avert this bombing by waving Japanese flags. They were not successful and received several casualties. It is known that Captain Carlson of the MAIL was killed and that Messrs Marshall, Vines, and Pickering were wounded. Casualties among the Chinese crews of these vessels were numerous but cannot be fully determined.

30. That the following members of the PANAY crew landed on shore from the KEIPING after vainly attempting to extinguish oil and gasoline fires on board: W.F. Puckett, Chief machinist's mate; J.A. Granes, gunner's mate first class; J.A. Dirnhoffer, seaman first class; T.A. Coleman, Chief pharmacist's mate; J.A. Bonkoski, gunner's mate third class; R.L. Browning, electrician's mate third class, J.L. Hodge, fireman first class, and W.F. Hoyle, machinist's mate second class. These men encountered Japanese soldiers on shore who were not hostile on learning they were Americans.

31. That all of the PANAY crew from the KEIPING, except J.L. Hodge, fireman first class, remained in one group ashore until the following day when they were rescued by H.M.S. BEE. Hodge made his way to Wuhu and returned to Shanghai via Japanese naval plane on December 14, 1937.

32. That in searching for and rescuing the survivors, Rear Admiral Holt, R.N., and the officers and men of H.M.S. BEE and H.M.S. LADYBIRD rendered most valuable assistance under trying and difficult conditions thereby showing a fine spirit of helpfulness and cooperation.

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33. That Charles L. Esslinger, storeroom first class, died at 1330 December 13, 1937, at Holsien, China, from wounds received during the bombing of the U.S.S. PANAY and that his death occurred in line of duty not the result of his own misconduct.

34. That Edgar G. Falsebus, coxswain, died at 0630 December 19, 1937, at Shanghai, China, from wounds received during the bombing of the U.S.S. PANAY and that his death occurred in line of duty not the result of his own misconduct.

35. That Lt. Commander James J. Hughes; Lieutenant Arthur F. Anders; Lieutenant (J.G.) John W. Gale; John H. Lang, chief quartermaster; Robert P. Feyer, fireman first class; Kenneth J. Rice, electrician's mate third class; Jack E. Sisk, electrician's mate first class; Charles S. Schroyer, seaman first class; Alex Kozak, machinist's mate second class; Percy D. Sicker, ship's cook third class, and Newton L. Davis, fireman first class, were seriously injured in line of duty not the result of their own misconduct.

36. That Lieutenant Clark G. Grazier, Medical Corps; Ensign Denis E. Bivorse; Charles S. Adams, radioman second class; Tony Barba, ship's cook third class; John A. Bonkoski, gunner's mate third class; Ernest G. Branch, fireman first class; Raymond L. Browning, electrician's mate third class; Walter Cheatham, coxswain; Thomas A. Coleman, Chief pharmacist's mate; John A. Dirnhoffer, seaman first class; Iuan F. Erh, mess attendant first class; Fred G. Fichtenmayer, carpenter's mate first class; Emery F. Fisher, chief watertender; Michael Gerant, machinist's mate second class; Cecil B. Green, seaman first class; John L. Hodge, fireman first class; Won E. Huffman, watertender second class; Karl F. Johnson, machinist's mate second class; Carl H. Kerste, coxswain; Peter V. Klumpers, Chief machinist's mate; William P. Lander, seaman first class; Ernest R. Muhlmann, Chief boatswain's mate; William A. McCabe, fireman first class; Stanley M. McEwen, seaman first class; James E. Peck, quartermaster second class; Reginald Peterson, radioman second class; Vernon F. Puckett, Chief machinist's mate; King F. Sung, mess attendant first class; Harry B. Tuck, seaman first class; Cleo E. Waxler, boatswain's mate second class; John T. Weber, yeoman first class, and Far L. Wong, mess attendant first class, were slightly injured in line of duty not the result of their own misconduct.

37. That the log book, commanding officer's night order book, the last chart by which the ship was navigated, pay accounts, service records, muster roll, public monies, and public vouchers were not salvaged. All the health records were preserved and turned over to proper authority by the medical officer, U.S.S. PANAY.

38. That certain secret and confidential publications remained on board in the confidential safe when the ship was abandoned.

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Extracts from

The Inevitability of Renovation

by FASHIMOTO, Kingoro

"The unit which I was in was scheduled to attack NANKING by marching through WUHU and up the YANGTZE River. But two days before the fall of NANKING, we unexpectedly received an order to attack all the Chinese soldiers retreating from NANKING toward the north on board transport ships. We instantly went back to WUHU and laid out a battery of more than one ri (TH, about 4 km.) wide, arranging heavy guns, field guns and machine guns along the road running alongside the river. Just at that time several ships which seemed to be transports full of defeated soldiers came in sight some several thousand metres downstream from WUHU and we opened fire at them.

"I heard that a British warship happened to be in the group and was hit by some of our shells, and that it became a problem later on, but as for the Imperial Army, we merely carried out the proper measures." (p. 13 - 14)

"At that time, an interesting thing happened. After the shelling of the British warship and immediately following the fall of NANKING, a Japanese destroyer came up the river and appeared in front of WUHU. I at once requested the ship to stop and the captain of the ship, a certain Lieutenant-commander, came by launch and landed to see us. We exchanged various informations. After this, I said to the Lieutenant-commander, 'Frankly, we are quite distressed because we have had nothing to eat or drink. I wonder if you can spare us some rice and sake, if you have any?' He readily accepted and answered that he would have his men bring them over.

"This is it', we said, and waited expectantly. Soon after, the marines brought the rice, but told us that they had no sake. The messenger for the captain said, 'We really had sake with us, but on the way from NANKING, we sank all the innumerable Chinese junks that were floating around full of enemy soldiers. When we thought of all those enemy soldiers becoming food for the catfish in the YANGTZE River, it delighted us so much that we couldn't help drinking up all the sake in celebration of our victory. We feel very sorry that we can't spare you any'. 'O. K.'

"At that time, even British warships could not pass off WUHU without being fired at and naturally the Chinese transports were not able to go beyond WUHU. The opposite bank was already captured by the Japanese troops. Therefore, the defeated soldiers of NANKING that jumped into the ships could flee neither up nor down the river. As if a big snake had swallowed an elephant, the enemy ships were helplessly cornered on the waters between NANKING and WUHU, unable to move either way. To think that our destroyers really blasted away at those junks made us very happy for it must have been quite effective and delightful." (p. 14 - 15)

"The first important point in the new system is to make a grand revelation of our national polity. That is, it is necessary to have politics, economics, culture, national defense, and everything else, all focused on one, the Emperor,

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and the whole force of the nation concentrated and displayed from a single point. Especially, the political, economic, and cultural lines which had been organized and conducted by liberalism and socialism in the past should be reorganized according to the principle of oneness in the Imperial Way (TM, KODO ITAI SHUGI).

"This system is the strongest and the grandest of all, and, at the same time, is that which will determine the future trend of our nation for a thousand years to come. There are many countries in the world, but there is absolutely no nation that can compare with our national blood solidarity which makes possible a unification like ours with the Emperor in the center.

"In this sense, this system will not only make the development of our principle of the 'Whole World Under One Roof' (TM, HAKKO ICHIU) a success under the present world chaos, but will turn the crisis into a divine opportunity and enable our nation to grasp the reins to lead the world in a new world order. The CHINA Incident may well be called the opening battle for the construction of a new world order.

"Therefore, the new system reveals the characteristic ideal of our race at this critical moment, and at the same time, it is only the new system that can open a clear path for the revelation of the principle of the 'Whole World Under One Roof' (TM, HAKKO ICHIU) and lead the world from its mad confusion. So, this is something more than merely an intention. If it is that which is necessary to a policy, the new system will be unnecessary when circumstances which necessitated the policy disappear. For example, assume that we compromise with AMERICA and BRITAIN, then, the new system will not always be necessary. The new system aims at the establishment of a new world order, organizing a characteristic national system and whatever circumstances may develop to lead these circumstances as according to the principle of HAKKO ICHIU (TM, Whole World Under One Roof), enveloping the whole world in the principle of the Imperial Way, and, at the same time, completely solving the present crisis."
(p. 52 - 53)

"The very conclusion that the CHINA Incident cannot be settled unless we cooperate with the Americans and British, prevents the incident from ever being settled. The moment we establish a policy to drive out all Anglo-Americans from CHINA, CHINA will begin to move toward a new order. The European situation will also change immediately when we make up our minds to form a joint front with GERMANY and ITALY. If we hope in vain that GERMANY and BRITAIN would fight forever, the European War may end earlier than we expect. Only when we rid ourselves of this idea that we have to depend on BRITAIN and AMERICA, and establish the plan to construct a self-supporting economy in the JAPAN-MANCHURIA-CHINA bloc, can we materialize an expansion plan of our armament, production power, independent of BRITAIN and AMERICA. Has the government studied or formed any plans for conceiving an economic plan with the intention of freeing itself from a pro Anglo-American policy? We'll lose GREAT BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, but MANCHURIA, CHINA and the SOUTH SEAS will become ours.

"Of course, it will require a good deal of effort to establish this bloc, and it cannot be mentioned in the same breath with the easy pro Anglo-American policy, but when we face it with the resolution of the soldiers out on the front,

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the more difficult things will be, the results will be the real blood and flesh. Instead of relying on foreign sources for materials, to have one's own through toil and hardships should be the nation's attitude.

"Only when we firmly do believe that allying with GERMANY and ITALY, and expelling British and American influences from CHINA, and settling the Incident with definite measures and plans, are the steps our nation should take, will the various administrative plans for the country be formed, the goal of the people determined, and the people, defying all hardships, earnestly strive for the settlement of the Incident with a burning hope for the future. Is it that the government is not endeavoring toward the materialization of this plan because they are selfishly concluding that such a thing is purely an ideal of no practical value? The time is when we must choose between maintenance or destruction of the present status quo. Compromise is not allowed. To Premier YONAI, we ask the government's decision concerning these matters." (p. 73 - 74)

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REPLY OF THE MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE
BRITISH AMBASSADOR.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur:

September 21st, 1937.

With reference to the incident of the wounding of His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to China, Sir Hughe Knatchbull-Hugesser, concerning which I made an interim reply in my Note under the date of September 6th, 1937, I now have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the inquiry in Shanghai and its vicinity having been completed the Japanese Government desire to make the following reply:

2. As the result of most careful investigations it has been established that on August

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26th at 2.35 p.m., two Japanese planes machine-gunned and bombed two motor-cars which were believed, in all sincerity, to be military busses or trucks carrying officers or soldiers of the Chinese army at a point three kilometres southeast of Katang, where the Chinese forces were concentrated and since August 18th, not only had Japanese aeroplanes made repeated attacks upon them but a number of aerial combats between the Japanese and Chinese planes had taken place.

3. Owing to the difficulty, in present circumstances, of conducting an investigation on the spot, there has been some slight discrepancy in the various reports received as to the position of the Ambassador's motor-car at the time when he was wounded, but it was ascertained that no Japanese aeroplane had made a machine-gun attack or dropped a bomb in the locality where the Ambassador was first reported to have been wounded.

However, careful study made simultaneously by the Japanese and British authorities leads to the conclusion that the position of the motor-car in question might have been to the southward of Katang, instead of 6 miles south of Taitsang as stated in an earlier British report.

4. In the light of all these circumstances, the Japanese Government consider that the incident may have been caused by Japanese planes which mistook the Ambassador's motor-car as a military bus or truck. As the wounding of the Ambassador may thus have been

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due to the action, however involuntary, of Japanese aircraft, the Japanese Government desire to convey to His Britannic Majesty's Government a formal expression of their deep regret.

5. As regards the question of the punishment of the aviator concerned, it is needless to say that the Japanese Government would take suitable steps whenever it was established that Japanese aviators killed or wounded, intentionally or through negligence nationals belonging to a third country.

6. As stated in their interim note of September 6th, instructions have been sent again to the Japanese forces in China to exercise the greatest care in safeguarding non-combatants, it being the desire and policy of the Japanese Government to limit, as far as this can possibly be done, the dangers to non-combatants resulting from the existence of hostilities in China.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency

The Right Honourable Sir Robert L. Craigie, K.C.M.G.,
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador to Japan.

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