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# 極東国際軍事裁判速記録

(英文)

第49,000頁から

第49,496頁まで

昭和23年11月9日から

昭和23年11月10日まで

国立公文書館

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分類 法務省

平成11年

排架番号 4 A

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法務大臣官房司法法制調査部

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1969



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審理 段階	判決 (事 実 認 定) (日 中 係 争) (日 中 係 争) (日 中 係 争)		
年月日	午 前	午 後	
23-11-9	49.092~49.188	49.189~49.286	
10	49.287~49.395	49.396~49.496	
備 考	1. 内容の索引については、各日速記 録冒頭の Index を参照されたい。 2. 証拠資料(却下資料等を含む。) の索引については、「極東国際軍事 裁判記録目録」の英文速記録頁欄を 参照されたい。		

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0 Higashi 23. 11. 9



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30

1 Tuesday, 9 November 1948  
2  
3

4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.  
11

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, all members sitting.

14 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

15 For the Defense Section, same as before.  
16

17 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
18 to English interpretation was made by the  
19 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.

3 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
4 except SHIRATORI and UMEZU, who are represented by  
5 counsel. The Sugamo Prison Surgeon certifies they are  
6 ill and unable to attend the trial today. The certifi-  
7 cates will be recorded and filed.

8 I continue the reading of the Judgment:

9 SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL

10 According to ARAKI, General Honjo conceived the  
11 idea of having the Governors of the Provinces organize  
12 a "Supreme Administrative Council" to make recommend-  
13 ations for the organization of the new State in Manchuria.  
14 He forwarded his plan to ARAKI and requested permission  
15 to set up a new state for the government of Manchuria  
16 with Henry Fu Yi as its head. During his interrogation  
17 at Sugamo Prison, ARAKI admitted that, since he had no  
18 better suggestion, and thought the General's plan would  
19 solve the "Manchurian Problem", he had approved the  
20 plan. ARAKI then sent additional experts into Manchuria  
21 to assist the Self-Government Guiding Board in carrying  
22 out General Honjo's plan.  
23

24 General Ma having reached an agreement with  
25 DOHIMARA, the Self-Government Guiding Board called a



1 meeting of the Governors of the Three Eastern Provinces  
2 and the Special District to meet at Mukden on 16 February  
3 1932 for the announced purpose of "laying the foundation"  
4 for the new state. The meeting was attended in person  
5 by General Ma, as Governor of Heilungkiang; General  
6 Chang Ching-hui as Governor of the Special District;  
7 General Hsi Hsia, as Governor of Kirin; and General  
8 Tsang Shihyi, as Governor of Liaoning; but General Tang  
9 Ju-lin, the Governor of Jehol, was not present. The  
10 legal advisor for the meeting was Dr. Chao Hsin-po,  
11 the Tokyo University trained Doctor of Laws, who had  
12 relieved Colonel DOMIHARA as Mayor of Mukden.

13 These five men decided that a new state should  
14 be established, that a North-Eastern Supreme Administr-  
15 ative Council should be organized which would exercise  
16 temporarily the supreme authority over the Provinces  
17 and the Special District, and that this Supreme Council  
18 should without delay make all necessary preparations  
19 for the founding of the new state.

20 On the second day of the Conference, the  
21 Supreme Administrative Council was duly organized, to  
22 consist of seven members, namely: the Governors of  
23 Heilungkiang, Kirin, Liaoning, Jehol and the Special  
24 District, and the two Mongol Chiefs who had joined the  
25 Conference on the morning of the second day. The new

1 Supreme Council immediately proceeded to business and  
2 decided: (1) to adopt the Republican system for the  
3 new state; (2) to respect the autonomy of the constitut-  
4 ing provinces; (3) to give the title of "Regent" to the  
5 Chief Executive; and (4) to issue a Declaration of  
6 Independence. That night, General Honjo gave an  
7 official dinner in honor of the "Heads of the New State".  
8 He congratulated them on their success and assured them  
9 of his assistance in case of need.

10 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

11 The next morning after General Honjo's dinner  
12 party, that is to say, on 18 February 1932, the Declar-  
13 ation of Independence of Manchuria was published by the  
14 Supreme Administrative Council. Dr. Okawa in his book,  
15 "2600 Years of Japanese History", published in 1939,  
16 in commenting on this declaration, has this to say:  
17 "The Chang Hsueh-liang Regime was swept completely  
18 away from Manchuria in one swoop through the quick and  
19 daring action of the Japanese troops." The Tribunal  
20 finds upon the evidence that there was no popular  
21 movement in Manchuria for the establishment of any  
22 independent government. This movement was sponsored and  
23 inspired by the Kwantung Army and its creature, the Self-  
24 Government Guiding Board, with its Japanese Advisors.  
25

ORGANIZATION OF THE NEW STATE

1           The Declaration of Independence having been  
2 issued, Governors Ma and Hsi Hsia returned to their  
3 Provincial Capitals, but they designated representatives  
4 to meet with Governor Tsang Shih-yi, Governor Chang  
5 Ching-hui and Mayor Chao Hsin-Po for the purpose of  
6 working out the details of the plan for the new State.  
7 On 19 February 1932, this group decided that the form  
8 of the new government should be that of a Republic with  
9 a constitution drawn on the principle of the separation  
10 of powers. The group then agreed upon Changchun as the  
11 Capital of the new State, fixed the design of the new  
12 national flag, and agreed that Pu Yi should be asked to  
13 act as "Regent" of the new State.  
14

15           The Self-Government Guidance Board immediately  
16 began holding mass-meetings and demonstrations in the  
17 Provinces at which the Kwantung Army paraded its might  
18 and fired artillery salutes to impress the Manchurians  
19 with the power of Japan. After the proper foundation  
20 had been laid by these demonstrations, the Board took  
21 the lead in convening an All-Manchurian Convention,  
22 which was held in Mukden on 29 February 1932. At this  
23 Convention, speeches were delivered; a declaration  
24 denouncing the previous regime of General Chang Hsueh-  
25 liang was unanimously adopted; and resolutions welcoming

1 the new state with Pu Yi as its Chief Executive were  
2 approved.

3 The Supreme Administrative Council met immedi-  
4 ately in urgent session and elected six delegates to  
5 proceed to Port Arthur to convey their invitation to  
6 Pu Yi to head the new government. Pu Yi did not respond  
7 to the first invitation from the Supreme Administrative  
8 Council, so a second delegation was appointed on 4 March  
9 1932 to induce Pu Yi to accept. Upon the advice of  
10 Colonel ITAGAKI, Pu Yi accepted the second invitation.  
11 After an audience with the Delegates on 5 March, Pu Yi  
12 left Port Arthur on the 6th for Tangkang-tze, and after  
13 two days, began, on the 8th, to receive homage as the  
14 "Regent of Manchukuo". Inauguration ceremonies were  
15 held at the new capital, Changchun, on 9 March 1932.  
16 Pu Yi declared the policy of the new state to be founded  
17 upon morality, benevolence and love. The next day he  
18 appointed the list of principle officials suggested by  
19 the Japanese.

20  
21 Prior to the arrival of Pu Yi, a number of laws  
22 and regulations, on which Dr. Chao Hsin-Po had been  
23 working for some time, had been made ready for adoption  
24 and promulgation. They came into effect on 9 March 1932  
25 simultaneously with the law regulating the organization  
of the Government of Manchukuo.



Public announcement of the new State of Manchukuo  
1 was made on 12 March 1932 in a telegram to the foreign  
2 Powers, requesting that they recognize the new State.  
3 Dr. Okawa stated that Manchukuo was a result of the  
4 plan of the Kwantung Army approved by the Japanese  
5 Government, and the establishment of the State progressed  
6 smoothly, because it had been well planned and prepared  
7 beforehand. Pu Yi says that Manchukuo was under the  
8 complete domination of Japan from the beginning.  
9

10 JAPANESE CABINET APPROVED FAIT ACCOMPLI

11 ARAKI was right when he said that the Honjo  
12 plan was approved by the Cabinet; but it was not so  
13 approved until 12 March 1932, after the plan had been  
14 executed and after the new state of Manchukuo had come  
15 into existence. It was on 12 March 1932, the day that  
16 the telegram announcing the formation of Manchukuo to  
17 the foreign Powers was sent out, that the Cabinet met  
18 and decided upon an "Outline for the Disposition of  
19 Foreign Relations Accompanying the Establishment of  
20 the New State of Manchukuo". It was decided to render  
21 "all sorts of aid" to the new State short of recognition  
22 under international law, and "lead her to fulfill the  
23 substantial conditions for an independent State step by  
24 step" in the hope that the Powers would ultimately  
25

1 recognize her independence. To avoid intervention of the  
2 Signatory Powers of the Nine-Power Pact (Annex No. B-10)  
3 it was thought best to have Manchukuo declare a policy  
4 consistent with the policy of the "Open Door" and in  
5 harmony with the principle of equal opportunity guaranteed  
6 by the Treaty. The Cabinet also decided that Manchukuo  
7 should seize the custom houses and salt-tax collecting  
8 organs; but that this should be done in such a way as  
9 not to "bring about trouble in foreign relations". One  
10 method agreed upon for doing this was to bribe the customs  
11 officials and replace them with Japanese. It was planned  
12 to seize military power in Manchukuo under the guise of  
13 subjugating banditry in line with the reservation made  
14 at Geneva. In short, the Cabinet fully realized that  
15 the occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of an  
16 independent state there by Japan was a direct violation  
17 of existing treaty obligations; and it was trying to  
18 evolve a plan whereby the reality of the breach could  
19 be concealed by an appearance of compliance with the  
20 obligations.  
21

22 THE LYTTON COMMISSION ARRIVED IN TOKYO

23 On the day that the All-Manchurian Convention  
24 was being held in Mukden, that is to say, on 29 February  
25 1932, the Lytton Commission arrived in Tokyo, where they

1 were received by the Emperor and commenced a series of  
2 daily conferences with the Government, including Premier  
3 Inukai, War Minister ARAKI, and others. Although these  
4 daily conferences continued for eight days, none of  
5 these government officials informed the Commission  
6 that Japan was forming a new State in Manchuria; and  
7 the Commission first learned of this after it had left  
8 Tokyo and arrived at Kyoto on its way to China.

9 On the day that the Commission arrived in Tokyo,  
10 KOISO was elevated by ARAKI from Chief of the Military  
11 Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry to the high position  
12 of Vice-Minister of War.

13 ARAKI DISPATCHED REINFORCEMENTS TO SHANGHAI.

14 The battle which had started at Shanghai on  
15 28 January 1932 had developed to such an extent that  
16 the Navy Minister was forced to call upon War Minister  
17 ARAKI for reinforcements. The Chinese 19th Route Army  
18 was giving a good account of its fighting ability.  
19 Large numbers of Japanese destroyers were anchored in  
20 the Hwangpu and Japanese airplanes were bombing Chapel.  
21 The Japanese Marines were using their permanent garrison  
22 in Hungkow as a base of operations; and barricades  
23 erected between this garrison and Chapel served as the  
24 front line between the ground forces. The Japanese  
25 destroyers, firing point blank, bombarded the forts at

1 Wu-sung; this fire was not returned by the forts, for  
2 they had no guns capable of answering. The Japanese  
3 Marines had invaded areas adjacent to the International  
4 Settlement, disarmed the police and paralysed all city  
5 functions; a veritable reign of terror was in full swing  
6 when the Navy Minister requested these reinforcements.  
7 ARAKI states that he conferred with the Cabinet and  
8 it was decided to send supporting forces quickly;  
9 10,000 men were dispatched the following day aboard  
10 fast destroyers. These reinforcements landed in the  
11 International Settlement fully equipped with tanks and  
12 artillery. The Navy drew up heavy ships and began  
13 shelling the city. However, this attack, which began  
14 on 20 February 1932, brought no marked success despite  
15 the fact that it continued for several days. Following  
16 this attack, ARAKI, claiming that General Ueda had  
17 suffered such great losses that it was necessary to  
18 send further reinforcements, sent the 11th and 14th  
19 Divisions to oppose the Chinese Army which had been  
20 defending the city.

#### 21 THE LEAGUE TOOK ACTION

22 The League of Nations was aroused to action.  
23 The members of the Council, other than China and Japan,  
24 addressed an urgent appeal to the Japanese Government  
25 on 19 February 1932 calling attention to Article 10 of



1 the Covenant (Annex No. B-6); and the Assembly was  
2 convened to meet on 3 March 1932.

3 The American Secretary of State advised the  
4 American Consul-General at Shanghai that the Secretary's  
5 letter to Senator Borah on the China situation was being  
6 released to the Press. In this letter the Secretary  
7 stated that the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10)  
8 formed the legal basis upon which the "Open Door Policy"  
9 rested. He set forth a long history of the Treaty. He  
10 commented that the Treaty represented a carefully  
11 matured international policy designed to assure to all  
12 parties their rights in China and to assure the Chinese  
13 the fullest opportunity to develop their independence  
14 and sovereignty. He recalled that Lord Balfour, Chair-  
15 man of the British Delegation, had stated that he under-  
16 stood that there was no representative present at the  
17 signing of the Treaty who thought that spheres of interest  
18 were advocated or would be tolerated. The Pact of Paris  
19 (Annex No. B-15) was intended to reinforce the Nine-  
20 Power Treaty. The two Treaties were interdependent,  
21 he said, and were intended to align world conscience and  
22 public opinion in favor of a system of orderly develop-  
23 ment through international law, including the settlement  
24 of all controversies by peaceful means instead of  
25 arbitrary force. He said that in the past the

1 United States had rested its policy upon the abiding  
2 faith in the future of China and upon ultimate success  
3 in dealing with China upon principles of fair play,  
4 patience and mutual good will.

5 The British Admiral, Sir Howard Kelly, as one  
6 of the many attempts to secure a cessation of hostil-  
7 ities at Shanghai through the good offices of friendly  
8 Powers, held a conference on board his flagship on  
9 28 February 1932. An agreement on the basis of mutual  
10 and simultaneous withdrawal was proposed; but the  
11 conference was unsuccessful, owing to the differing  
12 opinions of the parties. As though in resentment of  
13 this interference, the Japanese troops occupied the  
14 western part of Kiangwan, which had been evacuated by  
15 the Chinese, and the Wu-sung forts and fortifications  
16 along the Yangtze were again bombed from the air and  
17 shelled from the sea, as bombing-planes operated over  
18 the whole front including the Hanking Railway and the  
19 airfield at Hungjao.  
20

21 Before the Assembly of the League could meet,  
22 the Council proposed a roundtable conference on  
23 29 February to make local arrangements for a cessation  
24 of hostilities at Shanghai; both parties agreed to this  
25 conference, but it was not successful because of the  
conditions imposed by the Japanese.

1 General Shirakawa, who had been appointed to  
2 the Japanese supreme command arrived with reinforce-  
3 ments on 29 February. His first order directed the  
4 bombing of the airfield at Hangchow, which was approx-  
5 imately 100 miles away. General Shirakawa gained ground  
6 slowly as a result of heavy naval bombardment; and  
7 after a flank attack on 1 March, he was able to drive  
8 the Chinese beyond the 20 kilometer limit originally  
9 demanded by the Japanese as terms for cessation of the  
10 hostilities.

11 This "face-saving" success permitted the  
12 Japanese to accept the request of the Assembly of  
13 the League of 4 March 1932 calling upon both Governments  
14 to make a cessation of hostilities and recommending  
15 negotiations for conclusion of the hostilities and the  
16 withdrawal of Japanese troops. The opposing commanders  
17 issued appropriate orders and the fighting ceased;  
18 negotiations began on 10 March 1932.

19 The Assembly continued its investigation of  
20 the dispute; and on 11 March 1932, it adopted a resolu-  
21 tion to the effect that the provisions of the Covenant  
22 (Annex B-6) were applicable to the dispute, especially  
23 the provisions that treaties should be scrupulously  
24 respected, that members should respect and preserve  
25 the territorial integrity and political independence

1 of all the members of the League against external  
2 aggression, and that the members were obligated to  
3 submit all disputes between them to procedures for  
4 peaceful settlement. The Assembly affirmed that it  
5 was contrary to the spirit of the Covenant that the  
6 dispute should be settled under stress of military  
7 pressure, affirmed the resolutions of the Council of  
8 30 September and 10 December 1931, as well as its own  
9 resolution of 4 March 1932, and proceeded to set up a  
10 "Committee of Nineteen" to settle the dispute at Shanghai.

11 Contrary to their obligation, the Japanese  
12 took advantage of the truce to bring up reinforcements,  
13 which were landed at Shanghai on 7 and 17 March 1932.  
14 It was not until 5 May 1932 that a complete agreement  
15 was ready for signature. SHIGEMITSU signed for the  
16 Japanese. The fighting at Shanghai had been character-  
17 ized by extreme cruelty on the part of the Japanese.  
18 The needless bombing of Chapel, the ruthless bombard-  
19 ment by naval vessels, and the massacre of the helpless  
20 Chinese farmers whose bodies were later found with  
21 their hands tied behind their backs, are examples of  
22 the method of warfare waged at Shanghai.  
23  
24  
25



This Incident furnishes another example of  
1 the Japanese determination to use military force against  
2 the Chinese and to impress the Chinese with the might  
3 of Japan, using any pretext for the purpose. The ostensible  
4 reason for the use of force in this case was  
5 the request from some Japanese residents of Shanghai  
6 for protection. The Tribunal has no hesitation in  
7 coming to the conclusion that the force used was out  
8 of all proportion to the existing danger to Japanese  
9 Nationals and property.  
10

11 There is no doubt that at the time feeling  
12 was running high and the Chinese boycott of Japanese  
13 goods induced at least in part by Japanese action in  
14 Manchuria, was being felt. In the light of all the  
15 facts the Tribunal is of the opinion that the real  
16 purpose of the Japanese attack was to alarm the Chinese  
17 by indication of what would follow if their attitude  
18 toward Japan continued, and thus break down resistance  
19 to future operations. The Incident was a part of the  
20 general plan.  
21

22 MANCHUKUO WAS CONSTRUCTED AND OPERATED AS A PUPPET

23 Manchukuo was definitely a totalitarian State,  
24 because of the power vested in the Regent; and those  
25 who controlled the Regent controlled the State. Ordinance No. 1, which was promulgated on 9 March 1932,

prescribed the organic law for Manchukuo. In formal  
1 expression, the position was as follows: the govern-  
2 mental power was divided into four divisions: the  
3 Executive, the Legislative, the Judicial and the  
4 Supervisory: the Regent as the Chief Executive was  
5 the head of the State; all executive power as well as  
6 the power to override the Legislative Council was  
7 vested in him: the functions of the Executive Depart-  
8 ment were performed, under the direction of the Regent,  
9 by the Premier and the Minister of State, who formed  
10 a State Council or Cabinet: the Premier supervised  
11 the work of the Ministries through the powerful Gen-  
12 eral Affairs Board, which had direct charge of their  
13 confidential matters, personnel, accounting and supplies;  
14 subordinate to the State Council were various bureaux,  
15 such as the Legislative Bureau; but, following the  
16 Japanese Constitution, the Regent had authority, when  
17 the Legislative Bureau was not in session to promul-  
18 gate ordinances upon advice of his Privy Council;  
19 and the Supervisory Bureau supervised the conduct  
20 of officials and audited their accounts. The Legisla-  
21 tive Council was never organized and legislation was  
22 therefore enacted by ordinance of the Regent.

23 The General Affairs Board, the Legislative  
24 Bureau and the Advisory Bureau in practice by way of  
25

1 contrast to form, constituted a Premier's Office. Upon  
2 establishment of the State, the Self-Government Guiding  
3 Board was abolished and its personnel were transferred  
4 to the Advisory Bureau, which continued the work of  
5 the Board through the Self-Government Committees pre-  
6 viously established in the Provinces and Districts.  
7 The General Affairs Board, more than any other, was  
8 the agency of the Japanese for effective practical  
9 control and domination of every phase of the government  
10 and economy of Manchukuo.

11         The Ministers of State were generally Chinese,  
12 but each Minister had a Vice-Minister, who was Japanese.  
13 There existed a committee in the Government of Manchu-  
14 kuo not provided for in the Constitution which was  
15 known as the "Tuesday Meeting." Each Tuesday there  
16 was a meeting of the various Japanese Vice-Ministers,  
17 presided over by the Japanese Director of the General  
18 Affairs Board, and attended by the Chief of a Section  
19 of the Kwantung Army General Staff. At these meetings  
20 all policies were adopted, all rescripts, ordinances  
21 and other enactments approved; the decisions of the  
22 "Tuesday Meeting" were then passed on to the General  
23 Affairs Board to be officially adopted and promulgated  
24 as an act of the Government of Manchukuo. It was in  
25 this manner that Manchukuo was completely dominated

1 by the Kwantung Army. In a telegram sent by General  
2 Honjo to War Minister ARAKI on 3 April 1932, Honjo  
3 said: "I believe you have no objections that the  
4 execution of our policies regarding the whole of  
5 Manchukuo should, in so far as it involves negotia-  
6 tions with Manchukuo, be left chiefly to the Kwantung  
7 Army. In view of the recent conduct of the Japanese  
8 Government Offices and various other representing or-  
9 gans in Manchukuo, however, I fear that unless we  
10 make it thoroughgoing, confusion might arise." To this  
11 ARAKI replied: "I agree in principle to your opinion  
12 regarding unification in the execution of our Manchurian  
13 policies."

14 At first Japanese "Advisors" were appointed  
15 to advise all the important government officials of  
16 Manchukuo; but shortly after the formation of the  
17 State, these "Advisors" became full government officials  
18 on the same basis as the Chinese. Over 200 Japanese  
19 were holding office in the Central Government alone,  
20 not including those in the War Ministry and Military  
21 Forces, during the month of April 1932 -- one month  
22 after the formation of the State. In most bureaux  
23 there were Japanese advisors, councillors, and secre-  
24 taries. All important posts in the Supervisory Bureau  
25 were held by Japanese. Finally, most of the important



1 officials of the Regency, including the Chief of the  
2 Office of Internal Affairs and the Commander of the  
3 Regent's Bodyguard, were Japanese. Even the Regent  
4 was "supervised" by General Yoshioka, who was appointed  
5 by the Kwantung army for that purpose. In short, as  
6 for the Government and public services, although the  
7 titular heads were usually Chinese, the main political  
8 and administrative power was held by Japanese officials  
9 as advisors, councillors, supervisors, secretaries  
10 and vice-officials.

11 The Japanese Cabinet at a meeting on 11 April  
12 1932 considered methods for "guiding" Manchukuo and  
13 approved the method outlined above. ARAKI was a mem-  
14 ber of the Cabinet as War Minister at that time. The  
15 decision was: "The new State shall employ authorita-  
16 tive advisors from our country and make them the  
17 highest advisors in connection with financial, economic  
18 and general political problems. The new State shall  
19 appoint Japanese nationals to the leading posts in the  
20 Privy Council, the Central Bank, and other organs of  
21 the new State." The Cabinet then listed the offices  
22 of the government of Manchukuo which should be filled  
23 by Japanese. These included the Chief of the General  
24 Affairs Board and the Chief of each of that Board's  
25 sections, Councillors and Chief Secretary of the Privy

Council, and offices in the Revenue, Police, Banking,  
1 Transportation, Justice, Customs, and other Departments.  
2 This measure was found to be necessary so that the  
3 new State would manifest the "very characteristics  
4 that are important factors for the existence of the  
5 Empire in relation to politics, economy, national de-  
6 fense, transportation, communication and many other  
7 fields," and so that "a single self-sufficient economic  
8 unit comprising Japan and Manchukuo will be realized."

10 THE CONCORDIA SOCIETY AND THE "KINGLY WAY"

11 The Concordia Society (Kyo-Wa-Kei) was organ-  
12 ized by a committee composed of ITAGAMI and others in  
13 Mukden during April 1932. The Kwantung Army Commander  
14 was made ex-officio Supreme Advisor of the Society.  
15 The special mission of the Concordia Society was to  
16 spread the spirit and ideology of the State, the  
17 "Kingly Way", and to strengthen Manchukuo so that  
18 she could subserve Japan in her struggle against the  
19 Anglo-Saxon World and the Comintern. The policy of  
20 the Government of Manchukuo was expressed in proclama-  
21 tions issued on 18 February 1932 and 1 March 1932;  
22 it was to rule in accordance with the fundamental  
23 principle of the "Kingly Way". In this manner, the  
24 consolidation of Japan's conquest of Manchuria was  
25 accomplished in the sphere of ideological propaganda.

1 No political party other than the Society was allowed  
2 in Manchuria. The titular head of the Society was the  
3 Prime Minister of Manchukuo; but actually, the leader  
4 was a member of the Kwantung Army General Staff.

5 THE LYTTON COMMISSION VISITED MANCHURIA

6 The Lytton Commission arrived in Manchuria in  
7 April 1932 and began its work of penetrating the veil  
8 of secrecy thrown over the situation by the intima-  
9 tion of the inhabitants and obstruction of the Com-  
10 mittee's efforts by the Kwantung Army and Japanese  
11 officials of Manchukuo. Under the excuse of offering  
12 "protection" to members of the Commission and prospec-  
13 tive witnesses, the Army and the Gendarmes "supervised"  
14 their activities and movements. Pu Yi testified that,  
15 "We were all under the supervision of the Japanese  
16 Military Officers; and wherever Lord Lytton went, he  
17 was under the supervision of Japanese Gendarmes. When  
18 I interviewed Lord Lytton, many of the Kwantung mili-  
19 tary officers were beside me supervising. If I had  
20 told him the truth, I would have been murdered right  
21 after the mission left Manchuria." Pu Yi delivered  
22 to Lord Lytton a statement prepared by Colonel ITAGAKI,  
23 which Pu Yi now declares did not reflect the true  
24 facts. People who spoke Russian or English were care-  
25 fully supervised during the Commission's stay in

Manchuria; some were arrested.

1           The Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army sug-  
2 gested, in a telegram sent to the War Ministry on 4  
3 June 1932, that Japan show her contempt of the Lytton  
4 Commission by taking over the customs during the visit  
5 of the Commission. He said: "It is rather advantag-  
6 eous to take this action during the stay of the League's  
7 Inquiry Commission in order to display the independence  
8 of Manchukuo, and to indicate the firm resolution of  
9 Japan and Manchukuo in respect to the 'Manchurian  
10 Incident.'"

12                           THE ASSASSINATION OF PREMIER INUKAI

13           The opposition of Premier Inukai to the estab-  
14 lishment of Manchukuo as an independent State cost him  
15 his life. The Premier had consistently opposed the  
16 recognition of Manchukuo by Japan, maintaining that  
17 such recognition would be a violation of the sover-  
18 eign rights of China.

19           Within a few days after assuming office as  
20 Premier, Inukai sent a secret emissary by the name of  
21 Kayano to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to arrange  
22 terms of peace. Generalissimo Chiang was highly  
23 satisfied with Kayano's proposals and negotiations were  
24 proceeding satisfactorily when one of Kayano's telegrams  
25 to Premier Inukai was intercepted by the War Ministry.



1 The Secretary of the Cabinet informed Inukai's son  
2 that, "Your father is carrying on negotiations with  
3 Generalissimo Chiang. Concerning this, the War Minis-  
4 try is highly indignant." Although the negotiations  
5 were abandoned, the friction continued between the  
6 Premier and War Minister ARAKI.

7 The conflict between Premier Inukai and the  
8 "Kodo" or "Imperial Way" faction, of which ARAKI was  
9 leader at that time, reached the explosion point on  
10 8 May 1932, when Inukai delivered an anti-militaristic  
11 and pro-democratic speech at Yokohama. On 15 May 1932,  
12 the Premier was ill and temporarily alone in his  
13 Official Residence, when several naval officers forced  
14 their way into his home and assassinated him. Dr.  
15 Okawa furnished the pistols for the killing; and  
16 HASHIMOTO admitted in his book, "The Road to the  
17 Reconstruction of the World," that he was implicated  
18 in the murder.

19 Lieutenant-Colonel SUZUKI, who was an official  
20 in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry  
21 at that time, warned that if a new Cabinet should be  
22 organized under the leadership of political parties,  
23 a second or third assassination would occur. He  
24 made this warning at a dinner attended by KILO, KOISO  
25 and SUZUKI at Baron Harada's house two days after the

1 murder. The opposition to the expansionist policy had  
2 come largely from representatives of the political  
3 parties in Japan.

4 RECOGNITION OF MANCHUKUO BY JAPAN

5 ARAKI and KOISO retained their positions as  
6 War Minister and Vice-War Minister respectively in the  
7 new Cabinet; and under their leadership Manchukuo was  
8 recognized by the Government of Japan as an independent  
9 State. In replying on 4 June 1932 to a telegram from  
10 the Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army, the War Minis-  
11 ter said, regarding the question of recognition: "It  
12 has a very delicate bearing on various circles at home  
13 and abroad, and therefore we are now determined and  
14 ready to effect the recognition whenever opportunity  
15 offers." He also revealed the plan to rule Manchukuo  
16 through the Kwantung Army; he said: "As regards uni-  
17 ficstion of various organs in Manchuria, we are planning  
18 to establish a coordinating organ with the Army as its  
19 center, among other things aiming at the industrial  
20 development of Manchuria to meet with requirements  
21 for speedy stabilization of Manchukuo and national  
22 defense. Should such underlying motive by chance  
23 leak out at home or abroad, and especially in foreign  
24 countries, it would be extremely disadvantageous  
25 from the point of view of the direction of Manchukuo.

1 Therefore, we hope that you will be very circumspect  
2 even in the study of the matter in your own office."  
3 About the middle of June 1932, ARAKI stated before  
4 the Supreme War Council that the resolutions of the  
5 League of Nations and statements made by Japan in  
6 regard to Manchuria before the establishment of Man-  
7 chukuo could no longer be considered binding on Japan.

8         The Kwantung Army assisted ARAKI in forcing  
9 the Government to recognize Manchukuo by sending a  
10 so-called "Peace Mission" to Tokyo in June 1932. The  
11 purpose of this mission was to urge the immediate recog-  
12 nition of the new State; it worked in conjunction with  
13 the Black Dragon Society, which held conferences at  
14 Hibiya Toyoken to assist this "Mission."  
15

16         In view of the change of Cabinets, the Lyt-  
17 ton Commission returned to Tokyo on 4 July 1932 and  
18 held a series of conferences with the officials of the  
19 new Government in an effort to learn the views of  
20 the Cabinet regarding the situation in Manchuria.  
21 ARAKI was present at these conferences.  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 After the Commission returned to Peiping, that is to  
2 say on or about 8 August 1932, the "coordinating organ with  
3 "the Army at its center", mentioned by ARAKI in his tele-  
4 gram to the Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army, was esta-  
5 blished as planned. The "Four-in-One" system was replaced  
6 by the "Three-in-One" system; under this new system, the  
7 Commander of the Kwantung Army became the Governor of the  
8 Kwantung Leased Territory and at the same time Ambassador  
9 to Manchukuo. The new system took effect on 20 August 1932.  
10 A change of personnel was made to put this system in effect.  
11 Muto, Nobuyoshi, replaced Honjo as Commander of the Kwan-  
12 tung Army. ITAGAKI remained on the Staff of the Kwantung  
13 Army, and was promoted to the rank of Major General. Vice-  
14 Minister of War KOISO was sent to Manchuria as Chief-of-  
15 Staff of the Kwantung Army with the concurrent assignment  
16 as Chief of the Kwantung Army Special Service Organization,  
17 or Intelligence Service.

18 After the surrender, ARAKI stated: "At the conference  
19 "of the Big Three (Foreign, Navy and War Ministers), when  
20 "discussing recognition of Manchukuo as an independent state,  
21 "I suggested that we exchange Ambassadors since Manchukuo  
22 "was an independent state. The question came before the  
23 "Cabinet at a meeting in August 1932. The discussion was  
24 "as to when Manchukuo should receive recognition - now or  
25 "later. The Kwantung Army put in a request that we



1 "recognize immediately. I set the date of 15 September  
2 "1932 as the date to formally recognize Manchukuo. At this  
3 "meeting we discussed the contents of the Treaty to be  
4 "entered into with Manchukuo, and I approved the contents  
5 "agreed upon."

6 HIRANUMA, as Vice-President of the Privy Council,  
7 called a meeting of the Council on 13 September 1932 to  
8 consider the question of "signing of the Protocol between  
9 "Japan and Manchukuo." HIRANUMA, who had also been  
10 appointed a Member of the Investigation Committee of the  
11 Privy Council, read the report of the Committee to the full  
12 Privy Council. The report stated, among other things, "Our  
13 Imperial Government firmly believed "that it would be ad-  
14 "visable to recognize that country without delay. Never-  
15 "theless, in order to use prudence and caution, our Govern-  
16 "ment watched for half a year the developments in Manchukuo  
17 "as well as the attitudes of the League of Nations and other  
18 "countries. "Indications are that our country's recognition  
19 "of that country although it will as may be easily imagined  
20 "cause for a time no small shock to the world, it will not  
21 "bring about an international crisis. With the object of  
22 "co-existence and co-prosperity, our country intends to take  
23 "measures for recognizing Manchukuo by concluding an arrange-  
24 "ment through this Protocol and the Notes exchanged between  
25 "the two countries".

HIRANUMA was referring to four Notes as follows:

- 1 (1) The first Note consisted of a letter and the reply  
2 thereto. The letter, which was dated 10 March 1932, the  
3 day after Pu Yi's inauguration, was addressed by Pu Yi to  
4 Honjo. In this letter, Pu Yi stated that he appreciated the  
5 efforts and sacrifices of Japan in establishing Manchukuo,  
6 but that the development of Manchukuo could not be expected  
7 without the support and guidance of Japan. Pu Yi then re-  
8 quested that Japan agree, among other things, to the followin  
9  
10 (A) Japan to undertake, at the expense of Manchukuo, the  
11 national defence of the new State and the maintenance of  
12 order within the country, with the understanding that Man-  
13 chukuo would furnish all military facilities required by  
14 the Kwantung Army; (B) Japan to undertake to control all  
15 existing railroads and other transportation facilities and  
16 to construct such new facilities as may be deemed desirable;  
17 and (C) Japanese nationals to serve as Government officials  
18 in all branches of the Government of Manchukuo, subject to  
19 appointment, removal and replacement at will by the Commander  
20 of the Kwantung Army. Honjo's reply to the letter was simple  
21 that Japan had no objection to Pu Yi's proposals. (2) The  
22 second Note was an agreement between the Prime Minister of  
23 Manchukuo and Honjo dated 7 August 1932 relating to the  
24 control of transportation facilities and making the Japanese  
25 control more absolute. (3) The third Note was another agree

1 ment between the Prime Minister of Manchukuo and Honjo dated  
2 7 August 1932. It related to the establishment of the  
3 Japan Air Transportation Company. This Company was au-  
4 thorized by a Cabinet decision of 12 August 1932 to take over  
5 the air-routes which had already been established in  
6 Manchuria by the Kwantung Army under the pretext of military  
7 communications. (4) The fourth Note was an agreement  
8 between Commander Muto and the Prime Minister of Manchukuo  
9 dated 9 September 1932 relative to mining concessions in  
10 Manchuria.

11 According to the report read by HIRANUMA, these Notes  
12 were to be retroactive to the dates of their signing and  
13 were to be deemed international agreements, but were to be  
14 strictly secret.

15 The Protocol, which was to be made public, provided  
16 that Japan had recognized Manchukuo; that Manchukuo  
17 affirmed all rights and interests possessed by Japan and  
18 her subjects in Manchuria at the time of the formation of  
19 Manchukuo; and that both parties agreed to cooperate in the  
20 maintenance of their national security, recognizing that a  
21 threat to either was a threat to both and giving Japan the  
22 right to maintain troops in Manchukuo. The investigation  
23 Committee recommended approval of the Protocol and Notes.

24 The discussion that followed the reading of the report  
25 of the Investigation Committee reveals that the members of th.

Privy Council fully realized that the proposed Protocol and  
1 Notes violated the Nine-Power Pact (Annex No. B-10) and other  
2 treaty obligations of Japan. Privy Councillor Okada raised  
3 the question. The Foreign Minister had explained to the  
4 Diet that Japan would not be violating the Nine-Power Pact  
5 by recognizing Manchukuo, because Manchukuo had become in-  
6 dependent, and Japan had not agreed to prevent the indepen-  
7 dence of the Chinese people. Okada expressed the opinion  
8 that the United States and others would not be satisfied by  
9 that explanation. As he explained, "The Americans might say  
10 that it would be all right if Manchukuo had become in-  
11 dependent by the free will of her own people, but that it  
12 "was a violation of the Pact and a disregard of China's  
13 "sovereignty for Japan to assist and maintain that in-  
14 "dependence." The Foreign Minister replied: "Of course,  
15 in this respect, various views "are held in the United  
16 "States and other countries, but these are their own views."  
17 ARAKI explained, "The national defense of Manchukuo is at  
18 the same time the national defense of our country".  
19 Councillor Ishii states: "I feel very uneasy about Japan's  
20 contention in regard to the connection between the 'Man-  
21 "churian Problem' and the League of Nations", and he further  
22 observed: "It was almost an established view of a large  
23 "number of the people of the United States and other countries  
24 "that our action in Manchukuo violated the Pact of Paris  
25



(Annex No. B-15) and the Nine-Power Pact." However, Council  
 1 or Ishii added: "Now that Japan has concluded an alliance  
 2 "with Manchukuo, for joint national defense I believe that  
 3 "there will be no room for opposing the stationing of Japanese  
 4 "troops in Manchuria, this will make the League's past re-  
 5 "solution a dead letter." He then observed: "It was rather  
 6 "strange that the Manchurian and Mongolian recess had started  
 7 "no independence movement up to now!"

9 The vote was taken, the Protocol and Notes were approv-  
 10 ed by unanimous vote and the Emperor withdrew. Ambassador  
 11 Muto presented the Protocol to the Manchukuoan Prime Minister  
 12 with the remark, "Here it is. This is the agreement that  
 13 "you have to sign". Although Pu Yi testified that he did  
 14 not know of the existence of the Protocol up until the day it  
 15 was presented for signing, he signed it on 15 September 1932.

#### 17 PREPARATION FOR THE CONQUEST OF JEHOL

18 Efforts to persuade General Tang Ju-lin, who was Govern-  
 19 nor of Jehol Province, to declare his Province independent of  
 20 China and place it under the jurisdiction of Manchukuo proved  
 21 to be of no avail; therefore, with the conquest and consolida-  
 22 tion of the Three Eastern Provinces completed, the Japanese  
 23 army began to prepare for the conquest of Jehol. After the  
 24 surrender, ARAKI tried to explain the decision to invade  
 25 Jehol by saying, in speaking of the Privy Council meeting of  
 17 December 1931 where it was decided according to him to

1 appropriate funds for the subjugation of Manchuria, "It had  
2 "been decided that the three provinces comprising Chang  
3 "Hsueh-liang's territory required pacification; but a state-  
4 "ment by Chang to the effect that his jurisdiction extended  
5 "over four provinces expanded the scene of activities to  
6 "Jehol".

7 At the organization of the Supreme Administrative  
8 Council by the puppet Governors of the provinces on 17  
9 February 1932, it was provided that Jehol should be repre-  
10 sented on the Council; however, Governor Tang Ju-Lin ignored  
11 the invitation and continued to rule the Province, although  
12 the Mongols of the various Leagues within the Province at-  
13 tempted to collaborate with the new State and were claimed  
14 as subjects by Manchukuo.

15 The Japanese, having made their reservation at Geneva,  
16 needed only to find an excuse to proceed with their plan for  
17 the incorporation of Jehol into Manchukuo. The first excuse  
18 was presented when an official by the name of Ishimoto, who  
19 was attached to the Kwantung Army, staged a "disappearance"  
20 while traveling between Peipiao and Chinchow on 17 July 1932.  
21 The Japanese immediately claimed that he had been kidnapped  
22 by Chinese Volunteers and sent a detachment of the Kwantung  
23 Army into Jehol on the pretext of rescuing Ishimoto. Al-  
24 though the detachment was equipped with artillery, it was  
25 repulsed and failed in its purpose, after occupying a village

on the frontier of the Province. During this encounter,  
1 Japanese planes dropped bombs on the town of Chaoyang;  
2 and through the month of August 1932, Japanese planes  
3 continued to demonstrate over this part of Jehol Province.  
4 On 19 August 1932, a Kwantung Army staff officer was sent  
5 to Nanling, a small village situated between Peibiao and  
6 the boundary of Jehol ostensibly to negotiate for the  
7 release of Mr. Ishimot. He was accompanied by an infantry  
8 detachment. He claimed that on his return journey, he  
9 was fired upon and in self-defence returned the fire. On  
10 the arrival of another infantry detachment, as if by pre-  
11 arrangement, Nanling was occupied.

12  
13 Shortly after the engagement at Nanling, a declara-  
14 tion was issued to the effect that Jehol Province was the  
15 territory of Manchukuo, thus laying the foundation for its  
16 annexation through the action of the Kwantung Army. Mili-  
17 tary action continued upon one pretext or another, mostly  
18 along the Chinchow-Peibiao branch line of the Peiping-  
19 Mukden Railway, which is the only means of access to Jehol  
20 from Manchuria by railway. This was to be expected as the  
21 main lines of communication at that time between China  
22 proper and the Chinese forces remaining in Manchuria ran  
23 through Jehol.  
24  
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1 It was evident to casual observers that an invasion  
2 of Jehol was imminent and the Japanese Press freely  
3 admitted that fact. In September 1932, the 14th  
4 Mixed Brigade arrived in Manchu-  
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1 ria with the announced mission of "mopping up" bandits in  
2 the Tung Pientao, which is the district on the north side  
3 of the Yalu River between Manchuria and Korea. The real  
4 mission of this brigade was to prepare for the invasion  
5 of Jehol.

6 THE LYTTON COMMISSION REPORTED

7 In Geneva, the Council of the League met on 21 Nov-  
8 ember 1932 to consider the report of the Lytton Commission,  
9 which had been received on 1 October 1932. During the  
10 deliberations the Japanese Delegate, Matsuo, declared,  
11 "We want no more territory!" However, due to the fact  
12 that Matsuo refused to agree to any basis for settle-  
13 ment of the dispute, the Council was forced on 2<sup>d</sup> Nov-  
14 ember 1932 to transmit the report of the Lytton Commission  
15 to the Assembly for action.

16 The Lytton Commission in its report stated: "It is a  
17 fact that, without declaration of war, a large area of  
18 what was indisputably the Chinese territory has been  
19 forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan  
20 and has, in consequence of this operation, been separated  
21 from and declared independent of the rest of China.  
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1 The steps by which this was accomplished are claimed  
2 by Japan to have been consistent with the obligations  
3 of the Covenant of the League of Nations (Annex No.  
4 B-6), the Kellogg Pact (Annex No. B-15) and the Nine-  
5 Power Treaty of Washington (Annex No. B-10), all of  
6 which were designed to prevent action of this kind.  
7 The justification in this case has been that all the  
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1 military operations have been legitimate acts of self-  
2 defence." However, the Commission further stated in  
3 discussing the events at Mukden on the night of 18 Sept-  
4 ember 1931: "The military operations of the Japanese  
5 troops during this night, which have been described above,  
6 cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence.

7 The Assembly of the League met on 6 December 1932;  
8 and after a general discussion, adopted a resolution on  
9 9 December 1932 requesting the Committee of Nineteen, which  
10 it had appointed on 11 March 1932, to bring about a  
11 cessation of hostilities at Shanghai, study the report,  
12 draw up proposals for settlement of the dispute, and  
13 submit those proposals to the Assembly at the earliest  
14 possible moment.  
15

16 The Committee of Nineteen drew up two draft resolu-  
17 tions and a statement of reason indicating generally the  
18 basis on which it thought it possible to continue its  
19 endeavors. On 15 December 1932 the two draft resolutions  
20 and the statement of reasons were submitted to the parties.  
21 The Chinese and the Japanese Delegates proposed amendments;  
22 and the Committee adjourned on 20 December 1932 to permit  
23 discussion of the proposed amendments between the Dele-  
24 gates, the Secretary-General of the League and the  
25 President of the Committee.

THE SHANHAIKWAN INCIDENT

Before this discussion proceeded very far, the  
1 serious "Shanhaikwan Incident" occurred on 1 January  
2 1933. Situated at the extremity of the Great Wall,  
3 halfway between Peiping and Mukden, this city has al-  
4 ways been regarded as of great strategic importance.  
5 It is on the route followed by invaders, who coming  
6 from Manchuria wish to penetrate into what is now the  
7 province of Hopei. Moreover, from Hopei is the easiest  
8 route into Jehol.  
9

10 After Chinchow had been taken, the Japanese had  
11 advanced to Shanhaikwan - up to the Great Wall - and taken  
12 possession of the Mukden-Shanhaikwan Railway. The railway  
13 continues from Shanhaikwan to Peiping, where Marshal Chang-  
14 Hsueh-liang was maintaining his headquarters. Although the  
15 railway station at Shanhaikwan is just south of the Great  
16 Wall, the Japanese trains from Mukden ran to the station;  
17 therefore, the Japanese maintained troops at the station  
18 under the pretense of guarding the trains. The Chinese  
19 trains from Peiping also ran into this station, and the  
20 Chinese maintained troops there. The Chinese Commander  
21 reported that all had been well at the station until this  
22 "Incident" occurred.  
23

24 The fact that this "Incident" occurred during the  
25 discussion of the proposed amendments to the two draft



1 resolutions submitted by the Committee of Nineteen strongly  
2 suggests that it was planned in order to stimulate justifi-  
3 cation of the action of the Japanese Government in re-  
4 jecting all efforts of the Committee to arrive at a basis  
5 of settlement between China and Japan.

6 On the afternoon of 1 January 1933, the Japanese  
7 claimed that some Chinese had thrown a hand grenade.  
8 That was the excuse for a forthright assault on the  
9 walled city of Shanhaikwan. Smaller towns nearby were  
10 machine-gunned, American missionary property was bombed,  
11 and the fighting developed into old-fashioned trench war-  
12 fare so that the North China Plain between Peiping and the  
13 Great Wall became criss-crossed by hundreds of miles of  
14 trenches. Thousands of peaceful citizens were slaughtered;  
15 and the Chinese Government addressed an appeal on 11  
16 January 1933 to the signatories of the 1901 Protocol (Annex  
17 No. B-2).

18 JAPAN DECLINED ALL EFFORTS OF THE COMMITTEE  
19 OF NINETEEN

20  
21 The Committee of Nineteen met pursuant to adjourn-  
22 ment on 16 January 1933; and submitted to the parties a  
23 number of questions and requests for information in an  
24 effort to arrive at a basis of settlement between China  
25 and Japan. To all of its requests, the Committee received

1 unsatisfactory replies from Japan; and on 14 February  
 2 1933, the Japanese Government informed the Committee  
 3 that it was convinced that the maintenance and recognition  
 4 of the independence of Manchukuo were the only guarantees  
 5 of peace in the Far East, and that the whole question  
 6 would eventually be solved between Japan and China on that  
 7 basis. This put an end to the Committee's deliberations  
 8 and it immediately reported to the Assembly.

9 THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONDEMNED JAPAN

10 The Assembly of the League of Nations on 24 Feb-  
 11 ruary 1933 adopted the report prepared for it by the  
 12 Committee of Nineteen condemning Japan as the aggressor  
 13 in the war between her and China and making recommend-  
 14 ations for termination of that war. The Assembly report-  
 15 ed that for more than sixteen months the Council or the  
 16 Assembly had continuously tried to find a solution for  
 17 the Sino-Japanese dispute; however, the situation tended  
 18 constantly to grow worse and the "war in disguise" conti-  
 19 nued. It declared that "Through all its wars and periods  
 20 of 'independence', Manchuria remained an integral part  
 21 of China, and that a group of Japanese civil and military  
 22 officials conceived, organized, and carried through the  
 23 Manchurian independence movement as a solution to the  
 24 situation in Manchuria as it existed after the events of  
 25 18 September 1931; and, with this object made use of the

names and actions of certain Chinese individuals and took  
1 advantage of certain minorities and native communities  
2 that had grievances against the Chinese administration."  
3 The Assembly decided that it could not regard as measures  
4 of self-defence the military operations carried out on  
5 the night of 18 September 1931 by the Japanese troops at  
6 Mukden and other places in Manchuria; and that this ap-  
7 plied as well to the military measures of Japan as a whole,  
8 developed in the course of the dispute. It also stated  
9 that the main political and administrative power in the  
10 "Government" of "Manchukuo" rested in the hands of  
11 Japanese officials and advisors, who were in a position  
12 actually to direct and control the administration. It  
13 found that the vast majority of the population did not  
14 support this "Government", but regarded it as an in-  
15 strument of the Japanese. The Assembly declared that  
16 "It is indisputable that, without any declaration of war,  
17 a large part of Chinese territory has been forcibly seized  
18 and occupied by Japanese troops and that in consequence  
19 of this operation, it has been separated from and declared  
20 independent of the rest of China." The Assembly found as  
21 a matter of fact: "While at the origin of the state of  
22 tension that existed before 18 September 1931, certain  
23 responsibilities would appear to lie on one side and the  
24 other, no question of Chinese responsibility can arise for  
25

the development of events since 18 September 1931." This  
1 was a finding of aggression against Japan and a warning  
2 that similar conduct would meet similar condemnation  
3 in the future. Therefore, no person in Japan could  
4 rightly say thereafter that he honestly believed that con-  
5 duct of this kind would be condoned. This Tribunal finds  
6 no basis for disagreement with the report adopted by the  
7 Assembly of the League on 24 February 1933.  
8

9 The Accused SHIRATORI, who in his public an-  
10 nouncements was one of the foremost assertors of the  
11 legitimacy of Japan's actions in Manchuria, expressed  
12 the truth in a private letter to Arita, then Japanese  
13 Minister to Belgium. Writing in November 1935, and  
14 speaking of Japanese diplomats who favored conciliation  
15 in international affairs, he said: "Have they enough  
16 courage to return Manchuria to China, to get reinstated  
17 in the League of Nations, and to apologize to the world  
18 for the crime?"  
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JAPAN WITHDREW FROM THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

1           Rather than fulfill her obligations under the  
2 Covenant (Annex No. B-6), Japan gave notice on 27 March  
3 1933 of her intention to withdraw from the League. The  
4 notice stated her reason for withdrawal to be: "That  
5 there exist serious differences of opinion between Japan  
6 and these Powers (The majority of the Members of the  
7 League) concerning the application and even the inter-  
8 pretation of various international engagements and  
9 obligations including the Covenant of the League and the  
10 principles of international law."  
11

INVASION OF JEHOL

12           One day after the Assembly adopted its resolution  
13 condemning Japan as the aggressor in China, she openly  
14 defied the League by invading Jehol Province. Key points  
15 along the Great Wall, such as Shanhaikwan and Kiumenkou,  
16 fell into the hands of the Japanese as a result of the  
17 fighting that followed the "Shanhaikwen Incident", and  
18 the strategical situation of Jehol became very critical  
19 prior to 22 February 1933. On that date, the Japanese  
20 Army, in the name of the puppet State of Manchukuo, sent  
21 an ultimatum to China, stating that Jehol was not Chinese  
22 territory and demanding that Chinese forces in Jehol  
23 Province be withdrawn within 24 hours. The ultimatum  
24 was not satisfied and the advance of the Japanese Army  
25

1 began on 25 February 1933. The Japanese advanced in  
2 three columns from their bases at Tungliao and Sui-Chung,  
3 and did not stop until all the territory north and east  
4 of the Great Wall was occupied and all the strategic  
5 gates along the Great Wall were captured. ITAGAKI and  
6 KOISO as staff officers of the Kwantung Army assisted in  
7 the completion of the occupation of all Manchuria by  
8 2 March 1933.

9 TANGKU TRUCE

10 As a result of its advance to the Great Wall,  
11 the Japanese Army was in a favorable position to invade  
12 China proper; but time was needed to consolidate and  
13 organize its gains preparatory to the next advance; to  
14 gain this time, the Tangku Truce was signed on 31 May  
15 1933. Commander MUTO (not the accused) sent representatives,  
16 vested with plenary power and armed with a draft of the  
17 Truce, which was prepared by the Kwantung Army, to  
18 negotiate with the Chinese representatives at Tangku.  
19 The Truce as signed provided for a demilitarized zone  
20 south of the Great Wall. The terms were that the Chinese  
21 forces would first withdraw to a specified line. The  
22 Japanese were authorized to observe by airplane from  
23 time to time whether the withdrawal was complete; on  
24 being satisfied with the withdrawal, the Japanese Army  
25 was to withdraw to the line of the Great Wall; and the

Chinese forces were not to again re-enter the demilitarized  
1 zone.

2 ARAKI, A POPULAR FIGURE

3 The successful conquest of all Manchuria by the  
4 Japanese forces made War Minister ARAKI a popular figure  
5 among certain groups in Japan; and he was constantly in  
6 demand as a writer and public speaker. In a motion  
7 picture adaptation of one of his speeches made in June  
8 1933 and entitled, "The Critical Period of Japan", he  
9 stated the ideals of the Military and revealed their  
10 plan to wage wars of aggression in order to dominate all  
11 of Asia and the islands of the Pacific. Among other  
12 things, he said: "Has peace reigned in Asia during the  
13 last fifty years? What is the situation in Siberia,  
14 Mongolia, Tibet, Singkiang, and China: Are the waves of  
15 the Pacific really calm? Can we expect the waves of  
16 the Pacific of tomorrow to be as calm as they are today?  
17 It is the holy mission of Japan, the Yamato race, to  
18 establish peace in the Orient with its ideals and power.  
19 The League of Nations does not respect this mission of  
20 Japan. The siege of Japan by the whole world under the  
21 leadership of the League was revealed by the 'Manchurian  
22 Incident'. The day will come when we will make the whole  
23 world look up to our national virtues." (On the screen  
24 was shown Japan and Manchuria in the center, then China,

1 India, Siberia and the South Seas). "Manchukuo, which  
 2 was founded by the revelation of Heaven in the form of  
 3 the 'Mukden Incident', and Japan will work together  
 4 and will secure permanent peace in Asia." He then  
 5 defined national defence as follows: "I would not  
 6 adopt such a narrow view that defence of the nation may  
 7 be defined in terms of geographic position. It is the  
 8 mission of the Army to defend the 'Imperial Way',  
 9 in space, in time, in enlargement and development, in  
 10 eternity and continuity. Our troops have fought with  
 11 the everlasting spirit of the song: 'The greatest honor  
 12 is to die for the Emperor.' Our Country is destined  
 13 to develop in space. It is of course expected of the  
 14 Army to fight against those who oppose us in spreading  
 15 the 'Imperial Way'. Compatriots! Let us look at the  
 16 situation in Asia. Is it to be left unamended forever?  
 17 Our supreme mission is to make a paradise in Asia. I  
 18 fervently beseech you to strive onwards united." (On  
 19 the screen appeared the words: "Light comes from the  
 20 East!")

22 SECTION II. CONSOLIDATION AND EXPLOITATION  
 23 OF MANCHURIA REORGANIZATION OF MANCHUKUO

24 After the signing of the Tangku Truce, Manchukuo  
 25 was reorganized so as to strengthen Japan's control over  
 that puppet State and to facilitate the economic



exploitation of Manchuria in preparation for continuation

1 of the war of aggression against China and the waging  
2 of wars of aggression against other Nations, who might  
3 oppose her domination of Asia and the Islands of the  
4 Pacific.

5           The Japanese Cabinet decided on 8 August 1933  
6 to "develop Manchuria into an independent Nation  
7 possessing indivisible relations with the Japanese Empire."  
8 Control of Manchukuo was to be "executed by Japanese  
9 officials under the jurisdiction of the Commander of the  
10 Kwantung Army." The aim of the Manchurian economy was  
11 to be "the unification of Japanese and Manchurian  
12 economies in order to establish securely the foundation  
13 for the expansion of the Empire's economic powers to the  
14 whole world." "Co-existence and co-prosperity of Japan  
15 and Manchuria" were to be "restricted by the demands of  
16 the national defense of the Empire." ARAKI, who was a  
17 member of the Cabinet at the time this decision was  
18 made, had defined national defense in no uncertain terms.  
19 The concrete plan for the execution of this policy was  
20 to be approved by the Cabinet only after careful  
21 investigation, it was decided.  
22

23           The investigations were not completed until  
24 after DOHIMARA had been assigned to the Headquarters of  
25 the Kwantung Army on 16 October 1933, and HIROTA had

1 become Foreign Minister on 14 September 1933. However,  
2 on 22 December 1933, the Cabinet, with ARAKI and HIROTA  
3 present, decided that: "It seems that the Manchurian  
4 Government is considering a swift reformation to Monarchy  
5 as soon as possible. It must be made clear that the  
6 enforcement of the Monarchy is not the restoration of  
7 the Tsing Dynasty, but the foundation of a constitutional  
8 monarch; and all causes of hindrances to the development  
9 of the national policy must be nullified, especially to  
10 contribute to the strengthening and expansion of the  
11 Japanese and Manchurian national defense power necessary  
12 to overcome the international crisis which we may  
13 encounter before long." It was decided: that the  
14 General Affairs Board of Manchukuo should be strengthened;  
15 that basic reformation of the internal structure of the  
16 Government of Manchukuo should be exercised, especially  
17 upon the personnel; and that the "existing conventions  
18 and agreements between Japan and Manchukuo should be  
19 acknowledged by the Monarchy."

20 This, be it noted, was the Cabinet of Japan  
21 formulating its decisions as to the manner in which  
22 Manchukuo would be governed, a country which it was  
23 proclaiming to the World as independent. The astounding  
24 thing is that the pretence was still maintained before  
25 us and supported by hundreds of pages of evidence and

1 argument.

2 No better proof that this dependent status of  
3 Manchukuo did not change can be found than the telegram  
4 from Foreign Minister TOGO to the Commander of the  
5 Kwantung Army UMEZU dated 4 December 1941, which was  
6 only three days before the attack upon Pearl Harbor.  
7 In that telegram, TOGO gave the following instructions:  
8 "On the fourth, in a Joint Conference with the Government  
9 Control Board, we decided upon steps which we will have  
10 Manchukuo take in case the international situation turns  
11 critical. Differing from what I said in my telegram  
12 No. 873, our policy was changed as follows: 'When the  
13 Japanese Empire commences hostilities, for the time  
14 being Manchukuo will not participate. Because Manchukuo  
15 is closely bound up with the Japanese Empire and because  
16 England and the United States and the Netherlands have  
17 not recognized the Government of Manchukuo, as a matter  
18 of fact, Changchun will regard those three nations as  
19 de facto enemies and treat them accordingly'."

21 The next step in the reorganization was the  
22 enthronement of Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo. After  
23 the Cabinet decision of 22 December 1933 General Hishikari,  
24 who had succeeded General Muto (not the accused) as  
25 Commander of the Kwantung Army, called upon Pu Yi and  
told him that he planned to convert Manchukuo into an

1 Empire. A new set of Organic Laws was promulgated for  
2 Manchukuo on 1 March 1934. These laws provided for an  
3 Emperor to rule Manchukuo and prescribed his powers,  
4 however they did not materially change the general  
5 construction of the Government. Japanese continued to  
6 hold important positions in the Government; the "Tuesday  
7 Meeting" was retained as the policy making organ; and  
8 General Yoshioka continued with his assignment of  
9 "supervising" the Emperor, even to the day of his capture  
10 after the surrender. On the day that the new laws  
11 were promulgated, Pu Yi, after paying obeisance to Heaven  
12 at a temple in Changchun, was enthroned as Emperor of  
13 Manchukuo. However, he had no power. Although he was  
14 allowed to give audience to his Ministers once a year,  
15 that audience was carefully supervised by the Japanese  
16 Director of the General Affairs Board.

17 Having installed Pu Yi as Emperor of Manchukuo  
18 and revised the laws of that State to facilitate its  
19 economic exploitation, the Cabinet met on 20 March 1934  
20 to discuss the policy to be followed in carrying out  
21 that exploitation. Although ARAKI had resigned as War  
22 Minister on 23 January 1934 to become a Supreme War  
23 Councillor, Foreign Minister HIROTA was present at this  
24 Cabinet meeting. It was decided that fundamental policy  
25 would be "based on developing Manchukuo as an independent



1 Nation possessing an indivisible relationship with  
2 Japan, establishing securely the base of Japan's world-  
3 wide economic expansion, and strengthening Manchukuo's  
4 economic powers." Transportation, communication and  
5 other enterprises in Manchukuo were to be developed  
6 by special companies directly or indirectly under the  
7 supervision of Japan so as to contribute to the  
8 "national defense" of the Empire.

9 As though to remove all doubt regarding Japan's  
10 intentions toward China, HIROTA's Foreign Office issued  
11 a statement on 17 April 1934, which has come to be known  
12 as the "Hands Off China Statement" or the "Amau Statement",  
13 deriving the first name from its contents and the second  
14 name from the official who gave the statement to the  
15 Press. Amau was not only an official of the Foreign  
16 Office but also its official spokesman. On 25 April  
17 1934, Foreign Minister HIROTA during an interview with  
18 the American Ambassador in Japan on his own initiative  
19 referred to the "Amau Statement"; he stated that under  
20 questioning of newspaper men Amau had given out the  
21 statement without his approval or knowledge and that  
22 the World had received a wholly false impression of  
23 Japanese policy. HIROTA added that the policy of  
24 Japan was complete observance and support of the  
25 provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10)

1 in every respect. HIROTA's statement to the American  
2 Ambassador was a private statement, not a public statement.  
3 The "Amau Statement" was never publicly repudiated.  
4 Amau was regarded by the expansionists as a hero for  
5 having issued the Statement; and Foreign Minister  
6 HIROTA never disciplined him for having issued the  
7 Statement without authority of the Foreign Ministry.  
8 This Statement conforms closely to subsequent developments  
9 in Japanese foreign policy; and the Tribunal finds upon  
10 the evidence that it was an official declaration by  
11 the Foreign Ministry of Japan's policy toward China at  
12 the time and was issued for the purpose of warning the  
13 Signatory Powers of the Nine-Power Pact that the  
14 Japanese Government would not tolerate any interference  
15 with her plans in China.

16 This Statement contained, among other things,  
17 the following: "Owing to the special position of Japan  
18 in her relations with China, her views and attitude  
19 respecting matters that concern China, may not agree with  
20 those of foreign Nations; but it must be realized that  
21 Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in  
22 carrying out her mission in fulfilling her special  
23 responsibilities in East Asia. We oppose, therefore,  
24 any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of  
25 the influence of any other country in order to resist

Japan. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign  
1 Powers even in the name of technical or financial  
2 assistance at this particular moment after the 'Manchurian  
3 and Shanghai Incidents' are bound to acquire political  
4 significance. Japan, therefore, must object to such  
5 undertakings as a matter of principle."

6 "TWO-IN-ONE" SYSTEM

7 The Kwantung Army received a new Commander and  
8 a new Vice-Chief-of-Staff on 10 December 1934, namely:  
9 MINAMI and ITAGAKI respectively. These appointments  
10 heralded the completion of the reorganization of Manchukuo  
11 and the machinery for its control by Japan. By Imperial  
12 Ordinance the Japanese Government created the Manchurian  
13 Affairs Bureau to deal with affairs concerning Manchukuo  
14 in all Ministries. The Bureau was organized to correspond  
15 to the new "two-in-One" organization in Manchuria. The  
16 Commander of the Kwantung Army became Ambassador to  
17 Manchukuo as before, but the office of Governor of the  
18 Kwantung Leased Territory was abolished and its duties  
19 were taken over by the Director of the newly created  
20 Kwantung Bureau, which was placed under the Ambassador.  
21 Thus MINAMI became Commander of the Kwantung Army; and  
22 at the same time as Ambassador, he controlled the  
23 Government of the Leased Territories, the Embassy  
24 and the South Manchurian Railway Company. Although the  
25

1 Manchurian Affairs Bureau came under the Premier, the  
2 War Minister held the post of President of the Bureau,  
3 so that the effective control of Manchukuo remained with  
4 the Kwantung Army and the War Ministry. MIYAKI stated  
5 on interrogation that as Ambassador his prime duty was  
6 "to preserve the independence of Manchukuo." At that  
7 time he advised the Government "on such matters as  
8 agriculture, transportation, education, etc." Upon being  
9 asked the question: "In fact, your advice in substance  
10 was a directipn; was it not?", he replied: "You might  
11 say so -- yes." MIYAKI was succeeded as Ambassador and  
12 Kwantung Army Commander by General Ueda on 6 March 1936,  
13 who served until he was replaced by General UMEZU on 7  
14 September 1939. UMEZU held the post until 18 July 1944.

15 MANCHURIAN AFFAIRS BUREAU

16 As mentioned, the Manchurian Affairs Bureau was  
17 organized to deal with affairs concerning Manchukuo in  
18 all Ministries and set as the connecting link between  
19 the Japanese Government and the "Two-in-One" Administrator  
20 in Manchuria. It took charge of all matters concerning  
21 the Kwantung Bureau, the foreign affairs of Manchukuo,  
22 the corporations organized to exploit the economy of  
23 Manchuria, the colonization of Manchuria by the Japanese,  
24 cultural works for Manchukuo - which probably included  
25 the opium trade -, and any other matters concerning



1 Manchuria or the Kwantung Territory. By virtue of  
2 their positions as War Minister the following Accused  
3 served as President of this Bureau: ITAGAKI, HATA and  
4 TOJO. Also OKA and SATO each served as Secretary  
5 of this Bureau. The following served as Councillors  
6 to the Bureau at one time or another: KAYA, MUTO, SATO,  
7 SHIGEMITSU, OKA, UMEZU and TOJO.

8 CONTROL OF PUBLIC OPINION IN MANCHURIA

9 In order to control the news coming out of  
10 Manchuria and direct propoganda, the Kwantung Army  
11 Commander, or "Two-in-One" control organ, organized all  
12 the Press and news agencies in Manchuria. All the agencies,  
13 which up to that time had been under the Japanese  
14 Government, the Manchukuo Government or the Manchurian  
15 Railway Company, were organized into an association,  
16 which was known as the Koho Association. This association  
17 was charged with the duty of rigidly supervising all  
18 domestic and foreign news releases, and deciding the  
19 policy and means of propaganda as well as enforcing that  
20 policy upon its member agencies and those agencies not  
21 members.

22 We will recess for fifteen minutes.

23 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was taken  
24 until 1100, after which the proceedings were re-  
25 sumed as follows:)

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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

THE PRESIDENT: Continuing reading of the  
Tribunal's judgment:

HOSHINO BECAME DIRECTOR OF ECONOMY OF MANCHURIA

Under the new organization of Manchukuo,  
HOSHINO became the undisputed ruler of the economy  
of Manchuria. He began his training for this work  
when he left Japan on 12 July 1932 at the instance  
of the Japanese Minister of Finance to accept an  
appointment as a Commissioner in the Finance Ministry  
of Manchukuo. He was told at that time that he was  
considered competent for the position as Chief of the  
General Affairs Board, the all-powerful agency of the  
Kwantung Army for control of the Manchukuoan Government.  
He was advanced by successive promotions to the position  
promised. Just before the completion of the reorganiza-  
tion of Manchukuo, he was appointed on 1 July 1934  
as Chief of the General Affairs Bureau in the Finance  
Ministry of Manchukuo. Then on 9 June 1936 he be-  
came Vice-Minister of Finance for Manchukuo. On 16  
December 1936 he became Chief of the General Affairs  
Bureau of the General Affairs Board, where he served  
until his elevation to the high office of Director  
of the Board on 1 July 1937. He continued in this

1 office until relieved to become President of the  
2 Cabinet Planning Bureau in Tokyo on 21 July 1940.  
3 Any exposition of the economic exploitation of Man-  
4 churia is essentially a story of HOSHINO. When he  
5 left Tokyo in July 1932 to become a Commissioner in  
6 the Manchukuoan Finance Ministry, he took with him a  
7 trained staff to assist him in his duties; and he  
8 soon became recognized in Manchuria as the Japanese of-  
9 ficial in charge of economic affairs under the  
10 authority of the Kwantung Army.

11 ECONOMY OF MANCHURIA SEIZURE

12 At the very outset of the military occupation  
13 the Japanese seized control of the economy of Manchuria.  
14 The first public utility seized was the railroads. All  
15 the Chinese-owned railways north of the Great Wall  
16 and the monies standing to their credit in banks in  
17 Manchuria were seized. All railroads were co-  
18 ordinated, connected with and placed under the man-  
19 agement of the Japanese Government agency known as  
20 the South Manchurian Railway Company. Electrical  
21 supply and distribution systems were quickly taken  
22 over. All sources of revenue were taken by force  
23 and the revenues expended to finance the new Govern-  
24 ment. The customs were seized on the pretense that  
25 Manchukuo was an independent state. The Central

1 Bank of Manchukuo was established on 14 June 1932 to  
2 replace the old provincial banks and the Frontier Bank,  
3 whose funds were used to capitalize the new organiza-  
4 tion. A new currency was issued by the Central Bank  
5 beginning on 1 July 1932. The telephone, telegraph  
6 and radio systems, being state owned, were seized  
7 and placed under Japanese control. On 14 April 1932  
8 special officers were appointed to take charge of  
9 the Postal Administration; they had taken complete  
10 charge of this service by 26 July 1932. In all of  
11 these public services Japanese officials and ad-  
12 visors were placed in the main political and admin-  
13 istrative offices and exercised effective control  
14 of the organizations. The Japanese Cabinet con-  
15 firmed this practice in its decision of 11 April 1932.  
16 It was soon after this decision that HOSHINO was sent  
17 to Manchuria. He was a recognized authority on fiscal  
18 and economic problems and was sent to Manchuria to  
19 organize its economy.  
20

21 KWANTUNG ARMY'S ECONOMIC PLAN FOR GUIDING MANCHUKUO

22 On 3 November 1932, after HOSHINO's arrival in  
23 Manchuria in July, Chief-of Staff KOISO of the Kwantung  
24 Army sent a telegram to the Japanese War Ministry out-  
25 lining his plan for "guiding" Manchukuo. He said:  
"The administration shall be backed for the time being



1 by inner leadership of the Commander of the Kwantung  
2 Army and shall be carried out with officials of  
3 Japanese lineage as its leaders. Economically,  
4 co-prosperity and co-existence shall be the basic  
5 principle. In the future the systems accompanying  
6 the establishment of a unit for an economic 'bloc'  
7 between Japan and Manchukuo shall be kept according  
8 to the race co-ordinate to Japan and Manchukuo. In  
9 order to realize the organization of the economy of  
10 Japan and Manchukuo into a single 'bloc' we must  
11 realize industrially the idea of 'Fit Industry for  
12 Suitable Locality' both in Japan and Manchukuo with  
13 the aim of abolishing the mutual customs barriers."  
14 All plans adopted thereafter by the Japanese Cabinet  
15 for the control and exploitation of the Manchurian  
16 economy were based upon these ideas.

17 ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR MANCHUKUO

18 The day before the conquest of Jehol was  
19 completed, that is to say, on 1 March 1933, the Govern-  
20 ment of Manchukuo promulgated an "Economic Construction  
21 Program for Manchukuo". The Japanese Cabinet approved  
22 the essential features of this "Program" in its deci-  
23 sion of 8 August 1933 as related. In the announce-  
24 ment of the "Program" it was stated: "Efforts will  
25 be made to promote a healthy and vigorous development

1 of the whole national economy by applying to capital  
2 such State control as may be necessary in view of the  
3 evils of uncontrolled capitalistic economy and by  
4 making the most of the uses of capital". It was  
5 announced that economic development was to proceed  
6 upon the following basic principles: (1) "To apply  
7 State branches of economic activity in order effect-  
8 ively to open up the various national resources with  
9 which this country is endowed and to promote a co-  
10 ordinated development in all fields of economic  
11 endeavor; (2) To aim at the co-ordination and  
12 rationalization of the East Asian economy, to place  
13 the emphasis on co-ordination with the good neighbor  
14 Japan in view of the economic relationship of mutual  
15 dependence between the two countries, and to make  
16 increasingly closer this relationship of mutual help-  
17 fulness". In accordance with basic principles it was  
18 announced that the Government proposed "to make it a  
19 guiding principle that important enterprises of the  
20 nature of national defense or public utilities should  
21 be managed by public bodies or special companies".

22  
23 At the Japanese Cabinet meeting of 20 March  
24 1934, which was after the re-organization of Manchukuo  
25 and the installation of Pu Yi as Emperor, this "Program"  
received further sanction of the Cabinet and it was de-

1 cided that these industries necessary for "national  
2 defense" should be operated by special companies,  
3 which should hold a dominant position in the business  
4 in Manchukuo, so that rapid development might be ex-  
5 pected. The organization and operation of these  
6 special companies created monopolies in favor of the  
7 Japanese and effectively defeated the "Open Door  
8 Policy" in Manchuria. The United States and other  
9 Powers protested this unwarranted violation of ex-  
10 isting treaty obligations intended to insure "equal  
11 opportunity" for trade in China. However, the  
12 Japanese Government disclaimed all responsibility  
13 for the violation of treaties by Manchukuo on the  
14 theory that Manchukuo was an independent State.

15 JAPAN-MANCHUKUO JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

16 A joint Economic Committee was established  
17 in 1935 by an agreement between Japan and Manchukuo.  
18 The agreement provided that the Committee was to con-  
19 sist of eight members, four from each country. Japan's  
20 members were to be: Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung  
21 Army; the Councillor of the Embassy in Manchukuo;  
22 the Chief of the Kwantung Bureau; and one member  
23 specially appointed by the Japanese Government. It  
24 is to be noted that the Commander of the Kwantung  
25 Army automatically controlled three votes by this

arrangement. Manchukuo's members were to be: The  
1 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Commerce and Industry,  
2 and Finance, and the Japanese Director of the General  
3 Affairs Board. All questions before the Committee  
4 were to be decided by majority vote. In answer to  
5 a question put to him at the Privy Council meeting  
6 on 3 July 1935 during discussion of the question of  
7 ratification of the Agreement, HIROTA said: I ask  
8 him (Councillor Motoôa) to consider the fact that  
9 three out of the four members of the Committee from  
10 Manchukuo are Ministers and the remaining one is the  
11 Director of the General Affairs Board, who is, and  
12 will be a Japanese forever, I am confident. Although  
13 he is an official of Manchukuo, he is a central organ  
14 assuming leadership of that country. Therefore, in  
15 case of a difference of opinions between the two  
16 countries it cannot be imagined that he will make  
17 any decision that will be disadvantageous to Japan".  
18 The Committee was to deliberate on all questions con-  
19 cerning the economic tie between the two countries  
20 and supervise the Joint Holding Company to be organ-  
21 ized by Japan and Manchukuo later to control the in-  
22 dustries of Manchukuo; however, it was provided that  
23 matters important to the economic power would not be  
24 discussed by the Committee; and because they were  
25



1 not to be deliberated by the Committee, those matters  
2 were to be made into unilateral contracts binding  
3 only upon Manchukuo. HOSHINO became a member of  
4 this Committee upon his appointment as Director of  
5 the General Affairs Board of Manchukuo. MINAMI was  
6 a member from the time of the creation of the Com-  
7 mittee in 1935 until he was relieved as Commander  
8 of the Kwantung Army on 6 March 1936. UMEZU served  
9 on the Committee while Kwantung Army Commander from  
10 7 September 1939 to 18 July 1944. ITAGAKI, who be-  
11 came Chief-of-Staff of the Kwantung Army on 23 March  
12 1936, became ex-officio a member of the Committee on  
13 that date. Thus, ITAGAKI was one of the foremost  
14 figures in the construction of Manchukuo. Others  
15 who served on this Committee while Chief-of-Staff  
16 of the Kwantung Army were: TOJO, who served from 6  
17 March 1937 to 30 May 1938, when he became Vice-Minister  
18 of War; KIMURA, who served from 7 November 1940 to  
19 21 April 1941. Upon being appointed Vice-Minister  
20 of War, TOJO retained his post as a member of the  
21 Committee, but in the capacity as the Government  
22 Representative rather than as Chief-of-Staff.  
23  
24  
25

YEN BLOC ORGANIZED

1           One of the first acts of this Joint Economic  
2 Committee was to integrate the currencies of the two  
3 countries. In November 1935 the yen bloc was established  
4 and Manchukuo's currency was no longer based on silver  
5 and was stabilized at par with the yen.  
6

RELEASE OF EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY

7           The next important economic arrangement made  
8 by this Joint Economic Committee was a treaty which was  
9 signed between Manchukuo and Japan on 10 June 1936. The  
10 purpose of the treaty appears to have been to give  
11 Japanese all the benefits of Manchukuoan citizenship  
12 without imposing on them the corresponding obligations.  
13 The treaty recited that its purpose was to abolish by  
14 progressive stages the rights of extra-territoriality  
15 enjoyed in Manchukuo by Japan. However, it recited  
16 that "Japanese subjects shall be free within the  
17 territories of Manchukuo to reside and travel and  
18 engage in agriculture, commerce and industry, and to  
19 pursue callings and professions, and shall enjoy all  
20 the rights relating to land." A supplementary agreement  
21 went much more into detail and set out at great length  
22 the rights of Japanese in Manchukuo. One of these  
23 provisions was, "The Government of Manchukuo shall  
24 speedily take necessary steps in order that the rights  
25

of lease by negotiation hitherto possessed by Japanese  
1 subjects shall be converted into land-ownership or  
2 other rights relating to land." Thus was settled the  
3 highly controversial question involving the right to  
4 lease land growing out of the notes attached to the  
5 Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915. This was very important  
6 for Japan was colonizing Manchuria at a rapid rate.  
7 Between 1936 and 1940 approximately 221,000 Japanese  
8 migrated to Manchuria. By 1945 this number exceeded  
9 1,000,000. Most of the Japanese men settling in Manchuria  
10 were fit soldiers and were used to man new divisions of  
11 the Kwantung Army. The land for settlement of these  
12 Japanese was requisitioned at a nominal price and the  
13 Chinese farmers so dispossessed were moved and allotted  
14 undeveloped lands.  
15

#### INDUSTRIAL BANK OF MANCHUKUO

16  
17 The Industrial Bank of Manchukuo, which was  
18 organized in December 1936, with a capital of 60 million  
19 yen, served as an easy means of financing preferred indus-  
20 tries to be developed under the Japanese Cabinet Policy.  
21 This bank handled all loans made for industrial purposes  
22 in Manchukuo. The Manchurians were permitted to make  
23 deposits in the Central Bank of Manchukuo and its branches,  
24 but they were not allowed to borrow from the Industrial  
25 Bank; only Japanese were allowed to borrow from that

bank. A law of savings was enacted to force the people  
1 to save money and deposit it in the Central Bank for  
2 the Japanese. At the time of the surrender, approximate-  
3 ly 600 million dollars were in this bank--all the result  
4 of the compulsory savings law.

5  
6 SECOND PERIOD CONSTRUCTION PLAN

7 HOSHINO said during his interrogation that  
8 instead of the haphazard development of the first five-  
9 year period from 1931 to 1936, it was deemed necessary  
10 that a concrete coordinated plan be formulated for the  
11 development of Manchukuo. HOSHINO, working with  
12 various Ministries of Manchukuo, the Cabinet Planning  
13 Bureau, the South Manchurian Railway Company, and  
14 ITAGAKI as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, drew  
15 up an "Outline of Five Year Plan for Industrial  
16 Development of Manchukuo," which was completed in  
17 January 1937. HOSHINO says that the Commander of the  
18 Kwantung Army had the "final say" on all questions  
19 involving this plan. This Second Five-Year Plan  
20 followed the basic principles underlying the First  
21 Five-Year Plan and laid emphasis on opening up resources  
22 in Manchukuo and making them available for "national  
23 defense," that is to say, "war." The outline of the  
24 plan declared the policy with regard to mining and  
25 industries to be, "that munition industries for weapons



1 of war, airplanes, automobiles, and rolling-stock will  
2 be firmly established, and basic major industries such  
3 as those of iron, liquid fuel coal and electric power  
4 will be developed, and emphasis will be laid especially  
5 on the development of iron and liquid fuel industries,  
6 which materials are necessary for national defense."

7 This plan was adopted at a conference of  
8 provincial governors and the Chiefs of the General  
9 Affairs Bureau of the various ministries in Manchukuo  
10 in January 1937. On 17 February 1937 the Government of  
11 Manchukuo issued its "Official Report on the Result of  
12 the First Period Five-Year Administration and Outline  
13 of the Second Period Construction Plan." The outline  
14 stated: "Five years have elapsed since Manchukuo  
15 founded her country. In this period, the administrative  
16 and economic system have been rearranged, and the  
17 second 'Five Year Plan' will be inaugurated in 1937,  
18 with which epoch-making construction activity will be  
19 commenced dashingly." In effect, the second plan of  
20 the Kwantung Army for the exploitation of the economy  
21 of Manchuria was to be adopted without change.  
22

23 The Industrialist Aikawa was sent to Manchuria  
24 to help direct the five-year plan. He favored a huge  
25 holding company to control all industries in Manchuria,  
especially the heavy industries such as coal and steel.

CONTROL OF INDUSTRIES

1           On 1 May 1937 Manchukuo promulgated a "Law  
2 Controlling Important Industries," which was so drawn  
3 as to provide for the licensing of "Important Industries,"  
4 practically all industries being classified as "Import-  
5 ant" under the law. The law was promulgated in order  
6 to coordinate the economy of Manchuria with that of  
7 Japan. The "Essentials of the Five Year Program for  
8 Important Industries" released by the Japanese War  
9 Ministry on 29 May 1937 contained the following: "We  
10 plan systematically to promote the activity of important  
11 industries generally, so that by 1941, if anything  
12 happens, our country may be capable of self-supplying  
13 the important materials in Japan, Manchuria and North  
14 China." The plan then went on: "In promoting important  
15 industries for national defense, the requisite industries  
16 should be pushed ahead to the continent as far as  
17 possible according to the principle of 'Fit Industry  
18 for Suitable Locality'." It was in order to enforce  
19 this rule of "Fit Industry for Suitable Locality" that  
20 the "Law Controlling Important Industries" was promulgated  
21 by the puppet government in Manchukuo.

MANCHURIAN HEAVY INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

22           The Cabinet decided on 22 October 1937 to  
23 establish the Manchurian Heavy Industry Development  
24  
25

1 Corporation "in order to secure and advance the developing  
2 policy of Manchurian Industry and to establish synthetic-  
3 ally and speedily the heavy industry of Manchukuo."

4 This was to be a huge holding company; and its shares  
5 were to be held only by Manchukuo, Japan and their  
6 nationals. The original issue of stock was to be sold  
7 one-half to the Government of Manchukuo and one-half  
8 to Japanese private interests. The management of this  
9 company was to be "entrusted to a powerful suitable  
10 person among the Japanese civilians. The powerful  
11 suitable person among the Japanese civilians is pre-  
12 arranged as Aikawa Gisuke, the present President of  
13 Nissan." The directors and the president of the company  
14 were to be appointed by the two governments. Pursuant  
15 to this Cabinet decision an agreement was entered into  
16 with Manchukuo for the establishment of the company.

17 MANCHUKUO A WORK-HOUSE FOR JAPAN

18 The economic organization completed by Japan  
19 with the organization of the Heavy Industry Develop-  
20 ment Corporation proved to be of benefit only to Japan  
21 and the Japanese. Its sole purpose was to make of Man-  
22 churia a work-house for the production of war goods for  
23 use by Japan. The effectiveness with which this purpose  
24 was realized is vividly expressed by HOSHINO, the one  
25 man more responsible than any other for such success;

1 he stated that Japan took everything out of Manchuria  
2 which could be obtained. Since Chinese business men  
3 were not allowed to enter important industries and were  
4 not allowed to make loans, most of them went into bank-  
5 ruptcy. The Chinese farmers lost their lands to  
6 Japanese immigrants. The savings law reduced the  
7 Chinese laborer to working for mere subsistence. The  
8 monopolies on rice and cotton deprived the Chinese of  
9 adequate food and clothing in order to furnish the best  
10 rice and cotton for Japan's Army. A labor and civil  
11 service law was put into effect by UMEZU while he was  
12 Commander of the Kwantung Army, which required all  
13 persons between 18 and 45 to render labor service to  
14 the Japanese Army in opening highways, digging mines,  
15 and constructing public works. These laborers were kept  
16 in concentration camps where they were fed short rations  
17 and furnished no medical attention whatever. Heavy  
18 penalties were imposed for escape. In the result a  
19 system was developed whereby the Japanese came first,  
20 Koreans second, and Chinese last.

#### 21 OPIUM AND NARCOTICS

22  
23 In order to finance her operations in Manchuria  
24 and also in order to weaken the power of resistance of  
25 the Chinese, Japan sanctioned and developed the traffic  
in opium and narcotics. As early as 1929, the National



1 Government of China was making an effort to fulfill its  
2 obligations under the Opium Conventions of 1912 and  
3 1925. (Annex No. B-11 & B-12). That government had  
4 issued its Laws for the Prohibition of Smoking Opium,  
5 effective as of 25 July 1929. The plan was gradually  
6 to suppress the production and consumption of opium by  
7 1940. Japan as a signatory to the above opium conven-  
8 tions was obligated to assist the Chinese Government in  
9 the eradication of the drug habit by limiting the manu-  
10 facture and sale of the drugs within her territory and  
11 by preventing smuggling of the drugs into China.

12 The principal source of opium and narcotics at  
13 the time of the Mukden Incident and for some time there-  
14 after was Korea, where the Japanese Government operated  
15 a factory in the town of Seoul for the preparation of  
16 opium and narcotics. Persian opium was also imported  
17 into the Far East. The Japanese Army seized a huge  
18 shipment of this opium, amounting to approximately 10  
19 million ounces and stored it in Formosa in 1929; this  
20 opium was to be used later to finance Japan's military  
21 campaigns. There was another source of illegal drugs  
22 in Formosa. The cocaine factory operated at Sinei by  
23 Finance Minister Takahashi of Japan until his assassina-  
24 tion in 1936, produced from 200 to 300 kilos of cocaine  
25 per month. This was one factory that was given

1 specific authority to sell its produce to raise revenue  
2 for war.

3           Wherever the Japanese Army went in China,  
4 Korean and Japanese drug peddlers followed closely  
5 upon its heels vending their merchandise without hindrance  
6 from the Japanese authorities. In some cases, these  
7 traffickers were sent ahead of the invading Army to  
8 prepare a way for it by engaging in intrigue, espionage  
9 and sabotage; such seems to have been the case in North  
10 China and also in Fukien Province, where the Genki Plot  
11 was perpetrated. Even the Japanese soldiers and their  
12 officers at times indulged in this lucrative business  
13 of vending opium and narcotics. The Japanese Special  
14 Service Organization was charged with the duty of  
15 regulating the opium and narcotic traffic in territories  
16 immediately following their capture; and this organization  
17 in the Kwantung Army became so involved in the illicit  
18 traffic under KOISO that it was necessary for MINAMI,  
19 when he became Commander of the Kwantung Army in  
20 December 1934, to abolish the organization to prevent  
21 it from destroying all discipline in that Army.  
22 DOHIMARA was one of the foremost officers of this  
23 organization; and his connection with the drug traffic  
24 has been fully shown.

25           The general principle of gradual suppression of

1 the traffic in and use of opium and narcotics was the  
2 underlying principle not only of the drug laws promul-  
3 gated by China, but also of the international Opium  
4 Conventions of 1912, 1925 and 1931 (Annexes No. B-11,  
5 B-12, B-13). Japan, having ratified those Conventions,  
6 was bound by them. Using this principle of gradual  
7 suppression to their advantage, the Japanese promulgated  
8 Opium Laws in the territories occupied by them in  
9 China; these laws ostensibly followed the principle of  
10 gradual suppression by licensing known addicts to  
11 smoke in licensed shops. However, these laws were merely  
12 a blind or cover for Japan's real intention and opera-  
13 tions. These laws created government controlled  
14 monopolies for the distribution of opium and narcotics  
15 to licensed shops; and these monopolies were nothing  
16 more than revenue collection agencies, which encouraged  
17 the use of the drugs in order to increase the revenue  
18 therefrom. In all areas occupied by the Japanese the  
19 use of opium and narcotics increased steadily from the  
20 time of such occupation until the surrender.

22 This was the procedure followed in Manchuria.  
23 In the fall of 1932 the Opium Law was promulgated by  
24 Manchukuo and the Manchukuo Opium Monopoly Administra-  
25 tion was created as the administrative agency to enforce  
the law. This agency was under the general supervision

1 of the Director of the General Affairs Board and became  
2 one of the important sources of revenue for Manchukuo.  
3 The reliability of the revenue from these sources is  
4 attested by the fact that the Industrial Bank of Japan  
5 was willing to underwrite the 30 million yen founding  
6 bond issue secured by the opium revenue of Manchukuo  
7 and negotiated by HOSHINO soon after his arrival in  
8 Manchuria.

9 This procedure was repeated in North China and  
10 again in South China; however, the administrative  
11 agency in those places was the Ko-A-In or China Affairs  
12 Bureau, which maintained its main offices in Tokyo with  
13 branch offices all over North, Central and Southern  
14 China. These organizations created such demand for  
15 opium that the Cabinet was forced from time to time to  
16 authorize the farmers of Korea to increase their acreage  
17 devoted to growing poppies. The trade became so  
18 lucrative that Japanese trading companies, such as the  
19 Mitsubishi Trading Company and Mitsui Bussan, were  
20 induced by the Foreign Ministry to sign a contract  
21 limiting their trade areas and the amount of opium to  
22 be supplied by them.

23  
24 Japan's real purpose in engaging in the drug  
25 traffic was far more sinister than even the debauchery of  
the Chinese people. Japan having signed and ratified



1 the Opium Conventions was bound not to engage in the  
2 drug traffic, but she found in the alleged but false  
3 independence of Manchukuo a convenient opportunity to  
4 carry on a world-wide drug traffic and cast the guilt  
5 upon that puppet state. A large part of the opium  
6 produced in Korea was sent to Manchuria. There opium  
7 grown in Manchuria and imported from Korea and else-  
8 where was manufactured and distributed throughout the  
9 world. In 1937 it was pointed out in the League of  
10 Nations that ninety percent of all illicit white drugs  
11 in the world were of Japanese origin, manufactured in  
12 the Japanese concession in Tientsin, Dairen and other  
13 cities of Manchuria, Jehol and China, always by Japanese  
14 or under Japanese supervision.  
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SECTION III. THE PLAN TO ADVANCE FURTHER INTOCHINA.

1  
2 Japan's occupation of Manchuria and Jehol was  
3 completed when the Tangku Truce was signed in the spring  
4 of 1933. Jehol, facing another Inner Mongolian Province  
5 of Chahar on the west and the North China Province of  
6 Hopeh on the south, became the frontier of the newly  
7 formed puppet state of Manchukuo. If Japan were to advance  
8 further into China from the territory she had already  
9 occupied, her advance would be from Jehol westwards into  
10 Chahar or southwards into Hopeh, besides the other route  
11 which linked Manchuria with the rest of China through the  
12 narrow corridor of the Liaoning Province around Shanhai-  
13 kwan on the eastern end of the Great Wall.

14  
15 On 17th April 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office  
16 issued the "Amau Statement" warning the Powers who sub-  
17 scribed to the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10) that  
18 the Japanese Government would not tolerate any inter-  
19 ference with her plans in China. Although HIROTA later  
20 explained, upon inquiries, to the American Ambassador  
21 Grew, that the "Amau Statement" had been issued without  
22 his approval or knowledge, the fact remains that the "Amau  
23 Statement" truly represented Japan's policy towards China.  
24 Already, it appeared possible that Japanese ambitions in  
25 regard to China had not been satisfied by her occupation

of Manchuria and Jehol. Very shortly thereafter in May  
1 and June 1935 there took place two incidents, of trifling  
2 importance when compared with the demands based by the  
3 Japanese upon their occurrence, which resulted in the  
4 position of the National Government of China on both the  
5 Hopei and the Chahar fronts being substantially weakened.

6 THE HOPEI INCIDENT.

7 In the middle of May 1935 two Chinese newspaper-  
8 men were assassinated by unidentified assailants in the  
9 Japanese Concession in Tientsin. The journalists were  
10 said to have been pro-Japanese in sentiment. UMEZU was  
11 then Commander of the North China Garrison Forces and  
12 with his approval certain demands were presented by his  
13 Chief of Staff to General Ho Ying-Chin, head of the  
14 Chinese military organization in Peiping. On the 10th  
15 of June 1935 the incident was settled, the Chinese  
16 authorities agreeing to withdraw the Chinese 51st Army  
17 from the province of Hopei; to close the party offices  
18 and to ban all party activities of the Kuomintang in  
19 that province and to ban all anti-Japanese activities in  
20 that province.  
21

22 The above settlement is the so-called "Ho-UMEZU  
23 Agreement."

24 The defense submit that no pressure of any kind  
25 was put upon the Chinese authorities to induce them to

agree to the above major limitations on their sovereignty  
1 over the great province of Hopei. They say that the  
2 Japanese made no more than some "suggestions" which might  
3 improve future relations between the nations. In this  
4 connection the evidence of the defense witness, Kuwashima,  
5 should be noticed. He was then Director of the Bureau of  
6 Asiatic Affairs in the Japanese Foreign Office, and Sino-  
7 Japanese relations were his direct concern. He testified  
8 that he learned from the Japanese Legation at Peiping  
9 that the Japanese had made "a considerably strong demand"  
10 upon the Chinese. A consideration of the whole of his  
11 evidence makes it plain that Kuwashima understood that  
12 the Chinese had been presented with an ultimatum. There  
13 is also an entry in the Harada-Saionji Diaries in which  
14 Okada, the then Premier of Japan, is recorded as having  
15 said that "in the beginning only an exceedingly light,  
16 friendly warning" had been intended "from which such a  
17 serious thing had resulted." When on 30th May 1935 KIDO  
18 drew the attention of SHIGEMITSU, then Vice Minister of  
19 Foreign Affairs, to a report in the morning newspaper  
20 that the Japanese Garrison in North China had lodged a  
21 momentous claim against the Chinese Government, SHIGEMITSU  
22 did not deny the report, but rather speculated as to the  
23 personalities in the Japanese army who were responsible  
24 for such action.  
25



THE NORTH CHAHAR INCIDENT.

1 In June 1935, about the time when the Rapei  
2 incident was being settled by the "Ho-UMEZU Agreement,"  
3 four members of the Japanese Army entered the Changpei  
4 District of Chahar province. This is in the southwestern  
5 part of Chahar, a little to the north of the Great Wall.  
6 As they did not have the required permits from the Chahar  
7 Provincial Government, they were taken to the headquarters  
8 of the Chinese Divisional Commander, who communicated  
9 with the general in command of the Chinese 29th Army.  
10 The latter ordered their release and that they be allowed  
11 to continue on their projected journey to Kalgan and  
12 Peiping, but with the warning that the appropriate permits  
13 must be obtained in future. The matter was at first  
14 taken up by the Japanese Consul at Kalgan, who represented  
15 to General Ching, Deputy Commander of the Chinese 29th  
16 Army, that the Chinese Guards had insisted on searching  
17 the Japanese personnel, had pointed rifles at them, had  
18 detained them some four or five hours at Divisional Head-  
19 quarters, and had thus insulted the Japanese Army. Very  
20 shortly thereafter the consul stated that the matter was  
21 very grave and was beyond his power to settle. The  
22 matter had been transferred to the army. In December  
23 1934 KIHAMI had become Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung  
24 Army and ITAGAKI had become his vice-chief of Staff.

DOHIHARA, then attached to the Kwantung Army, was  
1 appointed to negotiate with General Ching. In the end  
2 it was agreed that the commander of the regiment con-  
3 cerned and the judge advocate of the division concerned  
4 should be dismissed and punished. These measures, one  
5 would have thought, should have amply met the occasion,  
6 if these officers had been in the wrong. By far the  
7 most important provisions of the agreement, however, are  
8 those which followed, and they are largely, if not wholly,  
9 unconnected with the incident. All units of the Chinese  
10 29th Army were to be withdrawn from the districts north  
11 of Changpei, that is to say, from substantially the  
12 whole of Chahar province. The maintenance of peace and  
13 order there was to be entrusted to the Peace Preservation  
14 Corps, an organization of the nature of a police force.  
15 In the future no Chinese were to be permitted to migrate  
16 to and settle in the northern part of Chahar province.  
17 No activities of the Kuomintang were henceforth to be  
18 permitted in Chahar province. All anti-Japanese insti-  
19 tutions and acts in Chahar province were to be banned.  
20 This is the so-called "Ching-DOHIHARA Agreement."  
21

22 Again the defense submit that no pressure of  
23 any kind was put upon the Chinese authorities to induce  
24 them to submit to the above major restrictions on the  
25 sovereignty of China over the great province of Chahar.

1 General Ching in his evidence calls it a "temporary  
2 settlement" accepted by the Chinese Government "in order  
3 to secure peace and under pain." Thus by June 1935, in  
4 less than two months, and nominally in settlement of two  
5 incidents of trifling importance in international  
6 affairs, the Japanese right flank in Jehol had been freed  
7 from any immediate threat of attack from Chahar; two  
8 Chinese armies, thought to be hostile to the Japanese,  
9 had been removed from Chahar and Hopei, and all activities  
10 of the Chinese National Party and all anti-Japanese  
11 activities had been banned in both provinces.

12 INNER MONGOLIAN AUTONOMOUS GOVERNMENT.

13 In the beginning of 1935 Prince Teh, the leader  
14 of the Mongols in Inner Mongolia, was striving to set  
15 up an autonomous Mongolian Government there. The sub-  
16 sequent history of this movement is taken from the evi-  
17 dence of General Tanaka, Ryukichi, a witness whom both  
18 prosecution and defense adduced from time to time, as  
19 occasion demanded, and whom both prosecution and defense  
20 cross-examined as a witness of no credit, again as  
21 occasion demanded. In this matter of the establishment  
22 of the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Regime there is no  
23 reason to distrust his account and he was certainly in  
24 a position to be familiar with the details.  
25

Tanaka's account of this matter follows.

1 MINAMI and ITAGAKI gave earnest support to the establish-  
2 ment of an Inner Mongolian Autonomous Government which  
3 they intended to be subservient to the wishes of Japan.  
4 In April 1935 MINAMI sent Tanaka and another officer to  
5 interview Prince Teh with a view to establishing such a  
6 government, and Prince Teh did not at this time come to  
7 terms. It should be noticed that there now followed the  
8 so-called "Ho-UMEZU" and Ching-DCHIHARA Agreements of  
9 June 1935, the latter of which substantially affected  
10 the northern part of Inner Mongolia, the province of  
11 Chahar. According to Tanaka in August 1935 MINAMI had  
12 an interview with Prince Teh at which the Prince promised  
13 close cooperation with Japan and MINAMI promised finan-  
14 cial assistance to the Prince. In December 1935 MINAMI  
15 sent two battalions of cavalry to assist Prince Teh in  
16 taking over the northern part of Chahar province. On  
17 11th February 1936 Prince Teh transferred the seat of  
18 his autonomous regime from Pailinmiao, in Suiyuan  
19 province, to West Sunito, and Japanese civilians were  
20 sent there to act as advisers to him.

21  
22 There is a significant cable, dated 2 October  
23 1935, from the Secretary General of the Japanese Embassy  
24 at Peiping to Foreign Minister HIROTA inter alia to the  
25 following effect: "the Japanese Forces' Mongolian  
Policy is making steady progress as I and Consul at



Changchiakou repeatedly reported to you. The other day  
1 Major General DOHIMARA made a trip from Changchiakou to  
2 Chengte and back and saw the Governor of Chahar Province  
3 and Prince Teh; his mission was no doubt to promote the  
4 Inner Mongolian self-government."

5           References will also be found in the Japanese  
6 Army plan for dealing with North China, transmitted to  
7 the Japanese forces in China on 13 January 1936, which  
8 make it plain that this Inner Mongolian Autonomous Govern-  
9 ment was supported and controlled by the Kwantung Army.  
10 This document will be considered more fully a little later.

11           ATTEMPT TO SET UP A NORTH CHINA AUTONOMOUS  
12 GOVERNMENT.

13           General Tanaka testified that in September 1935  
14 MIHAMI sent DOHIMARA to Peiping with orders to set up  
15 an autonomous regime in North China. Tanaka was then  
16 a staff officer with the Kwantung Army and he stated that  
17 he had a hand in the drafting of DOHIMARA's instructions.  
18 He also said that DOHIMARA, ITAGAKI, and Sasaki considered  
19 that "Anti-Communism" should be added as a slogan to the  
20 objective of creating an autonomous regime in North China.  
21 We accept this evidence, for it fits in with what followed,  
22 and its statement as to the real authors of the so-called  
23 autonomous movement in North China is confirmed by  
24 various documents from Japanese sources which will be  
25

noticed hereafter.

1 We have little evidence as to the events of the  
2 next two months. This is not surprising, for they were  
3 presumably months of intrigue, of dangerous intrigue.  
4 Negotiations on such matters are seldom recorded or made  
5 public.

6 DOHIMARA first tried to persuade Wu Pai-Fu to  
7 become the head of a North China Autonomous Government  
8 and failed. DOHIMARA thereafter tried to induce General  
9 Sung Che-Yuan, then Garrison Commander of the Peiping-  
10 Tientsin Area, to lead such a government, and failed.  
11 DOHIMARA and Takahashi, who was Military Attache of the  
12 Japanese Embassy, then passed from persuasion to demands  
13 that a North China Autonomous Government should be formed,  
14 and DOHIMARA and Matsui, who was Chief of the Japanese  
15 Special Services Board, further demanded that special  
16 economic concessions should be granted to the Japanese  
17 in North China.

18  
19 It is proved that when inducements failed to  
20 produce an autonomous government, DOHIMARA in November  
21 1935 betook himself to threats of force, and even to the  
22 issue of an ultimatum for the purpose of procuring the  
23 establishment of such a government, and that the Kwantung  
24 Army backed up his threats by concentrating a striking  
25 force of tanks, mobile troops, and airplanes at

Shanhaikwan at the eastern end of the Great Wall, ready  
1 to advance into the Peiping-Tientsin area.

2 About the end of the year 1935 there emerged  
3 two new forms of government in North China. One, which  
4 was set up directly as a result of DOHIMARA's effort,  
5 was called the "East Hopei Anti-Communist Autonomous Govern-  
6 ment." It was established about the end of November 1935  
7 with Yin Ju-leng as its chairman. He had been adminis-  
8 trative commissioner of the demilitarized zone south of  
9 the Great Wall in East Hopei. It proclaimed itself  
10 independent of the National Government of China. Its  
11 capital was Tungchow in the demilitarized zone, northeast  
12 of Peiping. The Japanese maintained garrison troops  
13 there. Its control extended over many districts of the  
14 demilitarized zone. The witness Goette travelled in  
15 this area many times after the establishment of this  
16 government, saw the Japanese garrison troops, and saw  
17 the Chinese gendarmerie of the new government, recruited,  
18 trained, and officered by Japanese. Being in the demili-  
19 tarized zone, this new government was beyond the reach  
20 of the forces of the National Government of China.  
21 That government protested to the Japanese against the  
22 existence of this so-called autonomous government, but  
23 without effect.  
24  
25

Another new governmental organ which made its

appearance in North China about this time was the Hopei-Chahar Political Council. It was created by the National Government of China as a result of pressure exerted by DOHARA and ostensibly to conform to his wishes. According to the Japanese Year Book it was a new political organ which had power to negotiate with Japan and Manchukuo for the maintenance of amicable relations.

DOHARA's hopes of these regimes can be gathered from his report made to MINAMI in Tanaka's presence in the end of 1935. DOHARA reported that the Hopei-Chahar regime and the East Hopei regime, though unsatisfactory, had been established and would more or less obey the Kwantung Army, and that the North China regime would be established with the Hopei-Chahar regime as its core.

Similar hopes were entertained by the Japanese Army at home at this time. On 13 January 1936 it transmitted to the Japanese forces in China a plan for dealing with North China. The object of the plan was stated to be the realization of self-government in the five northern provinces of China. This it will be recalled was the object for which MINAMI had dispatched DOHARA to Peiping in September 1935. The plan suggested that Japanese advice and guidance should be given to the Hopei-Chahar Political Council; that East Hopei independence should be upheld so long as the Hopei-Chahar Political



1 Council remained unsatisfactory, but, when it was estab-  
2 lished so as to justify confidence, a merger should be  
3 introduced; that measures should be avoided which might  
4 lead to Japan being misunderstood as if she were setting  
5 up a separate state like Manchukuo; that accordingly  
6 Japanese advisers should be limited in number; that  
7 measures towards Inner Mongolia should be continued as  
8 before, but measures which had become obstacles to the  
9 self-government power of the Hopei-Chahar Political  
10 Council should be held back for the time being; that  
11 management of North China should be the duty of the Com-  
12 mander of the Japanese troops in China; and that as a  
13 rule he should execute this informally by direct contact  
14 with the Hopei-Chahar and East Hopei Governments.

15 THE JAPANESE ARMY'S PLANS FOR AN ADVANCE INTO  
16 NORTH CHINA.

17  
18 About the time when DOHIMATA was expressing to  
19 MINAMI, commanding the Kwantung Army, his expectation  
20 that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council would more or less  
21 obey the Kwantung Army, and that an independent North China  
22 regime would be established with the Hopei-Chahar regime  
23 as its core, the Kwantung Army sent to Tokyo a Propaganda  
24 Plan which is most significant as to Japanese intentions  
25 towards North China. It was dispatched by the Chief  
of Staff of the Kwantung Army to the Vice Minister of

1 War on 9 December 1935. Certain passages in it merit  
2 quotation in full. As to the time of execution it is  
3 stated "Prior to the advance of our military forces into  
4 China proper, this propaganda shall be launched, chiefly  
5 to support from the side the propaganda of the Japanese  
6 Government and the Japanese forces stationed in China.  
7 After the advance of our forces into China proper it  
8 shall be performed so as to facilitate our military  
9 activities." The general principle is stated to be "We  
10 start our propaganda to convince the whole world of our  
11 lawfulness as soon as the advancement of the Kwantung  
12 Army into China proper takes place. We shall launch out  
13 on a movement to estrange the inhabitants of North China  
14 from the Central Government by fomenting anti-Kuomintang  
15 and anti-communism agitation among them. As for the  
16 Chinese people and army of the rest of China we shall  
17 take a measure to form an anti-war atmosphere."

18 We quote also the types of propaganda which are  
19 to be used. "1. The Central Government has regarded  
20 North China as a colony in a sense and has long made it  
21 the object of exploitation. The inhabitants in North  
22 China therefore have been cherishing a strong desire to  
23 establish a separate government of their own in order to  
24 shake themselves from the fetters of the Central Govern-  
25 ment. Burning with strong aspiration for independence

1 the people concerned have expressed their firm resolution  
2 to establish an independent country.

3 "2. The enactment of the nationalization of  
4 silver has made the Central Government the object of  
5 resentment and as a result of it the movement to estab-  
6 lish a new independent government in North China is making  
7 rapid progress.

8 "3. It is the greatest desire of the Japanese  
9 Government to form an anti-Communist front with the North  
10 China independent government, for it may be considered  
11 the first ray of hope for the establishment of lasting  
12 peace in the Orient by the harmonious cooperation among  
13 Japan, China and Manchuria. We therefore shall assume a  
14 definite attitude to support wholeheartedly the establish-  
15 ment and development of the independent government in  
16 North China.

17 "4. The Chinese Central Government has violated  
18 the agreement of cessation of hostilities in North China  
19 and other military agreements; they have been disturbing  
20 the peace of Manchuria; instigating a boycott of Japanese  
21 goods and an anti-Japanese sentiment; and has become a  
22 great menace to the Japanese interests and residents in  
23 North China and the existence of the Manchurian Empire;  
24 therefore we have to make it clear that we shall be  
25 obliged to resort to arms if the Chinese Government

continues such underhanded tactics.

1 "5. It must made clear that when we do dispatch  
2 our forces to China in the future we do it for the purpose  
3 of punishing the Chinese military, and not the Chinese  
4 people at large.

5 "6. We shall try to enhance an anti-war senti-  
6 ment among the people by propagandizing extensively that  
7 the employment of military forces by the Chinese Central  
8 Government or other military lords will reduce the people  
9 to the greatest misery and will lead to the destruction  
10 of the country.

11 "7. As for the Chinese forces, we will take a  
12 measure to promote antagonism between them and to in-  
13 crease their admiration for the strength of the Japanese  
14 military power, thus depriving their fighting spirit.

15 "8. Our propaganda for Manchuria will be that  
16 the appearance of the independent government in north  
17 China is nothing but a concrete manifestation of their  
18 longing for the fine administration of the Manchurian  
19 Government, and it will brighten the future of Manchuria."  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



We have quoted from this document so fully in order that its proposals, advanced on 9 December 1945 may be contrasted with the contention proposed by the defense in general, and by MINAMI, UMEZU, ITAGAKI, and DOHIMURA in particular, that the so-called North China independence movement was a spontaneous movement on the part of the people of North China, neither initiated nor furthered by Japan.

Relevant also to the question of the attitude and intention of the Japanese towards the so-called autonomous movement in North China is a "Draft of Outline for the military Disposal of Various Railways in North China" sent by General Tada, then Commander of the Japanese garrison forces in North China, to the Ministry of War in Tokyo on 2 December 1935.

This document contains detailed plans for the working of certain railways in North China on behalf of Japanese troops engaged in military operation in North China. The document does not specifically mention the nature of this proposed military operation. The operation is described in such vague terms as the "military objective", "military operations", and "when the army find it inevitable to settle the issue by armed force." A critical examination of the whole document, however, reveals that the Japanese Army

1 proposed to move from about the line of the Great Wall,  
2 driving before it the military forces of the National  
3 Government of China, and clearing Shantung, Hopei and  
4 Shensi, the three southern provinces of the five north-  
5 ern provinces of China. It is clear also that the oper-  
6 ation was to be embarked on to support the proposed  
7 North China Autonomous Regime. Thus the Chinese employ-  
8 ees of the railways were to be made to "understand the  
9 spirit of the North China Autonomous Movement," and  
10 General Tada expresses a private and strictly confiden-  
11 tial opinion as to the disposal of the railways when  
12 normal political condition is restored. He says "When  
13 the situation in North China is restored to its normal  
14 condition after the military operations are over, the  
15 railways will be turned over to the North China Re-  
16 gime. . . Under the management of the Communication  
17 ministry of the North China Regime Japanese advisers  
18 and/or some railway employess will be employed.  
19 addends. The following demands will be made of the  
20 North China Regime on the occasion of the abolition of  
21 the headquarters of the 'Japanese' Railway Corps.

22 "1. Employment of advisers and high-ranking  
23 officials by each railway.

24 "2. The right of guarding the railways and  
25 of posting troops at the principal places along the

railway lines.

1 "3. Cession of the Shantung Railway and the  
2 section of the Lungtai Railway east of Suchow.

3 "4. The right of constructing new railways."

4 Moreover the document shows that certain steps  
5 had already been taken in North China to pave the way  
6 for the operation. Thus

7 "2. We shall endeavor to check the south-  
8 ward transfer of rolling stocks in counter opposition  
9 to the Nanking Government's policy of carrying away  
10 rolling stocks and other materials to the south. For  
11 this purpose we shall do our best in applying all  
12 possible indirect means, but in the case of Peiping-  
13 Shenhaikwan Railway we shall check it even by might if  
14 necessary. In case such forcible measure is taken, we  
15 shall give as the nominal reason self-defense and pro-  
16 tection of the Peiping-Shenhaikwan Railway against the  
17 anti-Japanese military operations of the Nanking Govern-  
18 ment. (This is being enforced by the dispatch of mili-  
19 tary police under an agreement made with the Peiping-  
20 Shenhaikwan Railway Co.)"

21 Thus during the latter half of the year 1935  
22 the Kwantung Army and the North China Garrison Army  
23 with the support of and at times as directed by, the  
24 Japanese Ministry of War, were engaged in an attempt  
25

1 to detach the five northern provinces of China from  
2 allegiance to the National Government of China, and to  
3 set up an autonomous regime or regimes there, which  
4 would be subservient to Japan. The plan contained the  
5 two essential elements which had been present in the  
6 Japanese conquest of Manchuria and Jehol, namely, (1)  
7 military domination by Japan, and (2) a declaration of  
8 independence by such few Chinese figures as could be  
9 induced to serve Japan's purpose. In the Manchurian  
10 case, however, military conquest had preceded the arti-  
11 ficially engendered declaration of independence. In  
12 the case of North China the Japanese military had  
13 hoped to avoid the appearance of military conquest,  
14 and had tried hard to induce the establishment of an  
15 artificially engendered North China Autonomous Govern-  
16 ment at first by persuasion and later by threat of the  
17 use of force. By the end of the year 1935 the Japan-  
18 ese military had evolved the plans for invasion which  
19 we have just considered. The efforts of the Japanese  
20 military were known to the Japanese Foreign Ministry  
21 and were resented by it, but only because they were  
22 regarded as an attempt by the Army to encroach on the  
23 Foreign Ministry's domain -- the conduct of the foreign  
24 relations of Japan.  
25



HIROTA'S THREE PRINCIPLES

1 While Japan's armies in China were formul-  
2 ating plans in anticipation of military operations in  
3 North China, the Japanese Cabinet was working on a pro-  
4 gram of subjugating China through diplomatic measures.  
5 On 5 August 1935, Foreign Minister HIROTA sent to the  
6 diplomatic and consular officials in China a plan pre-  
7 pared on his instructions by the Bureau of East Asiatic  
8 Affairs of the Foreign Office, as a result of the re-  
9 investigation of Japan's policy towards China which  
10 had been made by that Bureau in collaboration with  
11 the Army and Navy authorities. Three general princi-  
12 ples were stated in the plan, as follows: (1) China  
13 should carry out strict control over all anti-Japanese  
14 speeches and activities, and both Japan and China  
15 should make efforts to promote friendship and cooper-  
16 ation on the basis of the principles of mutual respect  
17 of independence, cooperation and mutual assistance,  
18 and should work for the development of relations be-  
19 tween Manchukuo and China; (2) While the ultimate aim  
20 of the development of relations was that China would  
21 give formal recognition to Manchukuo and that Japan,  
22 Manchukuo and China would conclude an agreement to  
23 regulate the new relations among the three countries,  
24 China for the time being should not deny the fact of  
25

Manchukuo's existence, at least in North China and in  
1 the Chahar district which bordered the Manchukuo terri-  
2 tory, and should enter into actual relations of inter-  
3 dependence and cooperation with Manchukuo in the eco-  
4 nomic and cultural fields; (3) Japan and China should  
5 cooperate in Chahar and other districts bordering Outer  
6 Mongolia, with a view to removing the communist menace.  
7

8 In a subsequent telegram dated 28 September  
9 1935, addressed to Japanese diplomatic and consular  
10 officials in China and Manchukuo, HIROTA reiterated  
11 the three principles as the basis of Japan's foreign  
12 policy to stabilize East Asia and to work for common  
13 prosperity by means of cooperation and mutual assistance  
14 between Japan, Manchukuo and China, putting Japan as  
15 its center. In substance the three principles were  
16 recited as follows: (1) China should carry out strict  
17 control of all anti-Japanese speeches and activities  
18 and should cooperate with Japan on concrete questions,  
19 putting an end to her policy of depending upon European  
20 and American countries; (2) China must ultimately give  
21 a formal recognition to Manchukuo, but for the time  
22 being China should give tacit consent to the independence  
23 of Manchukuo and enter into relations of interdependence  
24 and cooperation with Manchukuo in the economic and  
25 cultural fields, at least in North China which is an

area bordering Manchukuo territory; (3) China should  
1 cooperate with Japan in removing the communist menace  
2 in areas bordering Outer Mongolia. The telegram appended  
3 the additional instruction that in the event the above-  
4 mentioned principles were carried into execution steadily  
5 and China's sincerity sufficiently manifested, a  
6 general agreement would be concluded for the regulation  
7 of the new relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China.  
8 One material alteration in this statement of the three  
9 principles as compared with the statement of 5 August  
10 1935 is that the later version omits the statements  
11 that Japan and China should cooperate on the basis of  
12 the principle of mutual respect of independence.  
13

14           After considerable discussion with the Army  
15 and the Navy, the plan as set out in the second version  
16 of 28 September 1935 was adopted on 4 October 1935 by  
17 the Premier, the Foreign, War, Navy and Finance Min-  
18 isters. Japanese diplomatic officials abroad were again  
19 notified and instructed to keep the matter strictly  
20 secret. On 21 January 1936, the three principles were  
21 made known to the public through HIROTA's address to  
22 the Diet. On the part of China, however, no enthusiasm  
23 was shown for their acceptance inasmuch as these  
24 principles would involve China's recognition of the  
25 de facto status of Manchukuo. Thus the diplomats of

1 Japan would have secured for Japan the fruits of her  
2 conquest of Manchuria.

3 While HIROTA, on 21 January 1936, was announcing  
4 his three principles of Japanese policy towards China,  
5 the Japanese Foreign Office was fully aware of the  
6 Army's plan to set up an autonomous government in the  
7 five northern provinces of China, for on that same  
8 day, 21 January 1936, it had transmitted a copy of that  
9 plan to the Japanese Ambassador in China.

10 THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT.

11 The February Incident was an outburst of the  
12 Army's resentment against the government under the  
13 premiership of Okada which was known as a Navy Cabinet  
14 and reputed to be opposed to the Army's policy of ex-  
15 pansion on the continent of Asia by military force.  
16 The Incident occurred on 26 February 1936. Earlier,  
17 when Okada was Navy Minister in the Saito Cabinet,  
18 great difficulties were experienced by the Cabinet be-  
19 cause the Cabinet was pursuing a policy of reducing  
20 the Army budget against vigorous opposition of the  
21 Army. When Okada became Premier in 1934, the power of  
22 the Army was increasing. There were already indications,  
23 while the Cabinet was being formed, that the Army would  
24 bring about disturbances and trouble with the new  
25 government.



1 On 26 February 1936, some 22 officers and  
2 1400 men revolted against the Government, terrorized  
3 Tokyo for three and a half days, seized the Premier's  
4 official residence, the Diet Building, the Home and  
5 War Offices, the Metropolitan Police Building and the  
6 General Staff Building, assassinated Finance Minister  
7 Takahashi, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Saito and  
8 General Watanabe and attempted to assassinate Grand  
9 Chamberlain Suzuki and Okada himself. As a result of  
10 the incident, the Okada Cabinet resigned on 3 March  
11 1936, and HIROTA succeeded as Premier.

12 The purpose of this Incident was to replace  
13 the Okada Cabinet by another with stronger policies  
14 which would fit into the policy of the Army for further  
15 expansion on the continent. Okada testified that he  
16 supposed the Incident was a spontaneous outburst of  
17 resentment on the part of a group of young officers  
18 against the Government's lack of sympathy with the  
19 ambitions of the military.  
20

21 We will adjourn until half past one.

22 (Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was  
23 taken.)  
24  
25

## AFTERNOON SESSION

1 The Tribunal met, pursuant to recess, at 1330.

2 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
3 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

4 THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of  
5 the Tribunal's judgment.

6 FORMATION OF THE HIROTA CABINET

7 On 9 March 1936, as a result of the February  
8 Incident, HIROTA succeeded Okada as Premier of Japan.  
9 Instead of taking measures to enforce military disci-  
10 pline and eradicate the interference of the Army in  
11 political affairs, some dire effects of which had  
12 just been exhibited, already in the formation of his  
13 Cabinet he yielded to Army demands as to the choice  
14 of some of his ministers. Moreover, in May 1936,  
15 shortly after he assumed the premiership, the organiza-  
16 tion of the Army and Navy was changed to require that  
17 Army and Navy ministers should be of rank now lower  
18 than lieutenant-general and vice-admiral, and vice-  
19 ministers of rank not lower than major-general and  
20 rear-admiral, and that they should all be on the  
21 active list. Since 1913 the organization had in form  
22 permitted the appointment of reserve officers as  
23 Ministers of War and of the Navy. While the change  
24  
25

1 did, in fact, make the law conform to the existing  
2 practice of appointing War and Navy ministers from  
3 senior officers on the active list, it was done in  
4 compliance with the demand of the Army, who were  
5 thereby assured that whoever became War Minister,  
6 whether on the active list or recalled from the re-  
7 serve list, would be subject to Army discipline and  
8 command and thus to control by the Army.

9 FOREIGN POLICIES UNDER THE HIRATA CABINET

10 On 30 June 1936, the War and Navy Ministries  
11 agreed upon a "Basis of National Policy." The funda-  
12 mental policy was to consist in advancing toward and  
13 developing the South Seas as well as obtaining a firm  
14 position in the East Asiatic Continent for stabiliz-  
15 ing Japan's national defense. The principles stated  
16 were: (1) Japan must strive to correct the aggres-  
17 sive policies of the great powers and to realize the  
18 spirit of the "Imperial Way" by a consistent policy of  
19 overseas expansion; (2) Japan must complete her  
20 national defense and armament to secure the position  
21 of the Empire as the stabilizing power in East Asia;  
22 (3) Japan expects the sound development of Manchukuo  
23 and thus hopes to stabilize Japan-Manchukuo national  
24 defense; in order to promote economic development,  
25 Japan intends to get rid of the menace of the U.S.S.R.;

1 to prepare against Britain and the United States and to  
2 bring about close collaboration between Japan, Man-  
3 chukuo and China; in the execution of this continental  
4 policy, Japan must pay due attention to friendly rela-  
5 tions with other powers; (4) Japan plans to promote  
6 her racial and economical development in the South  
7 Seas, and without rousing other powers will attempt to  
8 extend her strength by moderate and peaceful measures.  
9 Thus with the establishment of Manchukuo, Japan may  
10 expect full development of her natural resources and  
11 develop her national defense.

12           These plans were adopted on 11 August 1936  
13 as the "Basic Principles of National Policy" by the  
14 Five Ministers' Conference, consisting of the Premier,  
15 HIROTA, and the War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Mini-  
16 sters. While HIROTA contends that they were to be  
17 achieved by peaceful means and were defensive in nature,  
18 the contents of these principles speak for themselves.  
19 Japan proposed to assume the role of the leader of  
20 East Asia, thus bringing the entire sphere under her  
21 domination through expansion on the continent and to  
22 the South Seas, to the exclusion of the influence of  
23 western power. As has been previously observed the  
24 use of the words "national defense" in this document  
25 should be noted. They occur in many statements of.



1 Japan's policy. They are never confined to defense  
2 by Japan against the aggressive acts of other nations.  
3 They always mean military support by Japan of her own  
4 policies, aggressive or not.

#### 5 ITAGAKI'S MONGOLIAN POLICY

6 While the HIRATA Cabinet was formulating its  
7 expansionist foreign policy under the name of national  
8 defense, the Kwantung Army had its attention directed  
9 toward Mongolia in the north. Earlier, on 28 March  
10 1936, five days after ITAGAKI was promoted to Chief of  
11 Staff of the Kwantung Army, he had an interview with  
12 Ambassador Arita, expounding his views on the strate-  
13 gic importance of Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia.  
14 ITAGAKI said: "Outer Mongolia is of importance from  
15 the point of view of Japanese-Manchukuoan influence  
16 today, because it is the flank defense of the Siber-  
17 ian Railroad which is a connecting line between Soviet  
18 territory in the Far East and Europe. If Outer Mon-  
19 golia be combined with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet  
20 territory in the Far East will fall into a very danger-  
21 ous condition and it is possible that the influence  
22 of the Soviet Union in the Far East might be removed  
23 without fighting. Therefore, the Army aims to extend  
24 Japanese-Manchurian power into Outer Mongolia by all  
25 means at hand."

In connection with Inner Mongolia, he said:

1 "Western Inner Mongolia and the zone to the west of  
2 these are of great value for executing the continental  
3 policy of Japan. Should the said zone be placed in  
4 the sphere of Japanese and Manchurian influences, it  
5 means that will be a base for pacification of their  
6 brothers of the same race in Outer Mongolia. Moreover,  
7 that the influence of Soviet Russia which comes from  
8 Province of Sinkiang, as well as a land link between  
9 Soviet Russia and China will be blocked. . . . From the  
10 above standpoint, the Imperial Army has been further-  
11 ing its work with regard to Western Inner Mongolia  
12 for several years. The Imperial Army is resolved to  
13 further its work, overcoming all sorts of obstacles."

14  
15 This statement made by ITAGAKI shows what  
16 the Kwantung Army had done and would continue to do in  
17 those areas in line with Japan's "continental policy."  
18 It is to be recalled that a part of Inner Mongolia had  
19 already been brought under Japanese sway by the estab-  
20 lishment of the Inner Mongolia autonomous regime under  
21 Prince Teh through the efforts of LOHIFARA and others  
22 of the Kwantung Army in 1935. All that was left to  
23 be done was to extend the Japanese influence further  
24 west and to Outer Mongolia. This explains why the  
25 seat of the Inner Mongolia autonomous regime under

1 Prince Teh was moved from Pailingmiao to West Sumito  
2 in February 1936, and again to Teh-Hua in June of the  
3 same year.

4 STATE-FOUNDING CONFERENCE IN MONGOLIA

5 As a result of the adoption of a positive  
6 Mongolian policy by Japan, the autonomous movement in  
7 Inner Mongolia made steady progress. In April 1936,  
8 Prince Teh and Li Shou-Hsin met with the Japanese  
9 Special Service Chief Tanaka, Hisshi, at West Wuchu-  
10 muhsin. Representatives of Mengchenhui, Hsilinkuole-  
11 meng, Tsakharman, Ulanchapmang, Tumotechi, Aleshan,  
12 Koshimouchi, Ikechiemeng, Tsinghai and Outer Mongolia  
13 also attended this meeting, which was called the State-  
14 Founding Conference, lasting from 21 to 26 April 1936.  
15 The principal matters decided at the conference were:  
16 (1) A plan to found the Mongolian State by amalgama-  
17 ting Mongolia and Tsinghai; (2) A plan to set up a  
18 monarchy, with a committee system to serve the purpose  
19 for the time being; (3) A plan to found a Mongolian  
20 Congress; (4) A plan to organize a military government;  
21 and (5) A plan to conclude a mutual assistance agree-  
22 ment with Manchukuo.

23  
24 In June 1936, the seat of the regime was  
25 moved to Teh-Hua and an independent Mongolian government  
was set up there. In July 1936, an agreement between

1 this government and Manchukuo was concluded, providing  
2 for mutual political and economic aid. After the con-  
3 clusion of this treaty, Prince Teh set out to equip  
4 his army. The object was to increase cavalry divisions  
5 which had hitherto numbered three to nine. Both HINAMI  
6 and ITAGAKI gave their earnest support for the creation  
7 of the Mongolian State. The Army's policy was carried  
8 out in utmost secrecy. Preparations were made by the  
9 Japanese Army to recognize the independence of Inner  
10 Mongolia.

11 JAPAN'S POLICIES TOWARD NORTH CHINA - 1936-1937

12 On 11 August 1936, "The Second Administrative  
13 Policy Toward North China" was decided by the appro-  
14 priate ministries in the MIROTA Cabinet. The main  
15 purpose of the policy was stated to be to assist the  
16 people in North China to procure perfect independence  
17 in administration, to set up an anti-Communist, pro-  
18 Japanese and pro-Manchukuoan area, to secure necessary  
19 materials for Japan's national defense and to improve  
20 the facilities of transportation against the possible  
21 invasion of Soviet Russia, thus making North China a  
22 base for cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China.  
23 The five provinces in North China should finally be put  
24 under self-government. Advice should be given to the  
25 East Kopei regime to reform their internal administration



1 so as to serve as an example throughout Hopei and Cha-  
2 har. The object of economic development in North China  
3 was stated to be to create an inseparable connection  
4 between China and Japan based on the mutual economic  
5 interest promoted by free investment and also to make  
6 it contribute toward the preservation of friendly  
7 relations between Japan and North China, both in time  
8 of war or peace. Iron, coal and salt in the North  
9 China provinces should be utilized for Japan's national  
10 defense and for the promotion of transportation facili-  
11 ties and electric power. The same plan provided in de-  
12 tail for the unification and improvement of transporta-  
13 tion facilities and the methods of developing natural  
14 resources in North China. There is internal evidence  
15 in this plan that the hopes entertained by Japan at the  
16 end of 1935 that the Hopei-Chahar Political Council  
17 would prove subservient to Japan had been disappointed.  
18 This plan says a fair and square attitude is required  
19 for the guidance of the leaders of Hopei and Chahar.  
20 It says the system should be improved, the personnel  
21 purged and changed, and efforts made to abolish the  
22 financial, economic and military administration of the  
23 Chinese military clique.  
24

25 The content of the self-government which Japan  
now proposed for North China was that the new regime

1 should have control of finances, industry and trans-  
2 portation and should be free of the anti-Japanese inter-  
3 ference of the National Government of China. The plan  
4 at the same time provided that acts must be avoided  
5 which would make it appear as if Japan was infringing  
6 China's territorial rights or establishing an independ-  
7 ent country, or making North China an extension of  
8 Manchukuo. A similar provision, it will be remembered,  
9 appeared in the first plan, or Army plan, for North  
10 China forwarded by the Foreign Office to the Japanese  
11 Ambassador to China on 13 January 1936. The framers of  
12 Japan's policies still believed that black could be  
13 made to look white in the eyes of the world. The ex-  
14 pose' by the League of Nations of Japan's duplicity  
15 in regard to Manchuria had taught them nothing.

17 Subsequently, on 20 February 1937, "The Third  
18 Administrative Policy Toward North China" was decided  
19 upon by the appropriate ministries of the Hayashi Cabi-  
20 net. There was no substantial change in contents.  
21 Again, on 16 April 1937, "The Plan for Guiding North  
22 China" was decided upon by the Foreign, Finance, War  
23 and Navy Ministers of the same Cabinet. The essence of  
24 the plan was to make the Chinese Government recognize  
25 the special position of North China and to carry out  
economic measures. Both the Third Administrative

Policy Toward North China and the Plan for Guiding North

1 China decided upon by the Hayashi Cabinet will be  
2 treated in more detail later.

3 THE FENGTAI INCIDENT

4 In May 1936, as a result of negotiations con-  
5 ducted between the Japanese forces and the Chinese  
6 authorities in North China, one Japanese battalion was  
7 permitted to be stationed at Fengtai, a town west of  
8 Peiping. On 18 September 1936, an incident occurred  
9 when a company of Japanese soldiers carried out maneu-  
10 vers in Fengtai. As they passed through the garrison  
11 line of the Chinese troops there, the Chinese patrols  
12 attempted to halt them and a clash ensued. Although it  
13 was immediately settled, the Japanese used this incident  
14 as a pretext for reenforcement and occupied Fengtai.  
15 With the occupation of Fengtai, the Japanese were in a  
16 position to control the communications of the Peiping-  
17 Hankow Railway line and to cut off North China from Cen-  
18 tral China. This was the stage-setting for the Lukou-  
19 chiao Incident, sometimes referred to as the Marco  
20 Polo Bridge Incident which occurred on 7 July 1937.  
21 The bridge is on the railway from Fengtai to Peiping  
22 and if the Japanese could gain control of the bridge,  
23 their control of Peiping from the west would be facili-  
24 tated. The Japanese forces stationed at Fengtai then  
25

1 repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese  
2 garrison from Lukouchiao and also from Chang-Sin-Tien,  
3 another strategic point on the railway leading to Peiping.  
4 In the winter of 1936, the Japanese intended to reen-  
5 force their garrison force in this vital strategic  
6 area and planned the building of barracks and an air-  
7 field there. For this purpose they wished to pur-  
8 chase large tracts of land in the area between Fengtai  
9 and Lukouchiao. These demands, however, were refused  
10 by the Chinese.

#### 11 THE CHANG-KAWAGOE TALKS

12 In the autumn of 1936, a series of talks was  
13 held between the Chinese Foreign Minister Chang Chun  
14 and the Japanese Ambassador Kawagoe, with a view to  
15 adjusting Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations. Kawagoe  
16 also had an interview with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-  
17 shek at the end of November 1936, and there was a  
18 mutual expression of the desire to see the diplomatic  
19 relations between the two countries adjusted. During  
20 the talks with the Chinese Foreign Minister, the  
21 Japanese side submitted a proposal embodying the  
22 following important points: (1) Sino-Japanese  
23 economic cooperation; (2) Sino-Japanese Anti-Comintern  
24 Agreement; and (3) North China to be designated a  
25 special area in view of its relationship with Japan.



1 Cheng Chun responded that he was, of course, in favor  
2 of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation but wished this  
3 to be based on the principle of reciprocity and equality.  
4 He was also very much in favor of Sino-Japanese Anti-  
5 Comintern agreement, but here too he wanted to see that  
6 the agreement would not infringe upon China's sover-  
7 eignty. As to making North China a special area on  
8 account of its relation with Japan, he could only  
9 recognize a special economic relation, but would not  
10 be able to recognize any special administrative changes.  
11 These talks achieved no results since the attitude  
12 of the Chinese Government was incompatible with  
13 Japan's policies, particularly with regard to North  
14 China.

#### 15 THE FALL OF THE HIROTA CABINET

16 On 20 January 1937, one of Japan's two poli-  
17 tical parties, the Seiyukai Party, issued a declara-  
18 tion attacking the HIROTA Cabinet on the ground, inter  
19 alia, that its members were too much influenced by the  
20 dogmatic prejudices of the bureaucrats and of the  
21 military, and that the wish of the military to inter-  
22 fere in every sphere was a threat to constitutional  
23 government in Japan. On 22 January 1937, War Minister  
24 Terauchi tendered his resignation because, as he  
25 stated, the views on the prevailing situation held by

1 the political party which had some members sitting as  
2 cabinet members differed fundamentally from the Army's.  
3 Under the then existing situation, there was no hope  
4 of getting a new War Minister who could in any manner  
5 reconcile the extremist policy of the Army with the  
6 party politics, and the HIROTA Cabinet had to resign.

#### 7 UGAKI FAILED TO FORM A CABINET

8 Upon the resignation of the HIROTA Cabinet,  
9 Ugaki, on 24 January 1937, was given the Imperial Man-  
10 date to form a new Cabinet. Ugaki was not regarded  
11 with favor by the Army, which took appropriate and  
12 effective steps to prevent his accession to office.  
13 This was an important and significant happening, dis-  
14 cussed in more detail in another part of this Judg-  
15 ment. Accordingly we do no more than mention the mat-  
16 ter at this point as part of the narrative of events.

#### 17 THE HAYASHI CABINET AND ITS NORTH CHINA POLICY

18 The Hayashi Cabinet was formed on 2 February  
19 1937. UMEZU remained as Vice-Minister of War and KAYA  
20 was made Vice-Minister of Finance. The general policy  
21 of the Government was not changed. Continuing the es-  
22 trangement policy of the HIROTA Cabinet with regard to  
23 North China, "The Third Administrative Policy Toward  
24 North China" was decided on by the Ministries con-  
25 cerned on 20 February 1937. The principal object of

1 administering North China was stated to be to complete  
2 Japan's aim of making Manchukuo strongly pro-Japanese  
3 and anti-communistic, to procure defense materials, to  
4 protect transportation, to prepare defense against the  
5 U.S.S.R. and to establish unity among Japan, Manchukuo  
6 and China. To attain the above-mentioned object, Japan  
7 should carry out her economic policy in North China,  
8 secretly aid the government of North China and make  
9 the Chinese National Government recognize the special  
10 position of North China and the unity of Japan, Man-  
11 chukuo and China.

12           Again, on 16 April 1937 the "Plan for Guid-  
13 ing North China" was decided on by the Foreign, Finance,  
14 War and Navy Ministers. The essence of the guidance  
15 of North China was stated to be "to make the said area  
16 virtually a firm anti-communistic pro-Manchukuo Japan-  
17 ese region, and also to contribute to the acquisition  
18 of communicational facilities, thus partly preparing  
19 against the Red threat and partly forming a founda-  
20 tion for realizing the unity of mutual aid of Japan,  
21 Manchukuo and China." Regarding economic exploita-  
22 tion, the plan provided that the development of those  
23 military resources vital to national defense, such as  
24 iron, coal, salt and so forth, and the establishment  
25 of communications, should be speedily realized, by

1 special capital if necessary. Again the provision  
2 appears that actions which will cause other powers to  
3 misunderstand Japan's intentions must be avoided. The  
4 formulation of these policies in the Cabinet, partici-  
5 pated in by the various Ministries concerned, revealed  
6 that not only the Army but also the other departments  
7 of the Government stood ready for some positive pro-  
8 gram in regard to North China to be carried out in  
9 the near future.

10 THE FIRST KONOYE CABINET AND FURTHER PLANNING AGAINST  
11 NORTH CHINA

12 After the fall of the Hayashi Cabinet, Prince  
13 Konoye assumed the Premiership on 4 June 1937, with  
14 HIROTA as Foreign Minister and KAYA as Finance Minister.

15 In Army circles, there was agitation for fur-  
16 ther military action in China. TOJO, Hideki, then  
17 Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, sent a telegram  
18 on 9 June 1937 to the Army General Staff with the sug-  
19 gestion that judging from the present situation in  
20 China from the point of view of military preparations  
21 against Soviet Russia, Japan should "deliver a blow"  
22 first of all upon the Chinese National Government to  
23 get rid of the menace at the back if Japan's military  
24 power permitted it. In less than one month the sug-  
25 gested blow against the National Government of China



was delivered.

1           The events we have just reviewed show that  
2 the seizure of Manchuria and Jehol was only the first  
3 step in Japan's plan gradually to control the whole of  
4 China so that that country with its great market for  
5 Japan's manufactured goods and its enormous natural re-  
6 sources would help to make Japan the overlord of East  
7 Asia. No sooner had Manchuria and Jehol been seized,  
8 and while yet their conversion to satellite feeders of  
9 Japan's economy was hardly begun, than in the spring of  
10 1934 Japan was claiming a special position in regard to  
11 the five northern provinces of China. By June 1935  
12 Japan had forced the conclusion of the so-called "Ho-  
13 UMEZU" and Ching-DOKIARA Agreements, whereby the hold  
14 of the National Government of China over two of these  
15 provinces, Hopei and Chahar, was substantially loosened.  
16 By the end of the year 1935 the support of Japan had  
17 established two so-called independent governments,  
18 which were her creatures, the Inner Mongolian Govern-  
19 ment of Prince Teh and the East Hopei Anti-Communist  
20 Autonomous Government, whose capital was at Tungchow.  
21 By that time also there had been set up the Hopei-  
22 Chahar Political Council which Japan expected to be  
23 able to turn into a government of the five northern  
24 provinces which would be independent of the National  
25

Government of China and subservient to Japan's will.

1 Japan intended to follow the anticipated declaration of  
2 independence of the five northern provinces by a mili-  
3 tary occupation of them, and the military plans for this  
4 occupation and for the propoganda which was to accom-  
5 pany the movement were prepared for execution by the  
6 end of the year 1935. Neither persuasion nor the  
7 threat of force induced the Hopei-Chehar Political  
8 Council to proclaim the independence of the five north-  
9 ern provinces and, in our opinion, the occupation of  
10 these provinces by the Japanese Army would have occurred  
11 much earlier than it did if events in Japan had not  
12 compelled the Japanese Army to increase and consoli-  
13 date its influence over the Government of Japan so  
14 that it might control that government in support of  
15 its military adventure. As a result of the military  
16 revolt of February 1936 the Army got rid of the Okada  
17 Cabinet which was not supporting the Army's ambitious  
18 policies, but that revolt revealed a grave lack of  
19 discipline and responsibility among the younger ele-  
20 ments in the army which called for a pause while dis-  
21 cipline was re-established. HIROTA, the next Premier,  
22 and the War, Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers in  
23 his Cabinet, were wholly in favor of the expansionist  
24 policy which the army advocated, and the latter half  
25

1 of the year 1936 saw the adoption by some or all of  
2 them of the "Basis of National Policy of June 1936"  
3 and of the "Basic Principles of National Policy" and  
4 the "Second Administrative Policy toward North China"  
5 of August 1936. Meantime the Army had secured a foot-  
6 ing at Fengtai which should enable it to seize the  
7 Marco Polo Bridge, cut off the five northern provinces  
8 from the rest of China to the southward, and control  
9 Peiping. But the HIROTA Cabinet was not wholly in  
10 favor of the policies of the Army. There were elements  
11 in it which resented the increasing control of the  
12 military over the Government. These had to be got  
13 rid of, and in January 1937 the military brought about  
14 the fall of the HIROTA Cabinet and the failure of  
15 Ugaki to form a government. Finally in the beginning  
16 of June 1937, after the fall of the short-lived Hayashi  
17 Cabinet, Prince Konoye formed his first Cabinet, and  
18 government support for the adventures of the military  
19 was at last assured. The way was clear for the next  
20 step in Japan's plan to subjugate China.  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

## SECTION IV.

FROM THE MARCO POLO BRIDGE INCIDENT  
(7 July 1937) TO THE KONOYE DECLARATION  
OF 16 JANUARY 1938

1  
2  
3 Under the Boxer Protocol of 7 September 1901  
4 (Annex No. B-2), China granted to the Powers having  
5 legations at Peiping the right to station guards in  
6 the Legation Quarters and at twelve specified points  
7 along the railway between Peiping and Tientsin for the  
8 maintenance of open communication between the capital  
9 and the sea. By a supplementary agreement of  
10 15 July 1902 foreign troops stationed at these points  
11 were given the right to carry on field exercises and  
12 rifle practice without informing the Chinese authorities  
13 except in the case of feux de guerre.  
14

15 At the beginning of July 1937 Japan maintained  
16 a force, variously estimated from 7,000 to 15,000, in  
17 North China, while the other Protocol powers had only  
18 small detachments. The British had a total of 1007,  
19 including 252 members of the Legation Guards; the strength  
20 of the French effectives stationed in Hopei Province var-  
21 ied between 1700 and 1900, the bulk of whom were at  
22 Tientsin. The number of the Japanese troops greatly  
23 exceeded that needed to carry out the duties under the  
24 Protocol. From June 1937 the Japanese troops carried  
25 out intense night maneuvers in the vicinity of Lukouchiao



(Marco Polo Bridge). These maneuvers were held every night, while night maneuvers held by other foreign garrison troops were very much less frequent than those conducted by the Japanese. The Chinese had requested that notice be given beforehand of the night maneuvers, in order that the inhabitants of the territory should not be disturbed. To this the Japanese had agreed. On the night of 7 July 1937 the maneuvers were carried on without notice. It was therefore under an atmosphere of tension and unrest that on that night the Lukouchiao Incident broke out.

At about ten o'clock in the evening, the Chinese authorities received a telephone message from Matsui, **Takuro**, Chief of the Japanese Special Services in Peiping, alleging that one of the Japanese soldiers was reported missing after the Chinese garrison forces in Wanping had opened fire at the Japanese maneuvering troops, and demanding that the Japanese troops be allowed entry into the city of Wanping to conduct searches. Wanping is in the neighborhood of Loukouchiao which, being on the main communication line west of Peiping, was of considerable strategic importance. Prior to July 1937 the Japanese forces at Fengtai had repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the Chinese forces stationed at this place.

We have already noticed that in 1936 the Japanese had endeavored to take up a large tract of land between Fengtai to the west of Peiping and Lukouchiao for the purpose of erecting barracks and an airfield, and how that endeavor failed. The strategic effect on North China of the removal of Chinese troops from Lukouchiao and the establishment of military posts by the Japanese between Fengtai and Lukouchiao is obvious. Peiping would be completely cut off from the South and West.

General Chin Teh-Chun, at the time acting as Commander of the 29th Army in the absence of General Sung Che-Yuan who was then on leave at his home, instructed the Chinese liaison authorities to reply to the Japanese demand for entry into Wanping that the maneuvers held under the circumstances of that night were illegal and therefore the Chinese authorities had no responsibility whatsoever for the allegedly missing soldier. However, he said that he would order the Chinese troops stationed at Wanping to conduct a search on their own behalf. The Japanese, not satisfied with the reply, insisted on conducting the search themselves.

Wang Len-Chai, Administrative Commissioner in the city of Wanping, was ordered by General Chin to

1 investigate and report on the maneuvering of the  
2 Japanese troops and whether any Japanese soldier was  
3 missing. In the meantime, a report came to the Chinese  
4 authorities that a battalion of Japanese troops with  
5 six pieces of artillery was advancing from Fengtai to  
6 Loukouchiao. Chinese troops were thereupon ordered to  
7 be alert, while Wang Len-Chai was sent to negotiate  
8 with Matsui. While the investigation conducted by Wang  
9 Len-Chai did not locate the allegedly missing soldier  
10 and subsequent discussion with Matsui brought about  
11 no result, it was decided that a joint investigation  
12 should be conducted on the spot. After Wang Len-Chai  
13 and the Japanese representative Terahira entered the  
14 city, the Japanese troops encircled it on three sides  
15 and opened fire. Chinese forces defended the city  
16 from the walls. At five o'clock in the morning of  
17 8 July 1937, while the investigation was still going on,  
18 a Japanese battalion under its Commander Ichiki attacked  
19 the Chinese troops at Lungwangmiao in the neighborhood  
20 of Lukouchiao. At about six o'clock the Japanese  
21 began to attack the walled city of Wanping with  
22 machine gun fire.  
23  
24

25 SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS FOR TRUCE

In the morning of 8 July 1937 the railway

1 bridge leading to Chang-Sin-Fien was captured by the  
2 Japanese. In the afternoon of the same day the Japanese  
3 sent an ultimatum to the Commander of the city of  
4 Wenping to surrender before seven o'clock in the evening,  
5 failing which, bombardment would begin. The Chinese,  
6 however, stood firm and promptly at seven the Japanese  
7 bombardment began. On the next day, 9 July 1937, the  
8 Japanese, through Matsui and others, informed General  
9 Chin that the missing soldier had been found and asked  
10 for a truce with the following conditions: (1) All  
11 military actions should cease on both sides; (2) Troops  
12 of both sides should return to their original positions;  
13 (3) The 37th Division, which entertained more hostile  
14 feeling towards Japan, should be replaced by another  
15 unit of the 29th Army for the defense of Wenping. An  
16 understanding was also to be reached on both sides to  
17 refrain from developing henceforth incidents of similar  
18 nature. The truce was agreed to on the same day.

19 Chinese units under the command of Lieutenant-  
20 Colonel Chi Hsin-Wen retreated to their original  
21 positions, while the Japanese units were to withdraw  
22 toward Fengtai. At this point the incident might well  
23 be considered as having been settled, if the Japanese  
24 had conformed to the terms of the truce. But, it was  
25 later ascertained that some one hundred Japanese



1 soldiers along the railway tunnel were not withdrawn  
2 as agreed. During midnight on 9 July 1937 the Japanese  
3 troops there again fired into the city. Thereafter,  
4 Japanese troops continued to pour into the troubled area.  
5 By 12 July there were 20,000 Japanese troops and 100 air-  
6 planes in the area. There then occurred sporadic clashes  
7 between the two forces until the 27th of July when, as  
8 hereafter related, hostilities on a large scale broke out.

#### 9 ATTITUDE OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

10 The official telegram reporting the outbreak of  
11 hostilities reached Tokyo on 8 July 1937. On the follow-  
12 ing day the Konove Cabinet, in an extraordinary meeting,  
13 decided that the government attitude should be to hold  
14 fast to the policy of arresting the scope of the dis-  
15 turbance and to seek a prompt local settlement of the  
16 matter. Notwithstanding this decision of the Cabinet,  
17 the General Staff decided on 10 July 1937 to re-enforce  
18 the garrison by sending two brigades from the Kwantung  
19 Army, one division from Korea and three divisions from  
20 Japan. The Cabinet, of which HIROTA and KAYA were  
21 members, approved the Army plan on 11 July. Units of  
22 the Kwantung Army were sent to the Peiping and Tientsin  
23 area. However, on the night of 11 July 1937, upon  
24 receipt of the report from the North China Forces that  
25

the Chinese had come to terms, the Supreme Command decided  
1 to stop mobilization of the divisions in Japan proper.  
2 On 13 July 1937 the Supreme Command adopted the "Policy  
3 for the Treatment of the North China Incident", which  
4 provided that while the Japanese Army would follow the  
5 localization policy and would decide mobilization of  
6 the homeland forces in the light of future developments,  
7 they would nevertheless take resolute steps, if the  
8 Chinese neglected the terms they agreed upon, or showed  
9 their insincerity by moving their troops to North China.  
10

11 From 17 July 1937 while negotiations were being  
12 carried on between the North China Garrison Forces and  
13 the 29th Army on the spot, and between the Japanese  
14 diplomatic officials and the Chinese Government at  
15 Nanking, the Japanese Supreme Command proceeded to  
16 prepare for mobilization in Japan which had been  
17 interrupted on 11 July 1937. Even after Sung Che-Yuan,  
18 Commander of the 29th Army and head of the Hobei-Chahar  
19 Political Council, was reported to have come to terms  
20 on 18 July 1937, the Japanese Supreme Command still  
21 pushed forward preparations for mobilization on the ground  
22 that the Chinese Government had shown no sincerity.  
23 On 20 July 1937 the Cabinet authorized mobilization of  
24 three divisions. One week later the Commander of the  
25 North China Garrison Forces reported that, having

1 exhausted every means of peaceful settlement, he had  
 2 decided to use force to chastise the 29th Army and  
 3 requested approval, which was given by the Supreme  
 4 Command. In the meantime, mobilization orders were  
 5 issued for four divisions. Also, ostensibly for the  
 6 protection of Japanese residents in Shanghai and Tsingtao,  
 7 one division was to be reserved for each city.

8 It is important to note that under the "Draft  
 9 of the Outline for the Military Disposal of Various  
 10 Railways in North China" of 2 December 1935, which  
 11 provided for a sweep by the Japanese forces of the  
 12 provinces of Shantung, Hopeh and Shansi, Tsingtao  
 13 was the port at which reinforcements from Japan were  
 14 to be landed to take part in the sweep.

15 On the diplomatic front, the Japanese Foreign  
 16 Office took prompt measures to strengthen the diplomatic  
 17 staff in North China, following the Cabinet meeting on  
 18 11 July 1937 in which the important decision was made  
 19 to take necessary steps in connection with the dispatch-  
 20 ing of troops to North China. On 11 July 1937, Hidaka,  
 21 Counsellor to the Japanese Embassy at Nanking, was  
 22 instructed by the Foreign Office to notify the Chinese  
 23 Government of the intention of the Japanese Government  
 24 to settle the matter locally and to request the Chinese  
 25 Government not to obstruct the Japanese efforts (to save

1 the situation promptly). When the Chinese Foreign  
2 Minister demanded the withdrawal of Japanese troops  
3 from the places of disturbance and the cessation of  
4 sending re-enforcements from Manchuria, Korea and  
5 Japan proper, Hidaka evaded the issue by asking the  
6 Chinese Foreign Minister whether the Chinese Government  
7 had any intention of denying any agreement reached between  
8 the Japanese and Chinese authorities on the spot. After  
9 the Chinese Foreign Minister had pointed out in an  
10 official note that any local understanding or agreement  
11 would take effect only on confirmation by the Chinese  
12 Government, Hidaka was again instructed by the Japanese  
13 Foreign Office on 17 July 1937 to demand that the Chinese  
14 Government should not obstruct the execution of the terms  
15 of the settlement reached on the spot. It had thus be-  
16 come clear that what the Japanese authorities conceived  
17 as local settlement was the acceptance of Japanese  
18 demands by the North China authorities without the con-  
19 firmation of the Chinese Government. Acceptance of this  
20 proposal would obviously have the dual effect of weaken-  
21 ing the power of the local authorities by depriving them  
22 of the support of the Central Government, and of virtual  
23 recognition by the Central Government of an autonomous  
24 North China.  
25



UNITED STATES OFFICE OF GOOD OFFICES

1 The hostilities which broke out in North China  
2 had caused serious concern to the third powers who desired  
3 to see peace in the Far East. On 16 July 1937 United  
4 States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, issued a state-  
5 ment to the effect that the United States constantly and  
6 consistently had advocated maintenance of peace, national  
7 and international self-restraint, abstinence by all nations  
8 from use of force in pursuit of policy, adjustment of  
9 international differences by peaceful means, faithful  
10 observance of international agreements, upholding of the  
11 sanctity of treaties, respect of nations for rights of  
12 others, and a revitalizing and strengthening of interna-  
13 tional law, and that the United States would avoid enter-  
14 ing into alliances or entangling commitments but believed  
15 in cooperative effort by peaceful and practicable means  
16 in support of the above principles.

18 It was on the same day that the Chinese Govern-  
19 ment sent a memorandum to all the powers signatory to the  
20 Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10), and on the next day,  
21 17 July 1937 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek made a speech  
22 emphasizing that China was not seeking war but merely  
23 meeting attacks on her very existence. He then mentioned  
24 as minimum considerations for peaceful solution the follow-  
25 ing four points: (1) No encroachment on China's

1 sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) no altera-  
2 tions in the administrative system of the Hopei and  
3 Chahar Provinces; (3) no involuntary removal of princi-  
4 pal officers appointed by the Central Government; and  
5 (4) no restrictions to be imposed on the garrison dis-  
6 tricts of the 29th Army. On 19 July 1937 the Chinese  
7 Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented a memorandum to  
8 the Japanese Embassy in Nanking in which the Chinese  
9 Government renewed its proposal for simultaneous  
10 cessation of troop movements on both sides and mutual  
11 withdrawal of troops to their original positions on a  
12 date to be agreed upon by both parties. It also stated  
13 unequivocally that for the settlement of the incident,  
14 the Chinese Government was prepared to accept any  
15 pacific means known to international law or treaties,  
16 such as direct negotiations, good offices, mediation  
17 and arbitration.

18  
19 Mr. Hull, in an effort to settle the matter before  
20 it spread too far, held a talk with the Japanese Ambassa-  
21 dor on 21 July 1937. Among other things, he told the  
22 Japanese Ambassador that the United States Government  
23 was ready and would be most glad at any time to say or  
24 do anything, short of mediation, which, of course, would  
25 require the agreement of both parties in advance, which

might in any way contribute towards composing the  
1 present matters of controversy between Japan and China.  
2 But the attitude of Japan was made clear by Foreign  
3 Minister HIROTA who, in a speech made on 27 July  
4 1937 before the Budget Committee of the Diet, stated  
5 that the Japanese Government would reject any third  
6 power intervention. On 10 August 1937 three days  
7 before the outbreak of hostilities in Shanghai, Mr.  
8 Joseph Grew, the United States Ambassador in Tokyo,  
9 told the Japanese Foreign Minister that his Government  
10 had authorized him to make a definite offer of good  
11 offices. Following this, the Japanese Ambassador in  
12 Washington, in a note to the Department of State dated  
13 13 August 1937 stated that while Japan concurred in  
14 the principles contained in the statement made by Mr.  
15 Hull on 16 July 1937 concerning maintenance of world  
16 peace, it was the belief of the Japanese Government  
17 that the objectives of those principles would be  
18 attained only by a full recognition and practical con-  
19 sideration of the actual circumstances of the Far  
20 Eastern region. The United States Department of State,  
21 however, on 23 August 1937 issued a press release  
22 reaffirming the principles laid down by the Hull state-  
23 ment of 16 July 1937 and urging the settlement of diffi-  
24 culties by negotiations.  
25

THE LANGFANG INCIDENT

1           Despite the truce, fighting again broke out on  
2 14 July 1937. Wanping was continuously shelled by  
3 Japanese artillery. On 18 July (1937) Sung Che-Yuan  
4 called on Katsuki, Commander of the Japanese Garrison  
5 Forces, and expressed regrets, as demanded by the  
6 Japanese Army.  
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1 However, this did not ease the tension. Numerous inci-  
2 dents occurred. On the 25th of July a clash occurred at  
3 Langfang between Peiping and Tientsin between a company  
4 of Japanese troops and Chinese forces. There was another  
5 clash the next day at the Kwanganmen Gate of Peiping as  
6 a battalion of Japanese infantry endeavored to enter the  
7 city for the purpose of protecting the Japanese residents.  
8 While the exact cause of the outbreak of these incidents  
9 is not clear it is significant that on the 26th the  
10 Japanese had sent an ultimatum to the Chinese demanding,  
11 inter alia, the withdrawal of the Chinese 27th Division  
12 from the Peiping Area within twenty-four hours, failing  
13 which, Japan would attack with large forces.

#### 14 JAPAN'S ULTIMATUM REJECTED

15 On 27 July 1937 the day after the Japanese had  
16 delivered the ultimatum, Premier Konoye announced that  
17 in sending troops to North China, the Government had no  
18 other purpose than to preserve peace in East Asia.  
19 Japan's ultimatum was not accepted. Fighting broke out  
20 on 27 July 1937 at Fengtai and in the vicinity of  
21 Lukouchiao. Katsuki, Commander of the Japanese Garrison  
22 Forces, ordered reinforcements from Tientsin and Tungchow  
23 with strong equipment and more than thirty airplanes.  
24 In the early morning of 28 July 1937, the Japanese made  
25 an onslaught at Nanyuan, outside the city of Peiping,

with aircraft and artillery, inflicting heavy casualties  
1 on the Chinese. Large scale hostilities had thus  
2 developed.

#### 3 REACTION IN GERMANY

4 On 28 July 1937 the Japanese Ambassador  
5 Mushakoji called upon the German Reichminister Weizsacker  
6 and stated that Japan felt that Germany did not understand  
7 the anti-communistic efforts which the Japanese action  
8 in China constituted. He tried to show that Japan was  
9 doing anti-communistic work in China also for Germany's  
10 benefit. However, Weizsacker replied that he could not  
11 deduce an obligation on the part of Germany to approve  
12 or assist morally a Japanese action which might easily  
13 lead to the fostering of communism in China, the very  
14 opposite of the aim of both Germany and Japan.

15 On the same day, Weizsacker sent a telegram to  
16 the German Ambassador in Tokyo, instructing him to advise  
17 the Japanese to be moderate. He told the Ambassador that  
18 attempts of Japan to base measures in China as a fight  
19 against communism on the strength of the Anti-Comintern  
20 Pact were devious, as the said Pact had not the objective  
21 of fighting Bolshevism in the territory of third states.  
22 On the contrary, Japan's actions were rather considered  
23 to be contrary to the Anti-Comintern Pact because they  
24 would obstruct the consolidation of China and thus  
25

1 promote the spread of communism. Weizsacker further  
2 stated that the radio propoganda carried on by Japan in  
3 Germany, attempting to represent the war against China  
4 as a fight against communism, was unwelcome.

5 In the light of the German attitude and the  
6 nature of the operations adopted by the Japanese very  
7 grave doubts are thrown on the Japanese reiterated decla-  
8 rations that they were primarily concerned in combating  
9 communism. Such declarations were repeatedly made by  
10 DOHIHARA and ITAGAKI in their initial efforts to estab-  
11 lish the autonomous movement in North China. The Reich-  
12 minister seemed to have foreseen a situation which was  
13 later testified to by a witness in this trial, that the  
14 Chinese communists began to gather strength in the  
15 troubled conditions developing after the outbreak of  
16 the Lukouchiao Incident and that it was the Japanese  
17 who thus nurtured the communist movement.

#### 18 PEIPING CAPTURED

19  
20 On the same day, 28 July 1937, Generalissimo  
21 Chiang Kai-shek ordered General Sung Che-Yuan to retreat  
22 to Paoting in southern Hopei and to direct operations  
23 from there. During the next two days, 29 and 30 July  
24 1937, intense fighting took place in Tientsin where the  
25 Chinese forces put up a stiff stand, but subsequently  
they fell back toward the south along the Tientsin-Pukow

1 Railway, while other troops fell back along the Peiping-  
 2 Hankow Railway. Thus Peiping was isolated and finally  
 3 captured on 8 August 1937 by the Japanese forces under  
 4 the command of Kawabe, Shozo, who paraded the streets of  
 5 Peiping with his troops announced by proclamations  
 6 posted at important places that he was the military  
 7 governor, and threatened with death anyone who would defy  
 8 his edicts. According to neutral observers, within eight  
 9 weeks after the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese  
 10 had about 160,000 troops fighting in North China.

#### 11 THE OYAMA INCIDENT

12 While the hostilities in North China were pro-  
 13 gressing and following the capture of Peiping by Japanese  
 14 troops on 8 August 1937 another incident causing grave  
 15 concern to the world occurred in Shanghai on the very  
 16 next day. In the afternoon of 9 August 1937 Sub-  
 17 Lieutenant Oyama and his driver, Seaman Saito, of the  
 18 Japanese Naval Landing Party, were killed in front of the  
 19 airdrome on Hungjao Road in a suburb of Shanghai while  
 20 trying to enter the airdrome. The evidence as to the  
 21 details of the incident is contradictory. However, one  
 22 point is established beyond doubt; namely, that Oyama had  
 23 no authority to enter the airdrome. In any event the  
 24 incident, though it contributed to the tenseness of the  
 25 situation generally, is of little importance as the



Japanese did not allege it as an excuse or justification  
1 for their subsequent operations.

2 OTHER EVENTS PRECEDING THE SHANGHAI WAR

3 After the Oyama Incident occurred, the situation  
4 in Shanghai became extremely tense. Within less than  
5 forty-eight hours thereafter Japan concentrated about  
6 thirty warships in Shanghai and increased her armed forces  
7 by several thousands. At the same time, demands calcu-  
8 lated to remove or undermine Chinese defense were made  
9 on the Chinese authorities. Hostilities broke out on  
10 13 August 1937 and furious fighting continued thereafter.

11 As may be recalled, in the early part of 1932  
12 the hostilities in the Shanghai region were brought to an  
13 end by the conclusion of the Cease-Fire Agreement of  
14 5 May 1932 which stipulated that the Chinese troops would  
15 remain in the positions which they occupied at that date  
16 pending later arrangements upon the establishment of  
17 normal conditions in the area. The Chinese delegation  
18 to the Shanghai Conference, in accepting the Agreement,  
19 then declared in particular that it was understood that  
20 nothing in this Agreement implied any permanent restric-  
21 tion on the movements of Chinese troops in Chinese  
22 territory. In June 1937 acting on a report that the  
23 Chinese were reinforcing the Peace Preservation Corps in  
24 what he called "the forbidden area" and were constructing  
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1 defense works there, including the reconstruction of  
2 the Woosung Fortress, Okamoto, the Japanese Consul-  
3 General in Shanghai, called for a meeting of the Joint  
4 Commission set up under

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the Cease-Fire Agreement. At the meeting held on 23  
1 June 1937 Mayor Yui Hung-Chun, the Chinese representative,  
2 took the position that the matter was not within the pro-  
3 vince of the Joint Commission, whose duty was, as was  
4 clear from the Agreement, to supervise the withdrawal of  
5 troops. The representatives of the participating powers  
6 concluded that they could not express an opinion on con-  
7 flicting interpretations. While stating that he was not  
8 authorized to give any information concerning the number  
9 of Peace Preservation Corps in the Shanghai area and the  
10 question of fortifications, the Chinese representative  
11 did give an assurance that nothing undertaken in the area  
12 had any hostile intention or the nature of warlike pre-  
13 paration.

15 On or about 15 July 1937 after the hostilities  
16 broke out in North China, Mayor Yui invited Consul-  
17 General Okamoto and the Japanese military and naval at-  
18 taches to a meeting at which the Mayor expressed his de-  
19 sire to prevent the spread of hostilities to Shanghai and  
20 asked the Japanese to co-operate. Okamoto promised co-  
21 operation and asked that China control terrorism and anti-  
22 Japanese movement. Thereafter, they maintained close  
23 touch with each other. At times the Mayor called on  
24 Okamoto two or three times a day, requesting the latter  
25 to restrain certain actions on the part of the Japanese

marines. The actions which the Chinese complained of were such as maneuvers and emergency guard measures taken  
1 by the Japanese marines. According to Okamoto, he and  
2 the Commander of the Japanese Naval Landing Party agreed  
3 to restrain the maneuvers, but as to the emergency guard  
4 measures, he explained that they were taken as a result  
5 of the disappearance of a Japanese sailor by the name of  
6 Miyazaki, who was, however, subsequently found.

7  
8 In Japan following the occurrence of the Oyama  
9 Incident, the Army was notified by the Navy on 10 August  
10 1937 that for the time being the units in Shanghai would  
11 take no further steps, but circumstances might require  
12 preparations for sending troops. The Japanese Govern-  
13 ment then decided that it would be worthwhile to study  
14 the proposal for eventual mobilization. After the In-  
15 cident, the Japanese Naval Landing Party at Shanghai was  
16 reinforced by 1000 men from Japan. By noon of 11 August  
17 1937 there was a relatively large fleet, including the  
18 Flagship Idzumo and other naval vessels, at the Shanghai  
19 waterfront. On 12 August 1937, another meeting of the  
20 Joint Commission was held in Shanghai. While reiterating  
21 that the Commission had no authority over the issues,  
22 the Chinese representative pointed out that it was Japan  
23 who had rendered the Cease-Fire Agreement null and void  
24 by stationing armed forces at Paitzuchiao or the Eight  
25



1 Character Bridge, a place far beyond the railway from  
2 which it had been agreed that the Japanese forces would  
3 be withdrawn, and consequently Japan had no right to in-  
4 voke the agreement. He further pointed out that Japanese  
5 armaments and supplies were being landed and further re-  
6 inforcements were on the way; that these measures con-  
7 stituted a serious threat to the peace and order in  
8 Shanghai, and that China had the right to adopt measures  
9 for self-defense. The Japanese representative admitted  
10 in the meeting that Japanese forces had been in the Pait-  
11 zuchiao area and made no denial of the naval concentra-  
12 tion and reinforcements, other than an explanation that  
13 the Naval Landing Party had not yet prepared to do any-  
14 thing, while the Chinese representative also reiterated  
15 that the statement that the right to adopt measures of  
16 self-defense accounted for her military movements.

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18 At the same meeting on 12 August 1937 when the  
19 parties were asked to give assurance not to make an at-  
20 tack within forty-eight hours, the Chinese stated that  
21 they would not attack unless they were first attacked,  
22 while the Japanese rejoined that they would cause no  
23 trouble unless provoked or challenged, and then related  
24 the case of the arrest of a Japanese newspaperman by  
25 the Chinese as an illustration of provocation. The  
meeting brought about no solution of the trouble.

THE SHANGHAI WAR

1 On 13 August 1937, fighting broke out at a  
2 point near the headquarters of the Japanese Naval  
3 Landing Party and at another point in the Paitzuchiao  
4 area. The Japanese alleged that the cause of the out-  
5 break was the firing by Chinese troops on the Japanese  
6 Landing Party. On this point the evidence is contra-  
7 dictory. Even if their version was correct it would  
8 not, in our opinion, justify the extent and magnitude  
9 of the operations which followed as hereafter related.

11 As soon as the clash occurred, the Japanese  
12 Government on 15 August 1937 announced its decision to  
13 dispatch a force of two divisions from the homeland for  
14 the declared purpose of protecting Japanese subjects in  
15 Shanghai. A mobilization order was also issued on the  
16 same day and MATSUI, Iwane, was appointed Commander of  
17 the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Shanghai. Clearly,  
18 the Japanese Cabinet had decided to abandon the policy  
19 of localization. Fighting in the Shanghai area was in-  
20 tense. Further Japanese reinforcements arrived at Shang-  
21 hai on 23 August 1937. Aircraft were brought into action  
22 by both sides. Japanese airplanes bombed Nanking, the  
23 capital of China, and numerous aerial bombardments were  
24 carried out on the ports, and also on cities in the in-  
25 terior. The Japanese fleet, while cooperating with the

forces on land, patrolled the coast to prevent supplies  
1 from being brought to the ports by Chinese ships, a number  
2 of which were sunk.

3 While the fighting at Shanghai was in full swing  
4 Horinouchi, the Japanese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
5 in a radio broadcast to the United States on 1 September  
6 1937 defended Japan's actions in China on the ground of  
7 China's anti-Japanese acts and asserted that Japan's in-  
8 tentions were peaceful. He stated that the ultimate ob-  
9 ject of the current hostilities in North China and  
10 Shanghai was the realization of a situation permitting  
11 genuine cooperation between the two countries. Speeches  
12 of similar purport were subsequently delivered to the  
13 Japanese Diet by Foreign Minister HIROTA. It is clear  
14 that while these speeches were made, they had in mind  
15 Japan's policy of making North China a special area sub-  
16 servient to Japan, a policy which had been openly adop-  
17 ted by the successive cabinets since 1935. To implement  
18 this policy, a full scale war was being waged, extending  
19 as far south as Shanghai in Central China.  
20

21  
22 As hostilities continued, still further rein-  
23 forcements were poured into the Shanghai area. Between  
24 the end of September and the beginning of November, 1937,  
25 the Japanese Supreme Command dispatched five battalions  
from Japan and five more divisions from North China. In

the beginning of November 1937, three divisions landed in  
1 Hangchow Bay, about fifty miles south of Shanghai, and  
2 again, in the middle of the same month, one more division  
3 landed at Paomaokiang, sixty miles up the Yangtze River  
4 from Shanghai. As the area of conflict was thus being  
5 expanded, the Expeditionary Forces under MATSUI and the  
6 divisions of the Tenth Army which had landed at Hangchow  
7 Bay were amalgamated into the newly formed Central China  
8 Expeditionary Forces with MATSUI as its Commander in Chief.  
9 The battle continued for three months and by 12 November  
10 1937 the Chinese Army retreated to the West.

12 On 5 December 1937, the Shanghai Ta-Tao City  
13 Government was set up, under the sponsorship of Colonel  
14 Kusumoto of the Military Attache's Office, Japanese Em-  
15 bassy, and Colonel Kagasa of the Headquarters of the  
16 Japanese Supreme Command, with Su Hsi-Wen, a Japanese-  
17 educated Chinese, as the Mayor.

18 CONTINUED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN NORTH CHINA

19 To coordinate the Japanese military activities  
20 being carried on in China, HATA, Shunroku, was appointed  
21 on 26 August 1937, as Inspector General of Military Educa-  
22 tion, one of the three chiefs who would nominate the War  
23 Minister whenever there was a cabinet change. DOHIMARA,  
24 in command of the 14th Division, in August 1937 took part  
25 in the drive along the Peiping-Hankow Railway, and TOJO,



1 in command of an army corps, was engaged in hostilities  
2 in Chahar Province. At the same time the 5th Division  
3 under ITAGAKI was driving up the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway  
4 toward Kalgan, which was captured on 26 August 1937. It  
5 is worthy of note at this point that in November 1938 the  
6 provinces of Chahar, Suiyuan, and Shansi were organized  
7 as separate local government territories under the Autono-  
8 mous Federation of Mengchiang. This was an organization  
9 intended by the Japanese to rule Mongolia and Sinkiang.  
10 At the head of the Federation was Prince Teh whose ad-  
11 visors were Japanese Army officers and others who took  
12 charge of political and economic questions in the  
13 Federation.

14           On 31 August 1937, at Hweilei, approximately one  
15 hundred miles northwest of Peiping, where ITAGAKI had an  
16 interview with European and American correspondents, he  
17 declared that it was possible for him to turn south to  
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the Yellow River. This statement is the first indication  
1 to the public that the Japanese plans contemplated  
2 an advance to the South beyond the limits of North China  
3 which in fact followed soon after. On 4 September 1937,  
4 an Imperial Edict was issued, explaining the object of  
5 the Japanese military expedition in China as "to urge  
6 grave self-reflection upon China and to establish peace  
7 in the Far East without delay".  
8

9           These military activities were accompanied  
10 by propaganda in the form of press interviews, speeches  
11 and other utterances with the purpose of breaking the  
12 morale of the Chinese.

13           On 24 September 1937, Paoting, capital of  
14 Hopei Province, was captured. The Japanese generals  
15 participating in the fighting at that time stated to a  
16 foreign newspaperman that the military aim of the Japanese  
17 Army was "not so much the acquisition of territory as  
18 the annihilation, smashing, and killing of Chinese  
19 Nationalist Armies". This policy of annihilation of the  
20 Chinese Armies had been previously expressed by HIROTA  
21 in his speech of 5 September 1937, delivered in the Diet,  
22 in which he said, "we firmly believe that it is in  
23 accordance with the right of self-defense as well as with  
24 the cause of righteousness that our country is determined  
25 to deal a decisive blow to such a country, so that it may

reflect upon the error of its ways. The sole recourse  
1 open to the Japanese Empire is to administer the foregoing  
2 blow to the Chinese Army, so that it may lose completely  
3 its will to fight". In the same speech, he reiterated  
4 Japan's policy in regard to North China and concluded  
5 that the urgent need for Japan at that moment was to  
6 take "a resolute attitude and compel China to mend her  
7 ways". Japan, he said, had no other objective than to  
8 see a happy and tranquil North China, all China freed  
9 from the danger of recurrence of such calamitous  
10 hostilities as the present, and Sino-Japanese relations  
11 so adjusted as to enable them to put into practice  
12 Japan's above-mentioned policy.

14 ITAGAKI's troops made further advances, and  
15 on 14 October 1937, occupied Kweisui, the capital of  
16 Suiyuan Province. On the next day, 15 October 1937, an  
17 Imperial Ordinance was enacted in Japan, creating the  
18 Cabinet Advisory Council of which ARAKI was appointed a  
19 member, the responsibility of which was to participate  
20 in "the deliberation and planning of the Cabinet in  
21 regard to important state affairs concerning the China  
22 Incident".

24 On 9 November 1937, Japanese troops captured  
25 Taiyuan, the capital of Shansi Province. Immediately  
the Japanese set about organizing an autonomous government

1 at Taiyuan to govern the northern part of Shansi  
2 Province. This puppet government was later combined  
3 with those organized at Kalgen and Kusihua as part of  
4 the new "Autonomous Federation of Mengchang" to which  
5 reference has already been made. In the Shantung  
6 Area, the North China Expeditionary Forces on 25 December  
7 1937, captured Tsinan, capital of Shantung Province.  
8 At this stage, the Japanese Army had practically brought  
9 all the key points in North China under military  
10 occupation.

11 CHINA APPEALED TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

12 On 12 September 1937, China appealed to the  
13 League of Nations against Japan, invoking Articles 10,  
14 11, and 17 of the Covenant (Annex No. B-6). On 21  
15 September 1937, the League of Nations invited the Japanese  
16 Government to participate in the Twenty-Three Powers  
17 Consultative Committee. Japan, however, maintaining an  
18 attitude of non-participation in any political activity  
19 of the League of Nations, on the ground that she had  
20 withdrawn from the League, refused the invitation. At  
21 that time, HIROTA was the Foreign Minister in the First  
22 Konoye Cabinet.  
23

24 On 6 October 1937, the League of Nations found  
25 that the military operations carried on by Japan against  
China were out of all proportion to the incident which



1 was the cause of the conflict, that such action could  
2 not possibly facilitate or promote friendly cooperation  
3 between the two nations which Japanese statesmen had  
4 affirmed to be the aim of their policy, that it could  
5 be justified neither on the basis of existing legal  
6 engagements nor on that of the right of self-defense;  
7 and that it was in contravention of Japan's obligations  
8 under the Nine-Power Treaty of 6 February 1922 (Annex No.  
9 B-10), and the Pact of Paris of 27 August 1928 (Annex  
10 No. B-15). These conclusions were on the same day  
11 concurred in by the United States Government.

12 JAPAN'S TERMS FOR PEACE

13 While military operations were being successfully  
14 carried on, the Japanese Government adopted, on 1 October  
15 1937, an "Outline Regarding the Settlement of the China  
16 Incident". It provided that the incident should be  
17 brought to a speedy conclusion through the efforts of  
18 armed forces combined with timely diplomatic action.  
19 In North China there should be designated a demilitarized  
20 zone in which peace and order were to be maintained by  
21 armed Chinese police. Japan would have the right to  
22 station troops, but she might reduce the number of  
23 occupation troops and limit them to the number present  
24 at the outbreak of "the Incident". While the Tangku  
25 Truce was to remain in force, other arrangements such as

the "DOKIYAMA-Chin Agreement", the "UMEZU-Ho Agreement",  
1 and the arrangement concerning through railway traffic,  
2 mail service, air service, etc., should be dissolved.  
3 The Hopei-Chahar Political Council and the East Hopei  
4 Autonomous Council would be abolished and the administration  
5 in these areas would be conducted by the Chinese Government  
6 as it pleased. However, it was desirable that the  
7 administrative leaders of this area should bring about  
8 realization of friendly relations between Japan and  
9 China. As for the Shanghai area, there should also  
10 be designated a demilitarized zone in which peace and  
11 order should be maintained by the international police  
12 or the restrictedly armed Chinese police, to be assisted  
13 by the Municipal Police of the International Settlement.  
14 Japanese land forces might be withdrawn, but this should  
15 not include the right of anchorage of Japanese warships.  
16 For the general readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations,  
17 negotiations should be simultaneously or subsequently  
18 conducted along political, military, and economic lines.  
19 China should grant formal recognition of Manchukuo and  
20 conclude an anti-Comintern pact with Japan, enforcing  
21 strict control in the North China demilitarized zone.  
22 The Chinese customs tariffs on specified goods should  
23 be reduced and the freedom to prevent smuggling in East  
24 Hopei should be restored to the Chinese Government. This  
25

outline was approved by Premier Konoye, Foreign Minister  
1 HIROTA, the War and Navy Ministers.

2 BRITISH OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES

3 Prior to 27 October 1937, conversations were  
4 held between Foreign Minister HIROTA and British Ambassador  
5 Craigie concerning the cessation of hostilities in  
6 China. According to Horinguchi, then Vice-Minister of  
7 Foreign Affairs, HIROTA expressed, as his personal  
8 views, the following conditions for solution: (1) Creation  
9 of a demilitarized zone in North China; (2) Adjustment  
10 of relations between North China and Manchukuo on a  
11 practical basis; (3) Control by China of anti-Japanese  
12 movements; and (4) Equal economic opportunities in  
13 the North China region. These views were conveyed by  
14 Ambassador Craigie to the Chinese Government, and the  
15 views of the latter were also conveyed on two or three  
16 occasions to HIROTA through the British Ambassador.  
17

18 On 27 October 1937, HIROTA, in an interview with  
19 the ambassadors from Great Britain, the United States,  
20 Germany and Italy, stated that while the Japanese Govern-  
21 ment could not accept the invitation to attend the Brussels  
22 Conference, it desired to have any one of the four powers  
23 use its good offices for bringing about direct peace  
24 negotiations between Japan and China. The British  
25 Ambassador soon called upon HIROTA and informed the

1 letter of his government's willingness to use its good  
2 offices for negotiations between the two countries.  
3 Horinouchi testified that HIROTA accepted, but it was  
4 realized afterwards that there was strong opposition  
5 within the army against Britain acting as a go-between  
6 and the scheme had to be held in abeyance. However,  
7 Horinouchi admitted in cross-examination that it was  
8 Japan's policy to reject intervention or arbitration  
9 at any time and that although good offices of third  
10 parties were always welcome, it was the desire and  
11 policy of the Japanese Government to effect a settlement  
12 of the trouble between Japan and China by direct  
13 negotiations.

#### 14 THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE

15 After the League of Nations had failed to bring  
16 Japan to the conference table for the settlement of  
17 differences by negotiations, another means was being  
18 sought for the achievement of the same purpose. On  
19 two occasions, October 20 and November 7, 1937, the Belgian  
20 Government invited Japan to attend a meeting at Brussels,  
21 with a view to examining, in accordance with Article  
22 VII of the Nine-Power Treaty (Annex No. B-10), the  
23 situation in the Far East and of studying means of  
24 settling the conflict amicably. Japan again declined  
25 the invitation explaining that since the League of



1 Nations, to which the convocation of the proposed  
2 conference was closely linked, had expressed views  
3 hostile to Japan, the Japanese Government believed  
4 that frank and full discussion to bring about a just  
5 solution of the conflict could not be expected. On  
6 15 November 1937, by a resolution adopted in the Brussels  
7 Conference, Japan was pronounced the aggressor in  
8 the Sino-Japanese conflict.

9 THE IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

10 Confronted with difficulties both at home  
11 and abroad, Premier Konoye desired to resign in the  
12 middle of November 1937, but was dissuaded by KIDO.

13 On 20 November 1937, the Cabinet set up the  
14 Imperial General Headquarters, an organization to be  
15 established in war time only. It had control of operations  
16 and tactics. The Chief of Staff thus obtained virtual  
17 control over the War and Navy Ministers. Meetings were  
18 held once or twice a week. It had a great deal of  
19 influence on the Japanese Government prior to the outbreak  
20 of the Pacific War, since its utterances were not  
21 only those of the Army General Staff and the Naval General  
22 Staff, but also of the Emperor, who was its head.

23 THE ATTACK ON NANKING

24 When MATSUI was appointed Commander of the  
25 Shanghai Expeditionary Forces and left Tokyo for the

fighting area, he already had thoughts of pushing on to  
1 Nanking after the intended capture of Shanghai. He  
2 requested five divisions for the Shanghai Expeditionary  
3 Force before leaving Tokyo. Actual preparations for  
4 the advance upon China's capital were made, for he had  
5 previously made a study of the topography in the vicinity  
6 of Shanghai and Nanking. On 8 October 1937, MATSUI  
7 issued a statement in which he said "the devil-defying  
8 sharp bayonets were just on the point of being unsheathed so  
9 as to develop their divine influence, and that the mission  
10 of the Army was to fulfill all its duties of protecting  
11 Japanese residents and interests, and to chastise the  
12 Nanking Government and the outrageous Chinese." As the  
13 area of hostilities around Shanghai was likely to expand,  
14 MATSUI was appointed Commander in Chief of the Central  
15 China Expeditionary Forces.  
16

17           MUTO, Akira, was appointed MATSUI's vice-chief  
18 of staff in late November 1937. Approximately one month  
19 after the capture of Shanghai, the Japanese Army arrived  
20 outside the city of Nanking. MATSUI issued an order to  
21 the effect that as Nanking was the capital of China, its  
22 capture was an international event and careful studies  
23 should be made so as to dazzle China with Japan's military  
24 glory. The Japanese demand for surrender was ignored by  
25 the Chinese Government. Bombardment started and the city

fell on 13 December 1937. The Japanese Army that entered  
1 Nanking was a newly-formed organization, but it was  
2 composed of experienced troops. KATSUI made his  
3 triumphant entry on 17 December 1937. From 13 December  
4 onward, there occurred what has come to be known as the  
5 "Rape of Nanking" which will be dealt with in a later  
6 phase.

7  
8 On 1 January 1938, a provisional self-governing  
9 body was set up, flying the old discarded five-coloured  
10 Chinese flag instead of the Blue Sky and White Sun which  
11 is the official national flag of China.

12 GERMANY ACTED AS GO-BETWEEN

13 Having ignored the offers of good offices  
14 made by the United States and Great Britain, the Japanese  
15 Army desired that Germany should be asked to act as go-  
16 between. On 5 November 1937, certain peace terms  
17 proposed by Japan were conveyed to the Chinese Government  
18 through Trautmann, the German Ambassador in Nanking.  
19 Subsequently, on 28 and 29 November and 2 December, the  
20 German Ambassador again communicated the intentions  
21 of the Japanese Government and informed the Chinese  
22 authorities that the terms proposed by the Japanese  
23 Government early in November were still to stand.  
24 China was prepared to take the points proposed by Japan  
25 as the basis of discussion. The proposed terms were

embodies in what was called the August Plan drafted  
1 in July 1937, by officials of the Japanese Foreign,  
2 War, and Navy Ministries, but approved on 5 August  
3 1937 by the above-mentioned ministries. It consisted  
4 of three main points: (1) Establishment of unfortified  
5 zones along the River Pai-Ho and the withdrawal of  
6 Japanese and Chinese troops from the areas specified  
7 as such; (2) No annexation of territories; and (3)  
8 No indemnities. Negotiations on the lines of these  
9 terms were being conducted between Japanese Ambassador  
10 Kawagoe and the Chinese, when they were interrupted  
11 by the outbreak of the Shanghai hostilities on 13 August  
12 1937.  
13

14 One day in December 1937, according to the  
15 testimony of Horinouchi, Foreign Minister HIROTA was told  
16 by German Ambassador Birksen that he had information  
17 from Ambassador Trautmann in Nanking that the Chinese  
18 Government had the intention of reopening peace  
19 negotiations on the basis of the Japanese terms, and  
20 was asked if there was any alternation in the peace  
21 terms of the August Plan. Thereupon, the question was  
22 submitted to the Liaison Conference of the Government  
23 and the Army and Navy, and was placed on the agenda for  
24 the meeting of 20 December 1937. The fall of Nanking  
25 on 13 December 1937 had considerably stiffened the attitude



1 of the Japanese towards China. The Liaison Conference  
2 decided upon four fundamental terms of peace, which  
3 were as follows: (1) Collaboration with Japan and  
4 Manchukuo in an anti-communist policy; (2) Establishment  
5 of demilitarized zones and special administrative organs  
6 in designated areas; (3) Creation of close economic  
7 relations among Japan, Manchukuo and China; and (4)  
8 Necessary reparations by China. The differences between  
9 these Peace Terms and those of August 1937 which had been  
10 communicated to the Chinese Government were so great  
11 fundamentally that their acceptance by the Chinese  
12 would have involved amongst others, one that China  
13 had refused to accept from 1931; namely, the independence  
14 of Manchuria. In the circumstances it is not surprising  
15 that the overtures led to no practical solution of the  
16 difficulties.

18 On 22 December 1937, HIROTA communicated the  
19 above terms to Ambassador Dirksen, stating that as there  
20 had been a great change in the situation, it was not  
21 possible any longer to offer the earlier conditions. He  
22 said that if the Chinese side would generally agree on  
23 the new terms, Japan would be ready to enter into  
24 negotiations; otherwise, Japan would have to deal with  
25 the incident from a new standpoint. These new terms  
were communicated to the Chinese Government on 27 December.

1 1937, through Ambassador Trautmann.

2           On 13 January 1938, the Chinese Minister of  
3 Foreign Affairs replied to Trautmann that, as the new  
4 peace terms proposed by Japan were so general in their  
5 terms, the Chinese Government desired to be informed  
6 in detail of their nature and content in order to make  
7 a careful examination and reach a definite decision.

8 The Chinese reply was communicated to HIROTA on 14 January  
9 1938.

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1 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
2 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

3 THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the  
4 Tribunal's Judgment:

5 THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE ON

6 11 JANUARY 1938

7 While the peace terms were being offered to  
8 China, there developed a difference between the Army  
9 and the Government in Japan. The Army General Staff  
10 thought that the terms of peace were not only vague, but  
11 also aggressive. They were in favor of giving more  
12 specific terms. The General Staff was concerned about  
13 the protracted nature of the war in China. Not only was  
14 it a drain upon Japanese resources, but it embarrassed  
15 military and economic preparations for war against Russia,  
16 America and Great Britain. The Government under Konoye  
17 preferred to state them in general terms. Foreign  
18 Minister HIROTA and Education Minister KIDO supported  
19 Konoye's view; Home Minister Suyetsugu drafted the four  
20 terms, and Foreign Minister HIROTA caused them to be  
21 communicated to the Chinese Government. On 11 January  
22 1938, while the reply of the Chinese Government was being  
23 awaited, an Imperial Conference was held which was  
24 attended by HIRANUMA, who was President of the Privy  
25 Council. HIROTA explained the "Fundamental Policy for

1 the Disposition of the China Incident," providing for  
2 close collaboration and unity between Japan, Manchukuo  
3 and China. Based upon this policy, two alternative  
4 measures were adopted at the conference. On the one  
5 hand, the conference decided that if China should ask  
6 for conciliation, Japan would negotiate in accordance  
7 with the conditions of peace as contained in an addendum  
8 to the "Details of the Conditions of the Negotiations  
9 for Peace between Japan and China," which included,  
10 among other items, formal recognition of Manchukuo by  
11 China; establishment of an anti-communist self-government  
12 in Inner Mongolia; creation of demilitarized areas in  
13 occupied territories of Central China and recognition  
14 of Japan's right to station troops in designated areas  
15 of North China, Inner Mongolia and Central China. On  
16 the other hand, if China refused to reconsider, Japan  
17 would not only consider the Chinese Government her  
18 opponent but would assist in the formation of a new  
19 Chinese Government with which Japan could cooperate.  
20 Thereupon, the Chiefs of Army General Staff and Navy  
21 General Staff and the President of the Privy Council  
22 expressed their approval. Thus were the details of peace  
23 conditions drawn up.  
24

25 On the day when the Imperial Conference adopted  
the above plan, Ambassador Trautmann reported to his



1 Government that the telegram which he received from  
2 Tokyo contained no further information except that Japan  
3 seemed to be altering for the second time their peace  
4 proposals which were issued through the German Embassy,  
5 and "we are losing face with the Chinese through this."

6 THE KONOYE DECLARATION OF 16 JANUARY 1938

7 Upon receipt of the Chinese reply of the 14th  
8 of January through the German Ambassador, saying that the  
9 terms covered a very wide scope, that they desired further  
10 details in order to make a final decision, HIROTA became  
11 very angry and declared that it was China and not Japan  
12 who was beaten and must ask for peace. When reminded  
13 that officially China had knowledge of only four funda-  
14 mental conditions and the rest had been kept, at his  
15 wish, in a very indefinite form, HIROTA agreed to take  
16 the matter up with the Cabinet. In an all-day session  
17 of the Cabinet on 14 January 1938, according to KIDO,  
18 HIROTA reported the course of the peace negotiations  
19 with China and concluded by asserting that there was not  
20 good faith on the Chinese side. The Cabinet decided  
21 not to deal further with the Chinese National Government  
22 under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

23  
24 On 15 January 1938 a meeting of the Liaison  
25 Conference was held and, after lengthy discussion, the  
government plan was adopted although some members of the

General Staff still preferred reconciliation. On 16  
1 January 1938 Konoye issued a public statement announcing  
2 Japan's firm policy as decided by the Cabinet and the  
3 Liaison Conference. This historically important document,  
4 which decided the trend of relations between these two  
5 Asiatic countries, as translated for this Tribunal,  
6 reads as follows:

7           "The Imperial Government has been patient  
8 enough, after the occupation of Nanking, to give the  
9 last opportunity to the Chinese National Government  
10 for reconsidering the situation. But they do not under-  
11 stand our real intention, attempt foolishly to counter-  
12 attack, disregard the greatest distress of the people  
13 at home and do not mind the peace of the entire East  
14 Asia. Thereupon, the Imperial Government will not care  
15 for the National Government thereafter, and expect the  
16 establishment and development of a new government of  
17 China which will really be worthy coalition with our  
18 Empire. We desire to strive, rising under cooperation  
19 with such new government, to arrange the relation  
20 between the two countries and to construct a new  
21 revived China. Of course, there will be not even a  
22 slight change in our policy that respects the terri-  
23 toriality and sovereignty of China and the rights and  
24 interests of other powers in China. Our responsibility

for the peace of East Asia is now increasing heavier and heavier. It is the most earnest desire of the Government that our people devote themselves to perform this important mission."

The door was thus closed to further negotiations, and the stage was set for further invasion and the development of local regimes ultimately for the creation of a "new government" in China which would cooperate with Japan.

#### SECTION V.

##### THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CHINA

Prior to Konoye's declaration that Japan would not deal with the National Government of China, new regimes had already been set up by the Japanese in occupied territories, such as those in Northern Shansi, Kueihua, Kalgan and Shanghai, as well as so-called "Peace Maintenance Organizations" in various localities. These were merely local authorities governing areas of limited extent. There was one which covered a much larger area and was in line with Japan's policy of establishing a pro-Japanese autonomous regime in North China, i.e., the Provisional Government in Peiping. When hostilities first broke out in North China, Wang Keh-min, a retired high-ranking Chinese official who later headed the Provisional Government, was in Hongkong. He was

1 persuaded to come North by Japanese Army men stationed  
2 in Peiping and Shanghai, and staff officers from Peiping  
3 and Formosa were dispatched to Hongkong for the purpose.  
4 As a result, Wang came to Shanghai on 24 November 1937,  
5 and on 6 December 1937 was flown to Japan and went thence  
6 to North China. The Japanese authorities in North China  
7 had made great efforts under the plan to make the North  
8 China regime the Central Government of China in the  
9 future and arranged to invite not only Wang, but also  
10 other notable figures in South China through army  
11 officers who were stationed in Shanghai. After Wang's  
12 arrival in Peiping, on 14 December 1937, the day after  
13 the fall of Nanking, the Provisional Government was  
14 formally inaugurated in the presence of officers of the  
15 Japanese Army. Foreign journalists were invited to  
16 attend.

17  
18 Wang Keh-min became also the chairman of the  
19 Hsin-Min-Hui or New People's Association which had been  
20 created in December 1937 under orders of the Japanese  
21 Expeditionary Forces in North China. The function of  
22 this association was to make known to the people the  
23 policies of the puppet government and to keep the latter  
24 in touch with the people. The vice-chairman of the  
25 association was a Japanese.

The Konoye declaration of 16 January 1938 gave



fresh impetus to this Provisional Government. The  
1 various peace maintenance organizations in the Peiping  
2 and Tientsin areas had joined it and subsequently, on  
3 30 June 1938, the East Hopei Regime was also amalgamated  
4 with it.

5 By the end of January 1938 the Provisional  
6 Government had revised the Chinese customs tariffs on  
7 certain articles in the foreign export and import trade  
8 of North China. The United States Ambassador Grew  
9 delivered, on 31 January 1938, a protest to HIROTA,  
10 stating that the National Government of China was the  
11 only one authorized to do this and that the United States  
12 was addressing her representation to Japan, because "for  
13 the creation and the acts of the provisional regime the  
14 Japanese Government has an inescapable responsibility."  
15 The Federal Reserve Bank of China was incorporated in  
16 February and commenced its business on 10 March 1938  
17 and was authorized by the Provisional Government to  
18 issue paper currency. While the governor and vice-  
19 governor were Chinese, the directing personnel were  
20 mainly Japanese.

21 This Provisional Government, together with the  
22 Renovation Government in Central China, later accepted  
23 the invitation of Wang Ching-wei to participate in the  
24 organization of a so-called new Central Government.

Confirmation of the part played by Japan in the  
1 formation of the Provisional Government is derived from  
2 a document produced from the records of the General  
3 Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry. It  
4 recorded that, "In 1937, following the collapses of  
5 Teh-chow, Suiyuan, Changte, Taiyuan, etc., in North  
6 China, at the end of November the National Government  
7 had broken up and removed to Hankow, Chungking and  
8 Changsha and finally Nanking collapsed on 13 December,  
9 deciding the general trend of the war situation. Thus  
10 the opportunity to establish a new regime which was pre-  
11 arranged among the important men in North China had  
12 matured.  
13

14 "The circumstances in which Wang Keh-min  
15 consented to become the head of the North China regime  
16 are as follows: At the beginning of the incident he was  
17 at Hongkong. The head of special service facilities in  
18 Peking, Major General Kita, eagerly made efforts through  
19 Fijii Yamamoto, who was in Shanghai, to persuade Wang to  
20 accept the invitation; meanwhile, staff officers from  
21 Peking and Formosa were specially dispatched to Hongkong  
22 for the same purpose. As the result Wang came to  
23 Shanghai on 24 November and on 6 December made a flight  
24 to Fukuoka and went to North China with Yamamoto and  
25 Yu Chin.

"It is said that when Wang entered Shanghai,  
1 he had not yet consented to become the head of the  
2 North China regime but on condition that he made an  
3 inspection trip he consented to the journey.

4 "The North China army authorities had made great  
5 efforts under the plan to establish the North China  
6 regime as the Central Government of China in the future  
7 and arranged to invite not only Wang but other influential  
8 men from South China through Yoshino and Imai (military  
9 officers) who were stationed in Shanghai. Toward this  
10 policy the central army and General Terauchi gave  
11 approval; however, a section of the military officers  
12 in Shanghai expressed opposition, especially Colonel  
13 Kusumoto was opposed to pulling out many influential men  
14 from Shanghai, on the ground that there is no necessity  
15 to determine North China as the political center from  
16 the beginning.

18 "After the arrival in Peking, Wang Keh-min  
19 decided to accept the chairmanship of the North China  
20 regime and determined government organization and  
21 fundamental principles. On 14 December 1937 the  
22 Provisional Chinese Government was established in  
23 Peking."  
24  
25

THE RENOVATION GOVERNMENT IN CENTRALCHINA

The foregoing document shows further:

"Movement for establishment of a new government in Central China.

"When the Japanese force crushed the Chinese Army in Shanghai, and its vicinity, and subsequently on December 13, 1937, captured Nanking, movements for creating a new regime in the Central China were launched. First of all, the Shanghai Tatao municipal Government was organized in Shanghai on December 5. In various places other than Shanghai public order maintenance associations came into being. Among these the major organs are the Nanking Public Order Maintenance Association and the Hangchow Public Order Maintenance Association established on January 1, 1938. Nevertheless, in Shanghai area the influence of the Chiang regime and the Nationalistic Party proved to remain strong, far more than what was anticipated, even after the fall of Nanking, so that it was impossible for pro-Japanese elements to openly approach the Japanese even in the International Settlement. Thus, the matter of building up a substantial regime had long been difficult unlike the case in North China."

Following the declaration of 16 January 1938,



Premier Konoye and HIROTA addressed the Diet on 22  
1 January 1938, and discussed Japan's policy, emphasizing  
2 the prospective emergence of a new Chinese regime to  
3 cooperate closely with Japan for the ultimate establish-  
4 ment of a new order in East Asia. On 27 January 1938  
5 the Konoye Cabinet decided on a "Programme for the  
6 Establishment of a Central China New Regime." That is  
7 to say, notwithstanding protestations that this was a  
8 spontaneous Chinese movement, the Japanese Government  
9 took it upon itself to decide upon the "Programme for  
10 the Establishment of a Central China New Regime." The  
11 document already referred to as having been produced  
12 from the records of the General Affairs Bureau of the  
13 Japanese Foreign Office discloses the extent of Japanese  
14 direction of the movement:

16 "I. General Principles.

17 "(1) They shall found a highly pro-Japanese  
18 regime, gradually free themselves from dependence on  
19 Europe and America, and establish the foundation of a  
20 district in China dependent on Japan.  
21

22 "(2) The direction of that regime shall be so  
23 exercised that the regime, in the course of its future  
24 development shall smoothly amalgamate with the North  
25 China Regime. The direction shall stop at general inner  
direction by Japanese advisors. Detailed direction and

1 interference in administration by appointing Japanese  
2 officials shall be avoided.

3 "(3) Chiang Regime shall be annihilated. At  
4 the same time, elimination of Communists and destruction  
5 of the Nationalist Party in a short time within the area  
6 under Japanese occupation shall be realized. Afterwards  
7 similar operations shall be speedily extended to  
8 neighbouring areas."

9 The programme provided for nominal Chinese  
10 control but as to administration and finance it was  
11 directed. "The foundation of finance shall speedily be  
12 established, banking organs adjusted, and Japan-China  
13 economic collaboration in Central China realized.  
14 Measures for it are described in another programme."  
15 The direction upon arms was: "As for armaments, minimum  
16 army shall be trained for maintenance of peace and  
17 order, and make efforts, under the guidance of the  
18 Japanese Army, to restore public order. But the navy  
19 and air force shall be included in the defence plan of  
20 Japan." The new regime was to be developed as follows.

21 "The New Regime shall be speedily set up, and,  
22 by nurturing it, antagonistic influence shall be  
23 destroyed with physical and moral pressure.

24 "For this purpose, local autonomous bodies which  
25 are being set up successively in the areas under

Japanese occupation, shall be strengthened, and public  
1 sentiments desiring the establishment of a New Regime  
2 backed by Japan shall be powerfully stimulated. More-  
3 over, in and around Shanghai, economic rehabilitation  
4 shall be speedily realized, thereby to contribute to  
5 the establishment of the New Regime set up.

6 "Of the expenditures in the initial stage of  
7 the New Regime, considerable part shall be borne by  
8 Japan.

9 "For the relief of war sufferers, and  
10 rehabilitation of industries, emergency measures shall  
11 be speedily taken. Especially, agricultural produce  
12 shall be smoothly supplied to the market; and farmers  
13 shall take to spring farming without uneasiness.

14 "For this purpose, maintenance of local peace  
15 shall be undertaken by the Japanese Army to the best  
16 of their ability until the establishment of new local  
17 government organs.

18 "Order of the establishment of the new adminis-  
19 trative set-up is as follows:  
20

21 "1. Central Government set-up, especially  
22 legislative and executive departments.

23 "2. Shanghai Special Municipality set-up.

24 "3. Provincial Governments set-up.

25 "4. Organization of county autonomous bodies

and downwards.

1 "In parallel with the execution of 1 and 2,  
2 the influence of Tsingpan and Chihpan (Chinese secret  
3 societies) shall be turned pro-Japanese, and made to  
4 assist the New Regime directly and indirectly.

5 "In fixing new administrative districts, former  
6 ones shall generally be preserved.

7 "In foreign settlements, with the strengthening  
8 of the New Regime, Japanese influence shall be gradually  
9 extended, and, after the establishment of the New Regime,  
10 the organs of the old regime under the control of  
11 Japanese Army and Navy shall be taken over by the New  
12 Regime at proper opportunity, causing at the same time  
13 outstanding issues to be speedily settled."

14 In the early stage of the war, movements for  
15 creating a new regime had already been started. MATSUI,  
16 through Sugano, sought to persuade certain senior  
17 Chinese officials to form a new regime, but without  
18 success. When Liang Hung-chi, who later headed the  
19 Central China regime, and others came into the matter  
20 with the assistance of the Japanese Army and Navy special  
21 service organs, the new regime began to assume a more  
22 definite shape. On 28 March 1938, the Renovation  
23 Government, which was sometimes referred to as the  
24 Reformed Government or the Restoration Government, was  
25



1 formally established. Together with the Provisional  
2 Government in North China, it later accepted Wang Ching-  
3 wei's invitation to organize a so-called new Central  
4 Government.

5 Thus was realized the Japanese planning for the  
6 creation of a pro-Japanese, and indeed a Japanese-  
7 dominated, Chinese "Government."

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OTHER CITIES INVADED BY JAPANESE TROOPSUNDER HATA'S COMMAND

1 HATA was appointed Commander of the Japanese  
2 Central China Expeditionary Forces on 14 February  
3 1938, succeeding MATSUI. Three days later HATA  
4 became Commander-in-Chief of all Expeditionary  
5 Forces in China, succeeding Nishio, and remained  
6 in that post until November 1938.  
7

8 HATA's original task was to conquer the  
9 triangular area between the cities of Shanghai,  
10 Nanking and Hangchow. There developed later the  
11 purpose of continuing the operations and to expand  
12 the area of conflict farther into the interior if  
13 China did not come to terms. In a talk between Honjo  
14 and KIDO the former was quoted by KIDO as having said:  
15 "After the battle of Suchow (Hsuchow) it is, on the  
16 one hand, necessary to show an attitude of advancing  
17 to Hankow, but, at the same time, it is essential  
18 to take steps for settling the incident. If things  
19 do not turn out as hoped for I believe it would, by  
20 all means, be necessary to establish a close con-  
21 nection also with the Supreme Command and enter into  
22 protracted warfare by planning to continue for about  
23 three years." KIDO agreed generally with Honjo's  
24 opinion and promised to do his best, as he records  
25

in his diary of 19 May 1938.

1 HATA, having secured the triangular dis-  
 2 trict referred to proceeded against Hankow, which  
 3 fell to the Japanese on 25 October 1938. In that  
 4 campaign he had a force of 300,00 to 400,000 men  
 5 sent to him from North China. These forces moved  
 6 deep into the interior of China and at the dates  
 7 shown below had captured the following important  
 8 cities:  
 9

10 19 May 1938, Hsuchow, strategic junction  
 11 of the Tientsin-Pukow and Lunghai Railways; 6 June  
 12 1938, Kaifeng, capital of Honan Province; 27 June  
 13 1938, Matang, important fortification on the Yangtse  
 14 River; 25 July 1938, Kiukiang, leading commercial  
 15 city of Kiangsi Province; 12 October 1938, Sinyang,  
 16 important point on the Peiping-Hankow Railway;  
 17 25 October 1938, Hankow, in the center of China.  
 18

19 With the occupation of such important cities  
 20 over so vast an expanse of territory, it is not sur-  
 21 prising that HATA in interrogation acknowledged that  
 22 it was a war that was being waged in China, rather  
 23 than that which the Japanese Government euphemisti-  
 24 cally called an "Incident".

25 THE NATIONAL GENERAL MOBILIZATION LAW

In anticipation of a protracted war, the

Japanese Government enacted a National General  
 1 Mobilization Law. The draft had been prepared by  
 2 the Mobilization Plans Bureau and approved by the  
 3 Cabinet. When it came before the Diet in February  
 4 1938 S.M.T.O., then in the Military Affairs Bureau, as-  
 5 sisted Premier Konoye in making the necessary ex-  
 6 planations and securing the passage of the bill.  
 7 It went into effect on 5 May 1938. It was designed  
 8 to control and operate all human and material re-  
 9 sources so as to utilize the national power most  
 10 effectively for "national defense purposes" in time  
 11 of war, "(including an incident corresponding to  
 12 a war)". It authorized the general mobilization  
 13 of all Japanese subjects and the compulsion of all  
 14 Japanese subjects or juridical persons or other  
 15 organizations to co-operate with State or other or-  
 16 ganizations or persons nominated by the Government.

ITAGAKI BECAME WAR MINISTER

19 Pursuant to the wishes of the Army, ITAGAKI  
 20 on 3 June 1938 was appointed War Minister in the  
 21 Konoye Cabinet after its reorganization in May.  
 22 Immediately before this ITAGAKI had been successively  
 23 Vice-Chief of Staff and then Chief-of-Staff of the  
 24 Kwantung Army, Commander of a Division in China and  
 25 on the General Staff. Muto in July 1938 was ap-



1 pointed Vice-Chief-of-Staff of the North China Ex-  
2 peditary Forces. Japan had hoped the Hsueh  
3 Battle would be decisive by engaging and defeating  
4 the main forces of the Chinese Army. As the Chinese  
5 Government did not yield, even after the capture of  
6 Hsueh, the Japanese Supreme Command proceeded with  
7 the plan to drive on to Hankow to deliver yet another  
8 blow to the Chinese in the hope of reaching an end  
9 of the Chinese war. ITAGAKI, realizing that the  
10 war threatened to become a protracted one, sought  
11 to bolster the determination of the Japanese people.  
12 In his first press interview after assumption of the  
13 post of War Minister, on 26 June 1938, he told the  
14 Domei News Agency that the Army must be prepared to  
15 continue hostilities perhaps for ten more years.  
16 He said also that Japan would follow her own policy  
17 without fear or hesitation notwithstanding the  
18 attitude of Third Powers. He explained that there  
19 was no need for a formal declaration of war in view  
20 of the official declaration of the Japanese Govern-  
21 ment of the 16th January.

22  
23 Minister of the War ITAGAKI took part in  
24 the Five Minister's Conference, some of the decisions  
25 of which will be discussed presently.



1 "In case the present Central Government of  
2 China surrenders and accepts the third condition, (item  
3 three of the document, the conditions for surrender)  
4 stated later, it shall either be considered as a  
5 friendly regime and will be permitted to join the  
6 newly established Central Government, or be made to  
7 establish another new central government in cooperation  
8 with various existing pro-Japanese regimes."

9 The conditions for the recognition of the sur-  
10 render of the present Central Government of China in-  
11 clude:

12 "Retiring from public life of Chiang Kai-shek."

13 On the same day alternative decisions were made  
14 in the event of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek continu-  
15 ing to fight on.

16 It is to be noted that the constant policy was  
17 to foster and enlarge the Japanese controlled "Central"  
18 Government, the creation of which by Japan has already  
19 been discussed.

20 Again, on 15 July 1938 the Five Ministers'  
21 Conference decided in respect of the "new" Central  
22 Government of China: "Though the establishment of the  
23 new Central Government of China shall be undertaken  
24 mainly by the Chinese, it shall be internally assisted  
25 by Japan. The principle of the collaboration of

1 individual local governments shall be adopted to their  
2 government form.

3 "A Joint Commission shall be established as  
4 soon as possible through the cooperation between the  
5 Provisional Government and the Restoration Government,  
6 to be joined later by the Mongolian and Sing-Kiang  
7 (Mengkiang) Joint Commission. Then we should guide  
8 this regime so as to grow into a real central govern-  
9 ment by gradually absorbing various other influences  
10 or collaborating with them." It was "we", the Japanese,  
11 not Chinese who were to guide the growth of the "new"  
12 Central Government.

13 "The new Central Government shall not be  
14 established until after the fall of Hankow, with the  
15 Chiang Kai-shek regime reduced to a mere local govern-  
16 ment or until the reformation of the present Central  
17 Government is brought about by Chiang Kai-shek's retire-  
18 ment from public office.

19 "In case the Chiang Kai-shek regime is broken  
20 up or reformed, and should a pro-Japanese government  
21 turn up, we would make it a factor of the central govern-  
22 ment system and proceed to set up a central government.

23 "Adjustment of the relations between Japan and  
24 China in connection with our control of the establishment  
25 of the new Central Government of China, shall be done on



the following basis, and its concrete matters shall be  
1 decided separately."

2 This "basis" included: "The establishment of  
3 the general policy for the collaboration among Japan,  
4 Manchukuo and China based upon reciprocity, particu-  
5 larly on neighbourly friendship and goodwill, anti-  
6 Comintern and joint-defense and economic cooperation.  
7 In order to attain the above objectives, Japan will  
8 give internal guidance during a certain period."

9 The Military position of the "new" Chinese  
10 Government was settled in the following decision of  
11 the Five Ministers' Conference:

12 "We will urge the surrender of the Chinese  
13 Army, conciliate them, and bring them under control.  
14 We will strive to make them support the new government  
15 by promoting their anti-Chiang Kai-shek and anti-  
16 Communist consciousness, and making as many Chinese  
17 troops as possible cooperate with the Japanese Army  
18 for destruction of the anti-Japanese and pro-Communist  
19 army, and thus guide the racial conflict toward an  
20 ideological opposition.  
21

22 "The necessary Japanese troops will be  
23 stationed at ports, railways, waterways, etc. in the  
24 occupied areas which are strategic for communications,  
25 as well as at the locations of important resources;

1 and in remote districts armed Chinese troops will be  
2 organized to ensure the preservation of peace. The  
3 numerical strength of the troops will be decided in  
4 accordance with the actual local situation.

5 "We will conclude an anti-Communist Military  
6 Alliance and gradually reorganize the Chinese army to  
7 place it under the direction of the Japanese Army.  
8 When the circumstances permit, we will reduce our  
9 military strength to the minimum necessary for our  
10 national defense."

11 The decisions upon economic matters included  
12 the following:

13 "The development of the economy and communica-  
14 tion will contribute to the establishment of the national  
15 defense of Japan, Manchukuo and China, and satisfy the  
16 development of the economy of the three countries and  
17 the welfare of its people. Japan especially will  
18 materially hold the necessary transportation. In  
19 North China the demand for national defense shall be  
20 the first consideration and in Central and South China  
21 the interests of the people will be particularly con-  
22 sidered.

23 "We shall carry out the development of economy  
24 following the principle of ministering to each other's  
25 wants among Japan, Manchukuo and China and advance

energetically for the accomplishment of the three  
1 countries' economic sphere. However, we shall respect  
2 the rights and interests, already obtained by the  
3 third countries, and not interfere with their partici-  
4 pation in the economic development.

5 "Railway, water transport, aviation and  
6 communication will be materially placed under Japan's  
7 power, and satisfy the accomplishment of military  
8 activities and contribute to the welfare of the people."

9  
10 These quotations from the policy decisions of  
11 the Five Ministers' Conference indicated the general  
12 scheme to create a government in China completely  
13 dominated by Japan but built up behind a facade of  
14 Chinese autonomy.

15 THE DOHICHA AGENCY.

16 To advance the programme of establishing a  
17 new central government in China along the lines just  
18 discussed, the Five Ministers' Conference on the 26th  
19 July 1938 decided upon the creation of a Special Com-  
20 mission on Chinese Affairs. In particular the decision  
21 was as follows:

22 "The Special Commission for China belongs to  
23 the Five Ministers' Council and is an executive organ  
24 exclusively for working out important strategems against  
25 China and establishing the new Chinese Central Government

in accordance with the decisions of the Council.

1 "Every organ at the actual places concerned  
2 with the above-mentioned business is directed by the  
3 Special Commission for China in connection with the  
4 said business.

5 "The Army and Navy Ministers will be in  
6 charge of the liaison between Special Commission for  
7 China and the Imperial Headquarters."  
8

9 On the 29th July the Commission was set up  
10 under DOHIHARA, Tsude and Benzai, its functions being  
11 defined thus: "The important strategems against  
12 China in Paragraph 1 are understood as political and  
13 economic strategies which are not directly connected  
14 with military operations." Although DOHIHARA was the  
15 youngest of the commissioners, he was the only one who  
16 was a soldier in active service. He it was who under-  
17 took the administration of the affairs of the Commission  
18 and for the purpose set up an establishment in Shanghai  
19 under the name of the "DOHIHARA Agency." DOHIHARA was  
20 able to make use of his wide knowledge of China and  
21 familiarity with the Chinese. He started accordingly  
22 to enlist Tang Shao-Yi and Wu Pei-Fu, retired Chinese  
23 statesman and general respectively, for the purpose of  
24 establishing an anti-Chiang Kai-shek government in the  
25 "enemy's midst" among high-ranking Chinese. Wu Pei-Fu



1 was then living in retirement at Peiping. DOHIMARA  
 2 aimed to bring him out from retirement for active  
 3 collaboration with Japan. This scheme came to be re-  
 4 ferred to as the "Wu Project." The expenses in connec-  
 5 tion with this project were to come from surplus revenues  
 6 of the maritime customs in occupied China.

7 Tang Shao-Yi was assassinated and negotiations  
 8 with Wu Pei-Fu failed so DOHIMARA turned elsewhere. The  
 9 DOHIMARA Agency in China aided the development of a  
 10 scheme to bring Wang Ching-Wei to Central China. It  
 11 reported to Tokyo a conference with associates of Wang  
 12 Ching-Wei concerning arrangements for Wang Ching-Wei's  
 13 coming to Shanghai, etc. Although DOHIMARA claimed that  
 14 he was in Tokyo at that time, it is clear that he was  
 15 in control of these plans.

17 THE "FEDERATED COMMITTEE" OF PUPPET REGIMES

18 While DOHIMARA and others were making efforts  
 19 to carry out the policy of establishing a new central  
 20 government in China through Chinese personages, the  
 21 Japanese military authorities in Japan disclosed  
 22 their determination in pursuit of this policy. SATA,  
 23 then Chief of the Press Section of the War Ministry,  
 24 made two speeches upon the "China Incident" and said  
 25 that the fundamental attitude of the government was  
 to be found in the declaration of 16 January 1938 and

1 that the plans for the establishment of a new regime  
2 were absolutely unchangeable. On 27 and 28 August  
3 1938, representatives of the Tokyo government and of  
4 the Japanese army authorities in Tientsin met at Fukuoka,  
5 Japan, and decided on a basic plan for the coordination  
6 of the Provisional Government, the Renovation Govern-  
7 ment and the Mongolia-Sinkiang Federation. On 9  
8 September 1938, a plan for the establishment of a  
9 Federated Committee, or "Joint Committee," of these pro-  
10 Japanese organs in China was adopted by the Five  
11 Ministers' Conference. Consequent upon these decisions  
12 made in Japan the work of developing a "new" Central  
13 Government was pursued by the Japanese on the continent.  
14 On 9 and 10 September 1938, representatives of the  
15 Provisional Government and the Renovation Government  
16 met Japanese representatives at Dairen and arranged  
17 for the establishment of a "Federated Committee" at  
18 Peiping. It was to coordinate and unify the various  
19 puppet regimes, particularly the Provisional Govern-  
20 ment and the Renovation Government, and to prepare  
21 for the establishment of the future "new" central  
22 government. On 22 September 1938, the inauguration  
23 ceremony was held in Peiping and the first meeting  
24 of the committee was held on the next day.  
25

OCCUPATION OF CANTON AND HANKOW

1 Pursuant to a decision of the Five Ministers'  
2 Conference, held 8 July 1938, prescribing the occupation  
3 of certain strategic points in China, Japanese troops  
4 captured Canton on 20 October 1938 and Hankow on 25  
5 October 1938. Steps were taken to provide for the  
6 administration of these two important cities and their  
7 adjoining areas under Japanese occupation according  
8 to the familiar pattern. On 28 October 1938 the  
9 arrangements for administration of the Canton and  
10 Hankow districts were agreed upon among the War, Navy  
11 and Foreign Ministers. They provided for Japanese  
12 control of political affairs and for the development  
13 of a "Peace Maintenance Association." Although such  
14 regimes were to be established ostensibly at the  
15 initiative of the Chinese, political guidance was to  
16 be given by the Japanese. They were to be kept in close  
17 connection and cooperation with the Special Commission  
18 on Chinese Affairs, which, as previously noted, was a  
19 special agency under the leadership of DOHICHA. With  
20 regard to Canton, a special instruction was given by  
21 the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers as follows:

24 "The organization of a local regime shall be  
25 initiated by the Chinese side. However, the establish-  
ment of the regime shall be accelerated with the

1 cooperation of our political guiding agency (The Liaison  
2 Conference of the War, Navy and Foreign Ministry  
3 authorities at Kwantung), chiefly by our strategy agency  
4 (The Special Committee Towards China). After the  
5 establishment of the regime the political guiding  
6 agency shall take up its internal guidance."

7 The policy of occupying strategic points in  
8 China was carried much farther than the capture of  
9 Canton and Hankow, for on 25 November 1938 the Five  
10 Ministers' Conference decided upon the seizure of  
11 Hainan Island, in the extreme South of China. This  
12 island was captured by the Japanese on 10 February 1939.

13 JAPAN TERMINATED ALL RELATIONS WITH LEAGUE  
14 OF NATIONS.

15 Although Japan had notified her withdrawal  
16 from the League of Nations in March 1933, she continued  
17 to participate in certain of the activities of the  
18 League. After the fall of Hankow and Canton, the  
19 attitude of Japan towards third powers stiffened. On  
20 2 November 1938 at a meeting of the Privy Council,  
21 which was presided over by HIRANUMA and attended by  
22 the Premier and Ministers of State, including ARAKI,  
23 KIDO, ITAGAKI and Privy Councillors MURAKI and MATSUI,  
24 continuance of cooperation with the League was con-  
25 sidered, inasmuch as matters relating to diplomacy and



treaties were within the province of the Privy Council.

1 On the ground that a resolution had been adopted on  
2 30 September 1938 by the Council of the League of  
3 Nations condemnatory of Japan, it was considered  
4 impossible having regard to national honour, for Japan  
5 to have further cooperation with the organs of the  
6 League, and consequently a plan for the termination  
7 of cooperative relations between Japan and the various  
8 organs of the League except the mandatory rule of the  
9 South Sea Islands was drawn up and adopted by unan-  
10 imous vote at the Meeting. Notice to that effect  
11 was immediately served on the League of Nations.  
12

13 THE NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA.

14 Following her decision of complete withdrawal  
15 from the League of Nations, Japan proceeded to what  
16 it called the "New Order in East Asia." On 3 November  
17 1938 the Japanese Government issued a statement advis-  
18 ing the world that with the fall of Canton, Wuchang,  
19 Hankow and Hanyang, chief cities of China, the  
20 National Government had been reduced to a local regime  
21 and that the ultimate aim of Japan was to establish,  
22 in collaboration with Manchukuo and China, a New Order  
23 which would secure eternal peace in the Far East.  
24

25 On 29 November 1938 Foreign Minister Arita  
submitted a report to the Privy Council of which the

following are some of the more significant passages:

1           "as to the policy for adjustment of new Sino-  
2 Japanese relations, it is our intention to proceed on  
3 the basis of the following points with a view to  
4 establishing a New Order in East Asia through mutual  
5 collaboration in political, economic and cultural  
6 fields among Japan, Manchukuo and China: .....as  
7 to the problem of making peace with the Chiang Kai-shek  
8 Government.....it is our policy not to carry this  
9 out.....Our country will foster the establishment  
10 of a new Central Government on the basis of the pro-  
11 Japanese regime which has been established in Hankow  
12 and Canton, and after the new Central Government has  
13 been firmly established, we hope to achieve the follow-  
14 ing:.....General collaboration of Japan, Manchukuo,  
15 and China;.....Establishment in North China and  
16 Mengchiang of a zone of high degree of Sino-Japanese  
17 unity in defense and economic spheres:.....Establish-  
18 ment along the lower basin of the Yangtze River of a  
19 zone of a high degree of Sino-Japanese unity in  
20 economic collaboration.....In South China, besides  
21 the establishment of special zones on certain specified  
22 islands along the coast, endeavours shall be made to  
23 secure the foundation of Sino-Japanese cooperation  
24 and collaboration with the major cities and towns as  
25

starting points.....Regarding.....principle of joint  
1 defense, we hope to have Japan, Manchukuo and China,  
2 with the chief objects of jointly defending themselves  
3 against the Comintern and at the same time cooperating  
4 with each other in the maintenance of common public  
5 order and peace, adopt the following programme:.....The  
6 early withdrawal of Japanese troops, excepting the  
7 stationing of troops in specified zones, and islands  
8 for the purpose of guarantee and the maintenance of  
9 public peace and order.....Recently Britain, the United  
10 States, etc., have made various representations based  
11 on the principle of open door and equal opportunity.  
12 In this connection it is the intention of the Imperial  
13 Government to cope with the situation by adopting the  
14 policy of examining the so-called open door and equal  
15 opportunity principle from the standpoint of the establish-  
16 ment of a Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc based  
17 upon the necessities for the existence and defense of  
18 our Empire, and of not recognizing such a principle  
19 within the extent that it is incompatible with this  
20 standpoint.....Our chief objects are that: (a) Japan  
21 shall control in substance the development of natural  
22 resources for national defence and principally North  
23 China and Manchuria; (b) The currency system, customs  
24 and maritime customs system in new China shall be

1 adjusted from the standpoint of Japan-Manchukuo-China  
2 economic bloc. So long as the powers' rights and  
3 interests in China do not conflict with the foregoing  
4 two objects, we will not purposely exclude and restrict  
5 them."

6 Premier Konoye made a further speech on 22  
7 December 1938, reiterating Japan's resolution to  
8 exterminate the Chinese National Government and to  
9 establish a New Order in East Asia.

10 This Japanese "New Order in East Asia" caused  
11 the United States grave concern. On 30 December 1938  
12 Ambassador Grew, under instructions from his Govern-  
13 ment, addressed a note to the Japanese Government, in  
14 the course of which he said: "Further, with reference  
15 to such matters as exchange control, compulsory currency  
16 circulation, tariff revision, and monopolistic promotion  
17 in certain areas of China the plans and practices of  
18 the Japanese authorities imply an assumption on the  
19 part of those authorities that the Japanese Government  
20 or the regimes established and maintained in China by  
21 Japanese armed forces are entitled to act in China in  
22 a capacity such as flows from rights of sovereignty  
23 and further in so acting to disregard and even to  
24 declare non-existent or abrogated the established  
25 rights and interests of other countries including



1 the United States." Again, on 31 December 1938, Ambas-  
2 sador Grew delivered a note informing the Japanese  
3 Government of the view of his own Government that the  
4 so-called "New Order" could not be created by Japan's  
5 ex-parte declaration.

6 ITOGAKI was quoted by "Japan Advertiser" news-  
7 paper of 17 March 1939 as having declared in the Diet  
8 that in order to establish the so-called New Order,  
9 conflict with third powers was inevitable. Britain  
10 and France were Japan's next objective, while Russia  
11 was the first.

12 On 7 July 1939, on the occasion of the second  
13 anniversary of the Lukouchiao (Marco Polo Bridge)  
14 Incident, ITOGAKI was reported as giving a press inter-  
15 view in the course of which he said that Japan's  
16 mission of constructing a New Order in East Asia would  
17 necessitate the stamping out of unjust interference by  
18 third powers.  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

THE KO-A-IN OR ASIA DEVELOPMENT BOARD.

1 After the Japanese Army had made deep penetration  
2 into the interior of China, steps were taken by the  
3 Japanese to review the administration of the occupied  
4 areas, hitherto undertaken by the special service organs  
5 of the Japanese Army, preparatory to the formation of a  
6 New Central Government. Foreign Minister Ugaki desired  
7 to have a new organ to deal with China Affairs within  
8 the Foreign Office, but this suggestion was opposed by  
9 the Army. It was later decided at the instance of the  
10 Army that a China Affairs Board or some such organization  
11 be planned. The new organ to be set up was distinct from  
12 the Special Commission on Chinese Affairs created by the  
13 Five Ministers' Conference on 26 July 1938. The latter  
14 was an agency concerned with the means of crushing the  
15 Chinese National Government and establishing a new central  
16 government, while the Board to be established was to be  
17 concerned, primarily, with matters of administration in  
18 occupied areas.

19  
20 On 16 December 1938, this new organ came into  
21 being under the name of Ko-A-In, or Asia Development  
22 Board, but more frequently referred to as the China  
23 Affairs Board. The Premier was the President and the  
24 Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance, War and Navy were  
25 Vice-Presidents. According to the regulations governing

1 its organization, the Board was put in charge of the  
2 following: politics, economics and culture and the  
3 formulation of policies relative thereto; the supervision  
4 of commercial concerns to undertake enterprises in China  
5 under special laws or to do business in China; and the  
6 coordination of administrative affairs in China conducted  
7 by Japanese Government agencies. Its head office was  
8 in Tokyo, with four branch offices in Shanghai, Peiping,  
9 Kalgan and Amoy and two sub-branch offices in Canton  
10 and Tsingtao. SUZUKI, Teiichi, was one of the organizers  
11 of the Board and the head of the political or adminis-  
12 trative division. Decisions made by the head office in  
13 Tokyo were transmitted to the Branch or "liaison" offices  
14 which dealt with the local Chinese authorities in working  
15 out methods of implementing decisions made in Tokyo.

16 Notwithstanding the establishment of the Board,  
17 the Japanese Army in China did not forsake matters of  
18 administration. Special service organs continued to  
19 exist, and army interference was defended as necessary  
20 because of military operations.

21 Among the various matters handled by the Asia  
22 Development Board was opium. It studied the opium needs  
23 in different parts of China and arranged for the distri-  
24 bution from Mongolia to North, Central and South China.  
25 Japan's policy upon narcotics in China is treated

elsewhere.

1 WANG CHING-WEI DEPARTED CHUNGKING.

2 The movement for the establishment of the "New"  
3 Central Government in China received an impetus when Wang  
4 Ching-Wei left Chungking, China's wartime capital, on  
5 18 December 1938. He was Vice Chairman of the Kuomintang  
6 Party and Vice Chairman of the National Defense Council.  
7 As early as the spring of 1938, Koo Tsung-Wu and Tung  
8 Tze-Ning, former officials of the Chinese Foreign Minis-  
9 try, were brought into touch with Kagesa, Chief of the  
10 Chinese Section of the Army General Staff, and were taken  
11 to Japan by an army plane. There Kagesa had talks with  
12 them on reestablishment of peace between China and Japan.  
13 It was proposed that some person other than Generalissimo  
14 Chiang Kai-shek must be sought to promote peace between  
15 the two countries and that Wang Ching-Wei would be a  
16 suitable person. The conversations were reported to the  
17 Army General Staff, which took up the discussions. In  
18 the autumn of 1938, an officer of the Army General Staff  
19 returned from Shanghai to Tokyo bringing "Tentative Terms  
20 of Peace between Japan and China" which had been drawn up  
21 by Koo Tsung-Wu and Mei Ssu-Ping. This was brought by  
22 ITAGAKI before the Five Ministers' Conference, and  
23 amendments made to the "Tentative Plan" in accordance  
24 with the "Policy for the Adjustment of Relations between  
25



Japan and China" which had previously been drawn up by  
1 the Japanese Government. On 18 November 1938, Kameza,  
2 under orders of ITAGAKI, went to Shanghai to confer with  
3 Kao Tsung-Nu and Mei Ssu-Ping. After several amendments  
4 were made to the proposed terms, it was arranged that  
5 Wang Ching-Wei would leave Chungking according to a pre-  
6 arranged plan upon which the Japanese Government would  
7 announce the suggested terms of peace. These arrangements  
8 were approved by the Five Ministers' Conference on  
9 25 November 1938, and by the Imperial Conference on 30 Nov-  
10 ember 1938. As stated above, on 18 December 1938, Wang  
11 Ching-Wei left Chungking. He reached Hanoi in Indo-  
12 China on 20 December 1938. It is to be noted that the  
13 date of Wang Ching-Wei's intended departure from Chung-  
14 king was known to the Japanese Government at least six  
15 days previously, as KIDO recorded in his diary on  
16 12 December "it was reported that Wang Chao-Ming (Wang  
17 Ching-Wei) on the 18th would escape from Chungking, and  
18 for the present it was not good to disclose any political  
19 unrest in our country."  
20

21 KONOYE'S THREE PRINCIPLES.

22 On 22 December 1938, subsequent to Wang Ching-  
23 Wei's "escape" from Chungking, Premier Konoye issued a  
24 statement as pre-arranged. The essential points of  
25 this statement were as follows: (1) Japan, Manchukuo

1 and China should unite with the establishment of a New  
2 Order in East Asia as their common object and, in order  
3 to realize this, China would abandon resistance to Japan  
4 and hostility to Manchukuo; (2) Japan considered it  
5 essential for the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations  
6 that there be concluded an anti-Comintern agreement  
7 between the two countries in consonance with the spirit  
8 of the anti-Comintern agreement among Japan, Germany  
9 and Italy. In view of the circumstances prevailing in  
10 China, Japanese troops should be stationed at specified  
11 points. Inner Mongolia should be designated as a special  
12 anti-Communist area; (3) Japan did not desire economic  
13 monopoly in China or limitation of third powers'  
14 interests; but she demanded that China should, in  
15 accordance with the principle of equality between the  
16 two countries, recognize freedom of residence and trade  
17 on the part of Japanese subjects in the interior of  
18 China, to promote the economic interest of both, and  
19 should extend to Japan facilities for the development  
20 of China's natural resources, especially in North China  
21 and Inner Mongolia.

23 As planned, Wang Ching-wei on 29 December 1938  
24 made a speech in Hanoi in which he declared that the  
25 three points in the Konoye Statement were consistent  
with the spirit of peace, since the Japanese Government

1 had solemnly declared that she would respect the  
2 sovereignty, political independence and territorial  
3 integrity of China and would neither aim at an economic  
4 monopoly in China nor demand the restriction of third  
5 powers' interests in China. He urged that the Chinese  
6 Government should, as soon as possible, exchange views  
7 for a speedy restoration of peace between the two  
8 countries.

9 Thus was the ground prepared for acceptance of  
10 Japanese peace terms by the "New" Government intended to  
11 be created by Japan under Wang. By these means the dif-  
12 ficult and embarrassing war with China would be ended,  
13 leaving Japan free to pursue its strategic plans else-  
14 where. At the same time a complacent Government would  
15 be created by Japan giving the latter complete control  
16 of China both militarily and economically.

17 HIRANUMA FORMED A CABINET.

18  
19 Toward the end of 1938, Premier Konoye contem-  
20 plated resigning. HIRANUMA was opposed to this because,  
21 as he told KIDO, Wang Ching-Wei had left Chungking and  
22 the plot was proceeding steadily. Konoye however per-  
23 sisted with his resignation, and was succeeded by  
24 HIRANUMA on 5 January 1939. ARAKI remained as Education  
25 Minister, KIDO accepted the position as Home Minister  
and ITAGAKI continued to be War Minister.

1 Before ITAGAKI agreed to continue, he stipulated  
2 on behalf of the Army seven requirements, viz: (1) With  
3 regard to the "China Incident," the aims of the "Holy War"  
4 should be achieved and in accordance with fixed policies,  
5 particularly the declaration of 22 December 1938, con-  
6 taining the basis of readjustment of the relationship with  
7 China, which should be adopted in its entirety; (2) The  
8 plan for national defense should be established and expan-  
9 sion of armament should be the aim in order to cope with  
10 the new circumstances in East Asia; (3) The relations  
11 among Japan, Germany and Italy should be strengthened;  
12 (4) The system of national total mobilization should be  
13 reinforced and the Planning Board should be expanded and  
14 reinforced; (5) All efforts should be made to increase  
15 productivity; (6) National morale should be stimulated;  
16 and (7) Trade should be promoted.  
17

18 The first consequence of these demands was the  
19 adoption by a Cabinet Conference in January 1939 of the  
20 "Outline of the Plan for Expansion of Productive Power"  
21 drawn up by the Planning Board. This provided for the  
22 establishment of a comprehensive productive power expan-  
23 sion plan for Japan, Manchukuo and China, for the improve-  
24 ment of national defense and basic industries by 1941,  
25 in preparation for the "epochal development of our  
country's destiny in the future." On 21 January 1939





1 Premier HIRANUMA made a speech before the Diet, in which  
2 he said that his cabinet was committed to the same immu-  
3 table policy as the previous cabinet with regard to the  
4 China Affair, and that for those who failed to understand  
5 and persisted even in their opposition to Japan, there  
6 would be no other alternative than to exterminate them.  
7 In the meantime, Japan continued her military operations  
8 in China. As has been related, the Hainan Islands were  
9 captured on 10 February 1939 and Nanchang, Capital of  
10 Kiangsi Province, was captured on 26 March 1939.

12 We will adjourn until half-past nine tomorrow  
13 morning.

14 (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment  
15 was taken until Wednesday, 10 November 1948, at  
16 0930.)

17 - - -



1 Wednesday, 10 November 1948

2 - - -

3  
4 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
5 FOR THE FAR EAST  
6 Court House of the Tribunal  
7 War Ministry Building  
8 Tokyo, Japan

9 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,  
10 at 0930.

11 - - -

12 Appearances:

13 For the Tribunal, all Members sitting.

14 For the Prosecution Section, same as before.

15 For the Defense Section, same as before.

16  
17 - - -

18  
19 (English to Japanese and Japanese  
20 to English interpretation was made by the  
21 Language Section, IMTFE.)  
22  
23  
24  
25

MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
1 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

2 THE PRESIDENT: All the accused are present  
3 except KAYA, SHIRATORI and UMEZU who are represented  
4 by counsel. The Sugamo prison surgeon certifies that  
5 they are ill and unable to attend the trial today. The  
6 certificates will be recorded and filed.  
7

8 I continue the reading of the Tribunal's  
9 Judgment.

10 WANG CHING-WEI TAKEN TO SHANGHAI

11 The declarations of 22 and 29 December 1938, made  
12 by Konoye and Wang Ching-Wei respectively, were but a pro-  
13 lude to the establishment of a new central government in  
14 China. In March 1939, the Five Ministers' Conference in  
15 Japan decided to send Kagasa to Hanoi to take Wang to a  
16 "safety zone," which was decided upon as Shanghai. He  
17 reached Hanoi on 17 April 1939, carrying personal letters  
18 to Wang from Foreign Minister Arita, War Minister ITAGAKI,  
19 Ko-A-In Division Chief SUZUKI, and Navy Minister Yonai.  
20 Wang informed Kagasa that he would launch a movement for  
21 peace with Shanghai as his base. Wang was conveyed by the  
22 Japanese with the utmost secrecy from Hanoi to Shanghai  
23 where he arrived on the 8th May 1939.  
24  
25



WANG CHING-WEI VISITED JAPAN

1 While in Formosa with Wang on their way to Shang-  
2 hai, Kagosa reported to the War Ministry in Tokyo that  
3 Wang, in view of expected opposition, wished to have him-  
4 self set up as soon as possible at the place most convenient  
5 for his various activities. Later Kagosa actually set up  
6 headquarters for Wang in Shanghai. A Kagosa Agency was  
7 developed also to coordinate the work of the Japanese  
8 Gendarmerie and Wang's men.  
9

10 Wang was concerned to ascertain the views of the  
11 Japanese Government. Accompanied by Kagosa and other  
12 Japanese, he left Shanghai for Tokyo on 31 May 1939. While  
13 in Tokyo, he conferred with HIRANUMA, ITAGAKI, Konojo, Arima  
14 and Yonai. In his talk with HIRANUMA, soon after his arrival  
15 in Tokyo, HIRANUMA told him that his cabinet had inherited  
16 the ideas of the Konojo statement and was firmly adhering  
17 to it. On 15 June 1939, Wang had an interview with War  
18 Minister ITAGAKI, acting as the proxy of Premier HIRANUMA.  
19 ITAGAKI, pointed out that Japan could not dissolve the two  
20 existing regimes, the Provisional Government and Renovation  
21 Government, as those associated with them had been loyal to  
22 the plan of peaceful cooperation between Japan and China.  
23 He suggested the establishment of a political council in  
24 the Provisional Government and an economic council in the  
25 Renovation Government as the basis of maintaining Sino-

1 Japanese relations locally. Wang was not opposed to  
 2 this. ITAGAKI further suggested changing the Chinese  
 3 national flag, because the Blue Sky and White Sun ensign  
 4 was regarded as the symbol of anti-Japanism. ITAGAKI  
 5 also asked Wang's opinion upon the recognition of the  
 6 independence of Manchukuo, to which the latter answered  
 7 that as his aim was peace with Japan, he was firmly con-  
 8 vinced that there was no alternative but to recognize  
 9 Manchukuo.

10 DECISION OF THE FIVE MINISTERS' CONFERENCE-JUNE 1939

11 HIRANUMA says that in his talk with Wang Ching-  
 12 Wei on the 10th of June 1939, he discussed the future of  
 13 China and gave it as his opinion that there was no way but  
 14 to "take the measure which China thought proper"; yet  
 15 four days before, on 6 June 1939, while Wang Ching-Wei  
 16 was still in Japan, the Five Ministers' Conference de-  
 17 cided on a "Policy for the Establishment of a New Central  
 18 Government". The Policy, generally speaking, was directed  
 19 to the establishment of a pro-Japanese political system,  
 20 with a "New" Central Government and a group of consti-  
 21 tuent local governments - a form of federal government,  
 22 "but its details shall be conformed to the plan of ad-  
 23 justing a new relation between Japan and China". As to  
 24 the Chungking Government, the plan provided that it could  
 25 become a constituent element "provided that it change its

mind and be reformed". In more detail it said "When  
1 the Chungking Government gives up its anti-Japanese and  
2 pro-communism policy and accomplishes the required  
3 personnel changes . . . it shall be made a constituent  
4 element of the new central government, concluding (sic)  
5 that it has surrendered to us". The policy provided  
6 that "the time of establishment and its details shall  
7 be settled after consultation with Japan". The decision  
8 was reached also that "positive and internal aid neces-  
9 sary for this movement shall be given from the side of  
10 Japan". This statement of policy was drawn up because  
11 of discussions then taking place with Wang and set out  
12 a series of conditions to be required of him as well as  
13 a "Plan of Guidance of Wang's Movements". A considera-  
14 tion of this policy decision discloses a clear purpose  
15 of using Wang in the development of a Japanese-controlled  
16 government throughout the entire area of China. This is  
17 the fact although Kagawa in his evidence said that "Wang's  
18 party submitted a request containing broad principles  
19 such as respect for China's sovereignty, non-interference  
20 with domestic administration, the providing of Japanese  
21 advisers only at China's request, etc., and that these  
22 suggestions on the part of the Chinese were "generally  
23 admitted".

CABINET RESHUFFLE IN JAPAN AND CONTINUED MILITARYOPERATIONS IN CHINA

1  
2  
3 Within a period of four and a half months  
4 between the end of August 1939 and the middle of January  
5 1940, there were two cabinet changes in Japan. As a  
6 result of the signing of the Russo-German Non-Agression  
7 Pact on 22 August 1939, the HIRANUMA Cabinet, which had  
8 been striving for the conclusion of a Tri-Partite Pact  
9 with Germany and Italy, submitted its resignation. On  
10 30 August 1939, General Abe formed a new Cabinet. HATA  
11 succeeded ITAGAKI as War Minister and HUTO became Chief  
12 of the Military Affairs Bureau. On 12 September 1939  
13 ITAGAKI was appointed Chief of Staff of the General  
14 Headquarters of the China Expeditionary Forces stationed  
15 at Nanjing, where he continued his intrigues by supporting  
16 Wang Ching-Wei's "National Salvation Peace Movement".  
17 Military operations in China continued into the interior  
18 of China. On 20 July 1939, a "Situation Estimate" was  
19 made by the Army in Central China and presented to the  
20 Vice-Minister of War and other organs. This stated,  
21 among other things the future plans of the Army in China.  
22 It said that the Army had decided that a new central  
23 government should be established with Wang Ching-Wei as  
24 its head and should be given positive support in its  
25 development.



1 On 23 December 1939, Japanese landed in Lung-  
2 chow in southernmost China. On the next day, they cap-  
3 tured Nanning, the Capital of Kwangsi Province. At the  
4 end of 1939, Japan ordered her air force to bomb the Yun-  
5 nan Railway with a view to disrupting transshipment of war  
6 materials to the interior of China from the seaports of  
7 French Indo-China. In January 1940, another government  
8 change took place in Japan. Premier Abe resigned on 12  
9 January 1940 and was succeeded by Yonai. The general  
10 policy of Japan towards China however remained unchanged.

11 INAUGURATION OF THE PUPPET CENTRAL GOVERNMENT

12 After his return from Japan, Wang Ching-wei  
13 conferred with General Tada, Commander of Japanese Forces  
14 in North China, and with the leaders of the Provisional  
15 and Renovation Governments in regard to the proposed  
16 establishment of a puppet central government. By that  
17 time, July 1939, Kagesa had established in Shanghai the  
18 Kagesa Agency, which worked with the War, Navy and Foreign  
19 Ministries, as well as with the Asia Development Board.  
20 This Agency assisted in the establishment of the Central  
21 Government. A loan of 40 million Yen was advanced to  
22 Wang Ching-wei by Japan for that purpose. From 28 August  
23 to 6 September 1939, Wang conducted the "Sixth National  
24 Kuomintang "Congress", which revised the platform of the  
25 Party and adopted as "principles" Japan's proposals and

discussed a Central Political Conference to establish the  
1 new Central Government. Thereafter, Wang issued invita-  
2 tions to the Provisional and the Renovation Governments  
3 to participate in organizing the Central Political  
4 Council to create the new government.

5  
6 In Japan according to Kagawa, steps were being  
7 taken to implement a tentative plan which had been pre-  
8 pared by the Asia Development Board in October and this  
9 was agreed upon by the Japanese Government and Wang  
10 Ching-wei on 30 December 1939. Details regarding the  
11 establishment of a new Central Government were also  
12 agreed upon by a representative of Wang and Japanese  
13 officials in Tokyo. Then in January 1940, representatives  
14 of the Provisional and the Renovation Governments, as  
15 well as of the Japanese Army met at Tsingtao and decided  
16 to amalgamate the existing regimes. On 30 March 1940,  
17 Wang's government was formally inaugurated.

#### 18 SECTION VI

#### 19 GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

20  
21 Closely associated with Japan's programme of  
22 dominating China on the continent was the idea of esta-  
23 blishing a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This  
24 was recognized as being bound to bring her into conflict  
25 with the interests of third powers. On 7 July 1939, two  
years after the outbreak of hostilities at Lukouchiao

(Marco Polo Bridge), ITAGAKI and Yonai, War and Navy  
1 Ministers respectively of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, were  
2 reported in the "Japan Times and Mail" as stating that  
3 the unjust interference of third powers in the execution  
4 of Japan's mission of constructing a New Order in East  
5 Asia should be stamped out. "All the people in the  
6 country", the article continued, "must express their  
7 firm determination that Japan will never abandon her aim  
8 of making East Asia for East Asiatics. No pains must  
9 be spared for the attainment of the goal". On 29 June  
10 1940, Japan's Foreign Minister Arita broadcast a speech  
11 reiterating Japan's mission of establishing a New Order  
12 in East Asia and her determination "to leave no stone  
13 unturned to eradicate activities assisting Chiang Kai-  
14 shek". He stated that the countries of East Asia and  
15 the regions of the South Seas were closely related to  
16 each other and were destined to cooperate and administer  
17 each other's need for their common welfare and prosperity,  
18 and that the uniting of all those regions under a single  
19 sphere on the basis of common existence and stability was  
20 a natural conclusion. References were made at conferences  
21 of representatives of the Army, Navy and Foreign Office  
22 authorities to the possibility of fighting against Great  
23 Britain, the occupation of British colonies, and to  
24 Japan's intention that the New Order in the Far East  
25

1 included the South Seas and in particular the regions  
2 extending from Burma and the Eastern part of India to  
3 Australia and New Zealand.

4 The date of this public declaration of Japan's  
5 policy to expand in East Asia and the region of the Pac-  
6 ific Ocean, which was 29 June 1940, is significant. Of  
7 the countries interested in this sphere Holland had been  
8 overrun by the Germans and her government was in exile.  
9 France had surrendered to Germany. Britain was about to  
10 face a struggle for her existence. America, if she inter-  
11 vened, would almost certainly face a struggle with Japan,  
12 Germany and Italy, a struggle for which her state of re-  
13 armament was unfitted. Such an opportunity for Japan to  
14 expand at the expense of her neighbors would not easily  
15 occur again.

#### 16 THE SECOND KONOYE CABINET

17 In the middle of July 1940, the Yonai Cabinet  
18 was forced by the Army to resign because, upon the re-  
19 signation of HATA as War Minister, the Army refused to  
20 provide a successor. Konoye was again chosen to form a  
21 new Cabinet because, as KIDO said, he was to be "depended  
22 upon to settle the China Incident". TOJO became War  
23 Minister, while HIRANUMA, SUZUKI, and HOSHINO served as  
24 Ministers without portfolios. The new Cabinet was formed  
25 on 22 July 1940. Continuing the policy of establishing



a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, the new  
1 Foreign Minister Matsuoka declared on 1 August  
2 1940 that the immediate end of Japan's foreign policy  
3 was to establish a Great East Asian chain of common  
4 prosperity with the Japan-Manchukuo-China group as the  
5 core. On 28 September 1940 the Japanese Government pre-  
6 pared an "Outline of Japanese Foreign Policy" which pro-  
7 vided that an effort must be made to realize general  
8 peace between Japan and China and to promote the esta-  
9 blishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  
10 Under that plan, in the regions including French Indo-  
11 China, Dutch East Indies, Straits Settlement, British  
12 Malaya, Thailand, the Philippine Islands, British Borneo  
13 and Burma, with Japan, Manchukuo and China as centre,  
14 Japan should construct a sphere in which politics, econ-  
15 omy and culture of these countries and regions would be  
16 combined.  
17

18 FURTHER MILITARY ACTION BY JAPAN AGAINST CHINA  
19

20 Although the Government of Wang Ching-wei was  
21 formally installed on 30 March 1940, in Nanking, the  
22 Chinese National Government at Chungking was still  
23 holding out against Japan. In order to bring about the  
24 surrender of the Chinese Government, Japanese military  
25 operations continued with increasing vigour. On 12 June  
1940 Japanese forces captured Ichang, gateway to the

Szechuan Province, within which is Chungking. On 30  
1 June 1940 they again captured Kaifeng, which had been  
2 recovered by the Chinese. The Japanese Government also  
3 insisted upon sending troops to Indo-China in order to  
4 disrupt the supply line of the Chinese and to threaten  
5 them from the rear. On 14 September 1940 KIDO advised  
6 the Emperor to approve the action taken towards that end.  
7 After protracted negotiations, which will be discussed  
8 later, an agreement was made between the Japanese and  
9 French authorities to allow the Japanese troops to occupy  
10 northern French Indo-China from 23 September 1940 for  
11 operations against China.  
12

13 JAPAN SIGNED A TREATY WITH WANG CHING-WEI GOVERNMENT

14 Upon the inauguration of the new government, it  
15 was not a professional diplomat but a soldier, General  
16 Abe, Nobuyuki, who was appointed the Japanese Ambassador  
17 Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. This arrangement fol-  
18 lowed the pattern of Manchukuo, where a soldier, the Com-  
19 mander for the time being of the Kwantung Army, was ap-  
20 pointed Japanese Ambassador to the puppet government of  
21 Manchukuo. General Abe arrived at Nanking on 23 April  
22 1940, and all preparations were completed for the restora-  
23 tion of Sino-Japanese relations. After protracted nego-  
24 tiations between Wang and Abe, a draft treaty was agreed  
25 upon on 28 August 1940 and initialled three days after-

wards. After further negotiations and some alterations  
1 had been made, a treaty in its final form was settled.  
2 Following an Imperial Conference of 13 November 1940,  
3 the treaty was submitted to the Privy Council and was  
4 approved at its full session on 27 November 1940. It  
5 was formally signed on 30 November 1940 at Nanking.

6 "TREATY CONCERNING THE BASIC RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN  
7 AND CHINA"  
8

9 The Treaty and associated documents signed 30  
10 November 1940 were ex facie directed to the maintenance  
11 of mutual respect and cooperation with each other as good  
12 neighbours under their common ideal of establishing a new  
13 order in East Asia, and, with this as a nucleus contri-  
14 buting toward the peace of the world in general. The  
15 Treaty provided that the two governments agreed to elim-  
16 inate causes prejudicial to amity between the two coun-  
17 tries, and to engage in joint defense against communism,  
18 for which purpose Japan should station required forces  
19 in specified areas of Manchiang and of North China.  
20 The Wang Government agreed to recognize Japan's right  
21 to station naval units and vessels in specified areas  
22 in China. The Treaty further provided that the two  
23 governments should effect close cooperation so as to  
24 complement each other and minister to each other's needs  
25 in resources in North China and Manchiang, especially

1 materials needed for national defense. To develop re-  
2 sources in other areas, the Wang Government agreed to  
3 give positive and full facilities to Japan. The two  
4 governments agreed to promote trade and commerce and to  
5 extend specially close cooperation for the promotion of  
6 trade and commerce in the lower basin of the Yangtze  
7 River. Attached to the Treaty were two secret agree-  
8 ments. In the first, it was agreed that diplomacy would  
9 be based on concerted action and no measures would be  
10 taken with respect to third countries contrary to that  
11 principle. The Wang Government also agreed to comply  
12 with Japan's demands for military needs in railways,  
13 airways, communications and waterways in areas where  
14 Japanese troops were stationed. China's administrative  
15 and executive rights were to be respected in ordinary  
16 times. The second secret agreement allowed Japanese  
17 vessels to "freely enter into and anchor at the harbour  
18 areas within the territorial jurisdiction of the Repub-  
19 lic of China." The Wang Government agreed to cooperate  
20 in the planning, development and production of special  
21 resources, especially strategic resources, necessary for  
22 national defense, in Amoy, Hainan Island and the adjoining  
23 islands, and to facilitate the strategic demands of  
24 Japan. In a separate letter, addressed to Abe, Wang  
25 promised that so long as Japan was carrying on military



1 operations in China, the latter would cooperate toward  
2 the full attainment of Japan's war purpose. On the same  
3 day as the Treaty was formally signed there was published  
4 a "Joint Declaration by the Governments of Japan, Man-  
5 chukuo and China," which provided that the three coun-  
6 tries would mutually respect their sovereignty and  
7 territories, and would bring about general cooperation as  
8 good neighbors, common defense against communistic activi-  
9 ties and economic cooperation. By this treaty and asso-  
10 ciated secret agreements Japan secured the right to a  
11 voice in China's diplomatic activities, to maintain  
12 military and naval forces in China, to use China for  
13 strategic purposes, and to use Chinese natural resources  
14 for "national defense." In other words, despite the  
15 diplomatic protestations in these documents China was to  
16 become at the best a province or satrapy of Japan, and  
17 at the worst a country to be exploited to satisfy Japan's  
18 military and economic needs.

19  
20 INTERMITTENT PEACE TALKS AND CONTINUED MILITARY  
21 OPERATIONS

22 The signing of the treaty might well be re-  
23 garded by the Japanese Government with satisfaction,  
24 as the realization of the policy stated in the Konoye  
25 Declaration of 16 January 1938, in so far as the esta-  
blishment of a new central government and the obtaining

of military and other advantages was concerned. At the  
1 same time, the problem of how to deal with the Chinese  
2 National Government in Chungking, which was holding out,  
3 remained unsettled. The attitude of the Japanese  
4 Government during this period appeared to be devious or  
5 vacillating. Prior to the signing of the treaty, peace  
6 moves had been conducted toward the Chinese Government  
7 at Chungking, but they led to no tangible results.  
8 Foreign Minister Katsuka, in an attempt to take these  
9 negotiations into his own hands, despatched Tajiri,  
10 Matsumoto and others to Hong Kong. These efforts again  
11 proved fruitless. Following the signing of the treaty  
12 with Wang, the attitude of the Japanese Government toward  
13 the Chinese Government at Chungking again stiffened. On  
14 11 December 1940, Abe was given instructions as follows:  
15  
16 "The Imperial Government has now recognized the  
17 National Government (At Nanking) and had entered into  
18 formal diplomatic relations with it. However, in view  
19 of the situation that not only is the Incident still  
20 going on, but also that we are, at least, going to adapt  
21 the state for a long term warfare, you should try to  
22 rapidly bring up and strengthen the National Government  
23 (in Nanking), in accordance with the established policy  
24 of the Empire and the provisions of the new China-Japanese  
25 Treaty." Thereafter, armed operations against Chungking

1 were continued. On 1 March 1941, HATA was again appointed  
2 Commander-in-Chief of all Japanese Forces in China. SATO  
3 became Secretary of the Manchurian Affairs Bureau on 18  
4 March 1941, and KIMURA Vice Minister of War on 10 April  
5 1941. SUZUKI was made the President of the Cabinet  
6 Planning Board, following an agreement reached among  
7 Premier Konoye, KIDO, the War and Navy Ministers. On  
8 21 April 1941, Kunming, the capital of Yunnan Province,  
9 which occupied a strategically important position in the  
10 rear of Chungking, was bombed, and the United States  
11 Consulate building there was badly damaged. Chungking,  
12 having previously suffered damage from Japanese air  
13 raids, was again bombed on 9 and 10 May and on 1 June  
14 1941.

15 HULL-NOMURA TALKS RELATING TO CHINA

16 In the meantime, Ambassador Nomura was conduc-  
17 ting negotiations with the American Secretary of State,  
18 Cordell Hull, at Washington over questions affecting  
19 world peace, particularly Sino-Japanese relations. These  
20 will be discussed more fully later. It is sufficient  
21 to mention here that Japan sought (1) to end American  
22 assistance to China, (2) the assistance of America to  
23 induce Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate peace  
24 direct with Japan --really to accept Japanese terms, (3)  
25 the recognition of Manchukuo, and (4) the right to hold

China in military subjection through the stationing of  
1 Japanese troops there.

2 On 2 July 1941, another Imperial Conference was  
3 held, attended by TOJO, SUZUKI, HIRANUMA and OKA. A  
4 summary of Japan's policy in accordance with the current  
5 change of situation was adopted at the Conference. Among  
6 other things, it included a decision to exercise further  
7 pressure "to hasten the surrender of Chiang's regime."  
8

9 THE THIRD KONOYE CABINET

10 Foreign Minister Matsuoka was not in full agree-  
11 ment with Premier Konoye in regard to procedure in the  
12 negotiation between Japan and the United States. Matsuoka  
13 was also in favor of a Japanese attack on Russia, which  
14 had now been invaded by Germany, as well as an advance in  
15 East Asia and the Pacific, a policy which most of Japan's  
16 leaders thought beyond her powers. The Cabinet resigned  
17 on 16 July 1941 as a means of getting rid of Matsuoka.  
18

19 On 18 July 1941, Konoye formed his third Cabinet.  
20 Toyoda replaced Matsuoka as Foreign Minister. The funda-  
21 mental policy of the Japanese Government remained un-  
22 changed.

23 The negotiations between the United States and  
24 Japan were continued. On 27 August 1941, Konoye sent a  
25 message to President Roosevelt. A Japanese Government  
statement bearing the same date was also delivered to



1 President Roosevelt. Among other things, the statement  
2 said that Japan's measures in Indo-China were intended to  
3 accelerate the settlement of the "China Incident." Presi-  
4 dent Roosevelt, in reply, reiterated the principles re-  
5 garded as the foundation upon which relations between  
6 nations should properly rest, viz: respect for the  
7 territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and  
8 all nations and support of the principle of non-inter-  
9 ference in the internal affairs of other countries.  
10 Upon receipt of the reply, Konoye called the Cabinet  
11 into session on 5 September 1941, which decided to hold  
12 an Imperial Conference on 6 September 1941. TOJO,  
13 SUZUKI, MUTO and OKA were all present in the Imperial  
14 Conference, which, aside from making a decision to break  
15 off the negotiations in the middle of October, also set  
16 forth the following demands to be made in connection with  
17 the "China Incident" in the proposed discussions between  
18 Konoye and Roosevelt: (1) the United States and Britain  
19 should not interrupt the settlement of the "China Inci-  
20 dent" which would be made in accordance with the "Sino-  
21 Japanese Basic Treaty" and the Japanese-Manchukuo-China  
22 Tri-Partite Joint Declaration: (2) The Burma Road should  
23 be closed and the United States and Britain should give  
24 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek neither military nor  
25 economic support. On 22 September 1941 Toyoda delivered

to Ambassador Grew a statement of the terms of peace  
1 which Japan proposed to offer China. Those terms were:  
2 (1) Neighborly friendship; (2) Respect for sovereignty  
3 and territorial integrity; (3) Cooperative defense  
4 between Japan and China, for which Japanese troops and  
5 naval forces would be stationed in certain areas in  
6 China; (4) Withdrawal of Japanese troops upon the  
7 settlement of the China Incident excepting those which  
8 came under point 3; (5) Economic cooperation between  
9 Japan and China; (6) Fusion of Generalissimo Chiang  
10 Kai-shek's Government with Wang Ching-wei's Government;  
11 (7) No annexation; (8) No indemnities; (9) Recognition  
12 of Manchukuo. These terms, it will be noticed, notwith-  
13 standing their well-sounding purposes and having regard  
14 to the treaty with Wang's Government, would have given  
15 Japan complete dominance of China politically, economi-  
16 cally and militarily.

17  
18 In his discussion of the situation with  
19 Premier Kenoye on 9 October 1941, KIDO stated that  
20 although it would be inadvisable to make war on the  
21 United States immediately, Japan should prepare for  
22 military action for the completion of the "China  
23 Incident" which might last for ten or fifteen years,  
24 and to apply the whole of Japan's military force in  
25 China to realize Japan's plans against Kuning and

1 Chungking. On 12 October 1941, the Cabinet reached  
2 an agreement, upon the insistence of War Minister  
3 TOJO, that Japan should not waver in her policy of  
4 stationing troops in China or other policies connected  
5 with China and that nothing be done which might prejudice  
6 the result of the China Incident. This meant, in  
7 other words, in no circumstances should Japan yield  
8 up any of the many material benefits already gained  
9 or in prospect in China. On 14 October 1941, prior  
10 to the Cabinet Meeting, Konoye spoke to TOJO and urged  
11 further consideration upon the opening of hostilities  
12 between Japan and the United States and the bringing  
13 to an end of the China Incident. TOJO, as before,  
14 opposed any concession to the United States in the  
15 matter of withdrawal of troops from China, and said  
16 Konoye was too pessimistic. In the Cabinet meeting  
17 held that day, TOJO was insistent upon his view and  
18 brought about a complete deadlock. Konoye resigned  
19 on 16 October 1941.  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

## TOJO FORMED A CABINET

1 After the resignation of Konoye, TOJO became  
2 Premier upon the recommendation of KIDO. HIROTA also  
3 gave his specific approval to the recommendation. In  
4 the new Cabinet, TOJO was also War Minister and Home  
5 Minister. TOGO became Foreign Minister and concurrently  
6 Minister of Overseas Affairs, while KAYA became Finance  
7 Minister. SUZUKI was Chief Director of the Asia  
8 Development Board and concurrently President of the  
9 Planning Board. SHIMADA became Navy Minister, while  
10 HOSHINO was designated Chief Secretary of the Cabinet.  
11 As before, the Premier served as President of the  
12 Asia Development Board, with the Army, Navy, Foreign  
13 and Finance Ministers, as Vice Presidents.

CONTINUANCE OF UNITED STATES - JAPAN PARLEYS

16 After the new TOJO Cabinet came into office,  
17 the Japanese Government continued diplomatic discussions  
18 with the United States Government, but, while appearing  
19 to be urgent for a decision, it showed no willingness to  
20 make any real modification of its attitude concerning  
21 China. On 4 November 1941 TOGO informed Nomura that  
22 Kurusu was being dispatched to assist him in the parleys.  
23 On the same day, TOGO sent to Nomura another message  
24 giving the terms to be presented to the United States  
25 Government, including those relating to the stationing



of Japanese troops in China. Japan still insisted  
1 that it should station troops in China, in the Mongolian  
2 border region and on the island of Hainan, even after  
3 the establishment of peace between Japan and China,  
4 and that these would not be evacuated until the lapse  
5 of an indefinite period, which if necessary might be  
6 interpreted as 25 years. These terms were subsequently  
7 approved by the Imperial Conference held on 5 November  
8 1941, at which TOJO, TOGO, SHIRADA, KAYA, SUZUKI,  
9 HOSHINO, MATO and OKA were present. Nomura was promptly  
10 notified of the approval.  
11

12 CONTINUED MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN CHINA

13 The outbreak of the Pacific War did not abate  
14 Japan's military operations in China, nor alter the  
15 decision to crush the Chinese National Government at  
16 Chungking. Even before the outbreak of the Pacific War,  
17 casualties and losses suffered by China had assumed  
18 tremendous proportions. Up to June 1941, figures of  
19 the Japanese showed that the Chinese armed forces had  
20 lost 3,800,000 men killed, wounded and captured; that  
21 the Japanese had captured from the Chinese an enormous  
22 amount of booty; that they had destroyed 1977 Chinese  
23 planes; and that the Japanese had themselves lost  
24 109,250 men killed and 203 planes.  
25

In May 1942, the Japanese took Lungling and

Tengchung in Yunnan Province, in the rear of Chungking.  
1 In December 1943, they captured Changteh in Hunnan  
2 Province, although it was soon recaptured by the Chinese.  
3 By the middle of 1944, military operations were intensified  
4 in the interior of Central China. Changchow fell on  
5 20 April 1944, Loyang on 25 May 1944, Changsha on 18  
6 June 1944 and Hengyang on 8 August 1944. Then in the  
7 winter of the same year the Japanese made a further  
8 thrust into the strategic southwestern China. They  
9 captured Kweilin on 10 November 1944 and Liuchow on  
10 11 November 1944. At the close of the war, the official  
11 records of the Chinese Army showed that the army alone  
12 lost from 7 July 1937 to August 1945, 3,207,948 men killed,  
13 wounded and missing. We were not given figures on  
14 non-combatants killed or maimed in the course of the war,  
15 although there must have been very considerable civilian  
16 casualties.  
17

18 SECTION VII - JAPAN'S ECONOMIC DOMINATION OF  
19 MANCHURIA AND OTHER PARTS OF CHINA  
20

21 The case made against the accused is of waging  
22 aggressive war, with the object, inter alia, of obtaining  
23 economic domination of Manchuria and other parts of  
24 China. It becomes necessary, therefore, that we should  
25 discuss shortly the evidence presented upon this subject.  
As already related the Japanese policy in Manchuria was

1 to consolidate the territory under a government  
2 subservient to Japan and then by means of agreements  
3 with that government and by other means to obtain much  
4 needed basic materials required to carry out the program  
5 adopted in Japan and to obtain control of the communications  
6 and a substantial part of industry and commerce, all  
7 of which were of great value to later Military Operations.

8 In North China the same plan was followed for  
9 the same purposes and particularly to fill the demand  
10 for supplies which at the time were not obtainable  
11 in foreign markets and which were badly needed in the  
12 campaign against the whole of China and were necessary  
13 to facilitate the over-all plan. The same policy was  
14 adopted as the war progressed into Central and Southern  
15 China. The political domination has already been dealt  
16 with; the following account of the various measures  
17 adopted indicates the extent to which the policy of  
18 economic domination was carried out.

19 GENERAL ECONOMIC MATTERS

20 The Japanese policy toward China has been dealt  
21 with at an earlier point in this judgment in relation  
22 to the political policy. Most of the "Plans and Policies"  
23 there referred to also deal with economic matters. There-  
24 fore at this step we mention only a few decisions which  
25 are particularly applicable to the question of economic

domination.

1  
2 Typical of the policy was the adoption by the  
3 HIROTA Cabinet on the 11th of August 1936 of "The  
4 Second Administrative Policy Toward North China," the  
5 main purpose of which was "To Assist the people in North  
6 China in procuring perfect independence and to set up  
7 an anti-communistic and pro-Japanese and pro-Manchurian  
8 area and to secure the necessary materials for our  
9 National defense as well as to improve the facilities of  
10 the transportation against the possible invasion of  
11 Soviet Russia, and by making North China the base for  
12 the cooperation of Japan, Manchuria, and China as  
13 well as for mutual aid." It was then provided that Japan  
14 should guide the local political powers to insure the  
15 independence of North China. It was finally provided that  
16 iron, coal, and salt existing in the province should be  
17 utilized for our national defense and for the promotion  
18 of our transportation facilities and electric power."

19  
20 On the 20th of February, 1937, the Hayashi  
21 Cabinet adopted the "Third Administrative Policy Toward  
22 North China" the principal objects of which were procuring  
23 defense materials, improving transportation, preparing  
24 the defense against the USSR, and establishing cooperation  
25 between Japan, Manchukuo and China. On the 10th of June,  
1937, the War Ministry under the first Konoye Cabinet



1 prepared a "Resume of Policy regarding the execution  
2 of summary of five year program of important industries"  
3 which, as we have mentioned previously, was declared to  
4 be based upon a "policy for the establishment of a  
5 comprehensive plan for Japan, Manchukuo, and China in  
6 order to prepare for the epochal development of Japan's  
7 destiny in the future." The plan also recites that it  
8 aims at the establishment of self-sufficiency in regard  
9 to important resources within the sphere of our influence  
10 and thereby a void depending upon the resources of a third  
11 power." On the 24th December, 1937 the Cabinet decided  
12 the "Outline of Measures for the China Incident" which  
13 contained a section entitled "Policy for Economic  
14 Development." That section provided that its object  
15 was the economic development of North China to coordinate  
16 Japanese and Manchurian economy and to establish co-  
17 prosperity and coalition between Japan, Manchukuo and  
18 China. For that purpose it was considered necessary to  
19 develop and adjust every phase of economics by closely  
20 combining Chinese capital with Japanese capital, thereby  
21 contributing to the development and increase of production  
22 of necessary materials for the national defense of Japan  
23 and Manchukuo.

25 In order to give effect to the plans and policy  
last mentioned and to coordinate the Japanese efforts

in that regard provision was made in April 1938 for  
1 the creation of two national policy companies. These  
2 were the North China Development Company for North  
3 China and the Central China Promotion Company for Central  
4 China. The objects of the North China Development  
5 Company were to further economic development and to  
6 consolidate various undertakings in North China. Its  
7 operations were carried on as a holding company financing  
8 and controlling leading enterprises in transportation,  
9 harbor and port developments, electric power generation  
10 and transmission, mining, production and sale of salt  
11 and allied undertakings.  
12

13 It operated under the supervision of the  
14 Japanese Government and was subject to the orders of  
15 the government; in fact except in routine matters it  
16 required the approval of the government for all its  
17 decisions. For example the approval of the Japanese  
18 Government was required for the raising of loans, making  
19 changes in its articles of association, giving effect  
20 to mergers and dissolutions and distribution of profits.  
21 Its plans for investment and financing for each fiscal  
22 year also required the approval of the Government.  
23

24 UREZU was appointed a member of the company's  
25 organizing committee with OKA as an assistant. KAYA  
served as president of the company for some time going

out of office on the 10th of October, 1941, when he  
1 became Finance Minister in the TOJO Cabinet.

2           The Central China Promotion Company had objects  
3 very similar to those of the North China Development  
4 Company and was subject to substantially the same control  
5 by the Government. The operations in the development  
6 of public utilities, transportation, and natural resources  
7 which will shortly be referred to came under the control  
8 of one or the other of these companies.

9  
10           Before dealing with the particular operations  
11 reference should be made to the "Program for the Economic  
12 Development of China" adopted by the Planning Board in  
13 January, 1939. It was stated in this program that the  
14 development of natural resources in China had far-  
15 reaching consequences in realizing the ideas of economic  
16 collaboration between Japan, China and Manchukuo as  
17 the basic step for establishing a new order in East  
18 Asia. It was further stated that these activities were  
19 "as vital and urgent as military operations and political  
20 activities and that they should be carried out even  
21 during hostilities".  
22  
23  
24  
25

Reference should also be made to the "Summary  
1 of the Program for Economic Construction Embracing  
2 Japan, Manchukuo and China" put out by the Cabinet  
3 Information Bureau on the 5th of November 1940, the  
4 principal purpose of which was the establishment of a  
5 self-supporting and self-sufficient economic structure  
6 within ten years to strengthen the position of East  
7 Asia in world economy. Under the program Japan's  
8 function was to promote science and techniques and to  
9 develop heavy industry, the chemical industry and  
10 mining. Manchukuo was to develop important basic  
11 industries and China her natural resources, particularly  
12 mining and the salt industry.

14 Not only was no provision made in this program  
15 for consulting Manchukuo or China with regard to its  
16 operation but reading the document as a whole it is  
17 made clear that decisions as to its being put into  
18 effect in all its aspects were to be made by Japan and  
19 Japan alone.

21 Significant of the purposes of the Japanese  
22 plans in North China is a statement by KAYA that the  
23 plan for mobilization of materials in North China had  
24 three main points; the first was to supply Japan with  
25 war materials; the second was to expand Japan's armaments;  
and the third was to meet the needs of peace-time economy.



PARTICULAR INDUSTRIES

1 The foregoing gives an outline of the general  
2 plans and policies adopted by the Japanese Government.  
3 A short outline of how the general plans were applied  
4 to particular industries and special phases of economics  
5 will be of value at this point.  
6

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

7  
8 In 1935 when DOHARA was active in connection  
9 with the establishment of autonomous rule in North China  
10 he demanded the construction of a railway between  
11 Tientsin and Shihchiachuan. Reference has already been  
12 made to the railway plan drafted by the North China  
13 Garrison Force in November 1935 which indicated Japan's  
14 desire or intention to acquire the Shantung Railway and  
15 a section of the Lunghai Railway and to construct  
16 further new railways in China.  
17

18 In July 1938 the North China Telephone and  
19 Telegraph Company was organized, the North China  
20 Development Company owning more than 70% of its capital  
21 stock. Its objects were to construct and operate  
22 telegraph and telephone service including submarine cable  
23 in North China and connecting with Japan, Manchukuo,  
24 and the rest of the world. Other subsidiary companies  
25 of the North China Development Company were the North  
China Communications Company and the North China

Aviation Corporation. The North China Communications  
 1 Company operated 3,750 miles of railways, 6250 miles  
 2 of bus lines, and 625 miles of inland waterway communi-  
 3 cations in North China.

#### 4 NATURAL RESOURCES

5 By "The Outline of Measures for the China  
 6 Incident" of December 1937 provision was made for a  
 7 National Policy Company to take over the salt industries  
 8 and practically the whole mining industry in North  
 9 China for the purpose of obtaining revenue for Japan.

10 The Central Iron Mine Company, a subsidiary  
 11 of the Central China Promotion Company, was set up in  
 12 April 1938 to develop the estimated one hundred  
 13 million tons of coal in Central China.

14 Deposits of iron ore in North China estimated  
 15 at approximately two hundred million tons, or more than  
 16 half of China's estimated iron ore deposits, were taken  
 17 over in July 1939 by the Lungyen Iron Mine Company, a  
 18 subsidiary of the North China Development Company. Of  
 19 the mines coming under the control of this company, the  
 20 one having the largest estimated deposits of all was  
 21 the Lungyen Mine in Chahar Province. Part of the ore  
 22 from this mine and the surplus of pig iron produced  
 23 therefrom were exported to Japan. Of a total production  
 24 of 4,300,000 tons of ore mined by the company, 700,000  
 25

1 tons were used for the production of pig iron and of  
2 the balance 1,400,000 tons were sent to Manchuria and  
3 over a million tons to Japan.

4 In Central China iron deposits in the Yangtze  
5 Valley were estimated at one hundred million tons.  
6 For the purpose of continuing the development of this  
7 deposit the Central China Iron Mine Company was estab-  
8 lished in April 1938. The company was controlled by  
9 the Central China Promotion Company and other Japanese  
10 interests; payment for Chinese interests in the property  
11 was arranged to be made in the form of equipment and  
12 goods.

13 Coal deposits in North China were enormous  
14 and estimated to be more than 50% of the deposits in  
15 the whole of China. In developing these coal resources  
16 the Japanese adopted a policy of controlling the supply  
17 to the Chinese in order to insure a further supply for  
18 Japan, having particular regard for the need of coking  
19 coal. The Tatung Mine which had the largest annual  
20 production was taken over and operated by the Tatung  
21 Coal Mine Company, a subsidiary of the North China  
22 Development Company.

23 By 1938 the greater part of the salt consumed  
24 in Japan was imported from various countries in the  
25 East and Middle East including China. In order to

1 increase the supply from China the North China Salt  
2 Company was organized as a subsidiary of the North  
3 China Development Company for the production of salt in  
4 North China. For the same purpose in Central China the  
5 Hua Chung Salt Company was organized by the Central  
6 China Promotion Company in August 1939 and plans were  
7 made to develop new salt fields by investment of the  
8 funds of the holding company.

9 PUBLIC UTILITIES

10 Immediately after the occupation of Shanghai  
11 in December 1937 the Japanese took over various public  
12 utility companies among which might be mentioned:  
13 (a) Puntung Electric Supply Company which was then  
14 made a subsidiary of the Central China Water and  
15 Electricity Company which in turn was Japanese controlled;  
16 (b) the Chinese Electric Power Company in Shanghai was  
17 taken over in June 1938 and became a subsidiary of the  
18 same holding company. In these cases the owners of the  
19 companies were compensated at a valuation considerably  
20 below the real worth of the companies.

21 The Chapei Water and Electricity Company was  
22 taken over and after the outbreak of the Pacific War  
23 the American owned Shanghai Power Company was also taken  
24 over. Evidence was made before the Tribunal that after  
25 the surrender in 1945 when the various plants were taken



back by the former owners the plant equipment and  
1 machinery had deteriorated far beyond ordinary wear  
2 and tear.

#### BANKING

3  
4 From the beginning of the occupation of North  
5 China the Japanese Army circulated in North China bank  
6 notes of the Bank of Chosen and in Central China bank  
7 notes of the Bank of Japan, together with some military  
8 or occupation yen notes. However, the use of Japanese  
9 currency in occupied territories was disturbing to  
10 Japan's monetary system. In order to remedy this situa-  
11 tion the Japanese Government organized the Federal  
12 Reserve Bank of China in February 1938, the main policy  
13 of which was to stabilize currency and control the money  
14 market in foreign exchange. It was authorized to issue  
15 paper currency which was linked to the Japanese yen  
16 and so made the basis for Japanese investments in North  
17 China. Controlled by the Japanese Government this bank  
18 became very important and carried out Japan's policy in  
19 the financial field of its operations.  
20  
21

22 As a result of the Japanese virtual control of  
23 the economics of occupied China and its control of a  
24 substantial part of industry and commerce, many Japanese  
25 business men and industrialists went to China and entered  
the economic life making no effort to hide their control.

PROTESTS OF THE UNITED STATES

1           The adoption of the measures just referred to  
2 inevitably had the result of affecting the trade and  
3 commerce of other powers. Consequently on the 6th of  
4 October 1938, United States Ambassador Grew wrote to  
5 Prime Minister Konoye that the events in Manchuria were  
6 being repeated; that the exchange control in North China  
7 was discriminatory and that with the alteration of  
8 customs tariffs the Japanese control of transportation  
9 and communications, and the proposal to create a  
10 monopoly in wool and tobacco was putting Japan and  
11 Japanese merchants in a preferred position in China.  
12 He consequently asked for discontinuance of (1) exchange  
13 control and other measures discriminatory to American  
14 trade and enterprise; (2) monopolies or preferences  
15 conferred on Japanese interests, superiority of rights  
16 in commerce or the economic development in China and  
17 (3) interference with American property and rights,  
18 particularly censorship of mail and restrictions upon  
19 residence and travel by Americans and American trade  
20 and interests. To this protest the foreign minister,  
21 while admitting the truth of the charges, claimed  
22 justification for the economic measures as being for  
23 the benefit of China and East Asia.  
24  
25

NARCOTICS IN CHINA

1           Reference has already been made to the traffic  
2 in narcotic drugs in Manchuria.

3           A policy similar to that adopted in Manchuria  
4 was adopted from time to time as military operations  
5 succeeded in North, Central, and Southern China. This  
6 traffic is related to the military operations and  
7 political developments in that by means of it substantial  
8 funds were obtained for the various local governments  
9 set up by the Japanese, funds which would otherwise  
10 have to be furnished by Japan or found by additional  
11 local taxes. Incidentally, the effect on the morale  
12 of the Chinese population by the tremendous increase  
13 of drug addicts can be well imagined.

14           Prior to the outbreak of the China War the  
15 Chinese Government had been making determined efforts  
16 to wipe out opium smoking. That these efforts were  
17 meeting with success is demonstrated by a report made  
18 by the Advisory Committee of the League of Nations in  
19 June 1939 to the effect that the measures taken by  
20 the Chinese Government for the suppression of drug  
21 addiction under regulations promulgated in June 1936  
22 had produced highly satisfactory results.

23           Connected with the opium traffic in China from  
24 1937 were the Japanese Army, the Japanese Foreign Office,  
25

and the Asia Development Board. The Mitsubishi Trading  
1 Company and the Mitsui Bussan Kaisha were making large  
2 purchases of Iranian opium for Japan, Manchukuo and  
3 China. By arrangement with the Foreign Ministry the  
4 two companies in March 1938 made an agreement in respect  
5 to the places from which the opium was to be imported and  
6 their respective shares in the business. The distribu-  
7 tion of opium for Japan and Manchukuo was to be handled  
8 by the Mitsubishi Company, and that for Central and South  
9 China by the Mitsui Company; the distribution for North  
10 China being shared equally and the government offices  
11 of Japan, Manchukuo and China were to decide upon and  
12 inform the two companies of the amount to be purchased  
13 for each year. At the request of the Asia Development  
14 Board the agreement was revised by providing for the  
15 organization of the Iranian Opium Purchasing Association,  
16 the opium business of that company to be divided equally  
17 between the two trading companies.  
18  
19

20 The Special Service Organizations established  
21 in cities and towns under the China Expeditionary Force  
22 were entrusted with the sale of the opium. The Economic  
23 Division of the Asia Development Board stated the re-  
24 quirements of opium in North, Central and South China  
25 and arranged for its distribution. Profits from the  
sales of opium were transferred to the Asia Development



1 Board. At a later date a General Opium Suppression  
2 Bureau was created and the opium trade was administered  
3 by the Renovation Government which was to a certain  
4 extent supported by the profits from the sale of opium.  
5 But even at that time the KO-A-IN and the Japanese Army  
6 Headquarters in Central China were still responsible  
7 for policy making with regard to the opium trade.

8 From time to time measures were adopted  
9 ostensibly to control or reduce the traffic. One  
10 example was the General Opium Suppression Bureau which  
11 was organized in 1938 and at about the same time the  
12 Renovation Government set aside \$2000 a month for opium  
13 suppression propaganda. Notwithstanding these and  
14 other measures adopted, the traffic continued to  
15 increase. The explanation may be found in the cryptic  
16 evidence of Harada, Kumakichi, Japanese Military Attache  
17 at Shanghai from 1937 to 1939. He says, "When I was  
18 head of the Tokumu Bu, I received instructions through  
19 military channels to provide opium for the Chinese  
20 people by establishing an opium suppression board."

21 In June 1937 at a meeting of the Advisory  
22 Committee on Traffic in Opium of the League of Nations  
23 it was stated openly that the increase in illicit  
24 traffic in China coincided with the Japanese advances.  
25

INNER MONGOLIA

1           Following the withdrawal of Chinese troops  
2 from North Chahar after the Ching-DOHIMARA Agreement  
3 of 1935 as already related Japanese influence was felt  
4 in the provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan. Thereafter the  
5 farmers were encouraged to raise more opium. As a  
6 result production of opium was substantially increased.

NORTH CHINA

8           In North China, particularly in Hopeh and  
9 Shantung, after the Tangku Truce of 1933, and the  
10 establishment of the demilitarized zone the Chinese  
11 were unable to control the drug traffic. There then  
12 followed a tremendous increase in the number of drug  
13 addicts, the distribution of the drugs being handled  
14 by various companies and associations controlled by  
15 Japanese.

17           After the occupation of Tientsin in 1937 there  
18 was a notable increase in the use of narcotics. The  
19 Japanese concession in Tientsin became known as the  
20 center of heroin manufacturing. Not less than two  
21 hundred heroin factories were established in the  
22 Japanese concession and it was stated before the League  
23 of Nations Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium in  
24 May 1937 that it was common knowledge that almost 90%  
25 of all illicit white drugs in the world were of Japanese

1 origin manufactured in Tientsin, Dairen and the other  
2 cities of Manchuria and North China.

3 CENTRAL CHINA

4 Here again substantially the same story is  
5 told. In Nanking opium consumption had been practically  
6 wiped out before 1937. After the occupation by the  
7 Japanese troops the trade in narcotics became public  
8 and was even advertised in newspapers. As was established  
9 in an earlier part of this chapter the profits made in  
10 the drug traffic monopoly were enormous. By the autumn  
11 of 1939 the monthly revenue from the sale of opium in  
12 Nanking was estimated at \$3,000,000. It is therefore  
13 obvious having regard to the magnitude of the traffic  
14 in Manchuria, North, Central and South China how valuable  
15 the traffic was to the Japanese Government even if taken  
16 only in terms of revenue.

17  
18 We do not consider it necessary to give any  
19 further details of the traffic in drugs; it is sufficient  
20 to say that in Shanghai, in Fukien Province and Kwantung  
21 Province in South China and elsewhere after 1937, upon  
22 occupation of each province and large centre by the  
23 Japanese, the traffic in drugs increased on a scale  
24 corresponding to that in other parts of the country  
25 which has already been described.

## CHAPTER VI

## JAPAN'S POLICY TOWARDS U.S.S.R.

## MANCHURIA, THE "LIFELINE" OF JAPAN

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Throughout the period covered by the evidence tendered to the Tribunal, the intention to undertake a war against the U.S.S.R. has been shown to have been one of the basic elements of Japan's military policy. The military party was determined to establish Japan in occupation of the Far Eastern territories of the U.S.S.R., as well as in other parts of the continent of Asia. Although the seizure of Manchuria (the three North-eastern provinces of China) was attractive for its natural resources and for expansion and colonization, it was desirable also as a point of approach in the intended war against the U.S.S.R. Manchuria came to be referred to as a "lifeline" of Japan but it is quite clear that by this was meant a line of advance rather than a line of defence.

The purpose of invading and possession itself of the Far Eastern territories of the U.S.S.R. seems to have been a constant goad to the military ambitions of Japan. As early as 1924 Okawa, a vigorous advocate of Japanese expansion abroad, was pointing to the occupation of Siberia as one of Japan's objectives. This same attitude was taken also by the military, with whom



1 Okawa was in close accord. Army officers began to  
2 promote the idea that Manchuria was Japan's "lifeline"  
3 and should be developed as a "defence" against the  
4 U.S.S.R. ITAGAKI in 1930, when a Staff Officer of the  
5 Kwantung Army, advocated the use of force in the creation  
6 of a new state in Manchuria. Following the lead of  
7 Okawa he claimed that this would be a development of  
8 the "Kingly Way" and would lead to the liberation of  
9 the Asiatic peoples. HIROTA in 1931, while Ambassador  
10 in Moscow, suggested for the information of the general  
11 staff that there was need to take a strong policy  
12 vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, with the resolve to fight  
13 the U.S.S.R. at any time when necessary. The objectives,  
14 however, were not defence against communism, but, rather,  
15 the occupation of Far Eastern Siberia.

16  
17 On the formation of the Saito Cabinet in May  
18 1932 a degree of compromise was reached upon the con-  
19 flict which had developed between military and civilian  
20 members of the Cabinet in respect of the Manchurian  
21 adventure. In consequence the Cabinet acceded to the  
22 Army policy in Manchuria and decided upon the development  
23 of that region under Japanese domination. The Army, now  
24 freed from opposition within the Cabinet, went forward  
25 with its advocacy of war with the U.S.S.R. in the North  
as well as with preparations for such a war. In July of

1 1932, Kawabe, the Japanese Military Attache in Moscow,  
2 urged the importance of preparations for war with the  
3 Soviet Union which he said was inevitable. He regarded  
4 war with China and the U.S.S.R. as a foregone conclusion.  
5 In 1932 the accused MINAMI advocated making the Sea of  
6 Japan into a lake by which he obviously meant the  
7 seizure of the Soviet Far East where it bordered the  
8 Sea of Japan. In April 1933 SUZUKI, then in the  
9 Military Affairs Bureau, referred to the U.S.S.R. as  
10 the absolute enemy because, as he said, she aimed to  
11 destroy the national structure of Japan.

12 "NATIONAL DEFENCE"

13 It is interesting to notice at this time  
14 ARAKI's discussion of the term "national defence."  
15 This, he pointed out, was not confined to the physical  
16 defence of Japan but included the defence of Kodo, or  
17 the Imperial Way. This was another way of saying that  
18 the conquest of neighboring countries by force of arms  
19 was justifiable as "national defence." At about this  
20 time, 1933, ARAKI, then War Minister, forsook euphemism  
21 about "national defence" and told a conference of  
22 prefectural governors exactly what he meant, at least in  
23 respect of the Soviet Union. He said "Japan was to  
24 inevitably clash with the Soviet Union, therefore it was  
25 necessary for Japan to secure for herself through

1 military methods the territories of the Maritime  
2 Province, Zabaikalye and Siberia." ARAKI's definition  
3 of "national defence" was adopted by the Saito Cabinet  
4 as a basis of its policy in Manchuria. As has been  
5 shown already Japan's leaders always sought to justify  
6 their aggressive military adventures by claiming they  
7 were defensive. It was in this sense that Manchuria was  
8 developed as the "lifeline" of Japan.

9 DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES

10 That Japan's policy towards the U.S.S.R. was  
11 offensive or aggressive and not defensive is indicated  
12 by diplomatic exchanges in the period 1931-1933. During  
13 this period the Soviet Government twice made formal  
14 proposals to the Japanese Government to conclude a  
15 non-aggression and neutrality pact. In a Soviet  
16 statement made in 1931 to the Japanese Minister of  
17 Foreign Affairs Yoshizawa and to Ambassador HIROTA it  
18 was pointed out that the conclusion of a non-aggression  
19 pact would "express the peaceful policy and intentions  
20 of the Government, and it will be well-timed especially  
21 now when the future of the Japanese-Russian relations  
22 is the subject of speculations in Western Europe and  
23 America. The conclusion of this pact would put an end  
24 to these speculations." The Japanese Government did  
25 not give a reply to this proposal for a year. It was

only on 13 September 1932 that the Soviet Ambassador to  
1 Japan received a reply from Minister of Foreign Affairs  
2 Uchida in which he declined the offer on the ground  
3 that "... the formal beginning of the negotiations  
4 on the subject between the two governments in this case  
5 seems to be untimely."  
6

7 The Soviet Government on 4 January 1933 again  
8 repeated its proposal for the conclusion of a pact,  
9 emphasizing that the previous proposal "was not called  
10 forth by the considerations of the moment, but resulted  
11 from its peaceful policy, and therefore continues in  
12 force for the future." The Japanese Government in May  
13 1933, once more rejected the proposal of the Soviet  
14 Union. It should be noted that Japan rejected the pro-  
15 posal in spite of the fact that the Japanese Government  
16 had assurance at that time that it was a sincere expres-  
17 sion of peaceful policy of the Soviet Union in the  
18 Far East. In a secret memorandum written by the accused  
19 TOGO, Director of the Bureau of European-American  
20 Affairs, in April 1933, he said, "The desire of the  
21 Soviet Union for a non-aggression pact with Japan is  
22 motivated by its desire to secure the safety of its  
23 Far Eastern territory from the increasing threat which  
24 it feels since the Japanese advance into Manchuria."  
25 By December 1933 the Kwantung Army was making plans and



1 preparations for the day when Japan would use Manchuria  
2 as a base for attack upon the U.S.S.R.

3 CONTINUATION OF DESIGNS UPON U.S.S.R.

4 In 1935 the Okada Cabinet, which had taken  
5 office the previous year, gave its support to the Army's  
6 economic planning in Manchukuo although HIROTA denied  
7 that Japan's intention was aggressive. In November 1935  
8 SHIRATORI, then Minister in Scandinavian countries,  
9 wrote to Arita, the Ambassador to Belgium, pointing  
10 out that "Looking at the present-day power of Soviet  
11 Russia as from the standpoint of figures, it does seem  
12 to be most imposing, but, as the days are still shallow  
13 since the revolution and the dissatisfied elements  
14 still infest the countryside and shortages are still  
15 acute in implements and machineries, resources and  
16 materials, and manpower, it is clear that she will  
17 immediately sustain internal collapse once she fights  
18 against some great power. This is the unanimous opinion  
19 of those who are familiar with the actual situation.  
20 What is most desirous for Soviet Russia at present is  
21 to have peaceful and amicable relationships with the  
22 foreign powers. Therefore, countries which border  
23 Soviet Russia and who have any pending affairs that  
24 need to be settled sooner or later with her, should  
25 never idle away this opportune time of today." He

1 suggested that there should be demanded from the  
2 U.S.S.R. with resolution" and as "minimum" concessions  
3 to "abolish military armaments in Vladivostok," etc.,  
4 "..... not stationing a single soldier in the area of  
5 Lake Baikal." SHIRATORI suggested as the fundamental  
6 solution of Japan's problems with the U.S.S.R. "..... in  
7 order to eliminate the menace of Russia forever, it is  
8 necessary to make her a powerless capitalistic republic  
9 and to rigidly control her natural resources..... At  
10 present the chances are good."

#### 11 THE FEBRUARY INCIDENT

12 We have already discussed the downfall of  
13 the Okada Cabinet caused by an insurrection in the  
14 Army in Tokyo on the 26 February 1936. The Army's  
15 criticism was the insufficiently aggressive attitude  
16 of this Cabinet. On 27 February, the day after this  
17 incident, the Japanese consulate in Amoy explained that  
18 the purpose of the insurrection was to replace the  
19 Cabinet with a military one, and that the young military  
20 group intended that Japan should take the whole of China  
21 and prepare for an immediate war against the Soviet  
22 Union to the end that Japan might be the only power in  
23 Asia.  
24

#### 25 THE 1936 STATEMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY

In August 1936 HIROTA, who was now Prime  
Minister, in conjunction with his Foreign Minister,

War Minister, Navy Minister and Finance Minister,  
1 formulated a statement of Japan's national policy.  
2 This is an important and significant document directed,  
3 inter alia, towards "securing a steady footing of the  
4 (Japanese) Empire in the Eastern Continent as well as  
5 developing in the South Seas, under the joint efforts  
6 of diplomatic skill and national defence." The invoca-  
7 tion of "national defence" is significant. As one of  
8 the practical steps Japan "should strive to eradicate the  
9 Russian menace on the North, in order to realize a  
10 steadfast development of Manchuria, and for the solid  
11 defence of both Japan and Manchuria." The statement  
12 prescribed that the measure of military strength would  
13 be that necessary "to counteract all the military  
14 forces that Russia can furnish and employ in the Far  
15 East." Especial attention was to be paid to the comple-  
16 tion of military strength in Korea and Manchuria so  
17 that Japan might "strike a hit at the very outset of  
18 the war upon the Russians." In dealing with the  
19 extensive preparation for war which this policy  
20 decision would involve, it was decided that military  
21 expansion must go to the extent of creating fighting  
22 machines strong enough to inflict a crushing blow against  
23 the strongest forces which the U.S.S.R. could deploy  
24 along her Eastern borders. An examination of this  
25

1 declaration of Japanese national policy in conjunction  
2 with the circumstances then prevailing reveals an  
3 intention of attacking the Soviet Union with the object  
4 of seizing part of its territories. Furthermore, this  
5 purpose was to be prepared for and to be carried out  
6 under the pretence that it was defensive.

7 In 1937 plans produced by the Army consequent  
8 upon the national policy decision of August 1936 were  
9 clearly dictated by an expected war with the U.S.S.R.  
10 The plan for important industries issued in May 1937  
11 was to procure a long stride development ensuring the  
12 actual power of leadership in East Asia." The program  
13 issued in June 1937 with the same end in view laid down  
14 that self-sufficiency was to be achieved by 1941 "in  
15 order to be prepared for the epochal development" of  
16 Japan's destiny which was to "be attained in spite of  
17 all difficulties." The plan dealing with war materials  
18 was to the same end and provided that Japan's economy  
19 "would be made to develop rationally by unifying the  
20 handling of affairs by military administration."  
21 Attention was to be given to preparations for a speedy  
22 movement from a peace-time to a wartime basis.

24 This planning by the Army, although it so  
25 shortly preceded the continuance of the war in China at  
Lukouchiao, was not directed solely to that war. Okada



1 told this Tribunal that these plans were complementary  
2 to the Soviet Five-Year Plan and were for the purpose  
3 of maintaining Japan's strength vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R.  
4 A consideration of the plans affecting both major  
5 industries and those dealing more directly with the  
6 production of war materials shows on their face that  
7 they were to secure "national defence power." As has  
8 been mentioned earlier, "national defence" meant to  
9 Japanese militarists expansion on the continent of  
10 Asia by force of arms. The plans now under discussion  
11 revealed the Army's intention to achieve that result.

12 It is clear that these plans were offensive  
13 and not defensive plans and were directed against the  
14 U.S.S.R. We have already referred to the comments of  
15 the Military Attache in Moscow in 1932 and to those of  
16 SUZUKI to the same effect in 1933. The political  
17 maneuvers in North China were based upon the slogan  
18 of "anti-Communism." The national policy decision of  
19 August 1936 expressly pointed to the military strength  
20 of the Soviet Union as the yardstick for the development  
21 of military power by Japan and at the very moment of  
22 the issue of the Army plans of 1937 came the advice of  
23 TOJO that, having regard to the situation in China and  
24 the state of military preparedness against the U.S.S.R.  
25 it was desirable to attack China to clear the menace

1 to the Kwantung Army's rear before undertaking action  
2 against the U.S.S.R. It was at this time also, namely,  
3 in July 1937, that HASHIMOTO, in a newspaper article,  
4 advocated development of an air force to be used not  
5 only as the mainstay of Japan's armaments, but also for  
6 use against the U.S.S.R.

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EXPECTATION AND ALVOCACY OFWAR WITH THE U. S. S. R.

1  
2 In 1938, at a time when, as we have already  
3 seen, the press of Japan was effectively controlled  
4 by the Army, ARAKI, then Minister of Education, is  
5 reported in the press as having said at a meeting  
6 of the Political Economic Society at Osaka that  
7 "Japan's determination to fight to a finish with  
8 China and the Soviet Union is sufficient to carry  
9 it on for more than a decade."

11 In 1938, also, General Ueda, Commander of  
12 the Kwantung Army, discussing the position of North  
13 China, referred to "the fast-approaching war with  
14 Soviet Russia". Finally, the urgency with which  
15 the Army generally, and the General Staff in particu-  
16 lar, sought to bring the war in China to an end was  
17 no doubt dictated by the imminence of the war it in-  
18 tended against the U.S.S.R.

THE ANTI-COMINTERN PACT

21 The relations with Germany, which from the  
22 middle of the nineteen-thirties showed itself as the  
23 main aggressive force in Europe, were of particular  
24 importance to Japan having regard to its purpose  
25 of undertaking a war against the U.S.S.R.

As early as in March 1934, when the Accused

1 OSHIMA, as a military attache, was being sent to  
2 Germany, he was instructed by the General Staff to  
3 watch the German-Soviet relations and to find out  
4 what Germany might do in case of war with the Soviet  
5 Union.

6 In the spring of 1935 OSHIMA and Ribbentrop  
7 entered upon discussions for a German-Japanese al-  
8 liance. From the early part of December 1935 Lieut-  
9 enant Colonel Wakamatsu, specially sent for that pur-  
10 pose by the Japanese General Staff, took part in the  
11 discussions.

12 Inasmuch as the contemplated agreement had  
13 a general political purpose and the signing of it  
14 was outside the Army's jurisdiction, the matter was  
15 submitted to the Government for consideration and  
16 from 1936 Mushakoji, the Japanese Ambassador, took  
17 charge of the negotiations.

18 On 25 November 1936 the so-called "Anti-  
19 Comintern Pact" was signed by Japan and Germany.  
20 The Pact consisted of the text of the treaty and of  
21 a secret agreement. Only the text of the treaty was  
22 published to the world. It stated that the contract-  
23 ing parties agreed to inform each other of the activi-  
24 ties of the Communist International, to confer on  
25 necessary measures for defense, and to take such



measures in close co-operation and jointly invite  
1 third nations to take defensive measures in conform-  
2 ity with the Pact or to participate therein.

3 The secret agreement, as was provided in  
4 the agreement itself, was to be kept a secret. In  
5 fact, it was never published by the aggressive nations  
6 and became known to the Allied Powers only from cap-  
7 tured secret files. In a statement, published in  
8 the press, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
9 denied the existence of any secret articles attached  
10 to the Pact and declared that the Pact was an ex-  
11 pression of a special kind of collaboration between  
12 the two countries in their struggle against the Com-  
13 munist International as such, that the Japanese Gov-  
14 ernment did not contemplate the creation of an inter-  
15 national bloc, that "the present agreement is not  
16 directed against the Soviet Union or any other  
17 special country".

18  
19 The purpose of the Pact was the creation of  
20 a limited alliance between Japan and Germany. It  
21 was pointed out by Cordell Hull, former United States  
22 Secretary of State, "While the Pact was ostensibly  
23 for self-protection against Communism, actually it  
24 was a preparatory move for subsequent measures of  
25 forceful expansion by the bandit nations". Our

opinion, formed independently, is the same.

1           The Pact was directed primarily against  
2 the U.S.S.R. The secret agreement created a limited  
3 military and political alliance of Germany and Japan  
4 against the U.S.S.R. Both parties engaged not to  
5 conclude without mutual consent any political agree-  
6 ments with the U.S.S.R. incompatible with the spirit  
7 of the agreement.  
8

9           A year later, on 6 November 1937, Italy ad-  
10 hered to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

11           Formally, the arrangement provided for  
12 mutual obligation between Germany and Japan only in  
13 case of an unprovoked attack by the U.S.S.R. upon  
14 one of them, and limited the obligation to not ren-  
15 dering any assistance in such case to the U.S.S.R.  
16 In fact, at this time there is no evidence of aggres-  
17 sive intentions on the part of the U.S.S.R. against  
18 either Germany or Japan. Thus, the conclusion of  
19 the Pact against the eventuality of an unprovoked  
20 attack on the part of the U.S.S.R. would appear to  
21 have had no justification. That the Pact was not  
22 really defensive is shown by the broad interpretation  
23 of the commitments of the parties under the secret  
24 agreement. Such interpretation was given to those  
25 commitments by Germany and Japan from the very outset.

Thus, Japan's Ambassador to Germany, Mushakoji,

1 in his telegram sent in October 1936 with Ribben-  
2 trop's knowledge and consent, advised Foreign Minister  
3 Arita that he had "the firm conviction that only the  
4 spirit of the above-mentioned secret agreement will  
5 be decisive for Germany's future policy towards the  
6 U.S.S.R." Foreign Minister Arita spoke to the same  
7 effect at the Privy Council meeting on 25 November  
8 1936 which, with HIRANUMA presiding, approved the  
9 Anti-Comintern Pact. Arita emphasized the main pur-  
10 port of the Pact to be that "henceforth Soviet Russia  
11 has to consider the fact that she has to face both  
12 Germany and Japan..." That the nature of the al-  
13 liance between Germany and Japan against the U.S.S.R.  
14 was not defensive is indicated also by the fact that  
15 the conclusion by Germany of the non-aggression pact  
16 with the U.S.S.R. on 23 August 1939 was regarded by  
17 Japan's leaders as a flagrant violation by Germany  
18 of her commitments under the Anti-Comintern Pact.  
19 In a letter to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin dated  
20 26 August 1938, to be conveyed to the German Foreign  
21 Minister, it was pointed out that "The Japanese  
22 Government regards the pact of non-aggression and  
23 consultation recently concluded between the German  
24 Government and the Government of the Union of  
25

Socialist Soviet Republics as running counter to the  
1 secret appended agreement to the Agreement against  
2 the Communist International".

3 The main purpose of the Anti-Comintern Pact  
4 was the encirclement of the Soviet Union. This was  
5 partly admitted by Ribbentrop, one of its authors,  
6 when he said: "Of course, there was also a political  
7 weight against Soviet Russia that was more or less  
8 the background of the Pact".

9  
10 When on 25 November 1941 the Anti-Comintern  
11 Pact, which was originally stipulated to remain in  
12 force for five years, expired, and it was prolonged,  
13 the secret agreement was not renewed. There was now  
14 no necessity for it. The commitments under the se-  
15 cret agreement had been covered by the Tripartite Al-  
16 liance concluded prior to this extension.

17 The Anti-Comintern Pact served as a basis  
18 of Japan's policy vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. in subse-  
19 quent years. This military alliance with Germany  
20 played an important part in Japan's policy and pre-  
21 parations against the U.S.S.R. Prime Minister  
22 HIRANUMA in his address to Hitler on 4 May 1939  
23 specifically pointed out that "...it is a confirmed  
24 joy to me how effective the Anti-Comintern Agreement  
25 between our two countries proves itself in the  
between our two countries proves itself in the





1 participants of the negotiations, testified that the  
2 instructions received by him from the appropriate  
3 division of the Japanese General Staff in June 1938  
4 provided for the furtherance of German-Japanese co-  
5 operation against the U.S.S.R.

6 In April 1939 Ribbentrop stated in a telegram  
7 to the German Ambassador in Tokyo that the Japanese  
8 asked for our express approval to be able to give,  
9 after the signing and publication of the Pact, a  
10 declaration to the English, French and American Am-  
11 bassadors, with roughly the following contents: The  
12 Pact had developed from the Anti-Comintern Pact; the  
13 partners had looked upon Russia being the enemy;  
14 England, France and America had no need to feel that  
15 they were meant by it."

16 Although in the Tripartite Pact itself the  
17 fact that it was directed against the U.S.S.R. is  
18 not especially mentioned, this was not in doubt in  
19 the minds of the Japanese Army in September 1940,  
20 when the Alliance was signed. The reservation con-  
21 tained in Article 5 that the "above-stated articles  
22 of this alliance have no effect whatsoever to the  
23 present existing political relation between each or  
24 any one of the signatories with the Soviet Union", was  
25 not candid. The Japanese Ambassador to Berlin,

1 Kurusu, in a telegram to Tokyo of 26 September 1940,  
2 said: "The German Government plans to guide the  
3 German press to lay particular emphasis on the fact  
4 that the treaty does not mean anticipation of war  
5 with Russia. But, on the other hand, Germany is con-  
6 centrating troops in the Eastern regions as a check  
7 on Russia". Foreign Minister Matsuo, too, speaking  
8 of Article 5 of the Pact at the meeting of the Privy  
9 Council Investigation Committee on 26 September 1940,  
10 said: "Although there exists a non-aggression treaty,  
11 Japan will aid Germany in the event of a Soviet-German  
12 war, and Germany will assist Japan in the event of  
13 a Russo-Japanese war. With regard to the word  
14 'existing', if you mean to ask, if the present status  
15 of the Soviet Union cannot be modified, I say no; I  
16 mean that it will not be modified by the treaty under  
17 consideration..." The same appraisal of the Al-  
18 liance was given by its author, Ribbentrop: "...this  
19 stroke will have a double edge. Against Russia and  
20 against America."

22 On 22 June 1941, i. e., less than a year  
23 after the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance,  
24 Germany invaded the U.S.S.R. Notwithstanding the  
25 neutrality Pact with the U.S.S.R., Japan, as will be  
discussed later, did render aid to Germany while re-

1 refraining from open warfare against the U.S.S.R.

2 THE PRESIDENT: We will recess for fifteen  
3 minutes.

4 (Whereupon, at 1045, a recess was  
5 taken until 1100, after which the  
6 proceedings were resumed as follows.)  
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military  
1 Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

2 THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the  
3 Tribunal's judgment.

4 JAPANESE ATTACKS ON BORDERS OF MANCHURIA.

5 In 1938 and 1939 Japan launched offensive  
6 operations across the borders of Manchuria in the vicinity  
7 of Lake Khassar, in the East, and at Momonhan, in the  
8 West. These will be discussed more fully later.

9 NEUTRALITY PACT BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE SOVIET  
10 UNION.

11  
12 On 13 April 1941 Japan and the U.S.S.R. entered  
13 into a Neutrality Pact. This subject can be more con-  
14 veniently discussed later, but it is mentioned here as  
15 having been signed at this time because of the disregard  
16 for it displayed by the Japanese in the matters now to  
17 be referred to.

18 GERMANY ATTACKS THE U.S.S.R. IN JUNE 1941.

19  
20 After Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R. in  
21 June 1941 there was persistent advocacy of the seizure  
22 of Soviet territories in the Far East. This attack by  
23 Germany certainly stimulated the acquisitive policy by  
24 Japan against the Soviet Union. The Japanese ruling  
25 circles regarded Germany's victory over the U.S.S.R. as  
inevitable and imminent and thought this a favourable

1 opportunity for Japan to put into operation her aggressive  
2 plans against the U.S.S.R.

3 At first, in consequence of the initial success  
4 of the Germans in their attack on the U.S.S.R. there  
5 existed a tendency among the Japanese militarists for  
6 the speeding up of an attack on the U.S.S.R. The German  
7 Ambassador Ott in his telegram of 22 June 1941, the day  
8 Germany attacked the U.S.S.R., reported his conference  
9 with Matsuoka, pointing out that "He" (Matsuoka) "was  
10 of the same opinion as before, that in the long run,  
11 Japan could not remain neutral in this conflict.... Towards  
12 the end of the interview Matsuoka received another tele-  
13 gram from OSHIMA wherein the Reich Foreign Minister called  
14 attention to an alleged Russian withdrawal of troops  
15 from the Far East. Matsuoka explained spontaneously  
16 that he would immediately propose counter-measures."

17 The Japanese even had a fear that Japan might  
18 be late in her military preparations for an attack.  
19 Such a sentiment found expression in the telegram of  
20 31 July 1941 (No. 433) from Foreign Minister Toyoda to  
21 the Japanese Ambassador in Washington:

22 "Needless to say the Russo-German war has  
23 given us an excellent opportunity to settle the northern  
24 question, and it is a fact that we are proceeding with  
25 our preparations to take advantage of this occasion.....

1 If the Russo-German war proceeds too swiftly, our  
2 Empire would inevitably not have time to take any effective  
3 symmetrical action."

4 A secret Imperial Conference of military and  
5 political leaders of Japan on 2 July 1941 decided:  
6 "Though the spirit of the tripartite axis will form the  
7 keynote of our attitude toward the German-Soviet war, we  
8 shall not intervene for a while, but take voluntary  
9 measures by secretly preparing arms against the Soviet  
10 Union. Meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations will be continued  
11 with detailed precautions; and should the conditions of the  
12 German-Soviet war progress favourably to Japan we shall execute  
13 arms to solve the northern problems, thereby securing stability  
14 in the northern regions."

15 This decision suggests that Japan, in spite of  
16 the Neutrality Pact with the U.S.S.R., either considered  
17 herself bound as a participant in a conspiracy against  
18 the U.S.S.R. or was seeking an opportune moment to  
19 advantage herself. At any rate she intended to time her  
20 attack upon the U.S.S.R. with the most favourable moment  
21 in the Soviet-German War.

22 That preparations were intensified after the  
23 decision of the conference is revealed by a telegram  
24 of the German Ambassador Ott from Tokyo to Berlin of

3 July 1941. Upon the outbreak of the German-Soviet War,  
1 Smetanin, the U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Japan, saw Matsuoka  
2 and asked him the basic question concerning the attitude  
3 of Japan towards the war. Smetanin asked him whether  
4 Japan would remain neutral, as was the U.S.S.R., in  
5 accordance with the neutrality pact between the U.S.S.R.  
6 and Japan of 13 April 1941. Matsuoka evaded a direct  
7 answer to this question and said that his attitude to this  
8 problem had already been expressed (on 22 April of that  
9 year) in his statement made by him upon his return from  
10 Europe. At the same time he emphasised that the Tri-  
11 partite Pact was the basis of the foreign policy of Japan  
12 and if the present war and the neutrality pact happened  
13 to be at variance with that basis and with the Tripartite  
14 Pact, the neutrality pact "will not continue in force."  
15 Ott, referring to this interview, of which he had been  
16 informed, in his telegram of 3 July reported: "Matsuoka  
17 said the reason for the formulation of the Japanese  
18 statement to the Soviet Ambassador was the necessity to  
19 deceive the Russians or at least to keep them in a  
20 state of uncertainty, owing to the armaments still being  
21 incomplete. At present Smetanin was not aware of speedy  
22 preparations being made against the Soviet Union as is  
23 hinted at in the government resolution transmitted to  
24 us."  
25 us."



At this time Germany was urging that Japan  
1 should attack the U.S.S.R. as early as possible. In his  
2 telegram of 10 July 1941 addressed to the German Amba-  
3 sador in Tokyo, Ribbentrop stated: "Besides, I request  
4 that you go on working for the soonest possible partici-  
5 pation of Japan in the war against Russia, as per my  
6 message to Matsuoka, using all the means at your disposal,  
7 for earlier this participation in the war materialises,  
8 the better it is. The natural goal must be, as before,  
9 to bring about the meeting of Germany and Japan on the  
10 Trans-Siberian railroad before winter sets in. With  
11 the collapse of Russia the position of the Tripartite  
12 powers in the world will be so gigantic that the question  
13 of the collapse of England, that is, the absolute anni-  
14 hilation of the British Isles, will be only a question  
15 of time."  
16

17  
18 The Japanese Foreign Ministry, at least, con-  
19 sidered Japan's plans for war against the U.S.S.R. so  
20 close to realisation as to discuss the finding of suit-  
21 able means to provoke war. In his telegram of 1 August  
22 1941, Ott reported that, when in a conference with the  
23 Minister Secretary Yamamoto commissioned with the affairs  
24 of the Vice-Foreign Ministry, he "anticipatedly asked  
25 whether Japan intended to start her active advance with  
demands on the Soviet Government, the Vice Minister

marked this way as the best method of finding a defensive  
1 excuse for a Russo-Japanese attack in face of the  
2 neutrality agreement. He is personally thinking of  
3 demands of such sharpness that the Soviet Government could  
4 not possibly be able to accept them, whereby he seemed  
5 to have territorial cessions in mind."

6  
7 The failure of the initial German campaign against  
8 the U.S.S.R. made Japan delay her own offensive programme.  
9 The situation of the Soviet-German struggle called for  
10 caution. At the beginning of August, upon the slowing  
11 up of the advance of the German Army, OSHIMA asked  
12 Ribbentrop the reason. Ribbentrop referred him to Keitel,  
13 who explained that the advance of the German army was  
14 delayed by the excessive length of communications so  
15 that rear units were lagging behind and that in consequence  
16 the advance was approximately three weeks behind plan.

17  
18 The course of the Soviet-German war continued  
19 to influence Japan's immediate but not her long-range  
20 policy. Ott in a telegram to Berlin on 4 September 1941  
21 said: "In view of the resistance put up by the Russian  
22 Army against an army such as the German, the Japanese  
23 General Staff does not believe itself capable of achieving  
24 a decisive success against Russia before winter sets in.  
25 Moreover, it is probably guided by the thought of Komon-  
han still vivid in the memory, notably of the Kwantung

1 Army." In view of that "...the Imperial Headquarters  
2 in the last days came to the decision to postpone action  
3 against the Soviet Union."

4 In a telegram of 4 October 1941, Ott informed  
5 Ribbentrop that "Japan's waging of a war against the Far  
6 Eastern Army, still considered as being in fighting trim,  
7 is not feasible before next spring.... The tenacity  
8 displayed by the Soviet Union against Germany indicates  
9 that not even by a Japanese attack in August or September  
10 could the route via Siberia be opened up this year."

11 Postponing immediate attack on the U.S.S.R.,  
12 Japan, however, continued to regard this attack as one  
13 of the main objects of her policy and did not slacken  
14 either in purpose or in preparation for that attack.  
15 In confidential talks with the ambassadors of Italy and  
16 Germany on 15 August 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister,  
17 referring to the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact and the  
18 Russian assumption that Japan would not come into the  
19 war, said: "...in view of the military expansion the  
20 Empire is at present effecting, I think under present  
21 existing conditions the above-mentioned arrangement with  
22 the Soviet is the very best means of taking the first  
23 steps toward carrying out future plans concerning the  
24 Soviet which will be undertaken together with the German  
25 Government" and that "this is merely a temporary

arrangement, in other words that it partakes of the  
1 nature of a restraint upon the Soviet until preparations  
2 can be completed."

3 In an intercepted telegram from Tokyo to Berlin  
4 of 30 November 1941, apparently from the Japanese Foreign  
5 Minister to the Japanese Ambassador, the latter was  
6 instructed to interview Hitler and Ribbentrop. The tele-  
7 gram instructed: "Say that by our present moves southward  
8 we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet  
9 ....however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress  
10 the south and for the time being we would prefer to  
11 refrain from any direct moves in the north."

12 Japan's leaders, however, did not forsake their  
13 desires and designs. In August 1941 ARAKI is reported  
14 in the press as having said to the Secretary-General  
15 of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association that "Next,  
16 we shall deal with the Siberian Expedition....Japan's  
17 present ambition to dominate the continent may be said  
18 to have germinated in the Siberian Expedition." The  
19 same idea was developed by TOJO in 1942 after he had  
20 become Prime Minister, when in conversation with the  
21 German Ambassador Ott, he stated that Japan was a mortal  
22 enemy of the U.S.S.R., that Vladivostok was a permanent  
23 threat to Japan on the flank and that in the course of  
24 that war (i.e. the war between Germany and the U.S.S.R.)  
25



there was an opportunity of removing that danger. He  
1 boasted that it would not be difficult as there was an  
2 excellent Kwantung Army which included the best troops.

3 JAPAN DELAYS ATTACK ON U.S.S.R.

4 Ribbentrop in a telegram to Tokyo on 15 May 1942,  
5 expressed his desire that Japan "would arrive at a decision  
6 to attack Vladivostok at the very earliest." He went  
7 on to say "this is all based on the premise that Japan  
8 is sufficiently strong for an operation of this nature  
9 and will not have to free other forces which would weaken  
10 her position against England and America, as for example,  
11 in Burma. If Japan lacks the necessary strength to  
12 successfully undertake such an operation, then it would  
13 naturally be better that she maintain neutral relations  
14 with Soviet Russia. This also eases our burden since in  
15 any event Russia must maintain troops in East Siberia  
16 in anticipation of a Japanese-Russian conflict."  
17

18 At the end of 1942 because of the situation on  
19 the Soviet-German front Germany's desire that Japan should  
20 enter into a war with the U.S.S.R. became more insistent.  
21 In his conference with Ribbentrop on 6 March 1943,  
22 OSHIMA said that "The suggestion of the German Government  
23 to attack Russia was the subject of a mutual conference  
24 between the Japanese Government and Imperial Headquarters,  
25 in which the question was exhaustively discussed and

minutely probed. The result was the following:

1           "The Japanese Government thoroughly recognises  
2 the danger which threatens from Russia and has full  
3 understanding for the desire of its German ally, that  
4 Japan, too, enters into the war against Russia. It is  
5 not possible for the Japanese Government, however, in  
6 view of her present war situation to enter into the war.  
7 It is rather of the conviction that it is in the common  
8 interest, not to start the war against Russia now. On  
9 the other hand, the Japanese Government will never dis-  
10 regard the Russian question."

12           Explaining this decision OSHIMA said that he  
13 knew "that for a long time Japan had the intention of  
14 turning against Russia. But for the time being she  
15 evidently did not feel strong enough to do so. If one  
16 withdrew the front in the south and abandoned several  
17 islands to the enemy in order to shift all forces to the  
18 North, this could be possible. This would, however,  
19 mean a heavy defeat in the South. Both an advance to  
20 the South, and at the same time to the North was impos-  
21 sible for Japan."

23           THE GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE  
24 INCLUDES PART OF SIBERIA.

25           When the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-  
Prosperity Sphere was developed as a euphemism for

Japanese hegemony over East Asia it was inevitable that  
1 the seizure of Siberia and the Soviet Far East should  
2 be included. This was the natural consequence of the  
3 previous purpose and planning.

4 In the "Plan for Management of Territories in  
5 the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" worked out  
6 by the Japanese War Ministry and the Ministry of Overseas  
7 Affairs, at the end of 1941 and beginning of 1942, soon  
8 after the outbreak of the war against the United States  
9 of America and Great Britain, the seizure of the terri-  
10 tories of the Soviet Far East was considered settled,  
11 the only question being the portions to be seized. It  
12 was pointed out in the part of the plan entitled "Future  
13 of Soviet Territories" that "though this problem cannot  
14 be easily decided at present inasmuch as it is to be  
15 settled in accordance with the Japanese-German Pact"  
16 still in any event "the Maritime Province shall be  
17 annexed to Japan, the district adjacent to the Manchurian  
18 Empire shall be put into the Sphere of influence of that  
19 country, and the Trans-Siberian Railroad shall be placed  
20 under the complete control of Japan and Germany with  
21 Omsk as the point of demarcation."

22 The Accused HASHIMOTO, in his article of  
23 5 January 1942, entitled the "Great East Asia Sphere  
Under Imperial Influence" enumerating the countries which

were to be included in the Greater East Asia Sphere Under  
1 Imperial Influence mentions the Soviet Far East along  
2 with China, French Indo-China, Burma, Malaya, the Dutch  
3 East Indies, India, etc. He went on to say "We cannot  
4 yet decide whether all these countries should be incor-  
5 porated at once into the sphere under Imperial Influence,  
6 but it is at least absolutely necessary to include for  
7 the sake of national defence these countries in the  
8 sphere of our influence."  
9

10 The "Kokusaku-Kenkyu Kai" Society, of which  
11 prominent Japanese political and military leaders were  
12 members (including TOGO, KAYA, MUTO and SATO) and pre-  
13 sumably playing an important role in advancing if not  
14 in formulating official policy contemplated in its  
15 "Draft of Measures for the Construction of the Greater  
16 East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" published in May 1943  
17 that "....a reasonable scope of the Greater East Asia  
18 Co-Prosperity Sphere includes" along with other component  
19 parts, "all the Eastern region of the Soviet Union  
20 including Lake Baikal..... All of Outer Mongolia."  
21 Similar aspirations of Japan are found in the studies  
22 made by the Institute of Total Warfare which was estab-  
23 lished by the Imperial Ordinance of 1 October 1940 and  
24 was directly responsible to the Prime Minister. Thus,  
25 the original draft plan of the establishment of the



1 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere worked out by the  
2 Institute in January 1942 contemplated that "the central  
3 area" of various countries united by Japan would include  
4 besides Manchuria and North China the Soviet Maritime  
5 Province, and the so-called "Smaller Co-Prosperity Sphere"  
6 would include, besides the rest of China and Indo-China,  
7 Eastern Siberia.  
8

9           The Tribunal is of the opinion that a war of  
10 aggression against the U.S.S.R. was contemplated and  
11 planned throughout the period under consideration, that  
12 it was one of the principal elements of Japan's national  
13 policy and that its object was the seizure of territories  
14 of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East.  
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PLANNING AND PREPARING WAR AGAINST THE SOVIET1 UNION.2 MANCHURIA AS A BASE AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

3 The warlike policy of Japan against the U.S.S.R.  
4 was indicated in Japan's war plans. The war plans of  
5 the Japanese General Staff from the commencement of the  
6 period under review contemplated, as a first step, the  
7 occupation of Manchuria. In Japan's war plans the seizure  
8 of Manchuria was regarded not only as a stage in the  
9 conquest of China, but also as a means of securing a  
10 base for offensive military operations against the  
11 Soviet Union.

12  
13 Kawabe Torashiro, then a General Staff Officer,  
14 testified that a plan of war against the U.S.S.R.  
15 worked out in 1930 when the accused HATA was Chief of  
16 the First Department of the General Staff contemplated  
17 military operations against the U.S.S.R. on the Soviet-  
18 Manchuria border. This was before the Japanese occupa-  
19 tion of Manchuria.

20  
21 The accused MIKAMI and MATSUI also confirmed  
22 before the Tribunal that Manchuria was considered neces-  
23 sary for Japan as a military base in case of war with  
24 the U.S.S.R.

25 On 16 March 1931 HATA instructed a Colonel  
Suzuki to make a tour of inspection of the areas of

1 Northern Manchuria and Northern Korea with a view to  
2 operations according to the "Otsu" plan against the  
3 U.S.S.R. and the "Hei" plan against China. In a secret  
4 report presented by this officer upon the result of  
5 his tour detailed information was given relative to  
6 the "Otsu" plan which aimed at the occupation of the  
7 Soviet Maritime Province.

8 The seizure of Manchuria in 1931 provided  
9 bases for an attack upon the U.S.S.R. on a wide front  
10 for the purpose of seizing the whole of the Soviet Far  
11 East. Kasahara Yukio, Japanese Military Attache in  
12 the Soviet Union, in a secret report presented to the  
13 General Staff in the spring of 1931 advocating war with  
14 the U.S.S.R. and determining its objective wrote:  
15 "....we must advance at least as far as Lake Baikal....  
16 In case we stop on the line of the Lake Baikal, the  
17 Empire will have to be determined and prepared to con-  
18 sider the Far Eastern Province which she will have  
19 occupied as a proper territory of the Empire....."  
20 Under cross-examination the witness Kasahara admitting  
21 the authenticity of the document, testified that he  
22 proposed to the General Staff a speedy opening of a  
23 war against the U.S.S.R. and proposed the increase of  
24 armaments for the purpose of being ready for a war at  
25 any moment. In the spring of 1932 Kasahara was transferred

to the General Staff wherein he held the post of Chief  
1 of the Russian Section of the Second Department. On  
2 15 July 1932, shortly after that appointment, Kasahara  
3 sent a message through Lieutenant Colonel Kanda to the  
4 then Military Attache in Moscow, Kawabe Torashiro,  
5 regarding an important decision of the General Staff:  
6 "...that the (army and navy's) preparations have been  
7 completed. In order to consolidate Manchuria, the war  
8 against Russia is necessary for Japan." In cross-  
9 examination the witness Kaschere explained that in the  
10 General Staff "there was an agreement among the section  
11 chiefs and the branch chiefs that preparations would be  
12 made for a war by 1934."

14 When this decision was taken the accused  
15 UMEZU was Chief of the General Affairs Department and  
16 TOJO and OSHIMA were Section Chiefs of the General  
17 Staff, while MUTO was a member of the Second Division  
18 of the General Staff.

19 AGREEMENT BETWEEN WAR OFFICE AND GENERAL STAFF

21 In the summer of 1932 Section Chiefs of the  
22 War Office reached an agreement with Section Chiefs of  
23 the General Staff upon these preparations. Obviously  
24 this could not have been done without authorisation and  
25 approval of their seniors in the War Ministry. The  
accused ARAKI was then War Minister, the accused KOISO



1 Vice-War Minister and the accused SUZUKI was a member of  
2 the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. HRAKI  
3 and SUZUKI, as was pointed out earlier, openly declared  
4 in 1933 the intention of seizing by force the territories  
5 of the Maritime Province, Zabaikalya and Siberia.

6 MILITARY ATTACHE IN MOSCOW ADVOCATES ATTACK

7 On 14 July 1932, Kawabe, from his position as  
8 Military Attache in Moscow, sent a report to the General  
9 Staff in which he said "a Russo-Japanese war in the  
10 future is unavoidable" for which reason "emphasis must  
11 be laid on the repletion of military armaments against  
12 Russia." He also urged "as to the conclusion of a  
13 non-aggression pact proposed by the U.S.S.R., we must  
14 be non-committal and reserve our freedom of action."  
15 This, no doubt, had reference to Russian proposals  
16 which had been made for a neutrality pact, as has been  
17 discussed already.

18 PLANS FOR WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

19 As with the occupation of Manchuria in 1931,  
20 so with the invasion of the rest of China in 1937,  
21 the eventual war with the U.S.S.R. was always in mind.  
22 The strategy was directed to preparations for an attack  
23 on the U.S.S.R. That was pointed out by the accused  
24 TOJO, the then Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, in June  
25 1937, i.e., immediately prior to the beginning of an attack

on China, in a telegram to Vice-War Minister UMEZU  
1 and to the General Staff: "Judging the present situ-  
2 ation in China from the point of view of military  
3 preparations against Soviet Russia, I am convinced that  
4 if our military power permits it, we should deliver a  
5 blow first of all upon the Nanking regime to get rid  
6 of the menace to our back." Similarly, both during  
7 the seizure of Manchuria in 1931 and the invasion of  
8 the rest of China in 1937 the war plans of Japan against  
9 China and the Soviet Union were coordinated by the  
10 General Staff, the Japanese War Ministry and the Kwantung  
11 Army Headquarters.  
12

13 The accused MUTO admitted before the Tribunal  
14 that when he was Chief of the First Section of the  
15 General Staff he made a study of the 1938 plan. The  
16 war plans of the Japanese General Staff for 1939 and  
17 1941 were aimed at the seizure of Soviet territories.  
18 The war plan for 1939 was based upon a concentration  
19 of Japan's main forces in Eastern Manchuria to take  
20 the offensive. The Kwantung Army was to occupy the  
21 Soviet cities of Voroshilov, Vladivostok, Iman and then  
22 Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk and Kuibyshevka. The  
23 plan for 1941, prior to Germany's attack on the  
24 U.S.S.R., had similar aims. At the first stage of the  
25 war it was intended to occupy the cities of Voroshilov,

Vladivostok, Blagoveshchensk, Iman, Kuibyshevka and at  
1 the next stage to occupy North Sakhalin, Petropavlosk  
2 of Kamchatka, Nikolaevsk on the Amur, Komsomolsk and  
3 Sovgavan.

4           The offensive character of these plans and  
5 measures is indicated by the secret operations order  
6 dated 1 November 1941 of the Commander of the Combined  
7 Fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, wherein it was pointed out:  
8 ".....if the Empire does not attack the Soviet Union,  
9 it is believed that the Soviet Union will not commence  
10 hostilities." The same view was expressed by TOJO at  
11 the meeting of the Inquiry Committee of the Privy  
12 Council on 8 December 1941: ".....Soviet Russia is now  
13 fighting against Germany, so she will not avail herself  
14 of the Japanese southward advance."

15  
16           Although it was suggested that these plans were  
17 "routine", for a "strategic defensive" and so on, it is  
18 clear that they were offensive and not defensive. It  
19 may be that in some circumstances a defensive strategy  
20 would justify and, perhaps require offensive operations.  
21 A consideration of the nature of these plans, and the  
22 military policy of Japan in respect of the U.S.S.R.,  
23 compels the conclusion that these plans were aggressive  
24 and not "strategic defensive". They were "defensive"  
25 only in the distorted sense, already discussed, that

they defended the "Kingly Way", i.e., the expansion of  
1 Japan at the expense of its neighbours on the Continent  
2 of Asia.

3 ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

4 Immediately after the seizure of Manchuria,  
5 Japan started stationing there her main armed forces.  
6 The purpose of their training was mostly a preparation  
7 for military operations against the Soviet Union and  
8 China. Tanaka, former Chief of the Military Service  
9 Section and Chief of the Military Service Bureau of  
10 the War Ministry, estimated that 2,500,000 Japanese  
11 soldiers were trained in Manchuria.  
12

13 In 1938, TOJO, as the Kwantung Army Chief of  
14 Staff, in plans for the stationing of a meteorological  
15 service system in Chahar, stated its object was to  
16 "enable more accurate weather forecasting service in  
17 Japan and Manchuria and especially to strengthen a  
18 nautical meteorological service system in preparation  
19 for a war with Soviet Russia."  
20

21 The accused MINAMI, former Commanding General  
22 of the Kwantung Army, admitted during cross-examination  
23 that the construction of railways in Manchuria was  
24 directed towards the Soviet border, and admitted that  
25 they could have strategic uses, although he did claim  
that "their principal objective was the opening up of



1 Northern Manchuria."

2           In January 1938 the Kwantung Army Headquarters,  
3 under TOJO, worked out the "Outline of the policy for  
4 the establishment of a New China." This document sent  
5 to the War Minister refers to the task of persuading  
6 the local population "to contribute to the preparation  
7 for the fast approaching war with Soviet Russia." TOJO  
8 contemplated the use of the Mongolia-Hsingkiang area  
9 "as a base for invading Outer Mongolia."  
10

11           In a secret telegram sent to the War Ministry  
12 in May 1938, TOJO, then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung  
13 Army, pointed out that the South Manchuria Railway  
14 Company "...is receiving the army's guidance for co-  
15 operating in the enforcement of the national policies  
16 of Manchukuo and also in the operations preparations,  
17 etc. against the Soviet Union."  
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The Army authorities did not permit the Neutral-  
ic, Pact signed in April 1941 to abate their preparations  
for war with the U.S.S.R. Thus, the Chief of Staff of  
the Kwantung Army, in an address at a conference of form-  
ation commanders in April 1941, discussing the Japanese-  
Soviet Neutrality Pact said: "In accordance with the  
present situation of the Empire, it is a diplomatic  
measure planned to maintain for the time being, peace  
between Japan and the Soviet Union for the purpose of  
strengthening the Tripartite Alliance. Whether or not  
this pact can be made effective depends upon the future  
attitude of the two countries. It cannot be considered  
that we can immediately enter into friendly relations  
with the present attitudes. Consequently, in order to  
make this pact effective, our Army absolutely cannot  
permit the slacking down in its preparations for  
military operations. By steadily strengthening and  
expanding these preparations the effectiveness of the  
pact will be promoted. The Army will not make any changes  
in its past policies."

22  
23  
24  
25  
There are people in both Japan and Manchukuo  
who often say that military preparations against Soviet  
Russia may be reduced since the neutrality pact was  
concluded. However, as mentioned previously, there must  
not only be no changes in our past policy of military

preparations against Soviet Russia, but since the necessity for us to take a precise and lofty attitude towards ideology, counter-espionage, and other forms of stratagem is especially great, it is necessary for us to have our subordinates thoroughly understand this purport promptly." This text was obtained from a captured "Military top secret" document. The report does not disclose the presence of UMEZU, then the Kwantung Army Commander. He may have been present but a speech of such importance, a record of which was made and retained, must at least have had his approval.

At a similar conference on 5 December 1941 the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army instructed formation commanders to complete preparations for operations vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and to watch all changes in the military situation in the Soviet Far East and Mongolia in connection with the progress of the Soviet-German war in order to take advantage in good time of the turning point in the military situation. This speech was made while UMEZU was still the Commander of the Kwantung Army.

PLANS FOR CONTROL OF

OCCUPIED SOVIET TERRITORIES

Japan's leaders considered the seizure of Soviet territories so practicable that in the General Staff and the Kwantung Army Headquarters specific plans were worked

out for the management of these territories. From July  
1 to September 1941 a special group of General Staff  
2 Officers made a study of occupation regimes for the  
3 Soviet territories to be occupied by Japanese troops.

4 In September 1941, the Fifth Section of the  
5 Kwantung Army Headquarters was formed under Major General  
6 Ikeda, a subordinate of UMEZU, who was likewise engaged  
7 in the study of problems pertaining to occupation regimes  
8 for Soviet territories. Specialists from the General  
9 Affairs Department of Manchukuo were employed in this  
10 work.  
11

12 Officially, at least, the Kokusaku-Kenkyu Kai  
13 Society was claimed to be an unofficial organization.  
14 However, for the purpose of working out its drafts and  
15 studies it received top-secret documents from the War  
16 Ministry, the Ministry of Overseas Affairs and other  
17 Governmental bodies. One example is the top-secret  
18 "Plan for Management of Territories in the Greater East  
19 Asia Co-Prospcrity Sphere" worked out by the War Ministry  
20 and by the Ministry of Overseas Affairs in December 1941.  
21 According to this plan the Maritime province of the  
22 U.S.S.R., as well as other Soviet territories as far as  
23 Lake Baikal, were to be incorporated either into Japan  
24 or into Manchukuo. The Society in its "Tentative Plan  
25 Concerning the Scope and the structure of the Greater



East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" dated 18 February 1942,  
1 planned in advance measures to prevent "the concentration  
2 in Siberia of the Slavs who are being driven away from  
3 the European part of Russia".

4 The intensification of war preparations involved  
5 the employment of increasing numbers of persons. Special  
6 organizations were developed. Among these were the Total  
7 War Institute under the Cabinet and the National Policy  
8 Research Association (Kokusaku-Kenkyu Kai). The former  
9 Director of the Total War Research Institute, Lieutenant  
10 General Murakami Keisaku, testified that the Institute  
11 was instructed by Prime Minister TOJO to work out a  
12 draft plan of the system of administration for the  
13 territories of Greater East Asia to be occupied by  
14 Japanese forces. In all the studies made by the Insti-  
15 tute the question of the invasion of the U.S.S.R. was  
16 regarded as already settled. "The Plans to Govern Siberia,  
17 Including Outer Mongolia" published in the summarised  
18 research papers of the Institute for the year 1942 con-  
19 tained rules for the Japanese Occupation authorities.  
20  
21 Among these were:

22 "All old laws and ordinances shall be declared  
23 void, and simple but powerful military orders shall be  
24 enforced instead. Under the powerful leadership of the  
25 (Japanese) Empire, the natives shall not be allowed, in

principle, to take part in any politics. If necessary,  
1 a low grade self-government shall be allowed."

2 "If found necessary from the national defense  
3 and economic point of view, Japanese, Korean and  
4 Manchurian colonists shall be sent there."

5 "If occasion demands, compulsory emigration  
6 of the natives shall be effected."

7 "Permeation of our might shall be our aim, and  
8 we shall approach it with stringent power, not inclining  
9 into the so-called paternalism."

10 The work of the "Kokusaku-Kenkyu Kai" Society  
11 developed along the same lines as that of the Total War  
12 Institute.

13 By the spring of 1942 the Kwantung Army Head-  
14 quarters had drafted a plan for the military administrat-  
15 ion of Soviet areas to be occupied by Japan, and with  
16 UMEZU's approval this plan was forwarded to the General  
17 Staff. This plan included such sections as "administra-  
18 tion, maintenance of peace and order, organization of  
19 industries, circulation of currencies, communication  
20 and transportation."

21 In 1942 TOJO and UMEZU despatched Major General  
22 Ikeda and other officers to study the occupation regime  
23 established for the South Seas Area with a view to using  
24 it in the further working out of occupation regimes for  
25

1 the territory of the Soviet Union.

2 ACTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

3 AFTER GERMANY'S ATTACK UPON THE U.S.S.R.

4 After the attack of Germany upon the Soviet  
5 Union, Japan increased overall preparations for war  
6 against the U.S.S.R. Although at that time Japan was  
7 already engaged in a protracted war with China, she hoped  
8 to take advantage of the war in Europe to achieve her  
9 schemes against the U.S.S.R. This involved a secret  
10 mobilisation and the increase of the strength of the  
11 Kwantung Army. In the summer of 1941, in accordance  
12 with the plan, a secret mobilisation was carried out  
13 and 300,000 men, two fresh divisions and various special  
14 units were added to the Kwantung Army. By January 1942  
15 the Kwantung Army had been increased to 1,000,000 men.  
16 It received a large amount of new equipment. There were  
17 twice as many tanks as in 1937 and three times the number  
18 of planes. A large concentration of troops was deployed  
19 in Manchuria along the border of the Soviet Union.  
20 Besides the Kwantung Army, the Korean Army and the  
21 Japanese Army in Inner Mongolia, troops stationed in  
22 Japan were to be used in the intended attack upon the  
23 U.S.S.R. In addition to men and material large supplies  
24 of provisions were prepared for the Kwantung Army.  
25

SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE

1 As well as direct military preparations, an  
2 elaborate programme of subversive activities against  
3 the U.S.S.R., designed both for peace and war time, was  
4 in contemplation or in progress, as is shown by a report  
5 submitted to the General Staff and to the Kwantung Army  
6 Headquarters as early as 1928 by Kanda Masatane, a  
7 Japanese intelligence officer, who later held the post  
8 of Chief of the Russian Section, Second Division,  
9 General Staff. General principles and measures of  
10 subversive activities against the U.S.S.R. were set  
11 forth in the report. In particular, subversive and  
12 provocative activities were planned and put into execu-  
13 tion on the communication lines of Northern Manchuria,  
14 mainly on the Chinese-Eastern Railway. The report  
15 stated: "The affairs included in our sabotage activities  
16 against Russia are many and their activities will extend  
17 throughout the whole world." Kanda, a former Lieutenant-  
18 General, the author of the report, when examined in Court,  
19 confirmed this document.  
20

21  
22 A conference of Japanese military attaches in a  
23 number of countries, which was convened in April 1929  
24 in Berlin by the accused MATSUI, then Chief of the 2nd  
25 Division of the General Staff, considered methods of  
sabotage to be used from European countries during the



1 war which, even then, was projected against the U.S.S.R.  
2 This conference contemplated the use of White Russian  
3 emigrants to foreign lands. It considered also the  
4 question of espionage against the U.S.S.R., conducted  
5 by Japanese military attaches outside the Soviet Union.  
6 The accused HASHIMOTO, who was Military Attache in  
7 Turkey at that time and who attended and spoke at that  
8 conference, when examined in Court named other partic-  
9 ipants of the conference, among whom there were Military  
10 Attaches in Great Britain, Germany, France, Poland,  
11 Austria, Italy and Russia, and he admitted that  
12 subversive activities against the U.S.S.R. were discussed  
13 at the conference by MATSUI and others. Following this  
14 conference, HASHIMOTO, in November 1929, submitted to  
15 the Japanese General Staff a report upon the "Situation  
16 in the Caucasus and its strategic use for the purposes of  
17 sabotage activities", in which he stressed that "the  
18 Caucasus area . . . is surely important from the stand-  
19 point of stratagem against Russia." HASHIMOTO advised  
20 "make all races in the Caucasus confront each other and  
21 consequently to bring confusion in the area."

22  
23 The accused OSHIMA while in Berlin secretly  
24 carried on subversive activities against the U.S.S.R. and  
25 its leaders and discussed this with Himmler.

1 In 1942 the Japanese General Staff and the  
2 Kwantung Headquarters worked out new offensive war  
3 plans against the U.S.S.R. which remained valid for  
4 1943. Under these plans the war against the U.S.S.R.  
5 was to be commenced unexpectedly following the concen-  
6 tration in Manchuria of about thirty divisions. As with  
7 earlier plans, these last plans were not put into  
8 execution. At about this time the military prospects  
9 of the Axis Powers, Germany-Italy-Japan, began to deter-  
10 iorate. Thereafter they were placed more and more upon  
11 the defensive and such a venture as Japan's contemplated  
12 attack upon the U.S.S.R. became less and less possible  
13 until the final defeat of the Axis in 1945. Until 1943,  
14 at any rate, the Tribunal finds that Japan not only  
15 planned to wage a war of aggression against the U.S.S.R.  
16 but also that she continued with active preparations for  
17 such a war.

19 NEUTRALITY PACT

20 GERMANY'S ATTACK ON THE U.S.S.R.

21 As has been mentioned previously, Japan was  
22 invited by the U.S.S.R. in 1931 and 1933 to enter into a  
23 neutrality pact, but refused to do so. By 1941 Japan had  
24 forfeited her friendly relations with practically all the  
25 powers excepting Germany and Italy. The international

situation had so changed that Japan was now willing to do  
1 that which she had refused to do ten years previously.  
2 This willingness, however, did not indicate any change of  
3 the Japanese attitude towards the U.S.S.R., nor any abate-  
4 ment of her acquisitive designs upon that country.

5 On 13 April 1941, that is, shortly before the  
6 attack of Germany upon the U.S.S.R., Japan signed the  
7 Neutrality Pact with the Soviet Union. The Pact  
8 provided:

9  
10 "ARTICLE I.

11 "Both contracting parties engage to  
12 maintain peaceful and friendly relations between  
13 themselves and mutually respect the territorial  
14 integrity and inviolability of the other contract-  
15 ing party.

16 "ARTICLE II

17 "In case one of the contracting parties  
18 becomes the object of military action from the part  
19 of one or several other powers, the other contracting  
20 party will maintain neutrality during the whole period  
21 of the conflict."  
22

23 In signing the Pact the Japanese Government  
24 placed itself in an equivocal position, as at this time  
25 it had commitments to Germany under the Anti-Comintern  
Pact and the Tripartite Alliance. Its conduct in signing

the Neutrality Pact was still more ambiguous as, when it  
1 did so, it had every reason to expect Germany's impending  
2 attack upon the U.S.S.R.

3 As far back as 23 February 1941 Ribbentrop told  
4 OSHIMA that Hitler had created a number of new formations  
5 during the winter as a result of which Germany would have  
6 240 divisions, including 186 first-class attack divisions.  
7 Ribbentrop also dwelt upon the prospects of a "German-  
8 Russian conflict", which he said "would result in a  
9 gigantic German victory and signify the end of the Soviet  
10 regime."  
11

12 The forthcoming attack of Germany upon the Soviet  
13 Union was discussed in still more definite terms in the  
14 conversations of Germany's leaders -- Hitler and Ribben-  
15 trop -- with Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs  
16 Matsuoka in March 1941.  
17

18 In his conversation with Matsuoka on 27 March  
19 1941, Ribbentrop told him that "the German armies in  
20 the East are available at any time. Should Russia one  
21 day take up an attitude which could be interpreted as a  
22 threat against Germany, the Fuehrer would dash Russia  
23 to pieces. One is positive in Germany that such a  
24 campaign against Russia would end in a complete victory  
25 for German arms and the absolute destruction of the  
Russian Army and the Russian State. The Fuehrer is



convinced that in case of an advance against the Soviet  
1 Union a few months later, as a power (Grossmacht), Russia  
2 would no longer exist."

3 On the same day Hitler spoke in the same tenor  
4 to Matsuoka when he stated in the presence of OSHIMA, Ott  
5 and Ribbentrop, that Germany had concluded certain  
6 treaties with the U.S.S.R., but still more important  
7 than this was the fact that Germany had 160 to 200  
8 divisions at her disposal for her protection against  
9 the U.S.S.R. In his talk with Matsuoka on 29 March 1941,  
10 Ribbentrop said that the largest part of the German Army  
11 was concentrated on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich  
12 and once more expressed his belief in the complete  
13 defeat of the U.S.S.R. within a few months, once the  
14 conflict had broken out. In that conversation Ribbentrop  
15 also said ". . . a conflict with Russia was anyhow  
16 within the realms of possibility. In any case Matsuoka  
17 could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return  
18 that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible.  
19 On the contrary, the situation was such that such a  
20 conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to  
21 be considered possible." In reply Matsuoka assured him  
22 that "Japan would also be a loyal ally who would devote  
23 herself entirely, and not just in a lukewarm way, to the  
24 joint effort,"  
25

1                   Soon after his return to Japan after signing  
2 the Neutrality Pact in Moscow, Matsuoka told Ott,  
3 German Ambassador to Tokyo: "No Japanese Premier or  
4 Foreign Minister would ever be able to keep Japan neutral  
5 in the event of a German-Russian conflict. In this case,  
6 Japan would be driven, by the force of necessity, to  
7 attack Russia at Germany's side. No neutrality pact  
8 could change this."

9                   In his telegram of 20 May 1941 to Matsuoka,  
10 OSHIMA advised that Weizsacker had told him that "the  
11 German Government attached great importance to Foreign  
12 Minister Matsuoka's statement to Ott to the effect that  
13 Japan would attack the U.S.S.R. in case of a Russo-  
14 German war."

15                   The uncandid policy of the Japanese Government  
16 in signing the Neutrality Pact is confirmed by the fact  
17 that simultaneously with the negotiations for the sign-  
18 ing of the Pact, negotiations with Germany were being  
19 conducted for the extension of the Anti-Comintern Pact  
20 which was to expire on 26 November 1941. That pact was  
21 to expire on 26 November 1941. That Pact was prolonged  
22 for another five years on 26 November 1941, after the war  
23 between Germany and the U.S.S.R. had broken out.  
24

25                   The Japanese policy towards the U.S.S.R. and  
the Neutrality Pact is revealed by Smetanin's talk with

1 Matsuoka on the 25 June 1941, three days after Germany  
2 had attacked Russia. Matsuoka, being asked by Smetanin,  
3 the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, whether Japan would  
4 remain neutral in accordance with the Neutrality Pact  
5 between the U.S.S.R. and Japan of 13 April 1941, evaded  
6 a direct answer, but emphasized that the Tripartite Pact  
7 was the basis of the foreign policy of Japan and if the  
8 present war and the Neutrality Pact happened to be at  
9 variance with that basis and with the Tripartite Pact,  
10 the Neutrality Pact "will not continue in force". We  
11 have already referred to the German Ambassador's report  
12 of Matsuoka's sinister comments upon his talk with  
13 Smetanin. In June 1941, shortly before Germany's attack  
14 upon the U.S.S.R., UMEZU in his conversation with Prince  
15 Urech said "he welcomed the Neutrality Pact Japan-Russia  
16 for the moment. Since, however, the Tripartite Pact is  
17 the unchangeable basis of Japanese foreign policy,  
18 Japan's attitude towards the Neutrality Pact must  
19 undergo a change just as soon as the hitherto existing  
20 German-Russian relations undergo an alteration."

22 It would appear that Japan was not sincere in  
23 concluding the Neutrality Pact with the U.S.S.R., but  
24 considering her agreements with Germany more advantageous  
25 she signed the Neutrality Pact to facilitate her plans

for an attack upon the U.S.S.R. This view of the  
1 attitude of the Japanese Government towards the  
2 U.S.S.R. coincides with that reported by the German  
3 Ambassador to Tokyo in his telegram to Berlin of  
4 15 July 1941. Japan's "neutrality" in the war between  
5 Germany and the U.S.S.R. in reality served and seems  
6 to have been designed to serve as a screen for such aid  
7 as she could give Germany pending her own attack upon  
8 the U.S.S.R. The evidence presented to this Tribunal  
9 indicates that far from being neutral in accordance with  
10 the Pact with the U.S.S.R., Japan did render substantial  
11 assistance to Germany.  
12

13  
14 GENERAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE

15 BY JAPAN TO GERMANY

16 In Manchuria Japan carried out large-scale  
17 military preparations and concentrated there a large  
18 army, thereby containing considerable forces of the Soviet  
19 Army in the East which otherwise might have been used  
20 against Germany in the West. These military preparations  
21 were so regarded by the German and Japanese Governments.  
22 In his telegram to Berlin on 3 July 1941, the German  
23 Ambassador to Japan advised that "augmentation of military  
24 preparations, among other things, with an eye to realising  
25 this object, together with the aim of restraining Soviet



Russia in the Far East in her struggle with Germany is  
 1 steadfastly kept in the mind of the Japanese Government."

2 Ribbentrop in his telegram to Tokyo on 15 May  
 3 1942 likewise pointed out the great importance which a  
 4 successful surprise attack on the U.S.S.R. would have  
 5 for the further progress of the war in the interests of  
 6 the Tripartite powers, but he emphasized at the same time,  
 7 as has been mentioned before, the importance of Japan's  
 8 "neutrality" as an active aid to Germany in her war  
 9 against the U.S.S.R., "since in any event Russia must  
 10 maintain troops in East Siberia in anticipation of a  
 11 Japanese-Russian conflict."  
 12

13 JAPAN GIVES GERMANY MILITARY

14 INFORMATION CONCERNING THE U.S.S.R.

15 Evidence that Japan provided Germany with  
 16 military intelligence about the U.S.S.R. is contained in  
 17 a telegram from Ribbentrop to the German Ambassador in  
 18 Tokyo on 10 July 1941, in which Ribbentrop wrote: "Please  
 19 thank the Japanese Foreign Minister at this opportunity  
 20 for having transmitted the telegram from the Japanese  
 21 Ambassador at Moscow. It would be good if we could  
 22 receive more news from Russia in this way at regular  
 23 intervals."  
 24

25 Evidence was presented to prove that Japan

1 provided Germany with economic, political and military  
2 intelligence about the Soviet Union, derived from  
3 Japanese military and diplomatic agencies. Major  
4 General Matzumura, who from October 1941 to August 1943  
5 held the post of Chief of the Russian Section of the  
6 General Staff, testified that he, in accordance with  
7 the order of the General Staff, systematically provided  
8 the 16th (German) Section of the General Staff with  
9 intelligence for Colonel Kretschmer, the German  
10 Military Attache in Tokyo, regarding Soviet armed  
11 forces in the Far East, the war potential of the  
12 Soviet Union, the movement of Soviet troops from the  
13 East to the West, as well as of internal movements of  
14 Soviet troops.  
15  
16  
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25

Von Petersdorf, former Assistant Military

1 Attache of the German Embassy in Tokyo, testified  
2 that he had systematically received from the Japanese  
3 General Staff secret information about the Soviet Army,  
4 and especially about the Far Eastern army--the disposi-  
5 tion of troops, their strength, detailed information  
6 about the reserves, about the transfer of Soviet troops  
7 to the European front, about the war industry of the  
8 Soviet Union, etc. Von Petersdorf stated that the  
9 information which he had received from the Japanese  
10 General Staff differed in scope and nature from that  
11 normally received by military attaches through the  
12 usual channels.  
13

14 JAPANESE INTERFERENCE WITH SOVIET SHIPPING

15 The prosecution claimed and tendered evidence  
16 to show that, despite Japan's obligation of neutrality,  
17 the Soviet war effort was seriously interfered with by  
18 Japanese interference with Soviet shipping in the Far  
19 East. In particular there was evidence that at Hong-  
20 kong in 1941 Soviet ships at anchor, clearly marked  
21 as such, were shelled and one sunk; that in the same  
22 month Soviet ships were sunk by bombs from Japanese  
23 aircraft; that many Soviet ships were unlawfully ar-  
24 rested by Japanese naval vessels and taken to Japanese  
25 ports and detained on occasion for lengthy periods.

1 Finally it was charged that the Japanese closed the  
2 Sangar Strait and compelled Soviet ships to use other  
3 less suitable and more dangerous approaches to its  
4 Far Eastern seaboard. All this it was claimed was  
5 done to hamper the U.S.S.R. in its war with Germany,  
6 in defiance of Japan's obligations under the Neutral-  
7 ity Pact and by way of indirect preparation for the  
8 war Japan intended to undertake against the U.S.S.R.

9 It has certainly been established that the  
10 Neutrality Pact was entered into without candour and  
11 as a device to advance Japan's aggressive intentions  
12 against the U.S.S.R.

13 JAPAN'S OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

14 AGAINST THE U.S.S.R.

15 IN 1938-39

16 In the foregoing discussion of the Japanese  
17 attitude towards the U.S.S.R. we have refrained from  
18 any detailed consideration of the two matters raised  
19 by Counts 25, 26, 35 and 36 of the Indictment. These  
20 were not without significance in the earlier discus-  
21 sion, but as the Indictment raised them directly we  
22 thought it more convenient to reserve our detailed  
23 consideration of them until this time.

24 Following Japan's alliance with Germany  
25 under the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 1936 and her



military success in North and Central China after  
1 Lukouchiao in 1937, the Japanese Army, in the years  
2 1938 and 1939, resorted to hostilities against the  
3 U.S.S.R. first in the East of Manchuria and then in  
4 the West. In July 1938 the scene of hostilities was  
5 in the Lake Khassan area close to the junction of  
6 the boundaries of Manchuria, Korea, and the U.S.S.R.  
7 Maritime Province. Then in May 1939 hostilities  
8 broke out in the Komenhan area which is on the boundary  
9 between the territories of Manchukuo and Outer Mongolia  
10 or the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchuria. Both  
11 of these operations were claimed by the Japanese to  
12 be mere border incidents caused by uncertainty as  
13 to the boundaries and resulting in clashes of the  
14 opposing frontier guard detachments.

#### HOSTILITIES IN THE LAKE KHASSAN AREA

17  
18 In the beginning of July 1938 the Japanese  
19 border guards in the area west of Lake Khassan were  
20 strengthened by a concentration of field troops on  
21 the eastern side of the Tumen-Ula River which is a  
22 short distance west of Lake Khassan. Between the  
23 river and the lake there is a range of hills overlook-  
24 ing both, along the crest of which, according to the  
25 U.S.S.R. contention, the boundary ran; the Japanese,  
on the other hand, contended that the boundary was

1 more to the eastward and was along the western shore  
2 of Lake Khassan.

3 This height of land is of considerable strate-  
4 gic importance overlooking as it does to the West of  
5 the Tumen-Ula River, the railway running North and South  
6 and the roads communicating with the Soviet Maritime  
7 Province and the city of Vladivostok. From the Japan-  
8 ese side the importance of the high land was its value  
9 in protecting from observation and attack the railway  
10 and roads forming the line of communication to the  
11 North and East. Its military importance was realised  
12 by the Japanese and as early as 1933 the Kwantung  
13 Army had made a thorough topographical study of the  
14 area with a view, as stated by the Chief of Staff of  
15 that Army in his report to the Vice-Minister of War  
16 in December 1933, to "the time of hostilities against  
17 Soviet Russia."

18 Contemporary reports of the Soviet border  
19 guard outposts as well as other evidence indicate  
20 that during the month of July 1938 the concentration  
21 of Japanese troops was being carried out on an in-  
22 creasing scale. Before the end of July approximately  
23 one division of the Korean Army was concentrated in a  
24 small sector probably not exceeding three kilometers  
25 in length. General Tanaka, Ryukichi, in his evidence

1 for the defence says that when he arrived in the area  
2 on the 31 July the Japanese were attacking in force.  
3 Incidentally, his evidence on earlier preparations is  
4 interesting. He had paid a previous visit to the area  
5 on 15 July and he stated that at that time the Soviet  
6 troops had dug trenches and placed barbed wire on the  
7 western slope, i.e. on the Manchurian side of the  
8 Changku-Feng Hill, along the crest of which, according  
9 to the Soviet version, the boundary ran. These defen-  
10 sive measures are significant of the intention of the  
11 U.S.S.R. forces but Soviet witnesses denied that any  
12 such measures had been taken. If we accepted Tanaka's  
13 evidence to its full extent this might suggest en-  
14 croachment by the Soviet troops on Manchurian territory.  
15 However, no claim was made by the Japanese in respect  
16 of these defensive measures. As will be seen later the  
17 Japanese complaint was that the Soviet troops should  
18 not have been posted anywhere to the westward of Lake  
19 Khassan. Prior to the clash the Soviet border guard  
20 was small in number, not exceeding one hundred in the  
21 sector under consideration.

22  
23 In the early part of July while the Japanese  
24 troops were being concentrated in the area of Lake  
25 Khassan the Japanese Government opened diplomatic nego-  
tiations with the Soviet Government with a view to

1 obtaining the withdrawal of the Soviet border guards  
2 right back to the East side of Lake Khassan. On 15  
3 July the Japanese Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, Nishi,  
4 pursuant to the instructions of his government de-  
5 clared to the Soviet Commissioner for Foreign Affairs that  
6 the entire territory West of Lake Khassan belonged  
7 to Manchuria and demanded the withdrawal of Soviet  
8 forces from the West side of the lake. About the same  
9 time SHIGEMITSU, who had been on a mission in western  
10 Europe, was sent to Moscow with instructions to secure  
11 the fulfillment of the Japanese demands. Then fol-  
12 lowed discussions in which the Soviet representative  
13 reiterated that the boundary ran along the height of  
14 land to the West of and not along the shore of Lake  
15 Khassan. He said this was supported by the Hunchun  
16 Protocol of 1886 by which the boundary line was fixed.  
17 SHIGEMITSU adopted a peremptory attitude and said  
18 regarding the Hunchun Protocol: "To my mind at this  
19 critical moment speaking of some map is unreasonable.  
20 This will only complicate matters." On 20 July  
21 SHIGEMITSU made a formal demand for the withdrawal  
22 of the Soviet troops, adding that "Japan has rights  
23 and obligations to Manchukuo to use force and make  
24 the Soviet troops evacuate from the territory of  
25 Manchukuo unlawfully occupied by them."



On the question of the location of the boundary  
1 a map and a number of other evidentiary documents were  
2 produced before us and considerable evidence given.  
3 The Hunchun Protocol already referred to was signed  
4 in 1886 by the representatives of China and Russia and  
5 attached to it is a map indicating the boundary. In  
6 both the Chinese and Russian texts of the Protocol  
7 there is reference to the map and both contain the  
8 following significant passage, "..... the red line  
9 on the map marks the boundary all along the watershed  
10 and the water that flows Westward and pours into the  
11 River Tumen belongs to China and the water that flows  
12 Eastward and pours into the sea belongs to Russia."  
13 There is a slight discrepancy in the two texts in the  
14 detailed description of the boundary. That there may  
15 have been some doubts at the time as to the exact  
16 location of the boundary cannot be disregarded; how-  
17 ever, in the state of existing international law such  
18 doubt, if any, as existed would not have justified a  
19 resort to arms.  
20

21  
22 On the 21st of July 1938 War Minister ITAGAKI  
23 together with the Chief of the General Staff obtained  
24 an audience with the Emperor and requested that the  
25 Emperor sanction the use of armed force at Lake Khassan  
to enforce the Japanese demands. The eagerness with

1 which the War Minister and the Army desired to resort  
2 to military operations is illustrated in ITAGAKI's  
3 untruthful statement to the Emperor, that the use of  
4 force against the U.S.S.R. had been discussed with the  
5 Navy and Foreign Ministers who were in entire agreement  
6 with the Army. On the following day, however, at a  
7 Five Ministers Conference attended by ITAGAKI the  
8 question of the opening of hostilities at Lake Khassan  
9 was discussed and in the decision adopted it was  
10 stated, "(We) have made preparations for emergencies.  
11 The use of prepared military power is to be carried  
12 out by the Imperial Order after negotiation with the  
13 authorities concerned." Thus was obtained authority  
14 for the use of armed force at Lake Khassan; the only  
15 question remaining unsettled was the date of commence-  
16 ment of hostilities. This question was settled one  
17 week later: namely, on the 29th of July 1938, when  
18 the Japanese launched the first attack in the nature  
19 of a reconnaissance in the vicinity of Besymyannaya  
20 Hill, one of the hills on the height of land. This  
21 attack was made by a small number of troops, prob-  
22 ably not exceeding one company, which succeeded in  
23 overwhelming the small Soviet border guard posted on  
24 the hill. Later in the day Soviet border guard rein-  
25 forcements were brought up and drove the Japanese from

the ground they had taken.

1           On the night of the 30-31 July the Japanese  
2 returned to the attack with the main forces of one  
3 division this time on another of the hills on the  
4 ridge known as Zaozarnaye Hill. The witness, Tanaka,  
5 Ryukichi, whose evidence for the defense has already  
6 been referred to, confirmed the fact that on the 31st  
7 of July when he returned to the area the Japanese troops  
8 were attacking in force. It is true that he adds that  
9 the Japanese troops were on Manchurian territory; but  
10 this statement may be based on the Japanese claim that  
11 Manchurian territories extended as far as the West  
12 shore of Lake Khassan; in any event the Tribunal can  
13 find no evidence that the initiative was taken by the  
14 Soviet troops, which alone would have justified the  
15 Japanese attack.  
16

17           The fighting in the area continued from the  
18 31st of July until the 11th of August, 1938, by which  
19 time with the aid of Soviet support troops brought up  
20 after the opening of hostilities, the Japanese troops  
21 employed in the operation had been defeated and prac-  
22 tically wiped out. Thereupon the Japanese Government  
23 agreed that hostilities should cease and that the  
24 boundary be restored to the height of land along the  
25 range of hills in conformity with the Soviet contention.

1 From the evidence as a whole the Tribunal has  
2 come to the conclusion that the attack by the Japanese  
3 troops at Lake Khassan was deliberately planned by the  
4 General Staff and by ITAGAKI as Minister of War and was  
5 authorized at least by the Five Ministers who participated  
6 in the conference of the 22d of July, 1938. The  
7 purpose may have been either to feel out the Soviet  
8 strength in the area or to seize the strategically  
9 important territory on the ridge overlooking the line  
10 of communication to Vladivostok and the Maritime Pro-  
11 vince. The attack having been planned and undertaken  
12 with substantial forces cannot be regarded as a mere  
13 clash between border patrols. That the Japanese initia-  
14 ted the hostilities is also established to the Tribu-  
15 nal's satisfaction. Though the force employed was not  
16 very large the purpose above mentioned and the result  
17 if the attack had been successful are sufficient in the  
18 opinion of the Tribunal to justify describing the hos-  
19 tilities as a war. Furthermore having regard to the  
20 state of international law then existing and the  
21 attitude adopted by the Japanese representatives in  
22 the preliminary diplomatic negotiations, the operations  
23 of the Japanese troops were, in the opinion of the Tri-  
24 bunal, clearly aggressive.

We will adjourn until half-past one.

(Whereupon, at 1200, a recess was taken.)



## AFTERNOON SESSION

1  
2 The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
3 1930.

4 MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International Military  
5 Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

6 THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the  
7 Tribunal's Judgment.

8 OPERATIONS IN NOMONHAN (KHALKHIN GOL)

9 The hostilities in the Nomonhan district which  
10 lasted from May until September in 1939 were on a very  
11 much larger scale than those at Lake Khasan. They  
12 occurred at the eastern boundary of Outer Mongolia where  
13 it adjoins the Province of Heilungkiang. Immediately to  
14 the South is the Province of Chahar which in 1939 was  
15 under Japanese control.

16 The importance of Outer Mongolia in its re-  
17 lation to Japanese military plans toward the U.S.S.R.  
18 was great. Bordering as it does Soviet territory from  
19 Manchuria to a point West of Lake Baikal, its military  
20 control by an unfriendly state would be a menace to  
21 Soviet territory generally and in particular a menace to  
22 the Trans-Siberian Railway which is the connecting link  
23 between Soviet territory in the West and in the East  
24 and which for many miles runs approximately parallel with  
25

and not very far from the northern limits of Outer  
1 Mongolia. Outer Mongolia's strategic importance was  
2 recognized by both the U.S.S.R. and Japan.

3 As early as 1933 ARAKI in an article entitled  
4 "Japan's Mission in the Showa Era" advocated the  
5 occupation of Outer Mongolia adding that "Japan does  
6 not want such an ambiguous area as Mongolia to exist  
7 near to her sphere of influence. Mongolia by all means  
8 should be Mongolia of the East." A few years later in  
9 1936 ITAGAKI, who was then Chief of Staff of the Kwan-  
10 tung Army, pointed out in a conference with Ambassador  
11 Arita that "Outer Mongolia is of importance from the  
12 point of view of Japanese-Manchukuoan influence today  
13 because it is the flank defense of the Siberian Railroad  
14 which is a connecting line between Soviet territories  
15 in the Far East and in Europe. If Outer Mongolia be  
16 combined with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet territories  
17 in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition  
18 and it is possible that the influence of the Soviet Union  
19 in the Far East might be removed without fighting. There-  
20 fore, the army aims to extend Japanese-Manchurian Power  
21 into Outer Mongolia by all means at hand....."

22 The U.S.S.R. in anticipation of a possible move  
23 by Japan or by any other country, in 1936 entered into  
24 a mutual assistance agreement with the Mongolian People's  
25

Republic in virtue of which Soviet troops were stationed  
1 in a number of Mongolian towns; some Soviet troops had  
2 been sent to the Eastern part of Outer Mongolia a short  
3 time before the hostilities broke out in Nomonhan.

4 On the 11th of May, 1939, hostilities opened  
5 with an attack on the Mongolian border guards by  
6 Japanese reconnaissance troops numbering several hundred.  
7 Between that date and the 27th of the month further  
8 attacks were made by the Japanese in small numbers,  
9 each of which was repulsed. In the interval support  
10 troops had been brought up by both sides. On the 28th of  
11 May fighting was resumed on a large scale supported  
12 by aircraft, artillery, and tanks. Thereafter the  
13 struggle developed on an increasing scale and was only  
14 then terminated in September when the Japanese admitted  
15 defeat.  
16

17 It is difficult to say with accuracy the size  
18 of the forces employed but that they were large can be  
19 judged from the various estimates of total casualties  
20 and the area of the operations. The Japanese casualties  
21 in killed, wounded, and prisoners exceeded 50,000, the  
22 Mongolian-Soviet losses being more than 9,000. The  
23 operations were on a front of 50 to 60 kilometers and  
24 to a depth of 20 to 25 kilometers.  
25

The defense in this case is much the same as

that in the Lake Khasan Incident: namely, that the  
1 affair amounted to nothing more than a border clash  
2 over a dispute as to the exact location of the bound-  
3 ary between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. The Japanese  
4 contention was that in the area where the fighting took  
5 place the boundary was the Khalkhin Gol River which  
6 at that point flows in a North-Westerly direction,  
7 whereas the Mongolian contention was that it was some  
8 20 kilometers to the east of the river. Many maps were  
9 produced and much evidence given regarding the location  
10 of the boundary. Furthermore, evidence was given by  
11 members of the Mongolian border guard who had served for  
12 sometime before the clash that the boundary line was  
13 clearly marked with border marks along the line claimed  
14 by them as the boundary. It is not necessary to de-  
15 termine the position of the boundary at this time. It  
16 was subsequently agreed upon. The issue before us is  
17 concerned with the justification for the fighting which  
18 took place.

The most convincing evidence of the character  
21 and extent of the operations is found in captured  
22 Japanese document being a Proclamation of the Commanding  
23 General of the 6th Army, dated the 5th of September, 1939.  
24 It reads as follows:-

"Although the order to reform the 6th Army



was issued before, I must now state with sorrow that  
1 the realization of the glorious task of defense of  
2 the North-west area failed because the order was not  
3 carried out. The Army was cast into a whirlpool of irreg-  
4 ular war on the frontier between Manchuria and Mongolia.  
5 Such control of actions on the front continued for more  
6 than ten days into the present. Due to the brave and  
7 resolute actions of all the units under Lieutenant-  
8 General Kametsubara chaos in the course of battles was  
9 diminished. Now the Army is preparing in the Dzindzin  
10 Sumo area for a new offensive.

12 "The Commanding General of the Kwantung Army  
13 decided this autumn to help us by sending the well  
14 trained troops stationed in Manchuria, he transfers them  
15 to the place of the future battle, places them under my  
16 command and plans urgent measures to be taken to settle  
17 the conflict. The circumstances are now such that it is  
18 clear that the matter is beyond the limits of a mere  
19 frontier conflict. We are now waging sacred war in  
20 China and any changes in the conflict under the cir-  
21 cumstances of the complicated inner and outer situation  
22 acquire great state importance. The army has only one  
23 way to carry out its actions, that is to make the army  
24 unanimous and consolidated and immediately strike a  
25 crushing blow at the enemy to annihilate its growing

insolence. At present the preparation of the army is  
1 being successfully carried on. The Army will meet the  
2 coming autumn by finishing with one blow this mouse-  
3 stirring and will proudly show to the world the might  
4 of the selected Imperial troops. The officers and sol-  
5 diers have a deep understanding of the present circum-  
6 stances. All men of the army from privates to high  
7 level are full of brave and decisive spirit and are  
8 sure of victory. The army is always ready to crush  
9 and destroy the enemy anywhere having a deep faith in  
10 its first marshal the Emperor."  
11

12 No serious attempt was made by the defense to  
13 establish that the Mongolian or Soviet troops initiated  
14 the fighting nor was it contended in argument that such  
15 was the case. On the other hand the prosecution brought  
16 witnesses who had taken part in the operations who say  
17 that the hostilities were initiated by the Japanese-  
18 Manchurian troops. The Tribunal accepts the prosecution  
19 evidence on that point. Preparations for the conflict  
20 were undoubtedly made by the Kwantung Army but no evidence  
21 was given to enable us to say whether the General Staff or  
22 the Government authorized the commencement of the hostili-  
23 ties. The most the Tribunal is prepared to say is that  
24 it is improbable for operations to have been conducted  
25 on so extensive a scale without the prior knowledge of

at least the Japanese General Staff and the War Ministry.

1 Shortly after the outbreak of the affair, HIRANUMA, who  
2 was then Prime Minister, was informed of its occurrence  
3 by War Minister ITAGAKI. He says in his interrogation  
4 before the trial that he requested ITAGAKI to stop the  
5 hostilities but that he "could give no orders" and that  
6 "the military circles were of a "different opinion".  
7 It is, therefore, clear that in the very early stages of  
8 the conflict both HIRANUMA and ITAGAKI had full know-  
9 ledge of the situation and there is no evidence that  
10 either did anything to prevent continuation of the  
11 conflict.

12  
13 As in the case of the Lake Khasan Incident  
14 the Japanese troops were completely defeated; what  
15 would have followed if they had been successful is  
16 purely speculative. However, the mere fact that they  
17 were defeated does not determine the character of the  
18 operations. These operations were on a large scale ex-  
19 tending over a period of over four months; they were  
20 obviously undertaken by the Japanese after careful pre-  
21 paration as appears from the Proclamation of the Commander-  
22 in-Chief of the 6th Army and the intention was to ex-  
23 terminate the enemy troops opposing them. The contention  
24 that the incident was a mere clash between opposing border  
25 guards is therefore untenable. In the circumstances the

Tribunal holds that the operations amounted to an aggressive war waged by the Japanese.

THE DEFENSE OF CONDONATION

A subsidiary contention of the Defence with respect to both the Lake Khasan and Nomonhan fighting is that each was settled by an agreement between the Japanese and U.S.S.R. Governments. By an agreement signed by SHIGEMITSU and Molotov on the 10th of August, 1938, the fighting at Lake Khasan was brought to an end; each side withdrew to the positions occupied by them prior to the hostilities and thereafter tranquility was restored.

Under the TOGO-Molotov Agreement of the 9th of June, 1940, signed long after the fighting had ceased at Nomonhan, Japan and the U.S.S.R. agreed on the boundary between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria. Subsequently to these agreements a general settlement was made by the Neutrality Pact between Japan and the U.S.S.R. in April 1941.

Relying on these three agreements Counsel for Defence concludes his argument on the point by saying that after two types of agreements--one specific, one general, these matters cannot now be reopened.

In none of the three agreements on which the Defence argument is based, was any immunity granted nor



1 was the question of liability, criminal or otherwise,  
2 dealt with. The Tribunal is therefore of the opinion  
3 that these agreements afford no defence to the criminal  
4 proceedings being taken before this International Tri-  
5 bunal. In a matter of criminal liability whether  
6 domestic or international it would be against the public  
7 interest for any tribunal to countenance condonation  
8 of crime either expressly or by implication.

9 DEFENCE THAT MONGOLIA WAS NOT INDEPENDENT

10 Counsel for the Accused TOGO in his argument  
11 generally on Count 26 submitted that the Count was not  
12 proven for the reason that the "Soldisant Mongolian  
13 People's Republic" was an integral part of the Republic  
14 of China and not a sovereign state until 1945. The  
15 Tribunal is not concerned with nor does it consider it  
16 necessary to decide the status of Outer Mongolia. We  
17 are dealing with criminal matters in which intent is  
18 of paramount importance and the Defence will not now be  
19 permitted to renudiate the written commitments of the  
20 Japanese Government in which it formally acknowledged  
21 the status of the Mongolian People's Republic. By  
22 agreement of the 9th June, 1940, between the Governments  
23 of the U.S.S.R. and Japan, signed on behalf of the  
24 latter by the Accused TOGO, provision was made for the  
25 fixing of the boundary between Manchuria and Outer Mongolia:

the signatories respectively stating on behalf of the  
 1 Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo that they  
 2 consented to the agreement.

3 In the face of this clear acknowledgement of  
 4 the sovereign status of Outer Mongolia and in the ab-  
 5 sence of evidence to the contrary, the Accused cannot  
 6 now be heard to say that the point has not been proven,  
 7 nor can they be heard to say that the Tribunal may take  
 8 judicial notice of the fact that Outer Mongolia was  
 9 until 1945 an integral part of the Republic of China.  
 10

11 PART B - CHAPTER VII

12 PACIFIC WAR

13 The failure in 1938 of the Japanese attack  
 14 at Lake Khasan had revealed the unexpected military  
 15 strength of the U.S.S.R. in the Far East. The conclusion  
 16 on 23rd August 1939 of the Non-Aggression Pact between  
 17 Germany and the U.S.S.R. and the preoccupation of Germany  
 18 with her war against Britain and France had freed the  
 19 U.S.S.R. for the time being of anxiety as to her Western  
 20 frontier. Japan's advance to the North, hitherto in-  
 21 tended to be the first step in the realization of her  
 22 national policy, was not deferred until a better opport-  
 23 unity presented itself.  
 24

25 As the door of opportunity closed in the North  
 the Southern gates began to open and Japan took various

steps preliminary to the realization of the second major  
1 part of her national policy, the advance to the South.  
2 France and Britain suffered a grave rebuff at Munich in  
3 September 1938. Thereafter Prince Konoye, on 3rd Novem-  
4 ber 1938, publicly declared Japan's intention to  
5 establish the New Order in East Asia, and in that same  
6 month Japan announced that she could no longer apply the  
7 Treaty System unconditionally. She said that the  
8 application of the principles of "The Open Door" and  
9 "Equal Opportunity" might have to yield in face of the  
10 changed conditions in China. In that same month of  
11 November 1938 the Five Ministers' Conference decided to  
12 capture Hainan Island. That island was taken in Feb-  
13 ruary 1939 and the Spratley Islands in March 1939.

14  
15 In September 1939 there came war between  
16 Germany and Poland, France and Britain. At once we find  
17 Ambassador OSHIMA and General Teruchi speaking of the  
18 advisability of Japan advancing to the South: from the  
19 month of September 1939 onwards the attitude of the  
20 Japanese military in China towards foreign interests was  
21 noticeably more intransigent: and about that time the  
22 Japanese began to bomb the Yunnan Railway. In November  
23 1939 the Japanese Foreign Office demanded that France  
24 should cease forwarding military supplies over the  
25 Yunnan Railway to China and should admit a Japanese

Military Mission to French Indo-China to see that no  
1 such supplies went forward. Nothing could better  
2 advertise Japanese aggressiveness in the South, for  
3 France was entitled to forward these supplies and there  
4 was as yet no indication that French military strength  
5 would be broken. Nevertheless Japan felt strong enough  
6 to present these demands upon France, in view of France's  
7 preoccupation with the war in Europe. On 2nd February  
8 1940 Japan presented to the Netherlands demands which,  
9 if granted, would have given her a preferential position  
10 among the nations in respect to the economy of the  
11 Netherlands East Indies. In March 1940 KOISO told the  
12 Diet Committee of Accounts that Japan should expand  
13 into the Pacific Islands so as to be economically inde-  
14 pendent of the United States of America.

15  
16 On 9th May 1940 Germany invaded the Netherlands.  
17 Japan at once asked for and received from the United  
18 States of America, Britain and France assurances that  
19 they would preserve the status quo of the Netherlands  
20 East Indies. Japan gave a similar assurance. Never-  
21 theless by 22nd May 1940 she had asked for and received  
22 from Germany the statement that Germany had no interest  
23 in the Netherlands East Indies, a statement which was  
24 interpreted in Japan, and as it turned out rightly  
25 interpreted, as giving Japan a free hand in her relations



with the Netherlands East Indies, as far as Germany  
1 was concerned.

2 On 17th June 1940 France asked Germany for an  
3 armistice. On 19th June 1940 Japan renewed her demand  
4 on French Indo-China for the cessation of passage of  
5 supplies through Indo-China to China and for the recep-  
6 tion of a Japanese Military Mission to ensure that  
7 none went forward. These demands had been refused by  
8 France when they were made in 1939, but the situation  
9 of France was now very different, a fact of which Japan  
10 was taking advantage. Now the Governor of French Indo-  
11 China agreed, and the Japanese Military Mission arrived  
12 in Hanoi on 29th June 1940.

14 KOISO, then Minister of Overseas Affairs,  
15 spoke to the German Ambassador on 24th June 1940, of  
16 Japan's colonial aspirations in French Indo-China and  
17 the Netherlands East Indies and inquired what Germany's  
18 attitude was towards proposed military activity of  
19 Japan in these territories. The Ambassador adhered to  
20 the German declaration of disinterest in the Netherlands  
21 East Indies already given on 22nd May 1940. He further  
22 stated that Germany would probably raise no objections  
23 to Japanese action in French Indo-China but she would wish  
24 Japan to tie down the United States in the Pacific by  
25 threat of attack on the Philippines and Hawaii. On

1st July 1940 Japan refused a United States offer of

1 an agreement to preserve the status quo in the Pacific  
2 during the European War. The reason for this refusal  
3 was stated in an interview between KIDO and Arita, the  
4 Foreign Minister, as the inadvisability at this time of  
5 having Japan's activities, including those in the  
6 Netherlands Indies, restricted. There could be no  
7 plainer admission of Japan's aggressive intentions  
8 towards her neighbours. On 8th July 1940 Kurusu and  
9 Sato told Ribbentrop that for nine years the object  
10 of Japan had been to build a new China freed from the  
11 Treaty System, thus giving the lie to repeated official  
12 declarations of Japan made during those years. On 16th  
13 July 1940 Japan notified the Netherlands that she was  
14 sending an economic mission to Batavia to discuss  
15 supplies by the Netherlands East Indies to Japan. On  
16 that same day the Yonai Cabinet resigned under pressure  
17 from the military and their supporters, who thought the  
18 Cabinet too supine to take advantage of the opportunity  
19 for Japanese aggression in the South now presented by the  
20 fall of France and the Netherlands and the anxieties of  
21 Britain in Europe. The way was clear for the accession  
22 of the Second Cabinet of Kenoye on 22nd July 1940 and for  
23 the steps it took to further that policy of Japanese  
24 aggression to the South.  
25

JAPANESE POLICY IN 1940

1           During the Second Konoye Cabinet, which took  
2 office on the 22nd July 1940, important decisions were  
3 made which contributed directly to the launching of the  
4 Pacific War on 8th December 1941.

5           The negotiations with Germany leading to the  
6 signing of the Tripartite Pact on 27th September 1940  
7 have been discussed in an earlier part of the judgment.  
8 However, for a clearer understanding of the decisions  
9 made and the plans adopted during the Second and Third  
10 Konoye Cabinets and the succeeding Cabinet under TOJO, it  
11 is advisable to review briefly the policy and plans ad-  
12 opted from July to October 1940. These were a reaffirm-  
13 ation of the policy enunciated by the HIROTA Cabinet on  
14 11th August 1936 and the practical application of that  
15 policy to the circumstances obtaining in the latter  
16 half of the year 1940.

17           The important matters were: The Cabinet  
18 decision of 26th July 1940, the decision of the Four  
19 Ministers' Conference of 4th September 1940 and the  
20 Liaison Conference of 19th September 1940, the outline  
21 of Japanese foreign policy prepared in the Foreign Office  
22 on 28th September 1940 -- the day after the signing of  
23 the Tripartite Pact -- the decisions of the Cabinet meeting  
24 of 3rd October 1940, and the "Tentative Plan Towards the

1 Southern Regions" prepared in the Foreign Office on  
2 4th October 1940.

3 As a result of these it was settled by the  
4 beginning of October 1940 that the policy of the Japanese  
5 Government was to move to the Southern Regions with a  
6 view to the occupation of Singapore, British Malaya,  
7 and the Dutch East Indies, at the same time striving  
8 to avoid war with the U.S.S.R. and the United States  
9 of America. In the event of war breaking out with the  
10 United States, which was considered possible, the  
11 Philippines, Guam and other American possessions would  
12 be included among the territories to be taken.

13 In somewhat more detail the policy aimed at  
14 the following: (1) reliance on the Tripartite Pact;  
15 (2) conclusion of a Non-Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R.;  
16 (3) successful conclusion of the war in China; (4) incor-  
17 poration of French Indo-China, the Netherlands East  
18 Indies, the Straits Settlements, British Malaya, Thailand,  
19 the Philippines, British Borneo and Burma into the  
20 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (which hereafter  
21 for shortness we will refer to as the "Co-Prosperity  
22 Sphere"); (5) to offer to mediate for settlement of  
23 the European War and in return obtain from Great Britain  
24 recognition of the Co-Prosperity Sphere; (6) conclusion  
25 of a Non-Aggression Pact with the United States, whereby



the United States would recognize the Co-Prosperity  
1 Sphere in return for Japanese respect for the independence  
2 of the Philippines.

3           On 4th October 1940, Konoye made a statement  
4 to the Press in which he said that if the United States  
5 refused to understand the real intentions of Japan,  
6 Germany and Italy and continued its challenging attitude  
7 and acts, both the United States and Great Britain would  
8 be forced into war with Japan, meaning that Japan would  
9 be compelled to go to war with them. He explained  
10 that Japan was maneuvering, diplomatically to induce  
11 the U.S.S.R., Great Britain and the United States to  
12 suspend aid to China.  
13

14           By this time the aggressive intentions of  
15 Japan had become so evident that the United States  
16 of America was not prepared to continue to supply Japan  
17 with the raw materials to manufacture munitions of war  
18 which would be used to realize these aggressive aims.  
19 A Presidential Proclamation was issued extending to  
20 all iron and steel scrap, except to the Western Hemisphere  
21 and Great Britain, the embargoes imposed in 1938 and  
22 1939 in protest against Japan's disregard of treaties.  
23 It should be noted that the United States of America  
24 had on 26th January 1940 terminated its Commercial Treaty  
25 with Japan. The embargo was extended and placed under

1 a licensing system on 10th December 1940. Copper,  
 2 brass, zinc, bronze, nickel, and potash were added  
 3 to the embargo list on 3rd February 1941. Scrap rubber  
 4 was added on 5th May 1941. By 20th June 1941 the  
 5 situation had so deteriorated that all petroleum  
 6 exports from the United States were banned, except  
 7 to Great Britain and South America.

8       Measures were adopted to counteract the  
 9 American embargoes by strengthening the national economy  
 10 of Japan and by organizing Japan-Manchukuo-China as  
 11 an economic bloc. The Cabinet decided that it was  
 12 necessary to allot to each of the three countries  
 13 within the bloc well defined spheres of activity in  
 14 labor, finance, exchange, manufacturing, communications,  
 15 transportation, etc., in order to avoid economic rivalry,  
 16 dual investments, and duplication of enterprises.

#### 18       MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT POLICY

19       In a policy study of 25th October 1940, the  
 20 Kenoye Cabinet decided to recognize the puppet Central  
 21 Government of China led by Wang Ching-Wei and to negotiate  
 22 a basic treaty with that government for adjustment of  
 23 relations between it and the Government of Japan. The  
 24 Treaty was signed on 30th November; and the new Ambassador  
 25 to the puppet government was instructed that since the  
 Cabinet had adopted the puppet Central Government as an

instrument for long term warfare, he should bear that  
1 point in mind and cooperate to the fullest extent with  
2 the Army and Navy.

3 HOSHINO, as President of the Planning Board  
4 and formerly Director of the General Affairs Board  
5 of Manchukuo, was actively directing the negotiation  
6 of a joint declaration to be made by Japan, Manchukuo  
7 and China upon the occasion of the signing of the  
8 Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty. KIMURA was appointed to  
9 the Japan-Manchukuo Joint Economic Committee on 7th  
10 November 1940. The Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration  
11 was initialed in final form on 8th November and published  
12 on 30th November 1940 at the time the signing of the  
13 Sino-Japanese Treaty was announced. This joint declaration  
14 stated that the three countries would cooperate on a  
15 military and economic basis and take all necessary  
16 measures to establish the New Order in Asia.

17  
18 HOSHINO has explained the reorganization of the  
19 Japanese economy to bring it in line with the new economic  
20 bloc. He stated that in November the Cabinet decided  
21 upon a plan to group companies of each industry into  
22 associations in order to control those companies through  
23 the heads of the associations who were to be appointed  
24 by the Cabinet and placed under the supervision of the  
25 Minister of Commerce and Industry. He said that laws

and ordinances were issued to place the plan into  
1 effect and that there was little revision of the plan  
2 thereafter. As a result of that plan no less than 212  
3 major corporation mergers took place in 1940 involving  
4 capital amounting to 2,300,000,000 yen; and during  
5 the first half of 1941 there were 172 major mergers  
6 involving over 3,000,000,000 yen.

7  
8 The Privy Councillors had indicated during  
9 the deliberation upon the Tripartite Pact a number  
10 of measures that should be taken to prepare Japan  
11 for the war which they expected to follow the signing  
12 of the Tripartite Pact. Immediately after the Privy  
13 Council meeting, HOSHINO began to take measures to  
14 strengthen Japan's financial structure. On 19th  
15 October 1940, an Imperial Ordinance entitled "Ordinance  
16 Concerning Operation of Funds of Banks and Other  
17 Financial Institutions" was promulgated to add to  
18 government control over finances by requiring all  
19 financial institutions to adjust their investment policies  
20 according to government directives and providing for  
21 compensating of losses incurred by financial institutions  
22 as a result of government directives. On the same day,  
23 the Imperial Ordinance for Control of Corporate Accounts  
24 was promulgated by which institutions were required to  
25 conserve funds for attainment of the object of the



National General Mobilization Law.

IMPERIAL RULE ASSISTANCE ASSOCIATION

1  
2 One of the matters giving the Privy Councillors  
3 concern at the meeting of 26th September 1940, during  
4 the discussion of the Tripartite Pact, was the reaction  
5 to be expected from the Japanese people to the hardships  
6 to which they were being subjected and which would be  
7 increased as a result of the signing of the Pact because  
8 of economic sanctions the United States was expected  
9 to impose. Konoye's answer to that problem was the  
10 organization of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association  
11 on 10th October 1940. KIDO and Konoye had discussed  
12 the organization of a great all-embracing political  
13 party in May 1940 before the fall of the Yonai Cabinet,  
14 but had deferred action. HASHIMOTO brought to the  
15 Preparatory Committee of the Association his long  
16 experience in the organization of political associations,  
17 and HOSHINO assisted as a member of the Committee. The  
18 Articles of Association were drawn in detail with the  
19 obvious intention that the Association should spread  
20 over Japan into every district, county, city and even  
21 into every home. The Association was designed to turn  
22 Japan into a one party state on the lines of totalitarian  
23 states in Europe. Other political parties would be  
24 abolished. The Premier was to be at the head of the  
25

1 Association and the leader of the one party. Its  
2 purpose was presented euphemistically as being to  
3 establish a spiritually and physically united national  
4 structure to aid the Emperor in realizing the aims of  
5 Hakko Ichiu and making Japan the leader of a glorious  
6 world.

7 HASHIMOTO AND SHIRATORI APPEAL FOR PUBLIC  
8 SUPPORT OF WAR POLICY

9 A number of organizations were affiliated with  
10 the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. HASHIMOTO  
11 was a member of the Board of Directors of the Association.  
12 He organized the Sekiseikai, an ultra nationalist  
13 society. On 7th November 1940, while on an organizing  
14 tour, he issued his command to that society as follows:  
15 "Rise up resolutely, time approaches, instigate at  
16 once a powerful national movement, using every kind  
17 of method, speeches, meetings, posters, etc., and begin  
18 a sweeping campaign against sympathizers of England  
19 and America and at the same time start a movement to  
20 inspire moral support of the Advance Southward." He  
21 delivered an address to a meeting of the society at Kyoto  
22 attended by more than 5,000 persons on 2nd January 1941.  
23 In that speech HASHIMOTO advocated the overthrow of  
24 England and America, as he had done in his popular  
25 speech "Praying to Soldiers". Here again, he advocated

a "Southward Advance".

1           HASHIMOTO was engaged in writing during this  
2 period. He published his "Inevitability of Renovation"  
3 on 20th December 1940; and on 30th January 1941 he  
4 published his "Road to the Reconstruction of the World"  
5 and issued the 14th edition of his "Second Creation".  
6 In his "Inevitability of Renovation", after mentioning  
7 that the end of the year was approaching and that  
8 it was time to "ring a loud alarm bell", he advised  
9 that it was time to attack Great Britain while she  
10 was engaged in war with Germany and Italy in order to  
11 eliminate her opposition to the establishment of the  
12 New Order in Asia and the Pacific Region, and that  
13 the defeat of Great Britain should be followed by an  
14 attack upon the United States. His "Second Creation"  
15 contained the "Declaration of HASHIMOTO Kingoro". That  
16 declaration was to the effect that the world was facing  
17 an historic turning point, and that Japan, whose national  
18 policy was "Hakko Ichiu", should take a bold leap and  
19 immediately display her original character by following  
20 the Emperor blindly with all the Nation's capacity  
21 in order to become the glorious leader of the World. He  
22 stated that war preparations should be completed to  
23 enable Japan to crush Great Britain and the United States,  
24 who were interfering with Japan's expansion upon the  
25

Continent of Asia and her advance to the south. In  
1 his "Road to the Reconstruction of the World",  
2 HASHIMOTO displayed his support of totalitarian govern-  
3 ment and admiration of the methods of dictators and  
4 admitted having taken part in the Manchuria Incident.  
5 Japan's secession from the League and renunciation of the  
6 Washington Naval Limitations Treaty, as well as in the  
7 May and February incidents and other plots in Japan.

8  
9 SHIRATORI had retained his position as  
10 ambassador to Italy until 28th August 1940 when he  
11 became a Diplomatic Councillor in the Foreign Office  
12 and assisted in the reorganization of the Government  
13 along totalitarian lines and in the purge from the  
14 Foreign Service of those thought to have Anglo-Saxon  
15 sympathies. During this period, he lectured and wrote  
16 extensively in support of the proposed Tripartite Pact.  
17 In November 1940 he collected a number of his lectures  
18 and magazine articles and published them in one volume  
19 for distribution in support of the Pact. He declared  
20 in his "European War and the Attitude of Japan", which  
21 had been published in November 1939, that the European  
22 War could be developed to aid Japan in the establishment  
23 of its aims in the Far East. He stated in his "Necessity  
24 of the Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance" of December 1939  
25 that the aim of Germany and Italy was to divide the world



1 into a comparatively few groups of States with each  
2 group dominated by one member State, and that Japan  
3 should join Germany and Italy in their endeavor in  
4 order to establish the New Order in Asia, i.e. the  
5 domination of East Asia. In his "Trend of the Great  
6 War" of June 1940, he said that Japan was actually  
7 involved in the war because the fuse of the European  
8 War was first attached by the China War; and he asked  
9 significantly whether the enemies of Germany and Italy  
10 who were opposing the establishment of the New Order in  
11 Europe were not the enemies of Japan. He advised, in  
12 his "Comment on Japan's Non-interference" of June 1940,  
13 that since Japan had been assuming the leading role in  
14 establishing the New Order ever since the beginning  
15 of the Manchurian Incident, she should give early assistance  
16 to the Axis Powers, who were attempting to destroy the  
17 Old Order based upon democratic capitalism and establish  
18 the New Order based on totalitarian principles. He  
19 advised that this assistance should take the form of  
20 containing the American Fleet in the Pacific and  
21 suggested as Japan's possible reward the Netherlands  
22 East Indies and British colonies in the Far East and  
23 the Pacific.  
24  
25

SHIRATORI continued his writings after the  
1 Tri-Partite Pact was signed. He stated in his "Conclusion  
2 of Japan-Germany-Italy Alliance" of 29 September 1940  
3 that historians of the future generations would probably  
4 refer to the Pact as the "Treaty of the New World Order,"  
5 as it not only represented a racial feud between the Anglo-  
6 Saxon and the Teuton and between the yellow and white  
7 races, but it included a positive program to overthrow  
8 the status quo and prescribe the New World. He declared  
9 in his "Three Power Pact and the World of Tomorrow,"  
10 published in December 1940 that the totalitarian move-  
11 ment was spreading over the world like a prairie fire,  
12 leaving no room in the world of tomorrow for any other  
13 concept of world and man. He said that Japan had main-  
14 tained a pure and unadulterated totalitarian government  
15 during her entire existence which embodied the principle  
16 of the unity of the sovereign and subjects of one organic  
17 body as the immutable faith of the Japanese people. He  
18 said that the Manchurian Incident was a bursting forth  
19 of this healthy instinct of the nation, which had been  
20 hitherto suppressed by conditions long imposed by the  
21 democratic powers. He called for re-examination and a  
22 return to the true spirit of Hakko Ichiu. He pointed to  
23 the China War as essentially a conflict between Japan  
24 and the democratic powers, and declared that the wars in



1 the Zaibatsu companies, and the Yokohama Specie Bank  
2 were also represented on the staff of the Institute.  
3 Students were selected from every branch and department  
4 of the country's activities. Lectures were delivered,  
5 studies or exercises were conducted. The Institute  
6 compiled research reports on important subjects which  
7 were useful in planning total war.

8 To provide more manpower in order to achieve  
9 Japan's leadership of all East Asia, a campaign to  
10 encourage increase of the birth rate of the Japanese was  
11 adopted by the Cabinet on 22d January 1941. HOSHINO  
12 advanced the plan and it was adopted by the Cabinet with  
13 Home Minister HIRANUMA and War Minister TOJO warmly  
14 supporting the measure. The plan was to make payments  
15 to young married people to encourage early marriages,  
16 reduce the marriage age, ban birth control, give  
17 priority on materials to prolific families and establish  
18 special bureaus to encourage a high birth rate. The  
19 purpose was to increase the population so as to insure  
20 the leadership of Japan over East Asia, and furnish man-  
21 power for labor and military service in the development  
22 of Japan's plan in East Asia. The goal set was a popula-  
23 tion for Japan of 100,000,000 by 1950. The plan was put  
24 into effect by appropriate ordinances and decrees.  
25



COOPERATION UNDER TRIPARTITE PACT

1 Active cooperation with Germany and Italy under  
2 the Pact began shortly after it was signed. OSHIMA wrote  
3 in a newspaper article published on 27 October 1940,  
4 that one could not fail to be deeply stirred by the fact  
5 that the Pact had been concluded and that Japan's objec-  
6 tive of founding a New World Order had been made clear,  
7 but that the nation with unswerving resolution should  
8 make preparations for the attainment of that objective  
9 without delay. He advised that mutual economic and  
10 military cooperation with Germany and Italy should be  
11 perfected speedily so that no opportunities to establish  
12 the New Order in Greater East Asia and the South Seas  
13 would be lost.

15 The three signatories of the Pact agreed on  
16 20 December 1940 to form the commissions provided for  
17 by the Pact. The agreement called for the establishment  
18 of a General Commission and two Technical Commissions,  
19 military and economic, to be formed independently of  
20 each other in each of the three capitals. MUTO, as Chief  
21 of the Military Affairs Bureau, and OKA, who had become  
22 Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Ministry,  
23 were appointed to the Technical Military Commission in  
24 Tokyo.

25 OSHIMA was appointed Ambassador to Germany on

1 the day the agreement was reached and became a member of  
2 the General Commission in Berlin. The Army and Navy had  
3 urged OSHIMA's appointment as Ambassador because he was  
4 recognized as a strong supporter of the Pact and his  
5 appointment would promote cooperation with Germany and  
6 Italy. Matsuoka, in a speech delivered on 15 January on  
7 the occasion of OSHIMA's departure for Germany, stated  
8 that he was most delighted that OSHIMA was returning as  
9 Ambassador to Germany as he had built up such a personal  
10 credit among the German leaders that he could talk to  
11 them without reserve, and that practical use of the  
12 Pact would largely depend upon OSHIMA's ability.

13 Matsuoka planned a visit to Germany after  
14 OSHIMA's arrival there. His purpose was to promote  
15 cooperation under the Pact, to secure German assistance  
16 in settlement of the China War and to negotiate a Non-  
17 Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R., as contemplated by  
18 the Pact, for the purpose of neutralizing the U.S.S.R.  
19 during the advance to the South. The mediation of the  
20 border dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand,  
21 which we will mention presently, delayed Matsuoka's  
22 departure for Germany. He arrived in Berlin in March  
23 1941, and after holding conversations with Ribbentrop  
24 and Hitler proceeded to Moscow where he concluded the  
25 Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact of 13 April 1941.

1 Ratifications of that Pact were exchanged in Tokyo on  
 2 20 May 1941. As we have indicated, and as we have  
 3 discussed elsewhere, this Pact did not mean that Japan  
 4 had abandoned its aims of aggrandizement at the expense  
 5 of the Soviet. The Pact was dictated by expediency. It  
 6 was a matter of timing. With war proceeding in China  
 7 and a war in contemplation with Great Britain and the  
 8 Netherlands and possibly with America, it was necessary  
 9 to do everything possible to avoid immediate war with  
 10 the U.S.S.R.

#### 11 PREPARATIONS FOR MOVE TO THE SOUTH

12 One of the principal elements of the policy  
 13 adopted by the Cabinet in September and October 1940  
 14 was the establishment of an economic bloc of Japan,  
 15 Manchukuo and China in order to accelerate the estab-  
 16 lishment of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It  
 17 was decided that the first stage of development of the  
 18 Co-Prosperity Sphere should be a penetration into the  
 19 whole area west of Hawaii, including French Indo-China,  
 20 the Netherlands East Indies, British Burma, and the  
 21 Straits Settlements, excluding for the time the  
 22 Philippines and Guam. A complete strategical plan was  
 23 formulated. An attempt was to be made to effect a  
 24 settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to  
 25 employ his troops, rewarding China by allowing her to

1 annex Tonkin Province of French Indo-China and Northern  
2 Burma. It was planned to conclude protective treaties  
3 with French Indo-China and Thailand under the guise of  
4 military and economic alliances in order to secure  
5 bases in those countries for an advance on Singapore.  
6 Thailand was to be promised part of French Indo-China  
7 as her reward. However, in order to delay Thailand in  
8 making preparations to resist invasion by Japan, it was  
9 planned to pretend that Japanese-Thailand relations were  
10 secure until Japan was ready to start military action.  
11 To avoid destruction of the oil wells and other resources  
12 in the Islands of the Netherlands Indies, it was decided  
13 to capture Singapore before beginning operations against  
14 the Netherlands East Indies and to call upon the inhabi-  
15 tants during the seige of Singapore to declare their  
16 independence, seize the oil wells and hand them over  
17 intact to the Japanese. Independence movements were to  
18 be used in French Indo-China, Burma and Malaya to assist  
19 penetration in those areas. Military action was to  
20 begin upon settlement with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek  
21 or upon Germany's invasion of England, whichever occurred  
22 first; and in the event that neither occurred, the  
23 action was to commence when Germany had achieved some  
24 substantial military success. Action was to be coordinated  
25 with German military plans.



1 During November 1940 the Konoye Cabinet began  
2 to make advances to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek for  
3 settlement of the China War. Matsuoka continued his  
4 overtures to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and expected  
5 favorable progress as a result of conversations to be  
6 held by him in Berlin. The recognition by Japan of the  
7 puppet Central Government of China, however, had  
8 destroyed any possibility of reaching an agreement with  
9 the Generalissimo.

#### 10 THAILAND'S CLAIMS

11 With the outbreak of war in Europe, Thailand  
12 had presented demands to French Indo-China for the  
13 return to Thailand of territory lost to Indo-China in  
14 the year 1904. On 12 June 1940 a Non-Aggression Pact  
15 was signed between French Indo-China and Thailand. One  
16 of the terms provided for the appointment of a commis-  
17 sion to settle the matter of the disputed border. When  
18 France sued for an armistice with Germany on 17 June  
19 1940 Thailand demanded the revision of the border in  
20 accordance with her wishes as a condition of ratifying  
21 the Non-Aggression Pact of 12 June 1940.  
22

23 On 30 August 1940 there was concluded between  
24 Japan and France the so-called Matsuoka-Henri Agreement,  
25 by which France agreed to the entry of Japanese troops  
into Northern Indo-China. A note was sent by Thailand

1 to the French Indo-China authorities on 28 September  
 2 1940 repeating her demands and proposing the Mekong  
 3 River as the boundary between Thailand and French Indo-  
 4 China. The note stated that Thailand would not press  
 5 her claims to territory in Laos and Cambodia unless and  
 6 until such time as France renounced her sovereignty over  
 7 French Indo-China. On 11 October the French rejected  
 8 these demands. Thailand then began the concentration  
 9 of troops along the border and France countered by a  
 10 like concentration. It appeared that hostilities would  
 11 commence soon, but Japan limited her occupation of French  
 12 Indo-China to the northern part of that territory and  
 13 Thailand, left without Japanese support, stayed her hand.  
 14  
 15 In late October 1940 Thailand sent a delegation  
 16 to Japan to learn the Konoye Cabinet's intentions regard-  
 17 ing the border dispute between Thailand and French  
 18 Indo-China. The Japanese plans formulated in September  
 19 and October 1940 contained a suggestion that a secret  
 20 committee should be formed under the Japanese Thailand  
 21 Non-Aggression Pact to make preparations for a military  
 22 alliance between Japan and Thailand, to be signed as soon  
 23 as Japan should begin the military action against  
 24 Singapore. Accordingly, it was decided at the Four  
 25 Ministers' Conferences of 5 and 21 November 1940 to  
 assist Thailand in her negotiations with French Indo-China

and force French Indo-China to accept Thailand's demands  
1 by returning the territory on the west side of the Mekong  
2 River across from Luangprabang and Bakuse to Thailand,  
3 provided Thailand would accept the Japanese demands.  
4 Prime Minister Pibun of Thailand accepted the Japanese  
5 demands. In this way Japan prejudged the issue of a  
6 dispute in which she subsequently insisted in acting as  
7 arbitrator.  
8

9 Following the Four Ministers' Conference of  
10 21 November 1940 Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador  
11 that he had proposed to Thailand that if she limited her  
12 territorial claims the Konoye Cabinet would be willing  
13 to mediate between Thailand and French Indo-China. He  
14 told the Ambassador that if the need should arise, Japan  
15 would request the support of the German Government in  
16 dealing with the Vichy French Government. He said also  
17 that a cruiser was to be despatched to Saigon as a  
18 demonstration against French Indo-China to force her to  
19 agree to the Japanese demands. This cruiser was scheduled  
20 to arrive in Saigon about the middle of December.  
21

22 The Prime Minister of Thailand having agreed  
23 to the Japanese terms for so-called "mediation" of the  
24 dispute, Thailand resumed military action against French  
25 Indo-China; and on 28 November 1940 an engagement was  
fought between Thailand and French troops. Taking

advantage of this action, Matsuoka informed the French  
 1 Ambassador that he would act as an arbitrator regarding  
 2 Thailand's demands for recovery of territory ceded to  
 3 France in 1904. The Ambassador replied the next day  
 4 that the Vichy French Government appreciated the offer  
 5 of arbitration, but that it expected its territorial  
 6 integrity in French Indo-China to be respected.

7 FRENCH INDO-CHINA AND THAILAND TO BE USED FOR  
 8 ATTACK ON SINGAPORE  
 9

10 On 23 January 1941 Kurusu, the Japanese  
 11 Ambassador in Berlin, explained to Weizsacker that an  
 12 advance southward against Singapore was unthinkable  
 13 without using the land bridge of the Malay Peninsula  
 14 after crossing French Indo-China and Thailand territory.  
 15 For that reason Britain should be prevented from inter-  
 16 fering with Japanese arrangements with Thailand. A  
 17 group led by Diplomatic Councillor SHIRATORI was demand-  
 18 ing an immediate attack upon Singapore which they  
 19 considered the key position in the Pacific area. As a  
 20 consequence, the Japanese military authorities and the  
 21 German Military Attaches in Tokyo in January 1941 made  
 22 a study of the possibilities of such an attack. The  
 23 conclusion reached was that the attack should be carried  
 24 out in phases by occupying Saigon, and then landing on  
 25 the Malay Peninsula.



## The Liaison Conference of 30 January 1941

1 decided to utilize the mediation of the border dispute  
2 between French Indo-China and Thailand to establish  
3 Japan's position in those countries and to obtain naval  
4 bases on Camranh Bay as well as air bases in the vicinity  
5 of Saigon to be used for the attack upon Singapore. The  
6 steps taken to give effect to this decision will be  
7 dealt with later. The true purpose of the mediation  
8 was to be concealed, it was decided, and the negotiations  
9 were to be described as an attempt to maintain the peace  
10 between the disputing parties. After the Liaison  
11 Conference Konoye and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy  
12 General Staffs informed the Emperor of the decision of  
13 the Conference and secured his approval. KIDO, who was  
14 aware of the decision, recorded in his diary that this  
15 procedure of by-passing the Imperial Conference was  
16 unusual.

17  
18  
19 Germany prevented the Vichy French Government  
20 from sending reinforcements to French Indo-China, and  
21 French Indo-China was forced to sign an armistice with  
22 Thailand on 31 January 1941. Under the terms of the  
23 armistice, the troops of both countries were to retreat  
24 from the lines held on 28 January and all military  
25 action was to cease. Japanese were to supervise the  
observance of the armistice, which was to continue

until a permanent peace treaty could be agreed upon.

1 SATO, who had been on temporary duty with the South China  
2 Expeditionary Forces during the first invasion of French  
3 Indo-China in September and October 1940, was one of  
4 Japan's representatives in the supervision of this  
5 armistice. He did not return to his duties in the  
6 Military Affairs Bureau until March, when an agreement  
7 had been reached between Japan and Vichy France for  
8 settlement of the dispute and France had agreed to all  
9 of Japan's demands.  
10

11 The armistice having been signed, preparations  
12 for the mediation proceeded. The Japanese Mediation  
13 Commission was appointed on 5 and 6 February 1941, with  
14 Matsuoka, MIYANO and OKA among its members. The negotia-  
15 tions were to begin on 7 February; and on 6 February  
16 Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador that his Cabinet  
17 intended to use the mediation to force both France and  
18 Thailand to agree to make no political or military  
19 agreement with any third power and requested that the  
20 German Government be so notified.  
21

22 The results of this mediation of Japan in the  
23 dispute between Thailand and French Indo-China were  
24 seen when the peace treaty between Vichy France and  
25 Thailand was finally signed on 9 May 1941. The treaty  
provided for the cession by France to Thailand of

territory and for the establishment of the border along  
1 the center of the Mekong River, all as claimed by Thai-  
2 land. We have previously seen that this result had been  
3 determined at the Japanese Four Ministers' Conferences  
4 of 5 and 21 November 1940.  
5

#### 6 LIAISON CONFERENCES

7 The action of the Prime Minister and Chiefs  
8 of the General Staffs on 30 January 1941 established a  
9 precedent which was customarily followed until the end  
10 of the Pacific War. Important decisions were made at  
11 Liaison Conferences and reported directly to the Emperor  
12 for his approval. Thereafter Imperial Conferences were  
13 held only on the most important questions, such as  
14 decisions to declare war. The Liaison Conference there-  
15 fore latterly became the real policy-determining body  
16 of the Empire. Members of the Conference were the  
17 Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Army Minister, Navy  
18 Minister, Home Minister, Chiefs of the Army and Navy  
19 General Staffs and their Vice-Chiefs, the Chiefs of the  
20 Military Affairs Bureau and Naval Affairs Bureau,  
21 President of the Planning Board and the Chief Secretary  
22 of the Cabinet. In the Second Konoye Cabinet, TOJO,  
23 HIRANUMA, HOSHINO, MUTO, SUZUKI after his appointment as  
24 President of the Planning Board, and OKA after his  
25 appointment as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau,

regularly attended these Conferences and participated  
 1 in the formation and execution of government policies.

2 DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS

3 In February 1941 British Foreign Minister  
 4 Anthony Eden summoned Ambassador SHIGEMITSU for a confer-  
 5 ence on the situation. He referred to reports that the  
 6 situation in the Far East was extremely strained and  
 7 expressed disapproval of Matsuoka's statements and con-  
 8 tentions that only Japan had the right to mediate in  
 9 conflicts in the Far East. He condemned the fraudulent  
 10 nature of the mediation then being conducted between  
 11 France and Thailand. He declared Britain's intention  
 12 to defend her territories in the Far East. SHIGEMITSU  
 13 replied that he was not aware of any strained situation.  
 14 The evidence shows, however, that he was not only aware  
 15 of the critical situation but was also thoroughly  
 16 familiar with the plans adopted by the Konoye Cabinet  
 17 and the action which had been taken up to that date to  
 18 carry them into effect. He said that he interpreted  
 19 Mr. Eden's remarks as a clear statement of the British  
 20 position based on the premise that British-Japanese  
 21 relations were near the breaking point; and after  
 22 complaining of British-American cooperation he stated  
 23 that he would make a complete report to his government  
 24 and request instructions.  
 25



Matsuoka saw in this conference between  
1 Mr. Eden and SHIGEMITSU an opportunity to carry out the  
2 fifth provision of the plan adopted in September and  
3 October 1940, which was that at an appropriate time  
4 Japan should attempt to mediate so that Britain would  
5 make peace with Germany and to use that mediation to  
6 obtain from Britain recognition of Japan's domination  
7 of Southeast Asia and the adjacent parts of the Pacific.  
8 The plan was that Japan in return for that recognition  
9 would promise the preservation of the British Empire,  
10 including Australia and New Zealand, and would promise  
11 general economic cooperation with Britain. Matsuoka was  
12 conducting the mediation between France and Thailand;  
13 and on 10 February 1941 he informed the German Ambassador  
14 that an attack upon Singapore was being prepared. How-  
15 ever, on 13 February he cabled SHIGEMITSU to inform  
16 Mr. Eden that the British Ambassador's report of an  
17 impending crisis in the Far East was a ridiculous fantasy.  
18

19 Matsuoka told SHIGEMITSU that the report of the  
20 British Ambassador seemed to have been made upon the  
21 assumption that Japan would acquire military bases in  
22 French Indo-China and Thailand and then commence action  
23 against Britain in the South Seas concurrently with  
24 Germany's invasion of England. He said it was difficult  
25 to understand on what ground the Ambassador in Tokyo had

[Faint, illegible text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

based the alarming report as he, Matsuoka, had  
 1 privately investigated and had been unable to find  
 2 any basis for the report. Notwithstanding Matsuoka's  
 3 denial the substance of the British Ambassador's report  
 4 was in fact what had been decided by the Liaison  
 5 Conference of 30 January 1941 at which Matsuoka was  
 6 present. Matsuoka instructed SHIGEMITSU to say to  
 7 Mr. Eden that there was no basis for the press reports  
 8 that Japan was planning to start military action at any  
 9 moment as there was nothing that Japan could gain by  
 10 such action.  
 11  
 12 Matsuoka saw the British Ambassador in Tokyo  
 13 on 15 February 1941 and, after attempting to learn the  
 14 source of the Ambassador's information regarding the  
 15 impending crisis in the Far East, assured him that so  
 16 long as Britain and the United States refrained from  
 17 taking provocative action Japan would under no circum-  
 18 stances initiate action which should cause anxiety on  
 19 the part of those powers. The Ambassador enquired  
 20 whether Matsuoka would check the southward advance  
 21 and asked whether Japan expected exorbitant compensa-  
 22 tion for her role as mediator of the French-Thailand  
 23 dispute. Matsuoka replied that he would try to check  
 24 the southward advance to the best of his ability and  
 25 assured the Ambassador that Japan's purpose in mediating

the dispute was solely to restore peace between French  
1 Indo-China and Thailand.

2 Matsuoka on 20 February 1941 complained to the  
3 British Ambassador regarding the reinforcement of the  
4 British garrison in Malaya. Matsuoka complained also  
5 to the American Ambassador that Britain was taking  
6 offensive action in reinforcing the garrison in Malaya.  
7 The American Ambassador replied that it seemed to him  
8 extraordinary that Japan should interpret and character-  
9 ize an obviously defensive measure as an offensive one.  
10 He then mentioned the occupation by Japan in succession  
11 of Weichow, Hainan Island and the Spratley Islands, as  
12 well as the concentration of troops in French Indo-  
13 China and the public declarations of intention to  
14 advance to the South. He observed that the facts could  
15 hardly be interpreted by either Great Britain or the  
16 United States as indicating peaceful intentions on the  
17 part of Japan.  
18

19 Matsuoka addressed a note to Mr. Eden on  
20 17 February 1941. He denied the report of an impending  
21 crisis in the Far East. He claimed that the primary  
22 purpose of the Tripartite Pact was to limit the sphere  
23 of the European War by preventing third powers from becom-  
24 ing engaged and thereby to bring the war to an early  
25 termination. He assured the British Government that

1 this was the sole object of the Pact, which constituted  
2 the fundamental basis of Japanese foreign policy. He  
3 submitted that he could not but be anxious because of  
4 the British and American Governments' attempt to prepare  
5 for supposed contingencies in the Pacific Ocean and in  
6 the South Seas, and observed that if the United States  
7 would restrict its activities to the Western Hemisphere,  
8 the situation would indeed be very much mitigated. He  
9 then stated that the uppermost thought in his mind had  
10 always been world peace and that he sincerely hoped for  
11 an early termination of the China and European Wars.  
12 He suggested that Japan act as mediator for the settle-  
13 ment of the European War.

14           The British Government replied to Matsuoka's  
15 offer of mediation of 24 February 1941. After assuring  
16 the Japanese Government that the preparations by Great  
17 Britain and the United States in the Pacific Ocean  
18 and the South Seas were purely defensive and that they  
19 intended to take no offensive action against Japan,  
20 the British Government rejected the offer for mediation  
21 of the European War. The British Government stated that  
22 it had made every effort to avert the hostilities in  
23 Europe before their commencement; but having been  
24 forced into the hostilities, it had no thought but to  
25 ~~carry them to a victorious conclusion.~~



1 Mr. Churchill had a conversation with  
2 SHIGEMITSU on the day this reply was despatched to  
3 the Japanese Government in which he emphasized Britain's  
4 determination to continue the war. He expressed regret  
5 that Anglo-Japanese relations, which had been friendly  
6 from the time of the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese  
7 Alliance, should be getting worse. He said it would  
8 be a tragedy if a clash should occur between the two  
9 nations, that the defensive works under construction  
10 around Singapore were merely for protection, expressed  
11 his confidence in victory in the European War, and said  
12 that the question of mediation of that war as mentioned  
13 by Matsuoka would not arise. SHIGEMITSU denied that  
14 Matsuoka had suggested mediation and stated that Matsuoka  
15 had only intended to emphasize Japan's spirit toward  
16 peace. He expressed regret that Britain had been giving  
17 aid to the Chungking Government in its resistance to  
18 Japan.

19 Matsuoka, in a communication addressed to  
20 Mr. Churchill on 27 February 1941, reaffirmed his  
21 explanation of Japan's intentions under the Tripartite  
22 Pact, and again assured Britain that Japan had no  
23 intentions of attacking her. He professed surprise that  
24 his note to Mr. Eden of 17 February had been interpreted  
25 as an offer of mediation, but hinted that he was not

adverse to the idea.

1           PREPARATION FOR THE ATTACK UPON SINGAPORE

2           The failure of the attempt to destroy British-  
3 American cooperation and gain British acceptance of  
4 their penetration into Southeast Asia through mediation  
5 in the European War made it necessary for the Japanese  
6 leaders to pursue their alternative plan to use force  
7 to accomplish the same end by an attack upon Singapore.  
8 Preparations for the attack proceeded at a rapid pace.  
9 Aerial photography was undertaken in January 1941 to  
10 collect data for the landing operations at Kota Bharu.  
11 Additional mapping of that area was completed by the  
12 Japanese Hydrographic Office in July 1941. The maps  
13 were completed and printed by the Naval General Staff  
14 in early October 1941.

15  
16           The War Ministry, in conjunction with the  
17 Finance Ministry, as early as January 1941 commenced  
18 preparing military currency for use in the areas which  
19 they expected the Japanese troops to occupy in the  
20 advance to the South. Special currencies were printed  
21 and deposited with the Bank of Japan to be drawn by the  
22 Army as it occupied enemy territories. The military  
23 currency thus prepared consisted of dollars which were  
24 suitable for use in Malaya, Borneo and Thailand; guilders  
25 for use in the Netherlands East Indies; and pesos for

1 the Philippines. In January 1941 therefore both the  
2 War Ministry and the Finance Ministry contemplated  
3 Japanese armies occupying those territories for which  
4 this currency was prepared.

5 The Total War Research Institute early in  
6 1941 compiled research reports on such subjects as  
7 "The Estimate of the Domestic and Foreign Situation  
8 from the Total War Viewpoint," "Study of Total War Pertain-  
9 ing to the National Strength of Imperial Japan and the  
10 Foreign Powers," "Draft of the Plan for the Establishment  
11 of Greater East Asia," and "First Phase in the Total War  
12 Plan."

13 OSHIMA returned to Berlin to take up his  
14 duties again as Ambassador to Germany. He informed  
15 Weizsacker of the German Foreign Office on 22 February  
16 1941 that Singapore would have to be seized by an  
17 attack from the sea and from the land; and on 27 Feb-  
18 ruary he told Ribbentrop that preparations for the  
19 attack upon Singapore would be completed by the end of  
20 May; he added that the occupation of Hongkong and the  
21 Philippines had been provided for in case of need. On  
22 23 March 1941 Ribbentrop told Matsuoka that the capture  
23 of Singapore was essential and that the Philippines  
24 could be occupied at the same time. Matsuoka agreed  
25 with Ribbentrop and felt that if Japan did not take the

1 risk of conquering Singapore, she would become a third-  
2 rate power.

#### 3 FURTHER PREPARATION

4 The Japanese Imperial Headquarters continued  
5 its preparations for the attack upon Singapore during  
6 Matsuoka's visit to Germany. The Chiefs of the Army  
7 and Navy General Staffs informed the German Ambassador  
8 late in March 1941 that they were vigorously preparing  
9 for the attack upon Singapore. SHIRATORI discussed with  
10 the German Ambassador the strategy for the attack; it  
11 was his opinion that a frontal attack by the Navy should  
12 not be made but that bases should be established on the  
13 Malay Peninsula from which the Japanese Air Force aided  
14 by German dive bombers might bomb Singapore in prepara-  
15 tion for the attack down the peninsula. Matsuoka, in a  
16 conference with Field Marshal Goering on 29 March 1941,  
17 made arrangements for assistance from the German Air  
18 Force in return for an increase in the amount of rubber  
19 to be supplied to Germany by Japan.

20 Economic measures for war were being accelerated  
21 in Japan. An important question was oil as the United  
22 States was increasing its embargo and the negotiations  
23 with the Netherlands East Indies at Batavia were making  
24 no progress. HOSHINO of the Planning Board estimated  
25 that the Army and Navy had sufficient oil in storage



1 until the oil in the Netherlands East Indies could be  
2 seized. He, however, believed that the margin was  
3 narrow, as Japan's production was only 300,000 tons and  
4 her annual consumption was 2,000,000 tons. This fact  
5 made careful planning necessary for the capture of the  
6 oil resources of the Netherlands East Indies intact.  
7 This need for careful planning caused the Imperial  
8 Headquarters to suggest to Konoye in April 1941 that  
9 HOSHINO be replaced by SUZUKI, a soldier, in whom the  
10 Army and Navy had complete confidence. Konoye discussed  
11 the matter with KIDO, and on the 4th April HOSHINO was  
12 appointed a member of the House of Peers and SUZUKI  
13 was appointed President of the Planning Board and  
14 Minister without Portfolio.

15           The leaders of Japan now decided to strengthen  
16 the close relationship among Japan, French Indo-China  
17 and Thailand to continue economic negotiations with the  
18 Netherlands at Batavia and to maintain normal economic  
19 relations with other countries, but, in case they should  
20 conclude that the Empire's self-existence was threatened  
21 by the embargoes of the United States, Great Britain  
22 and the Netherlands, to resort to arms immediately to  
23 prevent consumption of Japan's reserve of vital war  
24 materials. KIMURA was appointed Vice-Minister of War  
25 on 10th April and nine days later he became Director of

War Supplies. These appointments necessitated his  
1 relief from the Japan-Manchukuo Joint Economic Commission.

2 Military topographical data was being assembled  
3 for military operations in various parts of the world.  
4 Espionage activities in the Netherlands East Indies  
5 were being carried out increasingly. Operations were  
6 being planned against Java, Sumatra, Bali and other  
7 places as well as Singapore. Mandated Islands were  
8 being fortified and plans were being completed for  
9 operations in the South Seas. Data were being assembled  
10 for use in Burma and Malaya. The work of printing  
11 military script for use in the occupation of southern  
12 areas continued.

14 Matsuoka, in conference with Hitler on 4 April  
15 1941, requested Hitler to furnish Japan through the  
16 Technical Military Commission established under the  
17 Tripartite Pact with all available information including  
18 the latest technical improvements and inventions relating  
19 to submarine warfare. He explained that the Japanese  
20 Navy would need this information in case it should  
21 decide to attack Singapore. Matsuoka added that sooner  
22 or later war with the United States would be unavoidable  
23 and Japan desired to be ready to strike decisively at  
24 the right moment. But Matsuoka cautioned Hitler not to  
25 mention in any cables to Japan that an attack upon

Singapore had been agreed upon, lest the secret leak  
1 out. Ambassador OSHIMA took part in Matsuoka's  
2 conferences in Berlin relating to assistance in the  
3 plans for the attack upon Singapore.

4 NEUTRALITY PACT - JAPAN - U.S.S.R.

5 An important question was the time for the  
6 attack upon Singapore. The Germans urged its immediate  
7 commencement, but the Konoye Cabinet's policy from the  
8 beginning, which Matsuoka had helped to form at a  
9 conference on 19 July 1940, had contemplated a Non-  
10 Aggression Pact with the U.S.S.R. to protect the  
11 Japanese rear during the attack upon Singapore and the  
12 Netherlands East Indies. Hitler insisted in his con-  
13 versation with Matsuoka on 27 March 1941, with OSHIMA  
14 and others present, that a better opportunity to begin the  
15 attack than the present would never occur again. Matsuoka  
16 replied that it was only a matter of time before Japan  
17 would attack as the Japanese had the feeling that other-  
18 wise she would lose a chance which might only return  
19 after a thousand years. Matsuoka referred to negotiations  
20 with the U.S.S.R. for a Non-Aggression Pact. The next  
21 day Ribbentrop tried to discourage Matsuoka from con-  
22 cluding the Pact with the U.S.S.R., stating that Japan  
23 should attack Singapore immediately and that if the  
24 U.S.S.R. interfered, Germany would attack the U.S.S.R.  
25

immediately. Ribbentrop repeated that assurance the  
1 following day. Matsuoka maintained his intention to  
2 visit Moscow on his return from Berlin and he concluded  
3 the Pact with the U.S.S.R. on the 13th of April 1941.

4 FRENCH INDO-CHINA

5 Matsuoka returned to Japan to conclude the  
6 formal agreements with France and Thailand which he had  
7 arranged before his departure for Berlin and support for  
8 which he had obtained during that visit.

9  
10 In June 1940, shortly after the fall of France,  
11 she was forced to agree with Japan's demands to permit  
12 a military mission into Indo-China to ensure observance  
13 of the embargo on materials to China. The Military  
14 Mission arrived at Hanoi on the 29th June 1940.

15 The Japanese Cabinet having decided upon its  
16 foreign policy, Foreign Minister Matsuoka moved on  
17 1 August 1940 to put that policy into effect. He called  
18 the French Ambassador and delivered what was virtually  
19 an ultimatum to France regarding French Indo-China. He  
20 also discussed with the German Ambassador an alliance  
21 and the securing of German approval to a Japanese  
22 invasion of French Indo-China.

23  
24 In presenting his views to the French Ambassador,  
25 Matsuoka informed him that although Japan appreciated the  
admission of the military mission into French Indo-China,



1 the Konoye Cabinet desired that France should allow  
2 Japanese troops to be stationed in Northern French  
3 Indo-China and the right to establish air bases there  
4 for action against the National Government of China.  
5 The French Ambassador pointed out that the demand was  
6 equivalent to requesting France to declare war against  
7 China although Japan had not done so. Matsuoka replied  
8 that the request was the result of necessity and that  
9 unless it was granted French neutrality might be  
10 violated. Matsuoka assured the French Ambassador  
11 that if the request was granted Japan would respect  
12 French territorial integrity and would evacuate French  
13 Indo-China as soon as possible.

14 Matsuoka informed the German Ambassador of his  
15 demands upon France and stated that he would be grateful  
16 if the German Government would not object to the action  
17 taken and would use its influence to induce the French  
18 Government to grant the demands. The French Ambassador  
19 asked, on 9 August 1940, for a clarification of the  
20 Japanese demands and a guarantee of French territorial  
21 rights in French Indo-China. Matsuoka again requested  
22 the German Government on 15 August 1940 to support the  
23 Japanese demands by influencing the Vichy France Govern-  
24 ment. On that day he threatened France with military  
25 action if the decisions to grant the demands of Japan

were further delayed. After further negotiation between

1 Matsuoka and Henri on 20 and 25 August, the latter on  
2 25 August informed the Japanese Foreign Office that  
3 France had decided to yield to the Japanese demands.  
4 The so-called Matsuoka-Henri Agreement, consisting of  
5 an exchange of letters, was signed on 30 August 1940.

6 According to the Matsuoka-Henri Agreement, the  
7 occupation of French Indo-China was to be temporary as  
8 it was stated to be solely for action against China and  
9 would be limited to Tonkin Province; and further, that  
10 Japan would respect the rights and interests of France  
11 in the Far East, especially the territorial integrity  
12 of Indo-China and the sovereignty of France in all  
13 parts of the Union of Indo-China.

14 The arrangements for the establishment of air  
15 bases and the passage of Japanese troops into Tonkin  
16 Province were left for negotiation between the head of  
17 the Japanese Military Mission at Hanoi and the Governor-  
18 General of French Indo-China. The Governor-General of  
19 French Indo-China was slow to yield to the demands of  
20 the leader of the Japanese Military Mission, Nishihara.  
21 Nishihara threatened on 4 September 1940 to remove his  
22 mission from Hanoi and order the advance of the Japanese  
23 South China Expeditionary Army across the French Indo-  
24 China border. On 4 September 1940 an agreement was signed  
25

but certain details remained to be settled. On 6  
1 September 1940 a unit of the Japanese Army in China  
2 crossed the border into French Indo-China. This action  
3 was said to have occurred through mistake and negotiations  
4 were continued.

5           The American Ambassador called upon Matsuo  
6 on 19 September 1940 and informed the Foreign Minister  
7 that the United States Government regarded Japan's  
8 demands upon France as a serious infringement of the  
9 status quo in French Indo-China contrary to the Japanese  
10 Cabinet's announcement. The Ambassador's remonstrance  
11 was disregarded, however, as an understanding had been  
12 reached with the German Government and the Tripartite  
13 Pact was expected to be signed in a few days.

14           The Vice-Foreign Minister informed the French  
15 Ambassador on 19 September that unless an agreement was  
16 reached between Nishihara and the Governor-General of  
17 French Indo-China before 23 September, the Japanese  
18 Army would cross the border into Indo-China on that day.  
19 The Japanese Military Mission evacuated French Indo-  
20 China and put to sea on 22d September in preparation for  
21 the expected invasion. The Japanese Army began the  
22 advance into French Indo-China at 2:30 p.m. of the same  
23 day. Faced with an actual invasion, the Governor-General  
24 was forced to accept the Japanese demands and signed an  
25

1 agreement on 24 September 1940 for military occupation of  
2 Tonkin Province, the establishment of air bases and the  
3 grant of military facilities in French Indo-China. The  
4 occupation of Tonkin Province proceeded rapidly and  
5 the air bases were established.  
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MARSHAL OF THE COURT: The International  
1 Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resumed.

2 THE PRESIDENT: I continue the reading of the  
3 Tribunal's judgment.

4 RELATIONS WITH THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

5 Japan's policy and actions having provoked  
6 sanctions and economic restrictions by America, she  
7 decided that her warlike needs, especially of oil, must  
8 be obtained from the Netherlands East Indies.  
9

10 On 12th January 1940 Japan gave notice to the  
11 Netherlands that the Treaty of Judicial Settlement,  
12 Arbitration, and Conciliation of August 1935 would  
13 expire in August 1940. Under this treaty the parties  
14 were bound to settle any dispute between them by peace-  
15 ful means and a permanent committee had been set up to  
16 settle disputes.

17 The Foreign Office made a study of Japan's  
18 economic preparation for war in March 1940. That office  
19 came to the conclusion that the United States, having  
20 insisted upon observance of the Nine-Power Pact from the  
21 very beginning of the China War, might be expected to  
22 extend her embargoes against vital war supplies for  
23 Japan if Japanese aggression continued. Ways and means  
24 were considered to make Japan independent of the United  
25 States for the supply of war materials. Counter-measures

suggested were: to seek sources of supplies in other countries, to consolidate the "intimate relationship" between Japan, Manchukuo, and China, and to bring the countries of South East Asia under Japan's economic control.

The Japanese Minister at The Hague had delivered to the Netherlands Foreign Minister a Note on 2nd February making certain demands. The principal demands made at that time were: that restrictions upon exports from the Netherlands and Netherlands East Indies to Japan and restrictions upon imports from Japan into the Netherlands East Indies should be removed; that laws respecting entry into the Netherlands East Indies should be modified; that facilities for Japanese investments in the Netherlands East Indies should be extended; and that all anti-Japanese publications in the Netherlands East Indies should be censored. A reply to these demands was still under consideration when Germany invaded the Netherlands.

On the 15th April 1940 Foreign Minister Arisaka issued a statement to the press. In this he pointed out that an intimate economic relationship of mutual dependence existed between Japan and the South Seas Region, especially the Netherlands East Indies, and that if the European War were allowed to spread so as

1 to disturb the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies  
2 Japan would be deeply concerned and the peace of East  
3 Asia would be disturbed. The next day, the Japanese  
4 Minister at the Hague called upon the Netherlands  
5 Foreign Minister to explain Japan's concern regarding  
6 the maintenance of the status quo in the Netherlands  
7 East Indies. The Netherlands Minister replied that  
8 his Government had not sought, nor would it seek any  
9 country's protection of the Netherlands East Indies  
10 and that it was determined to refuse any offer of pro-  
11 tection or intervention of any kind which might be made  
12 by any country. The United States Secretary of State,  
13 Mr. Hull, in reply to Arita's press statement, informed  
14 him on 17th April that intervention in the domestic  
15 affairs of the Netherlands East Indies or any alteration  
16 of the status quo anywhere in the entire Pacific Area  
17 by other than peaceful means would be a threat to the  
18 peace.

20 Germany invaded the Netherlands on 9th May  
21 1940; and two days later Arita reaffirmed his statement  
22 of 15th April regarding the status quo in the Netherlands  
23 East Indies. This statement contained the information  
24 that he had called upon the Netherlands Minister in  
25 Tokyo to reaffirm the determination of the Netherlands  
~~Government to accept no intervention in the Netherlands~~

1 East Indies. The announcement stated that the Govern-  
2 ments of the United States, Great Britain, France,  
3 Germany and Italy had been notified of Japan's continued  
4 concern over the maintenance of the status quo in the  
5 Netherlands East Indies.

6 The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Hull,  
7 issued a statement the day following in which he said  
8 that during recent weeks a number of Governments, in-  
9 cluding the United States, Great Britain and Japan,  
10 had made clear in official utterances their attitude  
11 of continued respect for the status quo of the Nether-  
12 lands East Indies, that this was in harmony with definite  
13 commitments formally made in writing in 1922, and that  
14 he assumed those Governments would continue to abide  
15 by their commitments. The British Ambassador called  
16 upon Arita on 13th May and delivered a British state-  
17 ment to the effect that the British Government had  
18 no intention of intervening in the Netherlands East  
19 Indies and believed the Dutch forces there sufficient  
20 to maintain the status quo. The Netherlands Minister  
21 called upon Arita on 15th May and informed Arita that  
22 the Netherlands Government believed that Great Britain,  
23 the United States and France had no intention of inter-  
24 vening in the Netherlands East Indies. The French  
25 Ambassador called upon Arita on 16th May and stated



1 that his Government agreed that the status quo in the  
2 Netherlands East Indies should be maintained.

3         The day after the French Ambassador had called  
4 upon Arita and delivered to him the assurance from  
5 France, which completed the assurances from all the  
6 Allied and Neutral Powers concerned that the status  
7 quo would be maintained in the Netherlands Indies, the  
8 Japanese Ambassador called upon Mr. Hull in Washington.  
9 After the Ambassador had questioned Mr. Hull regarding  
10 the status of certain Netherlands possessions in the  
11 Western Hemisphere, Mr. Hull interrupted him and  
12 pointed to material which had arrived via news services  
13 from Tokyo in which the Yonai Cabinet was reported to  
14 be discussing frequently questions regarding the  
15 Netherlands East Indies and Japan's supposed special  
16 rights in them. He said that the United States, Great  
17 Britain and France had recently renewed their com-  
18 mitments to respect the status quo of the Netherlands  
19 East Indies, but notwithstanding the efforts to main-  
20 tain an understanding with Japan there were constantly  
21 coming from Tokyo statements implying that the commit-  
22 ments had not been made. The Ambassador assured  
23 Mr. Hull that the Yonai Government was completely  
24 satisfied with the situation following the statements  
25 of the Powers and that his Government had no intention

of proceeding against the Netherlands East Indies.

1           The Netherlands Minister assured Arita on  
2 16th May 1940 that the Netherlands East Indies had no  
3 intention of placing any restrictions on the exportation  
4 of oil, tin, rubber and other raw materials vital  
5 to Japan and was desirous of maintaining general  
6 economic relations with Japan. In a Note handed to  
7 the Netherlands Minister in Tokyo on 20th May, Arita  
8 referred to that assurance and informed the Minister  
9 that Japan desired the Governor-General of the Netherlands  
10 East Indies to give definite assurances that the  
11 quantities of articles enumerated in an accompanying list  
12 would be exported to Japan each year regardless of  
13 circumstances which might arise. This demand was  
14 rejected by the Netherlands on 6th June and attention  
15 was called to the fact that economic relations between  
16 the two countries were governed by the so-called Hart-  
17 Ishizawa Agreement of April 1937 and to the further  
18 fact that Japan had recently renewed its commitment to  
19 respect the status quo in the Netherlands East Indies.  
20

21           In Berlin the Japanese Ambassador called at  
22 the German Foreign Office in Berlin on Arita's instructions  
23 and asked for a declaration of the German  
24 position upon the status of the Netherlands East Indies.  
25           Ribbentrop instructed the German Ambassador in Tokyo

1 to assure Arita that Germany had no interest in the  
2 Netherlands East Indies and that she thoroughly under-  
3 stood Japan's anxiety regarding the Netherlands East  
4 Indies. He instructed the Ambassador to mention dur-  
5 ing his interview with Arita that Germany, in contrast  
6 to the policy of the other great Powers, had always  
7 pursued a policy of friendship with Japan and believed  
8 that this policy had been advantageous to Japanese  
9 interests in East Asia. The German Ambassador  
10 delivered this declaration of disinterest to Arita on  
11 22nd May as instructed, for which Arita expressed  
12 gratitude. The next day, the Japanese Press gave  
13 great publicity to the declaration, contrasted the  
14 German attitude with that of the other Powers, and  
15 asserted that the German declaration gave Japan a free  
16 hand to act as she desired with regard to the Nether-  
17 lands East Indies. Subsequent events showed that  
18 this assertion was entirely justified. On 24th June  
19 KOISO told the German Ambassador that Japan had  
20 colonial aspirations in Indo-China and the Netherlands  
21 East Indies. Japan, having received Germany's state-  
22 ment of disinterest in the Netherlands East Indies  
23 on 22nd May 1940, informed the Netherlands Minister  
24 in Tokyo on 16th July 1940 of their intention to send  
25 a delegation into Batavia for economic negotiations.

1 Before the departure of the mission from Japan, the  
2 Yonai Cabinet resigned. The Second Konoye Cabinet  
3 took office on 22nd July. The basic principles of  
4 foreign policy decided by Konoye, War Minister TOJO,  
5 Foreign Minister Matsuo and the Navy Minister on  
6 19th July before they assumed office were formally  
7 adopted at the Liaison Conference of 27th July. The  
8 policy thus adopted among other things called for  
9 strengthening of the diplomatic policy towards the  
10 Netherlands East Indies in order to obtain important  
11 materials. Accordingly, the Konoye Cabinet proceeded  
12 with arrangements to despatch the economic mission to  
13 Batavia.

14 Drafts of alternative demands to be made  
15 upon the Netherlands were in the course of preparation  
16 while the selection of a chairman for the economic  
17 mission was being debated. The Navy was not prepared  
18 for an attack against the Netherlands East Indies.  
19 This is confirmed by a statement made by Prince  
20 Fushimi, Chief of the Naval General Staff, to the  
21 Emperor on 10th August 1940 that the Navy at that time  
22 wished to avoid using force against the Netherlands  
23 and Singapore and that the later war came the better,  
24 since at least eight months were needed to complete  
25 preparations after a decision for war was made. Now  
the help of the Navy was essential in any attack on



1 the Netherlands East Indies, for seaborne expeditions  
2 would be necessary. The drafts of the alternative  
3 demands to be made upon the Netherlands stated that  
4 the Cabinet had decided to express their opinions  
5 frankly upon the problems of entry, enterprise and  
6 investment in the Indies and requested that the Nether-  
7 lands Government agree to the demands of the Japanese  
8 Empire which was devoting itself to the establishment  
9 of the New Order in East Asia and Japan maintained  
10 that it was necessary to establish rapidly the economic  
11 self-sufficiency of the Co-Prosperity Sphere centred  
12 around Japan, Manchukuo and China and extending to the  
13 South Pacific. The first proposal asked, inter alia,  
14 that the Netherlands East Indies as a member of the Co-  
15 Prosperity Sphere give preferential treatment to Japan  
16 and allow Japan to exploit and develop certain natural  
17 resources of the Indies. The second proposal asked  
18 that the Netherlands East Indies cease relations with  
19 Europe and take its place as a member of the Co-  
20 Prosperity Sphere, allow a measure of self-government  
21 by Indonesians, and conclude a joint defence agreement  
22 with Japan to defend the Co-Prosperity Sphere. All  
23 restrictions on the export of goods, especially to  
24 Japan, must be abolished. These were demands which no  
25 independent country would grant save under duress.

1 The mission met with a cool reception when it  
2 arrived in Batavia in September 1940, and Kobayashi,  
3 the head of the Mission, advised Matsuoka on 13th  
4 September 1940 that the Governor-General of the Indies  
5 was not impressed by the serious situation and by  
6 Japan's threatening attitude. He suggested termination  
7 of the negotiations as he considered them to be futile.  
8 Matsuoka, however, had advised Kobayashi's assistant,  
9 Consul-General Scito, on 3rd September 1940, that the  
10 negotiations should not be limited to political problems  
11 and should also be directed toward the acquisition of  
12 oil fields as that was one of the Cabinet's main pur-  
13 poses in despatching the mission to Batavia. Kobayashi  
14 advised Matsuoka on 18th September that he would con-  
15 tinue the negotiations as an aid to the acquisition of  
16 oil fields, but suggested that the negotiations on that  
17 subject, which had until then been in progress in Tokyo,  
18 be transferred to Batavia.

19  
20 The Tripartite Pact was signed, and the occupa-  
21 tion of Tonkin Province together with the acquisition  
22 of military bases in French Indo-China was assured in  
23 late September 1940. According to the plan adopted  
24 in September and October 1940 it was decided to develop  
25 the attack upon Singapore by securing bases in French  
Indo-China and Thailand and to lull the Dutch into a

sense of security by continuing the economic negoti-  
1 ations at Batavia while secretly instigating an in-  
2 dependence movement among the natives and securing  
3 military data for the invasion of the Netherlands East  
4 Indies. It was decided also to launch a sudden attack  
5 upon Singapore, and while that attack was in progress  
6 to call upon the natives of the Netherlands East Indies  
7 to declare their independence of the Netherlands,  
8 secure the oil wells and natural resources of the  
9 Netherlands East Indies and deliver them intact to the  
10 Japanese forces as they advanced from Singapore to  
11 occupy the Netherlands East Indies. The call for the  
12 uprising of the natives of the Indies was to include  
13 a warning that if any of the oil wells or other re-  
14 sources of the Netherlands East Indies were destroyed  
15 the leading Dutch officials would be killed by the  
16 invading Japanese forces. The plan contained provisions  
17 for the organization of a new government in the  
18 Netherlands East Indies in order that Japan might con-  
19 clude a protective treaty with it under the guise of  
20 a military alliance which would provide for the appoint-  
21 ment of Japanese military and economic advisers in  
22 powerful positions in the new government. The new  
23 government was to be organized by a committee of  
24 Japanese and natives, with the Japanese forming a

1 majority, and the Netherlands East Indies were to be  
2 governed by the committee until the new government  
3 could be established.

4 The signing of the Tripartite Pact and the  
5 invasion of French Indo-China raised serious misgivings  
6 among the Netherlands delegation at Batavia who hesi-  
7 tated to continue the negotiations. The Japanese  
8 delegation assured them that the Pact was not directed  
9 towards the Netherlands Government and that Japan  
10 desired to continue the negotiations in order to pro-  
11 mote friendly political and economic relations between  
12 the Netherlands East Indies and Japan. The Netherlands  
13 delegation agreed to continue on the understanding  
14 that Japan had no hostile intentions towards and did  
15 not claim leadership over the Netherlands East Indies  
16 and requested the Japanese delegation to submit a list  
17 of points for discussion. On the day that this assur-  
18 ance was given, Kobayashi sent to Matsuoka a recommenda-  
19 tion that no time should be lost in placing the Nether-  
20 lands East Indies in the Co-Prosperity Sphere and that,  
21 with that in mind, appropriations should include funds  
22 for propoganda and training of personnel in preparation  
23 for that move. The new policy necessitated the replac-  
24 ment of Kobayashi by a man thoroughly familiar with the  
25 policy and plan. Kobayashi announced his recall to  
Tokyo two days after giving the above assurance.



The Japanese Ambassador in Berlin informed the  
1 German Government that Japan was prepared to act as pur-  
2 chasing agent to supply the German Government with vital  
3 war materials from the Far East and the Netherlands East  
4 Indies in return for Germany's support of Japan's advance  
5 to the South and into the South Seas. The German  
6 Government accepted this offer and on 4th October 1940  
7 delivered to the Ambassador bills of exchange as advance  
8 payment for tin, rubber, castor oil and spices to be  
9 obtained in the Netherlands East Indies. A complete  
10 working agreement for conducting the purchases was made.  
11 This agreement made further revision of the policy toward  
12 the Netherlands East Indies necessary. The Cabinet on  
13 25th October 1940 revised its policy to meet its agree-  
14 ment with Germany. It was decided that the obligations  
15 of the Japanese Government to Germany required the Indies  
16 to be in the Greater East Asia Economic Sphere immediately  
17 by establishing close economic relations and by developing  
18 and utilising their rich natural resources for cooperation  
19 with the Axis Powers. Complete details of a plan to  
20 place the policy into effect were agreed upon. Among  
21 others, these were that the Netherlands East Indies should  
22 sever economic relations with Europe and America, that  
23 the production in and export of essential war materials  
24 from the Netherlands East Indies should be placed under  
25

Japanese control, and that the formulation and execution  
1 of all economic problems of the Netherlands East Indies  
2 should be placed under a Japanese-Netherlands Commission.  
3 Had these ends been achieved, Japan would have controlled  
4 the economy of the Indies.

5 OSHIMA, who at this time had no diplomatic post,  
6 wrote an article for the Yomiuri newspaper on 27th  
7 October 1940 in which he called attention to Japan's  
8 obligation to cooperate with the Axis, pointing out that  
9 the Tripartite Pact imposed new obligations. He advised  
10 that the Japanese should realise that fact and establish  
11 a close relationship of mutual harmony and prosperity  
12 among Japan, French Indo-China, India, the Netherlands  
13 East Indies, the South Seas Islands, etc., for coopera-  
14 tion with Germany and Italy. He referred to the American  
15 embargo on vital war supplies, which was then being  
16 increased in an effort to halt further Japanese aggression,  
17 and said that America was not the world's arbiter and  
18 that if she would employ her vast natural resources to  
19 help establish the New Order she would indeed make a  
20 great contribution to world peace.

21  
22  
23 The Netherlands delegation had given the Japanese  
24 an elaborate and detailed statement of the oil situation  
25 on 7th October 1940, in which they set forth the amount  
of the various petroleum products they were prepared to

supply to Japan in view of the over-all situation and  
1 demands by other countries and also detailed the areas  
2 in the Netherlands East Indies which were available to  
3 the Japanese for exploration and exploitation for oil.  
4 The Japanese delegation replied on 21st October 1940  
5 that they were not satisfied with the amount of oil which  
6 the Dutch proposed to supply and expressed general dis-  
7 satisfaction with the proposals. They said that Japan  
8 desired to acquire rights to explore and exploit not only  
9 the oil areas reserved for private enterprise but also  
10 the Government reserve areas as well.

12 Consul-General Saito, in commenting upon the  
13 proposals to Matsuoka on 25th October 1940, explained  
14 that from the viewpoint of an industrialist the proposals  
15 were most reasonable, but that from a strategical view-  
16 point they should be given further consideration. He  
17 pointed out that the plan to prospect for oil must be  
18 used for the exploration of areas as bases for military  
19 operations against the Dutch by sending into those areas  
20 a large number of planes as well as troops disguised as  
21 labourers, and he requested advice as to the areas con-  
22 sidered strategically important by the Military.

24 The Japanese delegation purported to accept  
25 the Dutch proposals on 29th October 1940. They, however,  
stated that they understood the proposals and their

1 acceptance as granting to Japan certain large areas in  
2 Borneo, the Celebes, Dutch New Guinea, the Arca Archi-  
3 pelago and the Schouten Archipelago as Japan's sphere  
4 of exploration and exploitation for oil. They added that  
5 areas in Sumatra were also desired and that Japanese  
6 interests desired to participate in the capital invest-  
7 ment of the Dutch oil companies. The Dutch took the  
8 position that the acceptance, which went far beyond the  
9 Dutch offer, put an end to the negotiations. The Konoye  
10 Cabinet however had completed its plans to place the  
11 policy decisions of September and October 1940 into  
12 effect. Their preparations for employing force against  
13 the Netherlands were not yet complete. They announced  
14 that a special envoy was about to be appointed to instil  
15 new life into the negotiations. This envoy was appointed  
16 on 28th November 1940. He was Yoshizawa, a member of  
17 the House of Peers and formerly the Foreign Minister in  
18 the Inukai Cabinet.

19  
20 Yoshizawa proceeded to Batavia and presented  
21 new proposals on 6th January 1941 which were in keeping  
22 with the policy decisions of October 1940. In the  
23 preamble to those proposals it was stated that a certain  
24 interdependence existed between Japan and the Netherlands  
25 East Indies, that the Indies were abundant in natural  
resources and thinly populated and undeveloped, and



that Japan earnestly desired to participate in the  
1 exploitation of their natural resources and to promote  
2 trade and economic relations with the Netherlands East  
3 Indies. The detailed proposals called for modification  
4 of the entry laws, granting mining and fishing rights to  
5 Japanese, opening an air service between Japan and the  
6 Netherlands East Indies, abolition of restrictions upon  
7 Japanese ships, the lifting of import and export restric-  
8 tions, and the granting of manufacturing and enterprising  
9 rights to Japanese nationals in the Netherlands East  
10 Indies. These proposals if accepted would have placed  
11 the Netherlands East Indies under the economic domination  
12 of Japan. Had they been accepted Japan would have  
13 obtained without war at least a considerable portion of  
14 her aggressive aims in South East Asia.

15  
16 Yoshizawa reported to Matsuoka that he did not  
17 expect a favourable reply to his proposals as the  
18 Netherlands East Indies were depending more and more on  
19 Great Britain and the United States since the removal of  
20 the Dutch Government to London following the German  
21 invasion of the Netherlands. He stated that the defeat  
22 of the Italian Army in the Mediterranean Theater, the  
23 firm attitude of the United States toward Japan, and  
24 the improvement of the Indies defences, had given the  
25 Dutch new confidence, and that determined measures would

1 be necessary to include the Netherlands East Indies in  
2 the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

3 The Netherlands delegation answered Yoshizawa's  
4 proposals on 3rd February 1941 by stating that their  
5 first consideration was to provide for the welfare and  
6 progress of the native population of the Netherlands  
7 East Indies by improving economic relations and increasing  
8 trade with all neutral countries in a spirit of goodwill,  
9 and that the interest of the Netherlands East Indies  
10 demanded that economic relations with foreign countries  
11 be maintained on a basis of strict non-discrimination.  
12 They also pointed out that during the war it was necessary  
13 to restrict trade and other economic activities in order  
14 to ensure that direct or indirect advantages would not  
15 accrue to enemies of the Netherlands. A strong objection  
16 was then made to the claim of interdependence between  
17 Japan and the Netherlands East Indies as being unwarranted  
18 by the facts.

19 The Dutch reply to Yoshizawa's proposals left  
20 the door open for further negotiations, but the Dutch  
21 were aware of a speech delivered by Matsuoka before the  
22 Diet on 21st January 1941 as well as of events in French  
23 Indo-China and Thailand which seemed to indicate prepara-  
24 tion for military action by Japan against the Netherlands  
25 East Indies and consequently were suspicious of the

1 continuation of the negotiations. They warned the  
2 Japanese delegation that a Japanese occupation of Southern  
3 French Indo-China would constitute a military menace  
4 towards the Netherlands East Indies of such seriousness  
5 that it would cancel any agreement reached in the economic  
6 negotiations.

7 Matsuoka had said in his speech on 21st January  
8 1941 that the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-  
9 China, if only for geographical reasons, should be in  
10 intimate and inseparable relationship with Japan. He  
11 declared that the situation which had hitherto thwarted  
12 that relationship should be remedied, and pointed to  
13 the negotiations at Batavia as being directed to that  
14 end. Yoshizawa attributed the rejection of his proposals  
15 to Matsuoka's speech and complained to Matsuoka, warning  
16 him that if he were to be successful in maintaining the  
17 negotiations while the attack was being prepared, it  
18 was necessary for the officials in Tokyo to conduct  
19 themselves in a manner more conducive to that end.

21 The Dutch had been warned; and on 13th February  
22 1941 Yoshizawa informed Matsuoka that the Dutch expected  
23 positive aid from the United States and Great Britain  
24 and preferred to rely upon the United States rather than  
25 upon Japan. He advised that discontinuance of the nego-  
tiations at Batavia was merely a matter of time, and

that Japan's only means of settling the Indies problem was by force. Konoye instructed Yoshizawa on 28th March 1941 that failure of the negotiations would injure Japan's prestige, and that as the European situation was rapidly changing, the Japanese delegation should remain in Batavia to await developments, despite the Dutch attitude. These instructions were followed and the negotiations continued.

The Japanese delegation replied on 14th May 1941 to the Dutch rejection of their proposals by making modified proposals but stated that they desired to make it clear that the views expressed in the preamble to their proposals of 16th January were firmly held by the Japanese Government. The Netherlands delegation, aware of the further developments in the dispute between French Indo-China and Thailand, as well as the signing of the Soviet-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, rejected the modified proposals on 6th June 1941 as being incompatible with the essential principles of Netherlands economic policy. They also required that raw materials exported from the Indies to Japan would not be re-exported to Germany.

The next day Yoshizawa urgently requested authority to withdraw from the negotiations as he feared a Dutch request for the departure of his delegation. Matsuoka, describing the terms of the Dutch reply as



"unwarrantable," authorized discontinuance of the negotiations. Yoshizawa asked for an audience with the Governor-General of the Netherlands East Indies on 17th June 1941. After making one last futile attempt to secure modification of the Dutch attitude, he produced a draft of a joint communique to be issued announcing termination of the negotiations. The communique, designed to save "face" for Japan both at home and abroad, was approved with minor changes by both delegations; it contained this statement: "It is needless to add that the discontinuance of the negotiations will lead to no change in the normal relations between the Netherlands East Indies and Japan."

PREPARATIONS FOLLOWING TRI-PARTITE PACT.

TOJO said, during the discussion of the Tri-Partite Pact before the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council, that the Cabinet had considered the possibility of war with the United States resulting from the conclusion of the Pact and revealed that there had been careful planning to meet that eventuality. The discussion at the Imperial Conference and before the Investigation Committee of the Privy Council in September 1940 revealed that the Navy considered a Japanese-American war inevitable and was completely prepared for it, excepting that no adequate provision had been made for

1 replenishing its war reserves of oil. HOSHINO said that  
2 the Planning Board had been carefully planning for the  
3 war with the United States by accumulating vital war  
4 materials, including oil, and that he considered the  
5 supply sufficient for a short, decisive war. He con-  
6 sidered, moreover, that the supply could be replenished  
7 from the Netherlands East Indies and elsewhere if the  
8 war should be prolonged. The Privy Councillors were  
9 aware that the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact  
10 probably meant war with the United States and in report-  
11 ing upon the Pact recommended that all necessary prepara-  
12 tions be made for it.  
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Extensive preparation for war with the United States, Great Britain and other Powers followed. The puppet Central Government of China was recognized and the Japan-Manchukuo-China economic bloc was strengthened to improve Japan's economic position to meet the American embargo on war supplies after War Minister HATA and other Japanese leaders had publicly proclaimed that Japanese operations would not be stopped by what they termed the obsolete Nine-Power Treaty. The Planning Board under HOSHINO renewed its efforts to accumulate vital materials. As already related Konoye's Imperial Rule Assistance Association was organized with the help of HOSHINO, KIDO and HASHIMOTO to steel the people against the privations of the war with the United States and Great Britain which the Japanese leaders claimed to be inevitable. Propaganda in the form of writings and lectures was disseminated to popularize the waging of wars of aggression for acquisition of territory and natural resources. HASHIMOTO, SHIRATORI and OSHIMA were heavy contributors to this propaganda campaign. A military planning board in the form of the Total War Research Institute was organized and placed in operation with HOSHINO as its first President and with SUZUKI as one of its Councillors. OSHIMA was sent to Germany to promote

1 cooperation between the Axis members in the adventure  
2 upon which they had embarked.

3 RELATIONS WITH U.S.A. AND GREAT

4 BRITAIN

5 In October 1940 Konoye issued a statement to  
6 the Press in which he said that his Government was  
7 maneuvering diplomatically to induce the United States,  
8 Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. to recognize the Co-  
9 Prosperity Sphere envisaged by the Japanese leaders, a  
10 euphemism for Japan's domination of East Asia. He  
11 implied that if the United States refused to understand  
12 the real intentions of Japan she as well as Britain  
13 would be forced into war. The United States Government  
14 because of that statement extended its embargo to iron  
15 and steel scrap and increased its preparedness for  
16 defence. The Japanese Embassy in Washington complained  
17 that the Japanese Government found it difficult to con-  
18 cede that the extension of the embargo was caused  
19 solely by concern for the defence of the United States.  
20 The United States Government replied that despite the  
21 Nine-Power Treaty and other Japanese obligations,  
22 American trade had been practically eliminated from  
23 Manchuria and North China, and that it now appeared  
24 that Japan was intent upon forcing American enter-  
25 prises from Shanghai also.



1 The United States Government was concerned  
2 about Japan's advance to the south and the conclusion  
3 of the Tripartite Pact which had been followed by  
4 Konoye's warning. The President of the United States  
5 in an address to Congress declared that at no previous  
6 time had American security been so seriously threat-  
7 ened. On 15th January 1941 the Secretary of State  
8 told the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the House of  
9 Representatives that it was clear that Japan was ani-  
10 mated from the start by broad and ambitious plans for  
11 establishing herself in a dominant position in the  
12 entire region of the Western Pacific, and that her  
13 leaders had openly declared their determination to  
14 achieve and maintain that position by force of arms  
15 so as to make themselves masters of an area contain-  
16 ing almost one half of the entire population of the  
17 world. It was apparent to the Government of the  
18 United States that the Japanese military leaders were  
19 about to undertake the conquest of the entire Pacific  
20 Area at least to the westward of Hawaii and extending  
21 to the South Seas and to India.

23 The United States Pacific Fleet, based at  
24 Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, represented one of the greatest  
25 obstacles to the execution of the Konoye Cabinet's  
policy for military moves to the South. It was feared

1 by many of the Japanese leaders that this fleet might  
2 be used to reinforce Singapore, and they advocated an  
3 immediate attack upon Singapore to prevent this. The  
4 Japanese Navy, however, was demanding that more oil  
5 and other vital supplies be accumulated and that ade-  
6 quate preparations be made for replenishing those sup-  
7 plies before launching the attack upon Singapore. The  
8 Navy estimated in August 1940 that at least eight months  
9 would be required for this preparation. The Navy main-  
10 tained its demands before the Imperial Conference and  
11 the Privy Council during the discussions which preceded  
12 the signing of the Tripartite Pact.

13           The general plan adopted by the Konoye Cabinet  
14 took the Navy's demands into consideration by providing  
15 for an attempt to eliminate the threat of the United  
16 States Pacific Fleet through negotiations for a non-  
17 aggression pact with the United States Government.  
18 The suggestion was that as part of such a Treaty Japan  
19 should guarantee the security of the Philippines and  
20 Guam and the United States of America should recognize  
21 the Co-Prosperity Sphere. Preparation for an attack  
22 upon the United States forces was to proceed during the  
23 negotiations, so that in case the negotiations should  
24 fail, a surprise attack might be launched.

25           A Plan to destroy the United States Pacific

Fleet while it lay at anchor in Pearl Harbor by a surprise attack to be launched while the United States was at peace with Japan was conceived and submitted to the Commander of the Combined Fleets for study. He approved the plan and transmitted it to the Imperial General Headquarters as early as January 1941. The plan called for the organization of a task force to deliver an aerial attack upon the United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. To avoid detection and make the surprise complete, this force was to use a northern route little used by commercial shipping. In conjunction with the aerial attack, it was planned to use submarines to destroy any ships that might attempt to escape the air attack. There were many details to be worked out, such as the development and manufacture of shallow water torpedoes and midget submarines, as well as the perfection of a method of refueling at sea to allow the employment of the longer but more secure northern route of approach. The Japanese leaders considered that if the attack upon Pearl Harbor should be successful and result in the destruction of the United States Fleet, they would be able to seize all the important points in the Pacific and Indian Oceans before the United States would be able to prepare and launch a counter-attack. It was hoped

1 then that the United States would weary of a prolonged  
2 and costly war and negotiate a peace which would recog-  
3 nize Japan's supremacy in the territories it would  
4 have seized.

5 Foreign Minister Matsuoka took the first step  
6 toward the execution of the Cabinet's plan in January  
7 1941 by appointing Nomura as Ambassador to the United  
8 States to undertake the negotiations. Matsuoka deliv-  
9 ered to Nomura his instructions on 22d January, imme-  
10 diately before Nomura's departure from Japan. These  
11 were that Nomura should make the President of the  
12 United States and his subordinate officials understand  
13 that Japan had been forced to sign the Tripartite Pact  
14 because of American and British interference with the  
15 organization of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, that the  
16 Pact was merely defensive, but that it provided for  
17 immediate military assistance from the other two  
18 Powers in case the United States attacked any one of the  
19 Signatory Powers, and that Japan would be faithful to  
20 the Alliance. He further instructed Nomura to advise  
21 the United States Government that it would be well for  
22 the United States to cease interference with Japan's  
23 aims in East Asia and to cooperate with Japan in the  
24 establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in return for  
25 an opportunity to participate in the benefits which



might accrue from the establishment of that sphere.

1           A propaganda campaign was immediately com-  
2 menced, which was designed to convince the United  
3 States Government of the gravity of the situation and  
4 of the need for prompt negotiation of an understanding.  
5 The Cabinet decided to secure bases on Camrenh Bay  
6 and around Saigon for an attack to the South and  
7 called upon the German Government to prevent the rein-  
8 forcement of French troops in French Indo-China. The  
9 plan was approved at the Liaison Conference on 30th  
10 January 1941. The United States Government learned  
11 of the plan from its observer at Vichy, France, who  
12 reported on 28th January 1941 that the German Govern-  
13 ment had forbidden the Vichy Government to send rein-  
14 forcements. In consequence of this America, on 3d  
15 February 1941, added many non-ferrous metals and potash  
16 to its embargo list. It was at this time that Mr. Eden  
17 saw SHIGEMITSU and asked for an explanation of the  
18 report from the British Ambassador in Tokyo to the  
19 effect that a crisis was expected in the Far East  
20 within a week or two.  
21

22           The extension of the embargo by the United  
23 States Government caused Matsuoka some embarrassment  
24 in the Diet. He sent Nomura further instructions. He  
25 urged Nomura immediately upon his arrival in Washington

to make it clear that Japan had never intended to attack  
1 the United States, but that the Japanese Government  
2 could not understand why the United States was preparing  
3 for war against Japan, and that, if the United States  
4 continued to prepare, the result would endanger peace  
5 in the Pacific, as Japan had not been so much exhausted  
6 by the China war as some seemed to think, and that con-  
7 tinued warlike preparation by the United States was not  
8 advisable. He again instructed Nomura to emphasize the  
9 necessity for cooperation between the two Governments  
10 in the establishment of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in  
11 order to avert a crisis in the Pacific Area.

13           The United States Lend-Lease Act became effec-  
14 tive and gave new encouragement to the Powers resisting  
15 the Axis to the extent that the Netherlands delegation  
16 increased its resistance to the demands of the Japanese  
17 economic mission at Batavia. Mr. Eden was awaiting a  
18 reply from SHIGEMITSU to his inquiry regarding the re-  
19 port of an impending crisis in the Far East, and the  
20 American Ambassador in Tokyo was demanding cessation  
21 of Japanese interference with American trade in French  
22 Indo-China. Matsuo instructed SHIGEMITSU to inform  
23 Mr. Eden that the British Ambassador's report of an  
24 impending crisis was a ridiculous fantasy, although  
25 only three days before he had informed the German

Ambassador that he planned to visit Berlin to learn  
1 the attitude of the German Government toward the  
2 activities of the United States Government, for, as  
3 he explained, Japan planned to attack Singapore to  
4 deprive the United States of bases in the Pacific in  
5 case she should enter the European War. This was the  
6 situation when Nomura arrived in Washington.

7 The President of the United States received  
8 Nomura on 14th February 1941. He said that relations  
9 between the United States and Japan were deteriorating  
10 as a result of Japan's advance to the South and the  
11 conclusion of the Tripartite Pact. He suggested that  
12 the new Ambassador might like to re-examine and frankly  
13 discuss with the United States Secretary of State the  
14 important phases of American-Japanese relations.  
15 Nomura made a cautious reply to the President and in  
16 reporting to Matsuoka asked for further clarification  
17 of Japan's obligation to attack the United States in  
18 the event of that Power's entry into the European War.  
19 Matsuoka replied to Nomura on 4th March that he had  
20 made his position clear on that point on a number of  
21 occasions, that Japan would participate in the war in  
22 case the United States declared war on Germany.  
23  
24

25 The preparations for the attack upon Singapore  
were rapidly progressing. OSHIMA informed Ribbentrop

1 in Berlin on 22d February 1941 that the preparations  
2 would be complete by the end of May, and that for  
3 safety's sake preparations were also being made for  
4 war upon the United States as well as upon Great Britain.  
5 He said that the occupation of the Philippines had been  
6 included in the preparations. Notwithstanding these  
7 preparations, Matsuo assured Mr. Eden in his message  
8 of 17th February of the Japanese Government's peaceful  
9 intentions, and suggested that Japan act as mediator  
10 of the European War. The British Government rejected  
11 the offer on 24th February 1941 and said that, al-  
12 though it had been an unwilling participant in the  
13 European War, with the assistance it was receiving  
14 from the United States it would be able to maintain  
15 itself against all enemies, and that it was determined  
16 to continue the war until Nazism was completely erad-  
17 icated from Europe.

18 United States Secretary of State Hull and  
19 Ambassador Nomura held a conversation on 8th March  
20 1941. Nomura said it was unthinkable that Japan and  
21 the United States should fight because of the destruc-  
22 tive effects that would inevitably result. Mr. Hull  
23 agreed with him, but inquired whether the Japanese  
24 Military, who were in control of the Japanese Govern-  
25 ment, could expect the United States to sit quiet



1 while two or three nations organized naval and mili-  
2 tary forces and went out to conquer the rest of the  
3 world. Nomura denied that these were the intentions  
4 of his Government and said he did not believe there  
5 would be any more military movements unless the United  
6 States embargo should force his Government to make them.  
7 Mr. Hull then mentioned the Tripartite Pact and the  
8 public declarations of Hitler, Matsuoka and other im-  
9 portant German and Japanese leaders to the effect that  
10 their countries under the Pact were determined to es-  
11 tablish a New Order in the World by use of force.  
12 Nomura again denied that it was the intention of his  
13 Government to use military force for conquest. Mr.  
14 Hull replied that so long as Japanese forces were all  
15 over China and as far south as Thailand and Indo-China,  
16 and so long as this was accompanied by threatening  
17 declarations by Japanese statesmen, there could only  
18 be increasing concern by nations who were vitally  
19 interested in halting world conquest by force.

20  
21 The President of the United States talked  
22 with Nomura again on 14th March 1941, only three days  
23 after Matsuoka, with the assistance of the German  
24 Government, had forced the Vichy French Government to  
25 accept Japanese terms of settlement of the border dis-  
pute between France and Thailand. The President

complained to Nomura that the American people were  
1 aroused over what appeared to be a concerted effort  
2 under the Tripartite Pact to effect a junction of the  
3 German and Italian forces approaching the Suez Canal  
4 and the Japanese forces approaching Singapore. Nomura  
5 assured the President that Japan did not intend to ad-  
6 vance further to the south. The President then sug-  
7 gested that an armed clash between Japan and the  
8 United States could be avoided if the Japanese Govern-  
9 ment would remove the cause of the American people's  
10 suspicion of their intentions.  
11

12 Matsuoka went to Berlin for consultation with  
13 Hitler upon the question of concerted action under  
14 the Tripartite Pact after receiving the French accept-  
15 ance of his terms for settlement of the France-Thailand  
16 dispute. He passed in Moscow, and the American Ambes-  
17 sador in the U.S.S.R. was invited to talk with him on  
18 24th March 1941. Matsuoka was emphatic in his assur-  
19 ence to the American Ambassador that under no circum-  
20 stances would Japan attack Singapore or any American,  
21 British or Dutch possession and he insisted that  
22 Japan had no territorial ambitions. He said that  
23 Japan was ready to join the United States in a guar-  
24 antee of the territorial integrity and political inde-  
25 pendence of the Philippines. He declared that Japan

1 would not go to war with the United States. However,  
2 upon Matsuoka's arrival in Berlin, he explained to  
3 Hitler that his denials of his Government's intentions  
4 to attack were intended to deceive the British and  
5 Americans until the day when Japan would suddenly at-  
6 tack Singapore.

7 UNITED STATES CONDITIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS

8 Colonel Iwakuro, of Nomura's staff, working  
9 in cooperation with certain private citizens of the  
10 United States and Japan, composed a draft of pro-  
11 posals which it was thought might serve as the basis  
12 for an agreement between Japan and the United States.  
13 This draft was presented to the State Department for  
14 delivery to Mr. Hull. Mr. Hull saw Nomura on 16th  
15 April 1941, informed him that the draft had been re-  
16 ceived but that the United States Government could only  
17 consider proposals presented formally by the Ambassador.  
18 Nomura said he was prepared to present the draft for-  
19 mally as a basis for negotiations. Mr. Hull explained  
20 to Nomura that before the United States Government  
21 would commence negotiations it was necessary for the  
22 Japanese Government to convince the American Govern-  
23 ment of its sincerity by abandoning its doctrine of  
24 conquest by force and its use of force as an instrument  
25 of national policy and to adopt the principles which

1 the United States had proclaimed and was practicing  
2 and which it considered as embodying the foundation  
3 on which all relations between nations should properly  
4 rest. Mr. Hull then stated these principles as being:  
5 (1) Respect for the territorial integrity and the  
6 sovereignty of each and all nations; (2) Non-interfer-  
7 ence in the internal affairs of other countries; (3)  
8 Equality of commercial opportunity; and (4) Non-  
9 disturbance of the status quo of the Pacific, except  
10 by peaceful means. Mr. Hull emphasized that his talk  
11 must not be considered as the commencement of negotia-  
12 tions and that his statement of principles must be  
13 accepted before negotiations could begin. Nomura  
14 replied that he was convinced that his Government had  
15 no intention of advancing further to the South but  
16 that he would submit the principles enunciated by  
17 Mr. Hull to his Government and ask for instructions.  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



1 Nomura's request for instructions was received  
2 in the Japanese Foreign Office on 18 April 1941 and  
3 Konoye consulted with KIDO and the Emperor upon the  
4 answer to be given. The principle of equality of  
5 commercial opportunity appealed to the Zaibatsu which  
6 urged the Cabinet to commence negotiations upon the basis  
7 of the proposed draft. KIDO and Konoye agreed that  
8 negotiations might be commenced with the United States  
9 Government, but that the Cabinet should be careful to  
10 keep faith with the German and Italian Governments and  
11 should not abandon its plan to establish the Co-Prosperity  
12 Sphere, that being Japan's fixed national policy.

13 Matsuoka on his return to Tokyo again paused in  
14 Moscow, where negotiations resulted in his signing of the  
15 Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on 13 April 1941. He  
16 explained to the German Ambassador to Japan, who was  
17 accompanying him, that the Pact would substantially  
18 facilitate the Japanese advance to the South.

19 Konoye after discussing with KIDO and the  
20 Emperor the reply to be given to Nomura's request for  
21 instructions, cabled Matsuoka to return to Tokyo promptly  
22 in order to consider the matter. Matsuoka arrived in  
23 Tokyo on 22 April 1941 and sent Nomura a draft proposal  
24 to submit to the United States Government.  
25

The campaign of infringement of the interests  
1 of the United States continued during the deliberation  
2 upon the answer to be given to Nomura. Japanese inter-  
3 ference with the movements of American nationals and  
4 American merchandise in China became more pronounced.  
5 The American Consulate at Kunming in China was bombed  
6 for the third time and heavy damage caused. The Japanese  
7 Navy occupied Eniwetok Atoll and began setting up naval  
8 installations there. On 5 May 1941 the United States  
9 Government answered these acts by adding additional items,  
10 including scrap rubber, to its embargo list.

12 Ribbentrop learned of the conditions laid down  
13 by the United States for the commencement of the negoti-  
14 ations between Japan and the United States, and of the  
15 Japanese Cabinet's decision to open negotiations. He  
16 immediately stated to Ambassador OCHIMA that he could not  
17 understand Japan submitting to such conditions. OCHIMA  
18 assured Ribbentrop that his Government had no intention  
19 of entering into any treaty with the United States  
20 embodying the principles laid down by Mr. Hull. Ribben-  
21 trop accused the Japanese Cabinet of having abandoned its  
22 plan for attacking Singapore and of having broken faith  
23 with the German Government. He demanded that the  
24 Japanese Government either refuse to agree to the Hull  
25 principles or agree only on condition that the American

Government give its assurance that it would remain  
1 neutral. OSHIMA agreed with Ribbentrop, transmitted his  
2 views to Matsuoka, and stated that he considered Ribben-  
3 trop's suspicions and accusation well-founded. He  
4 recommended that the Cabinet adopt Ribbentrop's suggest-  
5 ion.

6  
7 On 8 May 1941 Nomura reported to Matsuoka and  
8 pointed out that the United States would not recognize  
9 the New Order in East Asia nor the retention of territory  
10 acquired through aggression and was insistent on the  
11 observance of the four principles enunciated by Mr. Hull.

12 Nomura delivered the first official Japanese  
13 proposal to Mr. Hull on 12 May 1941. That draft was  
14 couched in obscure and platitudinous terms, which really  
15 provided for a secret understanding between the two  
16 Governments, in substance as follows: The United States  
17 Government would agree (1) to recognize the establish-  
18 ment by Japan of the New Order in China in accordance  
19 with Konoye's three principles as embodied in the Japan-  
20 Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration of 30 November 1940  
21 and to advise Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate  
22 peace with Japan forthwith; (2) to enter into a secret  
23 agreement to withdraw aid to the National Government of  
24 China if the Generalissimo did not enter into negotiations  
25 for peace; (3) to recognize the right of Japan to estab-

1 lish the Co-Prosperity Sphere embracing China and the  
2 Southern Area upon the understanding that Japan's  
3 expansion in that area was to be of a peaceful nature  
4 and to cooperate in producing and procuring from this  
5 sphere the natural resources which Japan needs; (4) to  
6 amend its immigration laws so as to admit Japanese  
7 nationals on the basis of equality and non-discrimination;  
8 (5) to restore normal economic relations between the two  
9 countries; (6) to take note of Japan's obligation under  
10 Article 3 of the Tripartite Pact to attack the United  
11 States if in the opinion of the Japanese Government the  
12 assistance rendered to the Allied Powers resisting  
13 Germany and Italy amounted to an attack upon the Axis;  
14 and (7) to refrain from rendering assistance to the  
15 Allied Powers.

16  
17 The Japanese Government in return would agree to  
18 (1) resume normal trade relations with the United States;  
19 (2) assure the United States a supply of the commodities  
20 available in the Co-Prosperity Sphere; and (3) join  
21 the United States Government in a guarantee of the  
22 independence of the Philippines on condition that the  
23 Philippines would maintain a status of permanent neutrality.

24 The day after this draft proposal was delivered  
25 to Mr. Hull, the Japanese delegation at Batavia delivered  
~~its amended demands to the Dutch delegation which reiterated~~



1 ated the Japanese Government's previous declaration of  
2 interdependence between the Netherlands East Indies and  
3 Japan. In Tokyo Matsuoka informed the American Ambassador  
4 that both he and Konoye were determined that Japan's  
5 advance to the South would be made by peaceful means,  
6 "unless", he added significantly, "circumstances  
7 rendered that impossible." The American Ambassador  
8 inquired what circumstances Matsuoka had in mind.  
9 Matsuoka replied that he referred to the concentration  
10 of British troops in Malaya, which he described as  
11 provocative.

12 Ribbentrop learned of the draft proposal present-  
13 ed by Nomura to the United States of America and immedi-  
14 ately took OSHIMA to task, expressing resentment of  
15 Matsuoka's decision to commence negotiations with the  
16 United States without consulting the German and Italian  
17 Governments. He demanded that the attack upon Singapore  
18 be commenced without further delay. OSHIMA, reporting to  
19 Matsuoka, said: "I express my apprehension that should  
20 Japan lose this opportunity to expand southward and the  
21 possibility of attacking Singapore, she will invite the  
22 contempt not only of the United States and Great Britain,  
23 but also of Germany and Italy." He informed Matsuoka of  
24 the resentment of the German leaders against the negotia-  
25 tions with the United States and stated that, since the

1 Japanese-American negotiations were considered to involve  
2 a change in Japanese foreign policy which violated the  
3 plans of the military, he had taken the liberty of  
4 informing the Japanese Army and Navy officials. This  
5 was the beginning of the friction between Konoye and  
6 Matsuoka.

7  
8 UNITED STATES AGREES TO NEGOTIATE

9 - May 1941

10 The United States Government accepted the  
11 Japanese draft proposal of the 12 May 1941 as a starting  
12 point for the negotiations and undertook to explore the  
13 possibility of an understanding with the Japanese Govern-  
14 ment. On 28 May 1941 Mr. Hull and Nomura met. In the  
15 course of the conversation it became clear that there  
16 were two great obstacles to any successful prosecution  
17 of the negotiations: (1) the obscurity in which Japan's  
18 commitments under the Tripartite Pact were at present  
19 left, and (2) the provisions for settlement of the China  
20 question. As to the first matter, Mr. Hull desired that  
21 Japan qualify its attitude towards the possible event of  
22 the United States being drawn into the European War as a  
23 measure of self-defense. As to the second matter, Mr. Hull  
24 pointed out that the Japanese insistence on retaining \*

troops in China after the conclusion of any peace treaty  
1 with China would be a factor operating against friendship  
2 between the United States and Japan. Nomura was not able  
3 to state how many troops Japan proposed to retain in  
4 China nor the areas where they would be quartered.  
5  
6 On 31 May Mr. Hull told Nomura that at some  
7 proper time before definitive discussions he would  
8 discuss the draft proposal in strict confidence with  
9 the Chungking Government. Moreover, on 31 May a  
10 further United States draft was handed to Nomura in  
11 which it was proposed, inter alia, that Japan should  
12 state that the provisions of the Tripartite Pact did not  
13 apply to nations which became involved in the European  
14 War by reasons of protection, self-defense and national  
15 security. It was further proposed that Japan should  
16 submit to the United States of America the framework of  
17 the terms which she would submit to China. Annexed to  
18 this draft was a full statement of the attitude of the  
19 United States towards the activities of Germany and a  
20 declaration that the United States was resolved to take  
21 measures of self-defense in resistance to a movement which,  
22 in the view of the United States of America, was clearly  
23 directed to world conquest by force.  
24

25 On 4 June the Japanese Embassy suggested certain  
amendments to the American proposals. Among them was the

suggestion that the United States should drop from its  
1 draft the provision that the obligations of Japan under  
2 the Tripartite Pact did not apply to the case where a  
3 nation became involved in the European War as a measure  
4 of self-defense. Mr. Hull considered these Japanese  
5 amendments and on 6 June he told Nomura that they had  
6 carried the negotiations away from the fundamental  
7 points which the United States of America believed to  
8 be involved. In his view they revealed a stressing of  
9 Japan's alignment with the Axis, no clear indication of  
10 intention to place Japan's relations with China on a  
11 basis which would contribute to peace in the Far East,  
12 and a veering away from clearcut commitments on policies  
13 of peace and non-discriminatory treatment. Nevertheless,  
14 Nomura on 15 June 1941 submitted to Mr. Hull a new draft  
15 embodying the very suggestions to which Mr. Hull had  
16 already taken objection. Chungking was bombed by more  
17 than 100 Japanese planes on 10 June and American property  
18 was destroyed. Public statements by spokesmen of the  
19 Japanese Government emphasized Japan's commitment and  
20 intentions under the Tripartite Pact in a sense hostile  
21 to the interests of the United States of America. The  
22 negotiations at Batavia were obviously breaking down.  
23 The United States Government issued an order on 20 June  
24 banning all shipments of oil except those to Great Britain  
25



and South America.

1           The Japanese had been pressing for an answer to  
2 their proposals of 12 May. Mr. Hull talked to Nomura on  
3 21 June. He referred to the accumulating evidence from  
4 all over the world, including the public statements of  
5 Japanese leaders, indicating that the Japanese Military  
6 would endorse no understanding with the United States  
7 except one that envisaged Japan fighting on the side of  
8 Hitler should the United States become involved in the  
9 European War through its programme of aid to the  
10 democracies. He then stated that the proposal of 12 May  
11 1941 violated the principles which the American Govern-  
12 ment was committed to uphold, particularly in respect to  
13 the provisions of the proposal relating to China. Mr. Hull  
14 then informed Nomura that he had come to the conclusion  
15 that before proceeding with the negotiations the United  
16 States Government must await some clearer indication  
17 than had yet been given that the Japanese Government  
18 desired to pursue a course of peace. He expressed the  
19 hope that the Japanese Government would manifest such  
20 an attitude.  
21

22           We will adjourn until half past nine tomorrow  
23 morning.  
24

25           (Whereupon, at 1600, an adjournment was  
taken until Thursday, 11 November 1947, at 0930.)

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